Fully informed reasonable disagreement and Tradition Based Perspectivalism

Erik Daniel Baldwin, Purdue University

Abstract

It seems that the following statements are pairwise consistent (any two are consistent) but form an inconsistent triad (at least one must be false): (1) Regarding their respective inquires into p and q, A and B assess the evidential value of the same (or sufficiently similar) facts and experiences. (2) A believes that p is true and q false, B believes that q is true and p false, and both A and B correctly believe that p and q are inconsistent. (3) A and B's beliefs about the truth-values of p and q are equally reasonable. Here's why. Suppose that (1) and (2) are true. If A and B assess the evidential value of the same (or sufficiently similar) facts and experiences they could disagree about the truth-values of p and q but not be equally reasonable in doing so, as (3) says. And if (2) and (3) are true, then A and B could be equally reasonable and disagree about the truth-values of p and q but only if, contrary to what (1) says, they do not assess (because, for instance, they do not have) the same (or sufficiently similar) facts and experiences. Lastly, if (1) and (3) are true, then A and B would agree about the truth-values of p and not q, not disagree, as (2) says. Against appearances, I argue that (1)-(3) are consistent and that fully informed, reasonable disagreement of this sort is possible and that it is plausible to think that such disagreements may actually occur. In Chapter One I introduce my account of reasonableness. I also define and explicate important terms and concepts. In Chapter Two I discuss Alvin Plantinga's religious epistemology, including his proper function account of warrant and his Standard and Extended Aquinas/Calvin models. I argue that Plantinga's religious epistemology may be boiled down to five core theses, three associated with the Standard model and two associated with the Extended model. Associated with the Standard model are, (I) The Dependency Thesis, that humans are ontologically and epistemologically dependent on and created by God, (II) The Design Thesis, that humans are created in accord with a design plan one aim of which is the production of true belief, and (III) The Immediacy Thesis, that God endows humans with special cognitive faculties or belief forming processes through which Theistic Belief can be known in an epistemically immediate and basic manner. Associated with the Extended model are (IV) The Internal Inspiration of the Holy Spirit Thesis, that there is a special belief forming process the purpose of which is to produce specifically Christian beliefs about the nature of God, salvation, forgiveness of sins, eternal life, and the like, and (V) The Scriptural Revelation Thesis, that by means of scripture, which is identified with The Christian Bible, God propositionally reveals to humans important divine teachings and doctrines. I argue that since members of Islamic, Jewish, and (monotheistic) Hindu faith traditions (at least implicitly) accept (I)-(III) there are uniquely Islamic, Jewish, and Hindu analogs of (IV) and (V) and hence multiple Theistic extensions of the Standard model. In Chapter Three I consider a case of disagreement between Alvin Plantinga and his comrades, Ibn Plantinga, Al ben Plantinga, and Al Plantingachandra, a Muslim, a Jew, and a Hindu, respectively. Some Christians know what it is like to be a Zen Buddhist and some Zen Buddhists know what it is like to be a Christian. In Chapter Four, I consider a case featuring two such people, John and Paul. (George is away developing a Vaishnava extension of the Standard model and Ringo is otherwise preoccupied.) I articulate John's Zen Buddhist beliefs and Paul's Christian beliefs and show that since they understand one another's beliefs and since both have had Christian and Zen Buddhist religious experiences they are able to assess the same (or sufficiently similar) evidential considerations associated with having those experiences and hence that (1) holds in their case. It is obvious that (2) holds, so I don't argue for that. In Chapter Five I argue that (3) holds in The Case of John and Paul. First, I argue that Tradition-Based Perspectivalism (TBP), a view rooted in and inspired by Alasdair MacIntyre's Rationality of Traditions, is true. I argue that if TBP is true, and given that (1) and (2) antecedently hold in their case, we have a good reason to think that (3) also holds in The Case of John and Paul. In Chapter Six I respond to objections and consider ramifications of my arguments in light of central issues in the epistemology of disagreement. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Draper, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Religion|Philosophy|Epistemology|Philosophy|Islamic Studies

Off-Campus Purdue Users:
To access this dissertation, please log in to our
proxy server
.

Share

COinS