The Dramatization of Cultural Hybridity and the "In-Between" Turkey in Fazıl's Künye

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Abstract: In his article "The Dramatization of Cultural Hybridity and the "In-Between" Turkey in Fazil's Künye" Önder Çakırtaş addresses Turkey's historical context and exposes how political, social and cultural changes were expressed in Turkey's public sphere. Using Niyazi Berkes's theory of secularism as proceeding of modernism Çakırtaş discusses different examples of stylistic strategies of cultural hybridity in the playwright's historical-based play, Künye. He investigates how political changes in pre-Turkey times signify Turkey's national striving, and how the Ottoman-conservative past metamorphoses into Turkic-secular. The study juxtaposes the perceptions of 'introduction to Westernization' and 'departure from Islamic past' in a period of the national shaping of modern Turkey.
The Dramatization of Cultural Hybridity and the "In-Between" Turkey in Fazıl's Künye

Hybrid in its basic lexicon meaning refers to (1) "a person whose background is a blend of two diverse cultures or traditions" (2), "something heterogeneous in origin or composition," among other definitions in Webster's Online Dictionary. "Being one of the most widely employed and disputed terms in postcolonial theory" (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, Key Concepts 118), hybridity has grown into the main material through many ranges of history, cultural studies, literature, anthropology, and criticism. As Theodore Karwonski Gideonse establishes, "the concept of hybridity is not new. Pliny the Elder used the word to describe people who immigrated to Romé, and Bakhtin used it in the early twentieth century in discussing the parallel existence of vernacular and 'proper' languages" (Hybridity as Cultural Capital 7). The concept, therefore, has been described by many scholars with different meanings. To Marwan M. Kandiy, "hybridity is an association of ideas, concepts, and themes that at once reinforce and contradict each other" (Hybridity vii). Alternatively, as articulated by Nilanjana Bardhan, "hybridity is about cultural mixing and mingling, it also entails the production of a different (non-oppositional) kind of difference as a result of transculturation" (Identity Research 155). Then again, Brian M. Howell, and Jenell Williams Paris note that "the term 'hybridity' is borrowed from botany, describing two plants that are combined to create a new plant" (Introducing Cultural Anthropology 213).

Cultural hybridity, on the other hand, "refers to the cultural practice of combining and assigning new meanings to previously separate beliefs, practices, or ideas" (Howell and Paris, Introducing Cultural Anthropology 213), which habitually creates a strong link between hybridity and culture. It is due to the fact that humanness is the basis of the cultures, and culture is constituted by the kinds of moral and material properties revealed by a nation throughout history and transferred from generation to generation. Culture is the result of a society's perception, thinking, and lifestyles; in a way, a society's identity, separating it from other communities' values. To Raymond Williams, "beginning as a noun of process—the culture (cultivation) of crops or (rearing and breeding) of animals, and by extension the culture (active cultivation) of human mind—it became in the late nineteenth century, especially in German and English, a noun of configuration or generalization of the 'spirit' which informed the whole way of life of a distinct people" (The Sociology of Culture 10).

Just as the above definition suggests, the concept of culture has been redefined throughout the evolution of history. The term has been intellectualized within different perspectives from normative to historical, psychological to structural, and even genetic definitions (Smith, Cultural Theory 3). Among these definitions, the normative one, signifying "a rule or way of life that is shaped patterns of concrete behavior and action" (3), is much more in harmony with hybridity that foregrounds the combination of conflicting patterns of behaviors or ways of life. One being of the architects of the term cultural hybridity, the postcolonial critic, Homi K. Bhabha indicates that "the representation of difference must not be hastily read as the reflection of pre-given ethnic or cultural traits set in the fixed tablet of tradition. The social articulation of difference, from the minority perspective, is a complex, on-going negotiation that seeks to authorize cultural hybridities that emerge in moments of historical transformation" (The Location of Culture 2).

This kind of transformation in culture and identity is, in its most basic sense, related to the mixture of cultures that "renews the past, refiguring it as a contingent 'in-between' space, that innovates and interrupts the performance of the present" (Bhabha, The Location of Culture 7). Cultural hybridity, typified in decomposing the past and the present, may be used to define the mixture of cultures feeding from different cultures (Eastern-Western), just like those minorities with differing identities in America, Great Britain, Africa, and India (Bhabha, The Location of Culture 20, 60), or the cultures that stem from the same origin (Islamic-Ottoman-Turkic), such as modern Turkey. In order to comprehend the phases of cultural hybridity in Turkey, it is crucial to backtrack to the transition period from Ottoman to Republican Turkey.

