John Dewey's Philosophy of Education Before
Democracy and Education

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Introduction

John Dewey's Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, was published in 1916. It is still the best-known work in philosophy of education by an American author, and has remained in print down to the present time. Democracy and Education differs from many texts in the philosophy of education in that it was not written merely as a philosophy to be "applied" to education. It was made possible in large part by Dewey's participation in the Laboratory School at the University of Chicago from 1896 to 1904. Dewey's own experience with faculty and students at that school is the life of education for which Democracy and Education gives testimony. This is true as well for Dewey's shorter works on education written during and just after his involvement with the school, including School and Society, The Child and the Curriculum, and Moral Principles in Education. What is more, he was philosophy of education editor for Paul Monroe's Cyclopedia of Education and contributed a total of 118 articles to the five volumes of that work, 1911-1913. Reprinted in Dewey's Collected Works, these articles make up a total of 266 pages, sufficient for a volume in their own right. Looking at the articles alongside corresponding subject matter in Democracy and Education, one sees numerous examples of verbatim and slightly revised accounts of the former in the latter. When Dewey sat down to write Democracy and Education, he was well prepared by the work at the Laboratory School, his short books that were influenced by that work, as well as his thinking, teaching, and writing on related topics such as ethics, social theory, and logic.

Two other sources, less well known than his published works, but of value for what they show us of the origins of Dewey's philosophy of education, are stenographic records of two sets of lectures in philosophy of education, one in 1896, the other in 1899. The first consists of twelve lectures, 191 typewritten double-spaced pages (hereafter referred to as L1). These have no accompanying supplementary material, such as exact dates of each lecture, bibliography, syllabus, or outline. They were probably given by Dewey as lectures in the Lecture-Study Department of the University Extension, and then sent to students registered in an extension course, as was done for other lectures. The 1896 lectures have not been published.

The second set (hereafter referred to as L2) was found in Grinnell College Library by Reginald Archambault, and published in 1966. These lectures were given in a course in the Winter Quarter, 1899, beginning on January 3 and ending on March 24. This course is announced in the University of Chicago Register for 1898-1899. It is accompanied by a detailed Syllabus with an extensive bibliography. The course met three times a week: it consists of a total of 33 lectures, making up 300 pages in its printed form. L2, then, is longer and more detailed than L1. Yet L2 is not just a longer version of L1. Dewey did not give a shorter and a longer version of the "same" course. While much of the same ground is covered in both sets of lectures, the organization changes from L1 to L2 so that similar ideas are presented in different contexts. Dewey was thinking through the subject matter in each case while searching for different ways to make his ideas clear. Although Archambault's edition of the 1899 lectures has been available since 1966, it appears not to be well known; references to it appear very seldom in the literature on Dewey. We shall treat both L1 and L2 as little-known works. (In referencing them we shall indicate each set, followed by the numbers of the lectures. Thus, L1, 3 refers to the 1896 lectures, Lecture 3.)

L1 and L2 share much ground in common with Democracy and Education. Yet they are both "less" and "more" than that work. They are less in that certain ideas that appear in the 1916 work do not appear in L1 and L2. Some of these are also found in the Cyclopedia articles of 1911-1913. It is apparent that Dewey did a lot of thinking, teaching, and writing on educational theory between 1896 as preparation for Democracy and Education. At the same time, L1 and L2 are more than Dewey's 1916 work in that certain details presented in the lectures do not appear in Democracy and Education or take a smaller role there. It is clear that many of these details are based on examples of ideas that were being tried out in the Laboratory School, along with the activities that made up the trying. In 1896, the year of L1, the school opened; and in 1899, the year of L2, the school was in its fourth year. Thus in discussing philosophy of education, the work of the school was very much on Dewey's mind; and in the activities of the

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school, his philosophy of education was at work. Dewey's illustrations of philosophical, sociological, and ethical ideas by specific educational examples embody his lectures with a kind of immediacy, a vibrant sense of the interrelationship of theory and action. We might say that his lectures are sustained by particulars even as they are general; and that Democracy and Education, while not lacking in particulars, is largely concerned with the general perspective that gives them meaning.

