Horizon problems in Congress? The effects of self-policing on political opportunism
Abstract
The consensus in political science and economics is that horizon problems exist in Congress because retiring members are no longer subject to electoral constraints. Much support has been amassed for this proposition; for instance, in roll-call voting patterns and abstention rates. In this dissertation, I challenge this widely accepted idea. The central theme of this thesis is that self-policing constrains last-period shirking. Neither retiring politicians nor those going on to post-elective careers are able to maximize utility through opportunism, since it is treated with enmity by district residents and punished by prospective employers. In making this argument, I am questioning the severity (if not the existence) of last-period problems in legislatures. I test the argument on six legislative areas where shirking has been identified — Congressional abstention rates, roll-call and party voting patterns, foreign travel, legislative productivity (e.g., bill sponsorship and floor speaking), and check kiting at the House Bank — and find strong evidence of self-policing. This study leads to novel conclusions about legislators' last-period behaviors, sheds new light on numerous highly regarded studies, and provides a solution to enduring issues of opportunism in Congress
Degree
Ph.D.
Advisors
Parker, Purdue University.
Subject Area
Political science
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