The proclamation of the Republic—the central landmark in shaping today's Turkey—the conditions preparing this transferring process, and assessing the period after the Republic have been the focus of many discussions. Within this discussion and evaluation process, the transition movement from Empire to Republic has been, at times, likened to some other social transformation movements and even considered equivalent to those that led to the formation of key social-political revolutions in the world. The individual narratives examined here put forward that the political unrest is central to creating how social and cultural structures were built and the ways in which it continues to obfuscate topics of 'the personal is political' authorization. It is, therefore, essential to suggest that cultural hybridity in Turkey is based on four major unities: Islam, westernization, modernization, and secularism.

The transformations that the late Ottoman Empire and the early modern Turkey went through were not consisted of "unnoticeable" moves; instead, the rulers and the intendants were gone for the jugular regarding the Islamic identity and Islamic perspectives for which many reformists strove. The formal identity of a more secularly built, and which continues to obfuscate topics of 'the personal is political' authorization. It is, therefore, essential to suggest that cultural hybridity in Turkey is based on four major unities: Islam, westernization, modernization, and secularism.

Turkey is one of the best examples of hybrid cultural identity, and the country, where political-based transformation process made some basic contributions to its new face, was challenged to launch a new (modern) cultural revolution. Although cultural changes had something to do with the politics of westernization, the Cultural Revolution came into being as a direct reaction against Turkey's Ottoman-
based structure, and its urge to have a new-fangled identity. The high tide of cultural transfer, which was initiated in the early part of the twentieth century and which had a predominantly noticeable upward trend of various regions belonging to the Turkish Republic, functioned predominantly. Under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s time in power, Turkey was for the first time consciously disclosed as a national culture which "would encompass the nation’s creative legacy as well as the best values of world civilization, and thereby emphasize personal and universal humanism" (Raw, Exploring Turkish Cultures 20); it, therefore, encrypted Turkic transfers concurrently as national transfers into other contexts. The swift change introduced some contradictory identities that were torn between two essentials: Ottoman and Turkish. The centric alterations between the years 1912 and 1918 gave way to a more secular and national community. Here, westernization—as an inflection of modernization—brings Bauman’s inquiries into being: "Was not modernity a process of ‘liquefaction’ from the start? Was not ‘melting the solids’ its major pastime and prime accomplishment all along? In other words, has modernity not been ‘fluid’ since its inception?" (3) It is a fact that the transition from Empire to Republic unfolded a period of cultural fluctuation through which ‘conservatism’ metamorphosed gradually into ‘modernism,’ which gave rise to a more secular and national community.

In this respect, what Bauman conveys through his ‘fluidity of modernity’ has something to do with this communal alteration. However, the ‘fluidity’ through a modern Turkey was not just an instantaneous moment. It rather took a very long period of time that started in the late Ottoman period, that is, the turn of the nineteenth century. Though the starting point of Ottoman ‘westernization—modernization’ could be the eighteenth century, these motifs of metamorphoses did not attract the attention of the large population. However, in the nineteenth century the concept of modernization began to be treated as an issue of identity (Toprak, Islam and Political 58). As expressed by Hanioğlu: "The cumulative impact of military, economic, and administrative challenges at the end of the eighteenth century obliged the rulers of the empire to come to terms with the imperative of reform. Their conservative instincts at first produced only superficial changes. But once cosmopolitanization had failed to yield substantial results, a more radical response became inescapable" (A Brief History 42).

