From Cultural Third-Worldism to the Literary World-System

Jernej Habjan
Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb

Recommended Citation
Habjan, Jernej. "From Cultural Third-Worldism to the Literary World-System." CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 15.5 (2013): <https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.2346>

This text has been double-blind peer reviewed by 2+1 experts in the field.
The above text, published by Purdue University Press ©Purdue University, has been downloaded 1103 times as of 11/07/19.

This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information.

This is an Open Access journal. This means that it uses a funding model that does not charge readers or their institutions for access. Readers may freely read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of articles. This journal is covered under the CC BY-NC-ND license.
**Abstract:** In his article "From Cultural Third-Worldism to the Literary World-System" Jernej Habjan links the debate on Franco Moretti's distant reading to the debate on Fredric Jameson's "third world culture." In and around this debate, Aijaz Ahmad both critiqued close reading and rejected Jameson's "Third-Worldism." What Jameson's and Ahmad's interventions into literary theory meant at the end of the real-socialist alternative and what Moretti's meant at the end of the US-American alternative to real-socialism, a synoptic reading of all three interventions might help achieve at the end of what seemed the European alternative to the US-American alternative.
Jernej HABJAN

From Cultural Third-Worldism to the Literary World-System

In 2000, Franco Moretti asked what it might mean for literary studies to move beyond the world canon, and gave the following negative answer: "One thing is sure: it cannot mean the very close reading of very few texts — secularized theology, really ('canon!') — that has radiated from the cheerful town of New Haven over the whole field of literary studies" (Moretti, "The Slaughterhouse" 208). And in a companion piece, he characterized close reading as "a theological exercise — very solemn treatment of very few texts taken very seriously — whereas what we really need is a little pact with the devil: we know how to read texts, now let’s learn how not to read them" ("Conjectures" 57). Five years later, after a series of suggestions to replace deconstructive close reading of the canon with what Moretti named "distant reading" of the "world literary system," a positive answer followed in the form of retrospection: "While recent literary theory was turning for inspiration towards French and German metaphysics, I kept thinking that there was actually much more to be learned from the natural and the social sciences" (Graphs 2).

Moretti’s blend of historical materialist and psychoanalytic approaches to literature reached an international audience with his 1983 Signs Taken for Wonders: Essays in the Sociology of Literary Forms and in his subsequent work Moretti incorporated concepts of world-systems analysis and evolutionary theory. Moretti produced a new object of knowledge, namely world literature as a historically differentiated system of forms by following the example of world-systems analysis and he analyzed it using quantitative historiography’s graphs, geography’s maps, and evolutionary biology’s trees. However, he relied on "French and German metaphysics" as well, but in a way that rendered it not metaphysics, but dialectics capable of developing abstract schemes into concrete theoretical concepts and a metaphysically inspired literary theory into epistemologically pertinent theory. One is tempted to identify the "French and German metaphysics" that inspires, according to Moretti, current literary studies with the names of Derrida and, by extension, Heidegger. However, these are also the thinkers who more than anyone else inspire current literary studies to use the label of "metaphysics" precisely for pre-Heideggerian or even pre-Derridean philosophy. If this is indeed so — if Moretti’s characterization "metaphysics" is to be identified with the philosophers who themselves term their own predecessors "metaphysics" — then metaphysics is for Moretti precisely the Heideggerian and Derridean reduction of continental philosophical tradition to metaphysics. In this case, Moretti would be allied with such an ardent advocate of this philosophical tradition as Paul Ricoeur, the Heideggerian who dismissed Heidegger’s label "Western metaphysics" as a case of "laziness in thinking" (368; responding to similar critiques of his own use of the label, Derrida wrote, unconvincingly, that he has been using it purely "for pedagogical reasons" [229]). Granted, Moretti’s embrace of hard science — similar in some respects to the earlier school of Empirische Literaturwissenschaft (see Schmidt <http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1569>) and its corollary "comparative cultural studies" (see Tötösy de Zepetnek <http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1041>; Tötösy de Zepetnek and Vasvári) — rather than philosophy, hardly warrants such a conclusion, but it is the wager of my study that his application of scientific tools helps make way for better use of continental thought by literary theory, one that could also resist taking Heidegger’s and Derrida’s critiques of "Western metaphysics" at face value.