In this essay, we shall portray the relationship between L1 and L2 on one hand, and Democracy and Education on the other, in terms of three categories: (1) common ground shared by the lectures and the published work; (2) the most essential ways in which L1 and L2 complement Democracy and Education; and (3) the most essential ways in which Democracy and Education complements L1 and L2.

Common Ground

Dewey's idea that education is reconstruction of experience is perhaps the most striking element shared by the lectures and the later work, although the idea is introduced in a different context in each.

Dewey's definition of education "as the process of the reconstruction of experience, giving it a more socialized value through the medium of increased individual efficiency" comes in L1, 2. In L2, the definition does not come until lecture 12, with a slight restating: "the medium of increased individual efficiency" is now "the medium of increase of control of experience." In Democracy and Education, the definition is introduced in Chapter VI, again somewhat recast to say that reconstruction of experience "adds to the meaning of experience, and . . . increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience" (89-90).

In L1, 2 Dewey divides the definition into two parts, and discusses (1) the process of education as process, and (2) the character or content of the process. Under (1) he points out that the definition identifies the process with the aim. In doing so, he distinguishes this kind of process with various positions that set up aims external to the process—e.g., preparing for life in the future, or attaining a certain kind of moral character for the future. The definition that identifies process with aim, Dewey argues, refers to "the only learning which is really educative . . . the learning which emerges in and through the process of learning itself." Under (2) Dewey points out that the quality of the process comes in two interrelated phases; one is social, the other is individual. The meaning of experience, he says, is the "social side," while the agent of experience is the individual one. Then he argues that the two are "phases of one and the same process." By emphasizing the individual as agent in reconstructing experience, generic conception; (2) in terms of end or aim, increase of social value in experience is intended; (3) in terms of method, the aim is to bring experience more and more under the control of the individual. In discussing what is involved in the idea of reconstruction, Dewey here says that making "is just as good at one point as it is at any other." That is, it is not finished at any point, inasmuch as making is both the aim and the process, rather than preparation for some aim outside the process. In terms of subject matter, it is not formulated without respect for the child and then presented by lecture, teacher, or textbook. Rather, subject matter "consists simply in . . . bringing to consciousness the facts which are involved in the child as he is." In both L1 and L2 Dewey emphasizes the idea that reconstruction is both aim and process, and that the psychological can realize its possibilities in what they mean for social life. In L1 he introduces the definition rather abruptly, as if the remaining lectures are to be an elaboration of it; while in L2 he works up to it in eleven lectures, using the earlier lectures as a context for its emerging. In particular, in L2, 9 Dewey argues that, if we take seriously the idea that a philosophic conception of education must take into account both the psychological and sociological dimensions, then definitions of education which focus exclusively on one dimension are one-sided. In a progressive society, he says, we cannot treat the development of the harmonious powers of the individual without reference to adjustment of the individual to social conditions. It is futile to adjust the individual to existing social conditions, inasmuch as they are changing. We must treat individuals as able to use intelligence to formulate and solve problems as they arise. Thus individuals are to serve society, not as it now exists, but by taking into account the changes they intend to be part of the makeup of a society different from the one that now exists.

In Democracy and Education, Dewey reaches his definition of education in the third part of Chapter VI, "Education as Conservative and Progressive," after discussing two "conservative" conceptions of education: (1) Herbart's, which Dewey calls "education as formation," inasmuch as Herbart denies that education is a process of "unfolding" from within or a training of mental faculties; rather, presentations to the mind from without eventually constitute the mind. (2) The idea that education comes about through recapitulating certain cultural products from the past; this idea usually took some form of the "culture epoch theory." In contrasting these conceptions with the ideal of growth, Dewey holds that education is a reorganizing or reconstituting of experience, leading him to a definition of education as reconstruction of experience that virtually echoes the definitions of L1 and L2 (Dewey, 1916, 88-89). As in L2, Dewey works gradually up to the definition, placing it at the conclusion of the sixth chapter, which readies his readers for Chapter VII, "The Democratic Conception in Education." Later, he argues that
education as reconstruction is essential to vocational education and to the reconstruction of philosophy, social ideals, and methods.