These reforms were, in general, connected to the ‘westernization’ of Ottoman army, economy, and administration, let alone education; nonetheless, there were numerous challenges against these western-centric alterations (İnalçık, Faroqhi, McGowan, Quataert, and Pamuk, Economic and Social 766-69). During the reign of Mahmud II, "for the first time Westernization appeared as a formal policy linked to extensive bureaucratic reform and implemented with brutal force" (Hanioğlu, A Brief History 63). In 1839, with the proclamation of Tanzimat Fermanı (The Rescript of Gülhane), Ottoman Empire gave way to "the modernization of the Ottoman conception of government based on part on concepts borrowed from abroad" (Hanioğlu, A Brief History 73). The removal of the ‘conservative’ values of Empire went effective for the first time in the articles of that declaration. The proclamation of Tanzimat created a profound influence on the emergence of modern Turkey (through a national and secular direction) by semi-elimination of Islamic concepts in which Ottoman Empire—both rulers and the large part of population—were associated (Toprak, Islam and Political 101). In this regard, Hanioğlu goes on to say that "an early draft of the decree contained far fewer references to Islamic concepts than the final version, indicating that Islamic citations in the final text were cosmetic changes added as a sop to the ulema in order to shield the government from the criticism that it was imitating infidel practices (A Brief History 79).

The fact that the formation of an early modern Turkey was the inevitable result of the rise of a spreading secularist lifestyles, principles laid out with modern European concepts of law, and the gradual downfall in the ascendancy of religion was reinforced with the Constitution in 1876, and through Birinci Meşrutiyet (First Constitutional Period) in 1908, İkinci Meşrutiyet (Second Constitutional Period) in 1912, and the time periods between the years 1912-1919 (Kapucu and Palabiyik, Turkish Public Administration 71). Disobedience, strikes, and oppositions took place during a stream of turbulences within these time periods. A few groups of Young Turks, ulamas, old regime supporters, Islamists, liberals, and non-Turkish nationalists came together and thus "new parties began to emerge soon after the revolution, covering the entire range of the political spectrum" (Hanioğlu, A Brief History 154). The emergence of some ideological views (Ottomanism-Turanism) laid the groundwork for some movements along with the strengthening of some political parties to be the leader of these supporting groups. With the formation of Ittihat and Terraki (Party of Union and Progress), the rulers (Pashas) of the Ottoman Empire were impressed to abolish these public powers which dragged them towards the First World War (Kapucu, Studies on Ottoman 73-74).

After WWI, which reduced "an empire of three continents to an Asiatic state" (Hanioğlu, A Brief History 173), and the Turkish War of Independence, the new nationalist state of Turkey was under the rule of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. This establishment of the state was a process fraught with internal contradictions; the incoming political atmosphere shaped the cultural, social, and interpersonal faces of modern Turkey. As showed by Erol Köroğlu in the preface of Literature in Turkey during WWI, it has been the leading teleological attitude that "modern Turkish culture was shaped within the context of
the post-1923 nation-state and national identity form; after some vague experimentation in the late Ottoman period, it found its real identity during the Republic (xv). Thus, the political, social, and cultural identity was constructed with public pronouncements of the new while preserving the old. Paraphrasing Hanioğlu, this renewal raised a double-bind generation: keeping the sultan, while introducing the committee; maintaining the Islamic identity of the regime, yet endorsing secularism; espousing Turkism, yet professing Ottomanism; advocating democracy, but practicing repression; attacking imperialism, while courtling empires; and proclaiming etatism_2; while promoting liberal economics (A Brief History 202). With the proclamation of Turkish Republic, the nationalist and Kemalist ideologies, espousing the construction of the new state, began to be effective in education along with the separation of religion and state. In this respect, Turkish secularism can be assumed only in the context of a "modern nation-building project" (Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy 26).

On the other hand, Niyazi Berkes in the very beginning of The Development of Secularism in Turkey, expresses that "among the Muslim countries it was in Turkey that, prior to World War II, a secular concept of state, religion, law, education, and economy was first promoted, and a definite doctrine of secularism implemented as a political, constitutional, educational, and cultural policy" (4). Basically, Berkes tries to explain the modernization process of Turkey with regards to the phenomena of 'secularism' and 'laicism.' He, in the same token, Alev Çınar sets forth, as in "congregating with the official Turkish state ideology... that the different meaning of modernity refers, all in all, to societal and political philosophies of secularism, Turkish nationalism, and western-orientation. She attributes the early modernization of Turkey to the two basic constituents of institutionalization of the preliminary years of the republic: secularism and nationalism (Modernity, Islam and Secularism 4-5). Like Berkes, Çınar regards Islam as the chief contender of modernism; that is, in Turkey—with its tradition which conveys the authorization of the governing Islam—secularization has unescapably subdued a major turmoil.

