Reconciling freedom and solidarity: The modern republicanism of Hegel and Rousseau

John Alden Stout, Purdue University

Abstract

The debate between liberalism and communitarianism brought to the fore a conflict between maintaining conditions conducive to solidarity, the relation of social unity between fellow citizens, while protecting individual freedom. Liberals, following Rawls, insist that individual freedom rules out a shared conception of the common good. Communitarians argue that a shared conception of the common good is necessary for solidarity and that solidarity is a necessary condition for a functioning and flourishing democracy. The debate has lead to various proposed solutions that attempt to reconcile freedom and solidarity. I call this “the problem of solidarity.” In my dissertation, I argue that Hegel and Rousseau have resources to address the problem of solidarity that have not been appreciated. Specifically, Hegel and Rousseau share four central theses: (1) that there is a reciprocal relation between freedom and political normativity; (2) that freedom is comprised of individual and collective self-determination; (3) that the common good is nothing over and above the ends realized by collective self-determination; and (4) that mutual recognition is a necessary end of freedom as collective self-determination. These four theses overcome the problem of solidarity. First, the reciprocal relation between freedom and political normativity implies that the state can realize a shared conception of the common good, only if the common good itself is derived from the concept of freedom. Freedom is understood as individual and collective self-determination. Individual self-determination is the capacity to realize individual ends and requires the institution of individual rights. Collective self-determination is the capacity to realize shared ends. Since the common good is nothing more than the ends realized by collective self-determination, the state can legitimately realize a shared conception of the common good. A shared conception of the common good is taken as the ground of solidarity. Individual freedom is also maintained due to the importance of individual self-determination and the institution of individual rights. So freedom and solidarity can be reconciled. One objection to this view is that collectively realized ends may not be sufficient for solidarity, since there can be a great deal of polarization regarding which ends to realize. In response, I argue that both Hegel and Rousseau believed that freedom as self-determination necessarily presupposed a relation of mutual recognition. Since freedom presupposes this end, it is a necessary end of freedom itself. Mutual recognition provides a shared content to the common good that can serve as a ground for solidarity. The problem of solidarity is overcome through Hegel and Rousseau's unique contributions to political theory.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

McBride, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Philosophy|Political science

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