Ways in Which L1 and L2 Complement Democracy and Education

The problem of correlation occupies Dewey’s attention at length in L1 and L2—in L1, lectures 5 and 6; in L2, lectures 18-23. Dewey says the problem came about as an attempt to relieve the over-crowding and congestion of subjects that made it difficult for students to get an overall sense of what they were studying. The idea was to find ways of connecting the various studies with one another (L1, 5; cf. L2, 18). The danger, Dewey says, is that attempts to tie together various parts of the curriculum tend to be superficial; what is needed instead is an overhauling of the curriculum.

It is not enough to accept the various independent parts of the curriculum and then attempt somehow to cross-reference them. Rather, there is a deeper problem: whether there is any organic unity in the material of experience that is used in instruction, “and whether there is a corresponding unity in the mental processes which apprehend and assimilate this material” (L1, 5).

Dewey attacks the problem by distinguishing two aspects: (1) One regards the unity of subject matter. If there is a unity in experience, we must set out to discover it, and see how it is differentiated in the various subject matters. Or, “we must discover what the vital system of experience is and how each study operates like an organ of an organism to contribute its part to the whole” (L1, 5). (2) The other aspect is the problem of how the individual experiences the subject matter. In other words, if there is unity in experience, is there a corresponding unity in the processes the individual uses in making “the stuff of experience” his own? Put differently, there are two interconnected questions: the problem of what (that of subject matter), and the problem of how (that of method).

In both L1 and L2, Dewey points to two theories of correlation that fail to recognize the interconnection. One is that of William Torrey Harris, who views correlation from the standpoint of subject matter, almost ignoring the process by which the learner approaches the subject matter. The other is the Herbartian viewpoint, which recognizes the importance of unity in the mental processes of individuals but does not see the need for unity of subject matter.

The problem with Harris’ view, Dewey argues, is that of isolating subject matter from the ways in which children come to relate to it. Dewey disputes the view that the mind first isolates subject matter and then relates to it in a logical process (L1, 5). The problem with the Herbartian view is that it begins with a number of psychological states of conscious-
need to begin with their own experience, and from that move on to higher expressions of it, to make “literature” out of their own experience (L2, 20).

More prominent also in L1 and L2 than in Democracy and Education are “stages” of child development, which arose in the context of Dewey’s discussion of correlation. In arguing that Harris, the Herbartians and advocates of the culture epoch theory did not adequately take into account the “powers” of children at various stages of their development in relation to the subject matters which they are able to comprehend at those stages, Dewey gives an account of the “typical stages in the organization of experience and the corresponding educational epochs” (L1, 5). (1) “The child begins with an unconscious unity of experience, both on the social and individual side.” This is to say that, at first, the child does not clearly distinguish himself from others. “Each experience . . . occupies his entire consciousness and forms his whole world.” The educational problem is how to retain the child’s “organic wholeness” and yet acknowledge the separate pieces as they emerge out of it (L1, 5). (2) In the second period of development the child begins to specialize, to differentiate ends which he is able to have in view. Gradually the child consciously chooses certain ends in preference to others; hence certain values emerge. Dewey points out that both specialization — the selecting and valuing of certain ends and activities—as well as interrelation—the need to adapt each end to other ends in ways that fit together—are going on (L1, 5). (3) In the highest period of development, “specialization becomes a controlling principle in action” (L1, 15).