"Islam as the symbol of the unity of Turkish society [...], a cognitive map of action and meaning, a repository of memory, and also a sense of authority" (Secularism and Muslim 16). M. Hakan Yavuz goes deep into the core of this issue, attaching the secularization of Turkey to Ottoman "kanun, or edicts issued by the Sultan in areas not covered by Islamic law" (Secularism and Muslim 19). Yavuz maintains that the modernization of Turkey was consolidated through that kanun which helped to generate a secular sphere outside the religious law and this, in turn, had a major power on the secularizations of the Ottoman period in the 1920s "that the different meaning of modernity refers, all in all, to societal and political philosophies of secularism, Turkish nationalism, and western orientation. She attributes the early modernization of Turkey to the two basic constituents of institutionalization of the preliminary years of the republic: secularism and nationalism (Modernity, Islam and Secularism 4-5). Like Berkes, Çınar regards Islam as the chief contender of modernism; that is, in Turkey—with its tradition which conveys the authorization of the governing Islam—secularization has unescapably subdued a major turmoil.

With the Tanzimat, it was revealed that literary exchanges between the various Ottoman communities raised a new sense of literature. As a reflection of Ottomanism, Turkish was embraced to be a very influential language of literary works. Being an influential forerunner in the formation of the Young Ottomans and their free-for-all for constitutional reform in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century, Namik Kemal—an Ottoman Turkish writer, intellectual, reformer, journalist, playwright, and political activist—was among those who gave rise to Birinci Mesrutiyet (First Constitutional Era) in the Empire in 1876 (Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim 20). Many of Kemal's writings were impregnated with the national identity, fatherland, and political reform while embracing Western ideals (Eveder, Nations and Nationalism 763). The early Turkish drama primarily translated European plays when it was home to be translated. The first original play in Turkish—İbrahim Şinasi's play, Şair Evlenmesi (The Marriage of the Poet)—was written in 1859 as a denunciation of the match-making convention (Halman, Turkish Literature 76-77).

Şinasi stressed the social hitches through his humorous and critical approach in changing values of the people. Voicing the need to make translations from European literature, he paid attention to the basics of modern literature, and "disseminated his belief—which became a correct prophecy— that a modern Turkish literature would be born on the models of Western literature" (Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey 198). Transliteration of some basic Europe-centric works, which were for the most part French scripts, into the Ottoman literary archives, gave way to the westernization of the late Ottoman period. These differing approaches to literature brought versatility to the spheres of modern literature; the versatility included "modes of psychological states, feelings of conflict, doubt, anxiety, and, above all, the practice of philosophizing and moralizing, both of which were the signs of secularization in mind and morality" (Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey 280). "By 1900, major Ottoman literary figures were presenting images of a new modernist vision informed by French literature" (Hanioğlu, A Brief History 141). Hanioğlu further maintains that "works such as Tefvik Fikret's poem "Sis" expressed the moral decay of late Ottoman Istanbul, where a stubborn smoke has shrouded its horizons" (141). The Ottoman novel developed rapidly during the 1890s. One particularly appealing example was Halid Ziya (Usaklıgil)’s "Ask-ı Memnu” (Forbidden Love, 1905) a psychological study of adultery in a Bosphorus mansion. It constituted an allegory on the decline of the empire and a thematic and structural mode for much Turkish literature of the twentieth century" (141).

In addition to the ongoing politics of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, non-state linkages of different manners (folks, journalists, artists, musicians, craftsmen, and specifically writers among others) instigated cultural transfers during the early modern period of Turkey. From the very beginning of its emergence, secularism also led to the diversification of Turkish literature. Rather than using an ideological phenomenon, Şerif Mardin tackles with the term distanciation and establishes "Distanciation was a
relatively new development in Turkish intellectual life; it also marks the new generation’s attitude towards religion. But this was only one aspect of the alienation from the general cast of traditional Ottoman culture (Bahriye and Kaldırımlar). Such alienation from old Ottoman culture was reflected within the nationalist writings of various authors, including Ziya Gökalp, "the major ideologue of Turkish nationalism" (Ersoy et. al., Representations of National 190), Omer Seyfettin, "one of the most prominent names of the 'national literature' movement that set the stage for the emerging canon of modern Turkish literature" (190), Ibrahim Sinasi, Namik Kemal, Ahmet Mithat Efendi, who worked "to achieve a goal that can only be described as that of forging a shared Ottoman, Turk 'national' literary history" (Fragmen, 123), and Mehmet Ziya Gökalp, "a faithful believer who wrote the words of the Turkish national anthem" (Ozdalga, "Reflections" 48).