How does one historicize the radical image of close reading as "secularized theology," "a theological exercise" inspired by "French and German metaphysics"? For a history of close reading in the English-language scholarship as radical as Moretti’s charges, one would have to turn to Aijaz Ahmad. In 1992 Ahmad traced the practice of close reading back to the US-American depoliticized version of Romanticism, which prepared the ground for New Criticism’s antisocial readings of individual lyrical poems that peaked at the same time as anticorporalist McCarthyism. This kind of formalism was followed by Northrop Frye’s and Cleanth Brook’s post-McCarthyist focus on individual genres of narrative yet still individualistic poetry such as the romance. In the years of President Kennedy’s liberalism, the question of tension was gradually admitted, but also confined to textuality by critics such as Harold Bloom and Paul de Man, who then went on to radicalize this tendency as U.S. embraced and depoliticized deconstruction at the onset of neoliberalism. For Ahmad, close reading
with its Romantic mysticism combined with formalism is coterminous with Anglo-American literary studies, save for the New Left of the 1960s Britain and U.S. and then for Raymond Williams's Marxist appropriation of F.R. Leavis's interbellum Tory populism (Ahmad 46-56).

It is not difficult to agree with Peter Hallward that Ahmad's analogies between these critical approaches and their literary preferences, on one side, and geopolitical conjunctures on the other, are exaggerated. But there is a fourth dimension scattered throughout Ahmad's book that happens to coincide with those of the approaches to reading, the objects read, and the geopolitical situations: the institutional framing of the versions of close reading. New Criticism's lyric and Frye's narrative poem were attuned to the levels of depoliticization of their respective classrooms, de Man's and Bloom's conflictual textuality to the slightly liberalized situation, the deconstruction of teaching itself to the post-1968 university, and postcolonial studies — relegated in its poststructuralist phase to close reading as well — to the multicultural classroom comprising the formerly subaltern. It seems that this new classroom with both the student and the teacher denied the status of Cartesian subject of science and instead forced to remain, if not become, subaltern natives, is the material condition of what one might call the replacement of class struggle with class discussion, the teaching method glorified by the 1993 report to the American Comparative Literature Association (see Bernheimer) no more than a year after Ahmad had decreed it under the name of "theory-as-conversation" (70; the recent proliferation of this kind of identity politics in the institutions of literary studies is addressed by Suman Gupta). Thus, while close reading moves from texts to genres to the text and to the empirical agents of reading, Moretti's distant reading subverts this fetishistic current and turns to the institution, rather than the agents of reading, that is, to literary studies itself. For what he reads in order to formalize it by using graphs, maps, and trees are the very readings produced by individual national philologies and this is necessarily distant reading conducted collectively: readings by Moretti's The Stanford Literary Lab can be neither close nor his own and they certainly cannot assume the form of "discussion" or "conversation." Responding to "secularized theology" that has "radiated" from Yale "over the whole field of literary studies" and turned the latter towards "French and German metaphysics," distant reading is then a reply to the mysticism and formalism of poststructural close reading, with which Ahmad concludes his critique of close reading. Ahmad's critique is of course in itself a similar reply relating as it is the antihistorical close reading to its historical conditions. We can then follow Ahmad's example and claim that what his critique of close reading had meant around the fall of the Berlin Wall, Moretti's positive alternative meant around 9/11. And today — when these two symbols of the respective declines of the real-socialist alternative and the US-American alternative to it are joined by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers with its spillover effects in the part of Europe which hitherto posed as the alternative to the US-American alternative — the currency of distant reading is confirmed by a book-length evaluation of Moretti's work (see Goodwin and Holbo) or, per negationem, even by Carlynn Lesjak's critique of the proliferation of antihistorical reading approaches.