Dewey portrays the three typical “epochs” of education that correspond to these stages in development of experience. (1) The first is primary education, whose problem is “to present social life as a whole and in a rich orderly way to the child.” The aim is not what the child learns in definite acquisitions so much as it is “in filling out, in an orderly way, of the child’s own consciousness,” thus building up “the social whole” (L1, 5). (2) The second is secondary education, the period in which selection and specialized interests develop. From the social side, the child can use subject matters to understand their social use and “ethical import.” From the psychological side the child can work with remoter ends than those in primary school, and can select and adjust means with respect to those ends. Thus specialized subjects, such as history, mathematics, and science can come to attention as the earlier unity of experience gets to be broken up as the child gains control of the methods of the various subjects. Correlation can be attained as the child uses each subject matter to throw light on the others as well as on various other dimensions of his experience that are not confined to the typical subject matters. Correlation, Dewey says, is found “on the side of function or use”; “on the side of the adaptation of any act or idea to help in the attainment of another idea, or to give an enlarged meaning of it” (L1, 5). (3) The third is higher education, in which the aim is “to get control of the methods of investigation and reflection in use in various subjects independent of any immediate use of which these methods may be put” (L1, 5).

In both L1 and L2, Dewey spends much time discussing the curriculum from the standpoint of what he calls “constructive” activities, or the activities human beings undertake in their everyday occupations. In L1, 7 the point of departure is the opposition between the study of nature and the study of humanity, or the dualism between nature and man. When the studies are opposed to one another, each suffers from “an arbitrary isolation,” which leads Dewey to a discussion of the relationship between the scientific branches of the curriculum and those classed as humanities—history and literature.

Dewey then discusses ways in which each group of subjects can be placed in relation to the other. Man’s constructive power, he says, is the beginning of the matter. This is significant, not just for physical life, but for moral and social life as well. The true meaning of adaptation to the environment is “adaptation of the environment to self, rather than literal adjustment of self to the environment.” Thus human beings become conscious of the power of control, by subordinating physical forces to themselves. Or, “man comes to consciousness of himself as an end,” and the possibility of making other things a means to this end. “The greatest tool,” Dewey says, “is the idea of tools” (L1, 7).

Dewey then points out how science is the great instrument in developing our constructive activity, and adds that “history is precisely that projection of the process of evolution upon the plane of consciousness” (L1, 7). Thus history is seen as an instrument for realizing social ends; it connects our constructive activities with the development of natural science. Literature is taken to be an expression of ways in which our “experiences have a value which goes beyond their momentary occurrence.” It is “the expression of man’s consciousness of the more permanent and enduring values of his experience” (L1, 7). Literature is intimately connected with history; the latter “might be termed the literature which is authentic” (L1, 7). In this sense history is a species of literature.

The fine arts, in terms of their mode of operation, their form, are constructive activities; as to their meaning, they belong to literature. “Any constructive activity becomes artistic as soon as it is operated, not for its own special or immediate aim alone, but insofar as the one at work is capable of seeing, in what he is doing, the whole system of social purposes” (L1, 7; cf. L2, 3). Connections that Dewey sees between the natural sciences, history, literature, and the arts, portray the idea of relating, rather than separating, the various subjects of the curriculum. The aim is to enable the one
who produces to feel himself “as a social organ, reflecting in his own work the life of the community in which he belongs and contributing to its elevation” (LI, 7).

In the educational consideration of constructive activities, Dewey sees them as representing “the fundamental processes and instruments through which society has made itself what it is, in the subordination of nature to human ends” (LI, 7). He thinks that sympathy — between those “who labor with their hands and those who do not”—might be developed if everyone at sometime participated in some sort of productive labors. “Sympathy needs a common background sharing in common experience to be real and effective” (LI, 7). Here we see why, in the Laboratory School, students and teachers shared in preparing meals and other everyday activities.

While there are numerous examples in LI of ideas that were tried out in the Laboratory School, lectures 7 and 8 can be read as the theory on which the first two chapters of School and Society are based. The examples of children’s activities in shop, kitchen, and story-telling discussed there are anticipated in Dewey’s characterizations of the relationships sought between constructive activities, science, literature, and history in the lectures. Dewey distinguishes between two forms of constructive activity. First is the kind which shapes material directly, such as clay modeling, sand molding, whittling, and wood carving. This includes work with saws and planes on wood, sewing, and weaving. Second is the kind of activity which not only changes space relations, but also changes the nature of the materials, such as cooking.

