Dewey and Cosmopolitanism

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Many people rightly consider John Dewey a distinctively American thinker. He was born into a time-honored New England culture. He was educated in American schools. He lived and worked virtually his entire life in the United States. He had a lifelong respect for American traditions in poetry, literature, philosophy, and more. He was active in political and cultural movements, ranging from the protection of free speech to the right of teachers to unionize. For over a century his educational philosophy has influenced educators across the fifty states. He has had a wide-ranging impact on several streams of American thought, among them pragmatism. If Ralph Waldo Emerson had written after rather than before Dewey, he might have called Dewey “A Representative Man,” embodying much that is original and hopeful about the American prospect.¹

There is at least one other Dewey, however, fused with his familiar American avatar. This Dewey expressed in his writing a deep and abiding interest in the world writ large. This Dewey enunciated ideas and points of view as a philosopher in and of the world: as if the provenance of his thought had no national or otherwise predetermined boundaries, and as if the meanings in his thought were not preshaped by wherever his desk and typewriter happened to be. This Dewey was cosmopolitan. In what follows I will sketch some aspects of this claim. After providing a brief account of cosmopolitanism, I will focus upon Dewey’s philosophy of education where many of his cosmopolitan impulses come most generatively alive.

A Cosmopolitan Orientation

A cosmopolitan outlook embodies more than open-mindedness as conventionally understood. Rather it fuses reflective openness to the world with reflective loyalty to local roots, traditions, and practices. Cosmopolitanism presumes individual and cultural distinctiveness. It would vanish in a homogenized world. “Reflective” openness to the world connotes awareness, mindfulness, and responsiveness. It echoes what Dewey describes as a “readiness to learn” from life.² It is not “empty-
mindedness,” as if the person or community must throw out a welcome mat to any influence from the world. Rather, a cosmopolitan orientation embodies a considered receptivity toward and appreciation of the unfathomable variability that marks the human world.

Reflective loyalty toward the local mirrors the fact that a cosmopolitan orientation necessitates a sense of home. A person may feel at home in a culture, town, region, and language while also retaining reflective openness to new perspectives and ideas. But a person may feel equally or more rooted in a practice or vocation: for example, in a transcultural, transnational, and transpersonal community of scholars, doctors, poets, teachers, entrepreneurs, sailors, and so forth. Put another way, a cosmopolitan-minded person is always “leaving home” in the bubbled, closed, or walled-in sense of that term. The person recognizes, if not in so many words, the illusion of isolation. It is no more conceivable to shield oneself from the incessant influence of the world than it is to stop the sunrise or turn of the tide. What human beings can do is respond to that influence in more rather than less efficacious ways: those which allow them to sustain individual and cultural continuity through the vicissitudes of ongoing change.

A cosmopolitan-minded person does not reject home out of hand—with home understood, once more, as referring either to a geographical location or to a vocational one. To be sure, such “homes” themselves sometimes reject people. Consider the countless individuals and communities who have been exiled from or otherwise oppressed in their natal locales. The record of suffering ranges from Jews in Germany persecuted for their cosmopolitanism, to alleged enemies of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia condemned for their openness to alternative views, to the individual painter, poet, or scholar shunned by a community as not “loyal” enough to current standards and practices. Historically, cosmopolitanism has constituted a psychic, spiritual, and material refuge for many persons exiled by local community. And yet, it has served this function precisely by generating alternative senses of home, without which the orientation cannot be sustained (cosmopolitanism is not a synonym with open-mindedness nor with rootlessness). These remarks attest to the educational challenge as well as invitation embodied in cosmopolitanism. I take up below why Dewey provides valuable insight into both the difficulty and the opportunity contained in the idea.

A cosmopolitan orientation makes it possible for persons to appreciate that much more fully and reflectively their inheritances, roots and traditions. Through genuine encounters with other outlooks—as contrasted with consumerist samplings of diversity—people can come to see, perhaps for the first time, the significance in the very notion of human and cultural inheritance. A person may migrate beyond her or his natal roots, either literally or figuratively. From a cosmopolitan perspective this posture does not ipso facto entail a break with them. People can and often do reconstruct their perspective toward all that has given them not just a start in life but life itself. But this life is not final or terminal, as if culture necessarily imprisons human beings rather than, in contrast, giving them a working standpoint from
which to begin to consider the new and the unknown—and thereby to reconsider the old and the familiar. This process can be difficult; there are ambiguities, confusions, doubts, and sometimes conflicts persons will need to confront. As suggested above, these facts conjure the need for education. In a broad philosophical sense, the key distinctions that the analysis here raises are not between the cosmopolitan and the local, whose relations can in fact be seen as symbiotic, but rather between cosmopolitanism and uncritical or dogmatic universalism, on the one hand, and between the local and parochialism or dogmatic communalism or individualism, on the other hand. All of this is why a cosmopolitan orientation can be framed as a fusion of reflective openness to the world and reflective loyalty toward the local.4

**Dewey and the Cosmopolitan**

With this sketch of a cosmopolitan orientation in hand, let us turn to a portrait of Dewey as a cosmopolitan philosopher and consider a few of its brush-strokes.