There is, however, another reason for evoking Ahmad: the responses to distant reading have been unrelenting dismissals seemingly reminiscent of, and often even reminiscing, what is rightfully Ahmad's most influential — yet, judging by his critique of close reading outlined above, not at all rightfully his only influential — intervention into literary studies: his critique of Jameson's "Third-Worldism." In 1986, Jameson applied the Three Worlds Theory in order to map contemporary world literature by differentiating between the late capitalist First World, the real-socialist Second World, and the postcolonial Third World with their respective cultures of postmodernism, socialism, and nationalism. Ahmad responded with an extensive critique (95-122), which Paul Stasi recently summarized as follows: "Not only is [for Ahmad] the category [of third-world literature] too diverse to be meaningful ... but the evidence upon which the category is constructed [in Jameson] is painfully small" (234). Now, from this summary, which I think is correct, it is not clear whether the concept of the Third World is untenable as such or just in Jameson's attempt, that is, whether the obstacle is ontological or merely epistemological. It seems that the construction "Not only ... but" conjoins the ontologically impossible and the epistemologically prohibited — which is of course the structure of taboo. Is Ahmad really tabooing any conceptualization of the Third World? Is such a conceptualization really incestuous? Stasi seems to think so, since he reduces Jameson's concept of the Third World to a potential concept of the Western reception of the Third World: "If Jameson begins with a quite specific sense of himself as a first-world reader for whom third-world texts seem necessarily alien, he fails to
follow-up on the implications of this insight in his ringing declarations about literary form. Imagine if in place of the infamous sentence ['All third-world texts are necessarily, I want to argue, allegorical, and in a very specific way: they are to be read as what I will call national allegories'], Jameson had instead claimed that 'all third-world texts, when read in first-world locations, are read as what I will call national allegories' (Stasi 235; emphases in the original).

Granted, Stasi's summary of Ahmad's criticism does not develop the contradiction between Ahmad's ontological and epistemological reproaches, but by supplementing Jameson in this way Stasi, like Ahmad and most of the commentators after him, seems to choose the latter option. Perhaps this is why the contradiction seems to return in Stasi's own argument: while setting the above-cited epistemological limits on Jameson's concept of national allegory, a narrative that depicts the path of an individual as the embodiment of the nation's trajectory, Stasi nonetheless agrees with the finding of Pranav Jani's Decentering Rushdie, which he reviews, that postcolonial literature does indeed abound with what Jameson terms "national allegories." This allows one to consider the approach opposite to Stasi's epistemological relativization of Jameson: the approach that would turn an apparent epistemological obstacle into an ontological condition and see in Jameson's epistemological limitations regarding the Third World the very ontological status of this world. Indeed, the fact that even Jameson — whose susceptibility to non-Western cultures Ahmad is first to acknowledge — is unable to examine what he calls third-world culture can tell us something about its ontological status, namely about its marginal position within the First World and, moreover, within itself, as it were, insofar as, for Ahmad, the Third World is inconceivable even to itself (104-05). This marginal position may indeed pose an epistemological obstacle to a project like Jameson's, but, pace Ahmad, not an ontological one.

This is, then, one interpretation which might save Jameson and one that, incidentally, Jameson made neither in his article nor in his subsequent response to Ahmad's criticism ("A Brief Response"), perhaps because of what Alan Norrie sees as the privileging of the epistemological over the ontological in Jameson's dialectics. In this way, we can reconcile Stasi's epistemologization of Jameson not only with his and Pranav's acknowledgment of the actual predominance of national allegories in postcolonial literature, but also with the claim made by Julie McGonegal and developed by Imre Szeman that this epistemologization is present in Jameson's definition of national allegory itself, namely in his qualification "they are to be read as" (Szeman 197, 209). Szeman's projection of the epistemologization of the concept into the formulation of this concept is of course itself the kind of ontologization for which I am arguing here. This allows me to posit that an utterance cannot be refuted by the empirical circumstances of enunciation alone: things are not that easy, we cannot falsify Jameson's rendition of the Three Worlds Theory simply by referring to the fact that he is a first-world scholar. Hence, Ahmad's objection to Jameson that he failed to draw the consequences of his avowed relative ignorance of the Third World and to refrain from speaking about it can finally be turned into an objection to Ahmad that he himself failed to draw the consequences of this ignorance and to recognize in this inaccessibility of the Third World to someone like Jameson the first ontological predicate, rather than the conceptual untenability, of this world. Perhaps the fact that Ahmad was so shocked by the gap he had perceived between Jameson's Third-Worldism and the rest of his theoretical work calls for the conclusion that there is no gap, but merely Ahmad's underestimation of Jameson's Third-Worldism. Perhaps the fact that we cannot speak of the Third World in any non-falsifiable way means not that it does not exist and that we should stop speaking about it, but on the contrary that it does exist at least as something about which we have not learned to speak yet and that we can speak about it and that we must speak about it in order to precisely undo it as something about which we do not know how to speak.