In addition to considering constructive activities as processes, they may be considered in their social relationships, as in food, clothing, and shelter as fundamental social necessities. The processes become more diversified with richer and more varied results. In performing these activities, Dewey says, the individual “gets organs for appreciation of the part which they play in life” (LI, 8). Dewey calls attention to the opportunities for studying science that constructive activities can provide. Such work calls attention to the nature of materials. Constructive activities can also be occasions for introducing elements of measurement, and so mathematics can be made explicit. Questions of shape, size, nature of materials, can lead to geography. Sewing and cooking are activities that naturally lead to the study of plants and animals as sources of fibers, and to measuring of materials and the chemical changes that come about in cooking.

Dewey thinks the practical problem in history is to find ways to simplify the great mass of existing historical material in order to bring it within reach of children. Or, “the problem of history is how to make it a means of present social life instead of a series of events which are past and gone” (LI, 8). A way to make this kind of connection between past and present, Dewey argues, is through children’s constructive activities. To begin with the historical epoch of primitive men (“existing civilization reduced to its lowest terms”) the school can show something of the ways in which problems of obtaining food, clothing, and shelter can be presented in a rudimentary form. The introduction of tools, contrasting the hardships of primitive civilization with the life of today, helps children get a glimpse into the underlying forces that human experience has had to deal with. Thus history becomes an introduction to social life. “All history,” Dewey thinks, “should be an indirect sociology” (LI, 8; cf. L2, 26).

Another topic holding a prominent place in the lectures, but a minor one in Democracy and Education, is the place of images in learning. In LI, Dewey brings up the subject by saying that whenever something remains which is got from experience, then something has been learned (LI, 9). From the psychological side, building up of experience takes place through the image. If learning is a transition from non-realization to realization, the image is the “exact corresponding of the transition.” Being neither a state of ignorance nor a state of “complete wisdom,” the image is the bridge from one to the other (LI, 9; L2, 33). We have experiences, and later we turn them into images—formulations of experiences already had. Out of the mass of what we have gone through, we select some portions and ignore others; thus we construct certain images by which we are led on to further experience. “The image, being the instrument through which the new experience is built up, must be regarded like any tool” (LI, 9). Each image has its “motor fringe,” its tendency to bring on change. A young child tends to do something when an image comes to him. An older child can hold onto a train of ideas before acting on them. This means that learning can be initiated and maintained when conditions are provided for forming and expanding images. “The moral effect,” Dewey says, “comes through the fact that every image tends, sooner or later, to reflect itself in actual doing, because it is itself a partial doing, or forming coordination” (LI, 9).

As the image is the medium of building new experience, Dewey says, “It is the sole and only instrument of learning.” From the psychological side, teaching works on “the question of what images are formed in the child’s mind” (LI, 10). So far as learning is concerned, perception, memory, and logical thinking are various ways in which images are used: they are not distinct “faculties” of the mind. What are called faculties are concrete abilities to work in certain ways. They are “practical powers,” so that when we say that someone is a good observer, we are saying that he has a practical power of observing, not that he possesses a faculty of observing (LI, 10).

An image is not a mechanical copy of an earlier experience, but “is a reproduction of that experience adapted to help get some new experience” (LI, 10). To develop an image requires a reference to some end sought to which an im-
age from the past may be useful. Dewey emphasizes the activity of an image; because it is a particular doing in a particular situation, one "cannot be formed excepting as the self has something to do." This in turn means that there must be "something to be got out through the doing" (L1, 10). Again, this is a reference to an end sought and to the idea that an image "is itself a partial doing."

Ways in Which Democracy and Education Complements L1 and L2

One striking difference between L1 and L2 and Democracy and Education is that L1 and L2 do not discuss explicitly the nature of philosophy of education, while the 1916 work does. Of course, the subject is broached in both sets of lectures: In L1, 1 Dewey begins by saying that "the philosophy of education has the problem of discovering what the value of education is in human experience"; and in L2, 1 he says that the purpose of the course is to state general principles of education in philosophic form. Yet in neither L1 nor L2 does he explicitly discuss the nature of philosophy of education at length. In L1 and L2 he is "doing" philosophy of education without telling us what he is doing.