Rejecting Ottomanism and Islamism in favor of Turkism, and being a prominent political activist, Mehmet Ziya Gökalp advocated for the inclusion of such 'national courses' as literature and history into the curriculum of secondary education (Mardin, Religion and Social Change 272). Gökalp tried to create a nationalist urge within the escapology of Ottoman identity, and he "believed that a modern state must become homogeneous in terms of culture, religion, and national identity" (Aykın, From Empire 88). Genç Kalemeler (Young Pens) was among the ideals of Gökalp that encouraged literature that mirrored societal truths, was absorbed in national hitches, and employed simple language. The other minor communities such as Armenians, Albanians, Arabs, and Kurds also produced some significant literary journals and periodicals related to their nationalistic urges.

"Politics is not the idea itself, but its dregs" (‘ Çünkü siyaset fikrin kendisini değil posasıdır” [Kısılkılık, 201]), my trans., Just like "French literature which provided the intellectual background for the French Revolution" (Berkes, The Development 199), Turkish literary scripts accelerated the transition and secularization period of Republican Turkey. However, whilst there were many authors who idealized such western orientations as the realm of freedom, individual poise, purpose, civility, and prettiness, all as an umbrella for the Republic, there were many others who rejected these highly westbound eulogies. In contrast to the writers who believed that "there was absolutely nothing in the old dissipated, rotten hovels of the moment and passion, in which one was to be listed, for which was to be identified” (202), Ahmet Necip Fazıl Kıskıkrek—specifically after his spiritual revival beginning in 1934 (Sitembölükbaşı, Re-Islamization 172)—adhered to the Ottoman-Islamic-Eastern values and fashioned a very qualified magazine, titled Büyük Doğu, (Great East—in 1943) (Jenkins, Political Islam 116) that was banned due to its political sarcasms in 1978.

Being among non-state associations, backing the Turkish Literature with more than seventy literary works, and touching on innumerable essential questions, Necip Fazıl was one of the most brilliant writers of the Republican period. As reflected by Şerif Mardin "Necip Fazıl Kıskıkrek (1905-1983) is one of the puzzles of modern Turkish literature Although his style is thoroughly modern, he has been an icon for religious conservatives, and he himself assumed the position of someone who systematically attacked Turkey’s modern secular culture” ("Thoughts on" 74). Referring to theatre as the greatest discovery among the forms of art (Kısılkılık, Künye 6) ("Sanat şekilleri içinde bence en büyük keşif tiyatrodur" [Kısılkılık, Künye 6]), he revealed a new identity in theatre which reflected the panorama of Turkey being on the threshold of modernity. The cultural impact and the messages behind the clashes of old and new were among the main elements of Necip Fazıl’s stage. Necip Fazıl linked most of the transfers from Empire to Republic which had shaped an all-inclusive cultural model. However, the evaluation of the transition to the Republic was not just possible via the political turbulence, common in Turkey in 1900s.
ty is inversely proportional. It was during this time that, upon meeting Arvasi after deep insight of the crisis, he experienced, he wrote his first important theatre work, Tohum (Seed) in 1935 (Gül, Necip Fazıl 62).

Seeing theatre as "the highest tower of a fortress" ("sanat hisarsının en yüksek burcu" [Kısakürek, Siyah Pelerin Adam [5]]), Necip Fazıl describes theatre as: "capturing life in a cube whose front side is openable and closable [...] just like ensnaring [...] This is what theatre is" ("On tarafı açıklar-kapanır bir mikap (küp) içinde hayati yakalamak [...] Kapana kıştırın gibi [...] Tiyatro budur" [5]). His words on theatre as are as follows: "If you ask me, I'll show you 'the wheel' as the greatest of human exploration. I think, this greatest discovery of the human spirit is in the art form of theatre. How the wheel turns on an endless journey with endless distances, just like this, theatre is freezing of non-stop time with its all matter and motion staff in a jar in the form of a cube..." ("Bana sorarsanız, beşeri keşiflerin en büyüküğü olarak tekerleği gösterrim. Sanat şekilleri içinde bence en büyük keşif tiyatroy... Tekerlek, nasıl, bitmeyen mesafeler üzerinde son-suz bir dönüşe, tiyatro da, durmayan zamanın mikap biçimleri bir kavanoz içinde, bütün madde ve hâreket kadrosuyle dondurulması..." [5]).

