Biotechnologies and human nature: Ethical and political challenges

Nicolae Constantin Morar, Purdue University

Abstract

Human beings have a conception of themselves and of their (human) nature that sets them apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. This conception of our humanity is grounded on our exclusive 'human' intrinsic qualities like language, rationality, etc. Since morality is indexed only on these uniquely human properties, this conception has served as one of our main justifications for the continuing disenfranchisement of non-human animals from those kinds of beings who merit direct moral consideration. Biotechnologies have made possible the creation of human-to-animal-embryonic-chimeras that could probably exhibit indicators of humanhood. Two moral solutions are possible if we were to face such a novel being: first, accept these beings into our moral community and grant them the moral consideration they deserve, and at the same time, continue to exclude all the other non-human animals; or, second, realize that our attempt to map morality onto some unique human property is destined to fail. I argue that our initial special moral status (justified by our conception of humanity) is morally questionable. Thus, the case of genetic chimeras is an opportunity to reconsider the scope of our moral obligations, and hopefully to expand our moral circle to all sentient beings. In a near-future world of bionics and biotechnology, the radical enhancement advocate Ray Kurzweil predicts that the "primary political and philosophical issue [of the next century] will be the definition of who we are." 8 Could biomedical enhancement transform us to such an extent that we would be other than human? The bioconservatives argue that any technological intervention that could potentially alter 'human nature' should be morally prohibited since it distorts one's capacity for moral agency, it disrupts the egalitarian requirement of all our moral systems, and ultimately it calls into question the very foundation of our political organization, namely our human rights. However, I contend that those arguments are based on a gross misunderstanding of evolution. Neither is there a "genetic humanity" or "a common genome" that all and only human beings share as an essence defining/causing who we are, nor an appeal our membership in the Homo Sapiens seems plausible in order to ground our human rights. Hence, these arguments fail to play the normative role intended by bioconservatives. We need to debunk the influential argument from human nature, since only after we can start "doing the hard work of thinking how we can best respond, as individuals and institutionally, to the complex phenomena of enhancement."9 "Generations of philosophers have argued over the years that all human beings are essentially the same - that is they share the same nature - and this essential similarity is extremely important."10 However, in a post-metaphysical and post-Darwinian world, any appeal to transcendent explanations for this similarity is doomed to fail. Once our conception of human nature is relocated within the frame of biology, this relocation comes with two challenges: first, a negative approach that eliminates misguided candidates that could account for our similarity, and second, after we doubted whether the idea of human nature is worth saving, we need to shift the perspective and focus on the variability at heart in any living organism. And, the only proper way to describe the variation of phenotypic traits within any organic population is provided by the notion of a norm of reaction. Human nature becomes a tridimensional concept (a dispositional, selective population concept). The nature of X is an aggregate of all the norms of reaction, hence, as a population concept. Genotypes have specific responses to environmental factors. So, human nature is a dispositional concept in the sense that the traits that are characteristic to us are the ones humans are disposed to exhibit under specific conditions, but not always. Last, among all the traits that an organism displays, some of them have a greater explanatory value for the set of behaviors and features that interest us. So, human nature is a selective concept, or a theory laden concept because only some of the traits, if modified, could truly alter it. 8Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Spiritual Machines , (NY; Penguin, 1999). 9Allen Buchanan, Beyond Humanity, (Oxford, OUP, 2011), p.19. 10David Hull, "On Human Nature," in The Philosophy of Biology, (eds) D. Hull and M. Ruse, (Oxford: Oxford U Press, 1998), p.381.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Bernstein, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Ethics|Philosophy of Science|Philosophy

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