In Democracy and Education, Dewey does philosophy of education for 23 chapters and tells us what philosophy of education is in Chapter 24. i.e., he tells us what he had been doing for 23 chapters. We find his now-famous definition of philosophy "as the general theory of education," which had appeared in Paul Monroe's Cyclopedia of Education in 1913 (Vol. IV, 699). In Democracy and Education Dewey makes explicit what he had been doing in L1 and L2 by saying that "Philosophy is thinking what the known demands of us—what responsive attitude it exacts. It is an idea of what is possible, not a record of accomplished fact. Hence it is hypothetical, like all thinking" (Democracy and Education, 381). In L1 and L2 Dewey had been setting forth ideas of what is possible in education, as responses to what he thinks the known demanded of him.

In the Cyclopedia article and in Democracy and Education, Dewey related the history of philosophy to the origins of educational theory in the response of Plato to the claims of the Sophists that they could teach "virtue," the practical knowledge needed to conduct oneself in private and public life. Those responses were attempts to answer questions such as: What is the relationship of reason to conduct? What is virtue—a kind of knowledge, custom, or opinion? What is its relationship to change? If philosophy is to be related to living, Dewey argues, it must be something other than "speculation"; "it must be animated by the conviction that its theory is a hypothesis that is realized only as experience is actually shaped in accord with it" (Cyclopedia, Vol. IV, 701). Dewey's point is that Athenian philosophy and educational theory had a common origin in social problems, that Athenian philosophy and educational theory share the same problems. "Education," Dewey writes in Democracy and Education, "is the laboratory in which philosophic distinctions become concrete and are tested" (384). This is what he was working on in L1, L2, and Democracy and Education. And from 1896 to 1904 the Laboratory School was a specific laboratory in which certain philosophic distinctions were tested.

Certain topics discussed at length in L1 and L2 are either given little attention or attended to as parts of different contexts in Democracy and Education. For example, the problem of correlation, treated at length in 1896 and 1899, is not found in the index of the 1916 work. The place of constructive activities in schools, and their bridge to more formal subject matters, is hardly discussed in its own right in Democracy and Education; it is found in the context of play and work in the curriculum, labor and leisure, and intellectual and practical studies. Space devoted to Herbartian ideas and to the culture epoch theory in Democracy and Education is confined to the examples of the "conservative" role of these theories in the chapter, "Education as Conservative and Progressive." There Herbartianism is an example of "education as formation." In a telling description, Dewey says that, for Herbart, "The 'furniture' of the mind is the mind. Mind is wholly a matter of 'contents'" (82). The culture epoch theory is portrayed under the heading, "Education as an example of recapitulation and retrospection." His criticism of the recapitulation theorists' emphasis on the study of literature echoes that of L1 and L2: "Literatures produced in the past are, so far as men are now in possession and use of them, a part of the present environment of individuals; but there is an enormous difference between availing ourselves of them as present resources and taking them as standards and patterns in their retrospective character" (86). In Democracy and Education these two conservative theories are contrasted with, and constitute the opportunity to introduce Dewey's definition of education as reconstruction of experience.

Another obvious difference is in the attention given to the place of images in learning. As we have seen, Dewey discussed images at length in L1 and L2, going so far as to say in L1, 10 that, as the image is the medium of building new experience, "it is the sole and only instrument of learning." Imagination continued to be important for expanding and enriching experience in Democracy and Education, but its discussion there makes up about three pages in the chapter "Educational Values." There it comes under the heading, "The nature of realization or appreciation," where Dewey writes, "Only a personal response involving imagination can possibly procure realization even of pure 'facts.' The imagination is the medium of appreciation in any field" (276).
The appeal of *Democracy and Education* lies in the way in which Dewey shows how the ideas implied in a democratic society need to be tested in education. The appeal of L.1 and L.2 lies in Dewey's casting those ideas at work in a living "embryonic society," the Laboratory School.

References