As politically incorrect as such ontological valorization of epistemological obstacles of Jameson's kind can seem in today's ideological conjecture, it can find support in some of the debate ensuing from Ahmad's "Jameson's Rhetoric of Otherness." Santiago Colás's position can be understood along these lines when he suggests that the contradictions of late capitalism themselves enable Jameson to propose a paradoxical concept of the Third World as a world commodified in, and at once alternative to, late capitalism (264-66). In the same context, Madhava Prasad asks about the historical reasons — and not, say, Jameson's personal "guilt" — for the greater visibility of nationalism in the Third World in respect to the First (73-78). Prasad goes even so far as to charge Ahmad's refusal of national allegory...
with methodological nationalism and empiricism, something that will echo more than a decade later in Ian Buchanan's associating of Ahmad with identity politics.

One could indeed try to support these charges by arguing that, to use Althusserian parlance, Ahmad approaches Jameson's theoretical concepts as if they were proposed as empirical concepts. Jameson, for whom "Third World" "functions more as the name of a political desire ... than as the descriptor of any actual place" (Lazarus 106), defines the Third World merely as the world that has undergone the linking to the capitalist First World by colonialism and imperialism, thus enabling the concept to accommodate to any subsequent empirical delinking. As noted by Buchanan, Jameson follows Ernest Mandel's conceptualization of the Third World as a geographically potentially limitless product of capitalism (178). Ahmad, however, reads the concept as one intended to grasp empirical locations such as India for all time, which allows him to refute it simply by invoking the decolonization of a country like India (100-01). Thereby Ahmad far from proving the non-existence of the Third World presupposes its geographical determination. Hence, the option that Jameson is saying "not that 'all third-world texts are to be read as national allegories' but that only those texts which give us national allegories can be admitted as authentic texts of Third World Literature, while the rest are by definition excluded," can only be perceived by Ahmad as "the Law of the Father" (Ahmad 107). In this light, Jameson's concern at the end of "A Brief Response" that Ahmad may be betraying some anxiety towards theory is understandable.

Finally, it seems that Ahmad's empiricism is too easy a source of criticism to be able to yield a radical critique: his ultimate objection to Jameson's Third-Worldism is that the late capitalist and postmodern First World, as well as the socialist Second World, are granted their respective modes of production, while the postcolonial and nationalist Third World is left without one (99-100). A theoretical critique here might instead be that it is the Second World that lacks a mode of production in Jameson's argument insofar as real-socialism was not a proper mode of production that had succeeded the capitalist mode, but a social formation, a combination of several modes of production with the capitalist mode as the persistent determinant and that allows Immanuel Wallerstein to relate socialism to capitalism by grounding the modern interstate system in the modern world-system _qua_ capitalist world-economy. Jameson's scheme allows us to ascribe both a mode of production and an overall social formation to the First World ("late capitalism" and "postmodernism") as well as to the Third ("postcolonialism" and "nationalism") — but not to the Second (designated by Jameson merely as "socialism"). A possible theoretical solution would turn to world-systems analysis for a generalizing viewpoint to distinguish between the central, the semi-peripheral, and the peripheral types of global capitalism at the level of the determinant mode of production and to distinguish at the level of social formation between postmodern bourgeoisie (rendering its capitalism "late"), socialism (regulating the still persistent wage relation), and nationalism (fighting economic dependency). This would finally enable a conception, sketched recently by Neil Lazarus (106), of the nationalism of national allegories as a necessary historical condition for forming either a bourgeois or a socialist society.

