Toward a philosophy of difference: From Derrida to Deleuze

Vernon W Cisney, Purdue University

Abstract

Currently in continental philosophy there is an unrecognized fracture between the lineage of Derrida and the lineage of Deleuze. Most philosophers, including Derrida himself, have understood this divergence in terms of stylistic, rather than philosophical, differences. Against this trend, this dissertation analyzes the fracture in terms of the philosophical problem of difference, an attempt to think difference as constitutive of identity, rather than as a supplemental relation between two identities. This problem, though common to their philosophies, is worked out differently by each of them, specifically with respect to their understandings of the role of negation. I first argue (Chapter 1), against Todd May, for the importance of the philosophy of difference. May (1997) argues that the problem of difference is a newly contrived, specifically continental problem that results only in inarticulability, and that the goals of philosophers of difference, though worthwhile, can be met without a concept of difference. In response, I argue three points: (1) The problem appears throughout the history of philosophy, and dates back to Plato's attempt to formulate a "form of the different" in the Sophist and Aristotle's subsequent decision in the Metaphysics to distinguish "difference" and "otherness"; (2) May's claims as to the goals of the philosophy of difference, specifically the rejection of foundationalism, are misguided. For both Derrida and Deleuze, difference is foundational, but they conceptualize the foundation on an unstable, differential basis, rather than on identity; (3) At stake in the problem of difference are the question of identity and the nature of philosophy itself, perennial philosophical concerns. Philosophy is and always has been, I argue, rooted in ontology. Conceived in terms of universals or representational concepts, ontology cannot adequately account for the individual, because the individual is always irreducibly different from its concepts, regardless of how exhaustively enumerated our concepts are. This insufficiency derives from the effort to formulate identity on the basis of self-identical, abstract universals. Thus, in place of identity, what is required is an ontology on the basis of difference. I then argue (Chapter 2) that the location of their divergence is rooted in their readings of Hegel. In Hegelian dialectic, difference is implicitly contradiction and when contradiction is attained, it is necessarily overcome, the contradictory terms superseded, collapsing into what Hegel calls "the ground." Derrida and Deleuze both reject Hegel's notion of difference, but while Deleuze holds that difference should not be contradiction, Derrida rejects it on the basis that contradiction should not be resolved. Deleuze wants difference without negation (because negation relies upon identity), while for Derrida, negation is an unsurpassable aspect of difference. Chapter 3 draws out the implications of this conclusion. Both Derrida and Deleuze cite Nietzsche as the philosopher who thinks difference beyond Hegel, but just as their Hegel readings diverged, so too do their readings of Nietzsche. For Derrida, the Nietzschean contribution is a concept of signs, relating to other signs, devoid of any presupposition to truth. Différance, for Derrida, produces what he calls traces, the identity of which are constituted solely by the negation of the other traces in the system. Deleuze, on the contrary, understands Nietzsche as offering an ontology of force, forming the basis of an ethics. Difference, for Deleuze, is a pre-individual field of pure relation, wherein very small elements (singularities), indifferent to each other, relate to form identities. The indifference of the singularities to each other entails a non-negational relation. The final point of Chapter 3, that Derrida is focused on signs, while Deleuze is focused on being, opens the question of the meaning of philosophy, which is the topic of Chapter 4. Deleuze will unabashedly claim that philosophy is ontology, and that the task of philosophy is to think what is. Following Heidegger, Derrida will try to think an overcoming of the metaphysical tradition, beyond all ontology. In chapter 4, I argue in favor of Deleuze's claim that philosophy is differential ontology, and that Derrida, despite all his protestations to the contrary, is himself an ontological thinker. I conclude, on the basis of the preceding chapters, that Derrida is offering a "negative ontology," an account of being rooted in negation, while Deleuze is offering a positive ontology, but one formulated on a foundation of difference rather than on substance.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Smith, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Philosophy

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