Building state capacity in Russia: A case study of energy sector reform, 1992–1998

Younkyoo Kim, Purdue University

Abstract

This study seeks an explanation for the neglect of state building in Russia. The major hypothesis is that dependence on external rent leads to the weakness of the state. Three intervening variables—transaction costs, bargaining power of the state, and discount rates—are posited to explain variance on the dependent variable, the weakness of the state. Based on the exploration of three dimensions of energy sector reform, the dissertation argues that in the short run resource rents may be the only reliable and adequate source of finance for the Russian government. The division of resource rents among the many claimants (state vs. business, state vs. society, Moscow vs. regions, and Russia vs. foreign companies), it submits, will pose a stringent test of the viability of democratic governance in Russia. The dissertation concludes that some evidence indicates that Russia has in fact met the characteristics of the rentier state. The greater reliance on a large resource sector for revenue has led to high transaction costs of tax collection, weak bargaining power of the state, and high discount rates of government officials in Russia.

Degree

Ph.D.

Advisors

Theen, Purdue University.

Subject Area

Political science|Energy

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