Focusing on social problems with a nationalistic guiding impulse, he produced many dramatic great works that shed light on the transition period of Turkey. In his plays, it is inevitable not to notice Brechtian epic style which, for the most part, combines fear, anxiety, and psychological metamorphoses, reflecting metaphysical ideas. This mirrors his outstanding embodiment of characterization in which emotions like fear, terror, distress, suspicion, doubt, and loneliness become more obscure and concrete in each character of the plays. Choosing a list of domestic and Turkish-Anatolian dramatis personae, Necip Fazıl treats such major topics as fate and free will, casuistry, sense of wrongdoing, the mind-emotion-intuition relationships, substance-mental struggle, and investigation of unburdening. The mind is a challenge, above all, against faith and emotions. There are some elements of classical drama in his plays; that is, from time to time an expression of potent and influential style, a style somewhat exaggerated, theatrical attitudes, and forms of speech, valor, magnanimity, dignity, self-esteem are all reminiscent of exaltation of classical attachments.

Portraying Republican Turkey as a country "in-between" new identity, Kısakürek expresses this point in Kün耶 (Idea in Occlusion) as follows: "Since Tanzimat, we are blinding our own with a rising submission day by day" ("Tanzimattan beri gün geçtikçe bir teslimiyet içilişine kendimizi körleştirmiyoruz" [46]). Burhanettin Duran and Çemil Aydın, in one of their articles, accentuate that "the initiator of the ideologization of Islam in Republican Turkey was Necip Fazıl" ("Competing Occidentalisms" 485). Here, it is unescapable to say that Necip Fazıl’s main point was rooted not just in Islamism, but in nationalism, as well. Kısakürek reveals a reproduction of Ottoman pan-Islamism. Thus, through the ideal of ‘Great Jihad’, as a sub-branch of pan-Islamism, he plants the idea of national unity in Turkish people—a unity that is never free of Islam. His words, regarding Great Jihad in "Kün耶", are subliminially the emphasis on the fact that there is a cognizance of Great Jihad in Islamic belief: "You know, there is a statement called ‘Great Jihad’ in our religion. Great Jihad is not a fight of one million people against the same number of people. It is the fight of one single person against his own Self" ("Diminzide ‘büyük cihat’ diye bir tabir var, bilirsiniz. Büyük cihat, milyonlarca insanın bir o kadar insana kavgası değildir. Tek kişinin öz nefsiyle cenâb olmasi"") [Kısakürek, Kün耶 [37]]. Within this perspective, Kısakürek’s leaning towards non-sectarian unity and anti-western ideologies are admissible in that he urges to stress through ‘Man’s own Self’ is something very far-off non-Islamic manners of life. Again, his proclamations for his ideal of ‘Great East’ just touch not only Islamic values, but also nation-state structure which is based upon militarist nationalism. Kün耶, Gazanfer—as an nationalist statesman-soldier—reflects Kısakürek’s ideologies and political ideas which signalize that "Turkish military is the representative of the Great East, which is the source of legends" (Kısakürek, Kün耶 [37]).)