All the criticism of Ahmad, along with my alternative concretization of Jameson, may be exaggerated of course and dependent on considerable charity of interpretation regarding Jameson's argument. What I argue for here is that the criticism holds as soon as we apply it to the critiques of Moretti's distant reading of the world literary system as these seem to be a degraded repetition of Ahmad's reproaches to Jameson's Three Worlds mapping. Ahmad's intervention may betray some empiricism and it may have prevailed in the ensuing debate, yet both empiricism and its prevalence are a far cry from those of the critiques of distant reading. There is no Prasad, Colás, Buchanan, or Lazarus speaking for Moretti's case, with the exception of someone like Pascale Casanova who is, however, herself at least a collateral victim of most of the attacks on Moretti. More importantly, Ahmad would never even argue that first-world culture is a "guest" in the Third World, like one of the replies to Moretti does, speaking, like Ahmad more than a decade earlier, on behalf of India. We can then agree not only with Ahmad's distanciation from the liberal appropriations of his Marxist critique of Jameson's Marxism (10-11), but also with his claim that the process leading from the New Left to poststructural postcolonialism is one of regression. For we can agree with Ahmad's critique of Jameson's mapping of world literature to the extent to which we cannot possibly agree with the later poststructural (postcolonial) critiques of Moretti's (and praises of Ahmad's critique of Jameson). And if Ahmad's ambivalence as to the epistemological insufficiency and the ontological impossibility of
Jameson's Third World has been resolved by the responses to Moretti, it has been so only owing to these responses' total rejection of any notion of the Third World or any other kind of periphery. Ahmad's wager "that we live not in three worlds but in one [and] that this world includes the experience of colonialism and imperialism on both sides of Jameson's global divide" (103) was still traceable around 2000 in Moretti's assertion in "Conjectures" that the world literary system is "one, and unequal" (103) or in Hallward's claim that "there is and can only be one world ... whose diversity resists a singular coordination as much as it eludes stasis in a specified particularity" (337). Yet by the time distant reading received most of the commentaries, that wager had been flattened to a notion of a world that is perhaps one, but by no means unequal. This tactics of dismissing as totalizing, even totalitarian, any notion of unequal centers and peripheries had been deplored by Ahmad as a recent development in postcolonial studies (69), but had to be tackled by Hallward as the dominant tendency a decade later (for a similar critique roughly contemporaneous with Hallward's, see also Eagleton). In sum, between Jameson and Moretti the question changed from how to be a historical materialist in literary studies to whether or not to be one: "The critique mutates from a Marxist critique of 'Third-Worldism' into a 'Third-Worldist' critique of Marxism" (Lazarus 99). This makes a proper historical materialist evaluation of Moretti's distant reading of world literature even more urgent than of Jameson's Third-Worldism.

As I discuss the above evaluation elsewhere ("Research," "The Bestseller"), I limit myself here to a general argument for the dialectic of distant reading and for its consequent critique of identity politics. Granted, it seems anachronous to affiliate identity politics with the literary-critical currents which have not only rejected distant reading, but also made its kind of critique of identity politics no less than mainstream. But that is precisely the point: the critiques of distant reading are anachronous in relation to the main stream of contemporary theory. In this respect, they are part of what Gupta identified as the result of an ongoing institutionalization of theoretically aware or, in his terms, social constructionist identity politics in the humanities in general and literary studies in particular. This persistence of identity politics despite better knowledge, indeed despite theory, is the object of Peter Hitchcock's depiction of the contemporary literary scholar as a "cultural accretionist" who "banks on multiplicity sui generis as cultural capital" in the quest for "recognition by accretion achieved in a wonderful flourish by adding the letter s where necessary and eschewing the uppercase: literatures, not Literature; americas, not America; traditions, not Tradition" (196). Moreover, what Hitchcock says in 2003 of literary studies, whose world literature section is for him the "decaffeinated" variety of postcolonial studies, Hallward more or less said, two years earlier, of postcolonial studies itself (xiv-xv, xix-xx). This confirms Ahmad's early critique of postcolonialism, but it also legitimizes, I think, my problematization of his critique of Jameson, insofar as a siding with Ahmad would be taken as a siding with identity politics in current literary studies informed, for example, by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's critiques not only of Jameson's Third-Worldism, but also of Moretti's literary world-system. This strand of current literary studies refuses the literary world-system because it refuses the world-system itself (A Critique 71-79; Death 107-09).