Dewey evinces a profound curiosity and passion for what can be called “the space between.” This space resides between the self-that-was and the self-in-formation; between the community yesterday and the community today; between the point-of-view-that-was and the new point of view; between the way of life that had been treated as given and the way of life now seen as art-full. For Dewey, this space exerts a magnetic pull for anyone awake and alert to it. It beckons persons. It calls upon them to step forward. It urges them toward creativity, toward expressivity, toward inhabiting the world that much more fully, which is to say reflectively and appreciatively. Its gesture is universal and egalitarian: the space between is for anyone to enter, anywhere and anytime, whether in a traditional or transforming cultural context, and whether as a farmer, parent, teacher, business person, airline pilot, street cleaner, or professional athlete. The fact that some individuals and communities have historically been denied the opportunity or resources to participate in this creative space reflects its compelling human value.

The space between is also temporal in character. It denotes initiations and completions, beginnings and endings, points of departure and points of arrival. To capture this movement in space and time, Dewey deploys the concept “interest,” to which he lends a catalytic character. Interest in its singular form differs from interests in the plural, in which people speak of “their” interests or “our” interests as if these were possessions or set markers of identity. Interest in its singular form is a useful name, according to Dewey, for a process of engagement in and with the world. Interest marks out the dynamic, unpredictable, yet decisively generative time and space between the beginning and the culmination or consummation of activity.

In his philosophical anthropology Dewey argues that person and interest are two names for the same phenomenon. In his view, a person is not a finished, complete, or fixed entity, however much the person’s habits may run in a steady rhythm or well-worn groove. Rather a person, in principle, is in fact in continuous formation through the crucible of what he or she participates in and the manner or style in which he or she participates. Thus, for Dewey, to all intents and purposes person
and interest fuse: the person dwells in and through the process that is interest, in
and through the space and time that is interest.

Education for Dewey is a name for identifying and highlighting the quality
of the movement in what I have dubbed the space between. Does that movement
expand, deepen, and enrich the person? Or does it render the person more narrow-
minded, shallower in their thinking, more impoverished in imagination? Does it
have a social and moral quality? Does it substantiate the person with a social con-
sciousness and fortify her or him to speak, to act, to participate in the affairs of the
world to the extent that strength, resources, and circumstances allow? It is not that
interest begins in social or public interaction, or that solitude and self-cultivation
are unimportant. Rather, it is that the latter gain depth and significance precisely
through participation in the larger human and natural world.

Dewey’s vision is universal in scope, a fact that mirrors the idea mentioned
previously that the space between is itself universal and egalitarian as a condition
in the world. But Dewey’s view is not universalistic in the sense of prescribing a
particular method or trajectory for his fellow human beings. As is well known,
Dewey has been criticized for leaving open-ended core concepts such as growth and
reconstruction. But precisely here is where I discern a cosmopolitan as contrasted
with universalizing voice in his work. Cosmopolitanism and universalism are not
synonyms. Cosmopolitanism puts forward what I characterized earlier as a lived
fusion of reflective openness to the world and reflective loyalty toward the local. This
orientation does not presume or express an aprioristic foundation or pre-established
metaphysical ground. A cosmopolitan outlook positions one to be on the lookout
for new ground, for creating new ground, for imagining ground which is not yet,
in which diverse people in a changing world can grow meaningful lives.

Consider once more Dewey’s view that interest and person (or self) are two
names for the same phenomenon. “The self is not something ready-made,” he
argues, “but something in continuous formation through choice of action.” He
emphasizes that “the kind and amount of interest actively taken in a thing reveals
and measures the quality of selfhood which exists. . . . Interest means the active or
moving identity of the self with a certain object.” In Dewey’s view, the fundamental
“object” with which a growing self identifies is “learning from all the contacts in
life”—not just some contacts, not just those which are familiar and comfortable,
but all of them. The person closes the door on nothing, at least not in an a priori
way, but first engages the world, learns from it and in it, and judges accordingly.
Interest, he writes elsewhere, “mean[s] that self and world are engaged with each
other in a developing situation.” Persons can come to respond rather than merely
react to the world’s incessant influence and change.