Competing Occidentalisms 485). The Development and the Envisioning of a New Identity. In fact, while there are some soldiers who reflect the national side of the writer, there are some law students who mirror the authority and governmental rules. On the other hand, there are some public ladies and gentlemen who are the representatives of the ‘old-rottten’ Ottoman, and there are some European pilgrims who symbolize the brilliance of westernization and intelligentsia on their way to Newly-Modernized-Turkey. The modern portrayal of some figures (particularly those European characters) within the historical background of an incoming Republic challenges Bauman’s suggestion that “the history of time began with modernity. Indeed, modernity is, apart from anything else, perhaps even more than anything else, the history of time: modernity is the time when time has a history.” (110) Here, the main conflict arises from Kısakürek’s style of perceiving modernism. He does not confine any time sequence within the boundaries of modernism, and he conceptualizes what modernism brought together with westernism. Moreover, Kısakürek adopted the distinction between good-material and bad-non-material aspects of the west-civilization-modernity formulated by the Islamists of the Second Constitutional Period. By employing an eclectic method, he is able to argue that the good aspects of western ideologies and values, which had given rise to western political hegemony, were already inherent in Islam (Duran and Topcu, Competing Occidentalisms 485). That’s a reason why he never adopts modernism-westernism as a new identity for Turkey, and he juxtaposes highly contra characters to denote the ‘solid’ transfers in Turkish culture, which projects the socio-cultural differences in the community. This is what Bhabha reflects when he articulates that "social differences are not simply given to experience through an already authenticated cultural tradition" (The Location 3) which underlines the evolutionary change within transition (from eastern to western; from traditional to modern). He continues, “they
are the signs of the emergence of community envisaged as a project— at once a vision and a construction —that takes you 'beyond' yourself in order to get to 'between' in a spirit of revision and reconstruction, to the political conditions of the present' (The Location 3). For that reason, Künye reveals the most extreme example of these contra characters and the most contrarian dialogues which reflect Necip Fazıl’s anti-western thinking. The characters representing 'the men-women of the people' are introduced as 'conservatives' who reject European men-women and who harshly criticize the physical appearances (of their clothes and their being bawdy) of these westerners.

Such staging refers to the last periods of Ottoman and early periods of Turkey: a state 'in between' two cultural/territorial cultures which induces cultural hybridity. This entrapment is the result of a new-fangled secular Republic witnessing the growth of the West, and an Islamic-based Empire yearning for the East. It is the very answer the law student Künye in struggled to find by asking: "What do you mean? On the face of any kind of the progress of the West, shall we remain Oriental with our turban, our robes, our baggy trousers, and our black ignorance?" ("Ne demek istiyorsun? Yani garbin her türlü ilerleyişkarısımda, şanlıımiz, çübbemiz, salvarınımız ve simsiyah cehlimizle şarklı mı kalamalım?" [Kisakürek, Künye (46)]. On the other hand, the characters described as 'men-women of the people' have some ironic ascriptions to the European characters. For instance, "the sultan would not pass here by horse-drawn carriage; he would pass by a European-invented car walking prickly. This car would be dragged by a couple of devils invisible to the eye" ("Hünkar atı arabalı geceleyicik de, kendi kendisine yürüyen frenk ijadi bir arabalı geçecektir. Bu arabayi göremez bir cift doru seytan çekiyor muyuz" [48]). Necip Fazıl’s occidental approach has something to do with his anti-Western attitude in Künye. Some of his characters are cultivated and modern, and some are uncultured and ridiculed: "THE FIRST YOUNG AND SWELL WOMAN: Leave that empty-headed French boy! His hand kissing is getting on my nerves! THE SECOND YOUNG AND SWELL WOMAN: What about your English boy? Has he removed his booted feet from the dining table?" ([BİRİNCİ GENC VE ŞİK KADIN]: Birak şu sulu Fransız! El öpüşü o kadar sininirme dokunuyor ki! [IKİNCİ GENC VE ŞİK KADIN]: Ya senin İngilizsin? Çizmeli ayaklarını yemek masasından indirdiğin var mı?" [112]).

These discrepancies all bring more than two identifications on Necip Fazıl’s stage: a culturally conservative Ottoman-bound ladies and gentlemen, a culturally liberal group of western-bound ladies and gentlemen, and a culturally hybrid group of Turkey-bound ladies and gentlemen. Thus Necip Fazıl introduces various implications of 'in-between' phenomenon through Künye. Şerif Mardin emphasizes the impression of 'in-between,' taking Necip Fazıl’s stand in the center, by asserting that "although Necip Fazıl could fit himself into the frame of the new devlet, he was thrown off balance by the secular republic’s abrogation of what a modified Gramscian scheme would call the cultural organism underlying Ottoman state practice—that is, not only the educational and cultural institutions but also the deeper cultural process" ("Rethinking Modernity" 74).