In a field that seems as vast as the literary world-system, the temptation to try to falsify existing theorizations simply by bringing to their attention supposedly neglected empirical objects — rather than more sophisticated theorizations of these objects — is particularly strong. Yet this kind of temptation has already been warned against by scholars of world literature themselves (Moretti, "Conjectures" 55; Jameson, "Third-World Literature" 68; Casanova, "Literature" 82, 72-73) and, at the level of scientific practice as such, by both French and British traditions of epistemology (e.g., Bachelard 237-40; Popper 113, 92). The most influential theories of world literature since the field's Renaissance have been proposed by Franco Moretti, Pascale Casanova, and David Damrosch. Literary studies has often received their theories in a manner that represents the latter as a realistic solution to the exaggerated universalism of the former two. For most critiques of one of these two are also explicit critiques of the other one (see, e.g., Beecroft 88-91; Kliger 259-71; Neubauer 177-78; Orsini 78-82; Prendergast 104-05; Stephanides 101-03), often on behalf of the third one as the alternative (see, e.g., Gupta 142-45; Milutinović; Vrh 187-96; see also Brown; see Juvan 73-86 for a critique of Damrosch from Casanova's and similar viewpoints). It seems, however, that this alternative can already be proposed by a synoptic reading of Moretti's and Casanova's proposals. Such an approach would have the advantage of remaining within their own horizon, that is, of solving their supposed
deficiencies without having to dismiss the productive aspects of their theories and to resort to a third, compromise solution. Thus, it could demonstrate the existence of a problematic common to these two theories and continue the project of conceptualizing Goethe's and Marx's and Engels's initial analogies between world literature and the world market as these are taken more seriously by Moretti and Casanova than by other theorists of world literature the latter of which often keep their Goethean and Marxian references at the level of obligatory opening remarks. In sum, such an approach would go beyond falsification-by-facts, which has certainly been the predominant mode of reception not only in Moretti's case, but also in Casanova's as her theory is often rejected as Gallocentric (see Beecroft 88-89; Damrosch 27; Milutinović 32-33, 30; Prendergast 106-07), even to the point of alluding to her French nationality as the empirical producer of the theory (see Virk 207).

One can only agree with Damrosch's central point that world literature exists only as so many local, that is, national or regional, loci of reception of world literature: the material existence of world literature are libraries, school curricula, publishing houses, and other institutions which are necessarily localized and thus unable to provide a world-wide agreement over and a universal conception of what exactly world literature comprises (Damrosch 281). However, this is once more a case of abandoning a theory for empirical objects, not for a stronger theory. Such a theory can only be produced by treating its object as what Claude Lévi-Strauss coined a "total social fact" — which is both a "thing" and its native "representation" — so that "any valid interpretation must bring together the objectivity of historical or comparative analysis and the subjectivity of lived experience" (25-29). To the local, native's point of view on world literature stressed by Damrosch should therefore be added an investigation of how world literature functions as such despite being merely a sum of its local "representations." For world literature is, as Damrosch claims, the interaction of all localizations of world literature — but this "glocalization" is not all. The term "glocalization" itself embodies what Gupta tracks as the hegemony of identity politics in current literary studies. Roland Robertson introduced the term to social theory in the early 1990s to grasp globalization as what deconstructionists might call a supplement, a seeming unfortunate modern counterpart to local identities that in fact produces the very illusion of locality. Today, however, "glocalization" is being appropriated by literary studies to signify, on the contrary, some ultimate immunity of local identities to global forces.

World literature conceived as the circulation of texts and, ultimately, local world literatures that prevents a unified concept of world literature (see Damrosch 4-6) is still an abstract universal, which any post-Hegelian theoretical investigation should concretize. This can be done by valorizing Goethean and Marxian initial economic homology. As Jameson has shown in his A Singular Modernity, global capitalism makes local versions of modernity, not particular contents of an abstract universal form, but so many answers to the contradictions of this form itself. Alternate modernities are but attempts to bypass the unwanted antagonisms inherent in the global world-system by condensing them in a singular modernity, the Western one, instead of seeing in the latter precisely concrete universality, an embodiment of the vagaries of the universal field itself. Of course, modernity exists solely in particular local actualizations, but its concrete universal is lies in the necessity of local acceptance of and adaptation to universal modernity. Since material conditions of world literature are precisely those of capitalist global modernity — and insofar as Jameson's strategy prevents nominalist historicizing (see Žižek 34) — alternative local notions of world literature should also be viewed as attempts to fend against the asymmetry of world literature as in Moretti's core/periphery opposition or Casanova's Greenwich Meridian of literature ("Literature" 74-76). Granted, not all local representations of world literature place Shakespeare in the center, but they must all acknowledge the existence of a hegemonic representation and the marginalization of Shakespeare may as well be one way to do that and is, moreover, always-already perceived against the backdrop of the hegemonic notion, that is, always already overdetermined by that notion — in a word, "glocalized" in Robertson's original sense, which, however, Robertson, in "Glocalization" (38), was the first to betray precisely with his example of the glocal Shakespeare. Hence, what is perceived as an epistemological obstacle should once more be recognized as an ontological condition: the reason for the absence of a myriad of particular local literary phenomena from Moretti's or Casanova's mapping of world literature should perhaps be located not in their epistemological shortcomings, but in the ontological status of their object itself, that is, of world literature as something necessarily asymmetrical, discriminative, non-all. The lacunae
in these mappings may just as well represent the lacunae of world literature itself, that is, these mappings may turn out to be just that — mappings.