Problems about social and cultural identity, thus, are rooted in the idea of multifaceted reformulations of Islam, Ottoman past, and hence, contrast the tributes to western-modern employments. Künye, therefore, typifies a propagandist play by which Necip Fazıl illustrates the divergence of Islamic and Ottoman identity, epitomizing cultural hybridity. This is the core idea which Necip Fazıl framed within Büyük Doğu (Great East), in which "the process of ideologization of Islam was carried out in 'opposition' to the Kemalist project of Westernization" (Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity 116). However, through the characterization of Gazanfer, Necip Fazıl, generates a prototype of 'idealistic' public man who is designated assets of nationalist and Kemalist vision. This is the central Fazilian perception to represent a paradox which brings face to face Islamic-Ottoman past and secular-Kemalist-Turkish present. This is just what Şerif Mardin puts forward by saying that, "it is true that Necip Fazıl...represents only one type of Turkish reaction to the Jacobian secularism of the Turkish Republic (est. 1923)" (Religion Sociology 245). The same is figuratively addressed by Elisabeth Özdalga: In order to reach his dispossessed or culturally homeless audiences, Necip Fazıl implicated himself with strong allusions to religion ("Reflections on" 57).

For that reason, Necip Fazıl mirrors a portrayal of politicization of Islamic and nationalistic identity in Gazanfer’s characterization. This, paradoxically discloses an identity contrasting the core meaning underlying his name. (In the Online Dictionary of Turkish Language Society, ‘Gazanfer’ means "a brave, courageous, and strong man." (Türk askeri, destanlar kaynağı "Buyuk Doğu"nun mümes-silidir" [38]) (<http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_bts &arama=kelime&guid=TDK.GTS.57 0b7754267251.04937558>). He is a man who is torn between new and old, entrapped in the dichotomies of cultural hybridity. In order to strengthen this point of view, as a result, Necip Fazıl chooses İstanbul as a setting to give the impression of a spiritual linkage that represents the clashes of 'in-between'. Gazanfer’s statement, "in this great fire, I see the spirit of İstanbul which turned into spunk. Its entire being, except the mosques, the tombs, and the tombstones, wants to declare what a great delusion it is" ("Ben bu yangında İstanbul’un kav haline gelmiş ruhunu görülüyorum. Camilerinden, türbelerinden, mezar taşlarından başka bütün varlığı, ne büyük bir vehim olduğunun ilan etmek istiyorum" [Kisakürek, Künye (26)]. He indirectly touches on the disparity between the condition in which İstanbul is found: a city torn between the clashes of Ottoman-Islamism-traditionalism, and Turkey-secularism-modernism. Thus, Necip Fazıl presents a polemical play that discards westernization of Islamizations and Islamic way of life.

The emergence of the Republic of Turkey in Anatolia is generally rumored to be the inescapable and probable outcome of the downfall of an expansive conglomerate empire and of the bordering nation-states in the adjoining regions of the degenerated Ottoman state. However, this ex post facto may be attuned to the late Ottoman period; the major base to viewing the period as it really was is represented in the works of the literary forerunners. In particular, authors of the transferring period distort fundamental historical manners by towing them out of their historical milieu and enlisting them..."
in an artificial sequence of events forming a basis for the au fait new state. Thus, the cultural hybridity appears on the stage.

Because of Ottoman Empire’s collapse and shrink, and because of the fact that Tanzimat Epoch, First Constitutional Era, and Second Constitutional Era all leaded up to the formation of an inherent superior-liberal-secular civilization, many reformists, including some intellectuals, journalists, academicians, and authors called out to an urgent new-fangled country, a Republic which would embrace a brand-new identity. Against all the proclamations of western-bound authors and reformers, Kısakürek tackled with Occidentalism and he, with propagandist uniqueness, refused western modernism. Thus, his theatre revealed one of the most significant samples of ‘cultural hybridity’ in Turkey, and his characters emphasized the ‘entrapments of double identity’ reflecting Bhabha’s ‘in-between’ phenomenon. This hybridity was the result of such ideological philosophies as Ottomanism, Turkism, Islamism, Modernism or/and westernism that formulated the emergence of the Republican Turkey.

Works Cited


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