Read together, Moretti's theory of the literary world-system and Casanova's theory of the world republic of letters imply the irreducibility of cultural space to economy. According to Casanova, historically, the most influential center of the world republic of letters has been Paris, although France never became the core of the world-economy as considered by Moretti. Moreover, this irreducibility is already implied in each of these two projects: for Casanova, literary capitals are not mere projections of economic capitals (not even Pierre Bourdieu's inversely symmetrical projections), but enjoy the so-called relative autonomy ("Literature" 84-85). So too, Moretti, far from projecting the world-systems model onto world literature, sees in world literature a world-system of its own, with, again, France in its core ("More Conjectures" 77-78). Casanova therefore locates centers of world literature in geopolitical regions which were never at the center of the global capitalist system, that is, the system that Moretti views as homologous, but not identical, to world literature. And this is of course no coincidence, since the main source of both models — the source combined with Bourdieu's structuralist sociology in Casanova's case and updated with Wallerstein's world-systems analysis in Moretti's — is Fernand Braudel's economic historiography.

A synoptic reading of Casanova's and Moretti's thought can therefore yield results opposite to those arrived at by the existing attempts at such a reading. Instead of discarding the claim about an economic problematic shared by these two projects in the name of a culturalist alternative attributed to Damrosch, one can recognize its far from reductionist introduction of the economic perspective in Damrosch's account despite his adherence to Goethean and Marxian references to the world literary market. Moreover, such a reading can offer a different kind of third option: instead of a culturalist compromise it can refer a theorization of Moretti's and Casanova's kind to a theory of global capital such as Harvey's. Like Moretti, Harvey pays close attention to the findings of world-systems analysis, while locating like Casanova the "capital of modernity" in Paris, "a capital city being shaped by bourgeois power into a city of capital" (Paris 24). A model such as Harvey's can thus be welcomed as a synoptic reading of Casanova and Moretti avant la lettre. Such a reading can articulate world literature theory with critical globalization studies (as it is also becoming evident to literary studies, in which Harvey has recently been honored as a Welles Library Lecturer and an opening contributor to a Routledge reader on Literature and Globalization [see Harvey's Cosmopolitanism and "Time-Space"]).

Finally, a difference between the Goethean and Marxian economic analogy can be acknowledged: "To celebrate global literature today as a new and expanded form of Goethe's Weltliteratur ignores the fact that literature as a medium of cultural production no longer occupies the privileged place it once held in Goethe's age" (Huyssten 10). What separates us from Goethe is, however, not just the first pole of his comparison between world literature and the world market, but also the second: for Goethe, the market is still a neutral field of exchange (see Goethe 433-34), something that ever since the capitalist overdetermination of market economy has been forsaken for a tendency toward monopoly and oligopolies because "a totally free market, were it ever to exist, would make impossible the endless accumulation of capital" (Wallerstein 25). And if in the case of the first pole the difference between Goethe and us is ontological, in the second case it is merely epistemological insofar as Goethe neglected the fact that he lived in a world with a predominantly capitalist and not just market economy, the world that is also our own. This epistemological obstacle can be removed by moving from Goethe's comparison to Marx and Engels who acknowledged the capitalist character of the world market only two decades after Goethe's invention. As an argument for this move, my study can perhaps serve as a contribution to Moretti's goal to reproduce for literary studies the typical Wallerstein page where the "day of synthesis" takes up a third of the page and "years of analysis" everything else. A contribution, then, to making Graphs, Maps, Trees the introduction of the kind of work Wallerstein and Fernand Braudel wrote.

Note: I thank Rok Benčin, Marko Juvan, and Marko Kržan for commenting on my article.
Works Cited


Author's profile: Jernej Habjan conducts research at the Ljubljana Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts and in the University of München research project "Globalization and Literature." His interests in scholarship include the epistemologies of world literature studies, speech act theory, and deconstruction. His recent publications include "The Bestseller as the Black Box of Distant Reading," *Primerjalna književnost* (2012). E-mail: <jhabjan@zrc-sazu.si>