Thus the cosmopolitan dimension of Dewey’s thought can be summarized
in what we might call cosmopolitan interest—that interest in learning from all the
contacts of life which becomes, in effect, a way of dwelling in the space between, a
way of inhabiting not the world nor the local in some kind of “pure” form but rather
their interaction within the person’s or community’s experience. The powerful con-
ception of teaching and learning Dewey elucidates in texts such as *The Child and the Curriculum*, *The School and Society*, and chapters 8-14 of *Democracy and Education* can be read as an attempt to help teachers and students inhabit the space between.

That space is also where democracy “happens.” I do not find it coincidental that in *Democracy and Education* Dewey does not address the idea of democracy until after he has characterized his conception of education. The latter pivots around notions of communication, interaction, and what it means to grow as a human being in intellectual, moral, ethical, aesthetic, and social terms. Put another way, for Dewey, education constitutes the continued reconstruction of experience, by which he means a process of continually learning from experience and using the results of that learning to shape subsequent experience. Education involves developing habits or arts of listening, speaking, attending, contemplating, and acting. The most fundamental habit of all is the habit of keeping habit itself responsive, dynamic, and expansive. Such a habit positions the person to develop her or his bent as fully as possible while also interacting richly and responsibly with other people.

In chapter 7 of *Democracy and Education*, Dewey poses the question, What kind of political community will best support this conception of education? Put another way, what relational order will most likely support every human being in realizing as fully as possible her or his unique potential? Dewey finds the answer in democracy. But democracy does not provide the answer. The idea of democracy does not dictate what kind of education people need and deserve. For Dewey the concept denotes more than a system of laws, regulations, and institutions, indispensable as they are. More importantly, democracy’s root is the demos, the people—all people, not just a select few. Democracy comes alive, or is realized, in concrete interaction between people. It has no other existence. As Dewey famously writes: “A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.”9 Democracy happens when people exchange thoughts in a meaningful way around a meal, when they share views in the shop or at the public park, when they comment on common concerns on email or over the phone, and in countless other venues. All such exchanges contribute to an ethos that encourages more of the same.

Democracy never begins de novo or from scratch. It cannot be manufactured or brought about by fiat. According to Dewey, democracy takes form through ongoing modes of communication and interaction. Formal education and other supportive institutions can strengthen, deepen, and widen these modes, all of which in turn further substantiate a democratic ethos. In short, Dewey envisions a reciprocal dynamic: a dialectic of the informal and the formal, the spontaneous and the guided, the organic and the organized, the tacit and the explicit. At the center of all this, once again, is the concept of interest: interest and self as two names for the same phenomenon; what he later calls “public interest”10 as a term of art for the emergence of shared concern regarding the consequences of particular actions and events; and what I am calling cosmopolitan interest as the fusion of reflective openness and reflective loyalty in experience.
Dewey and Cosmopolitanism

Dewey and the Challenge and Invitation in Cosmopolitan Education

Dewey evokes in his writing a picture not just of a genuine democratic way of life in the United States, but also of a world realm of human beings learning at all times the arts of communication—which is to say the arts of listening to others whose views may differ, of speaking even or especially when others may disagree, and of retaining tenacious patience in the face of difficulty such that people learn the ways of peace rather than merely replay the ways of violence. Dewey is perfectly aware that such a world realm does not exist and that, moreover, there are ever-evolving, ever-powerful forces militating against it. But as I read him, he thinks and writes as if this realm was not a utopian pipe-dream but in fact realizable in the here and now—whenever, wherever, and however there is genuine communication. These often spontaneous expressions of cosmopolitan community do not materialize dramatically and noisily, at least not typically. Rather their mode of expression is usually ordinary, everyday, word by word, act by act, in which one can discern—if one pays attention—qualities of receptivity and of subtle transformation in outlook and conduct.

At various junctures in his writing Dewey suggests that this outlook is rooted not in a given nation or state but rather in everyday exchanges and arrangements that reach across prefigured borders. Dewey writes as if cosmopolitan community constitutes a viable and productive ideal, with such a community denoting not transnational organizations per se but rather modes of interacting or transacting between self, other, and world. His reflections on cosmopolitanism appear in a particularly telling form in Democracy and Education, in the celebrated chapter on the democratic idea in education I touched on above. Dewey traces the evolution and substance of cosmopolitan ideas circulating during the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, and he argues that they retain a contemporary vitality. He concludes his reflections as follows: “The secondary and provisional character of national sovereignty in respect to the fuller, freer, and more fruitful association and intercourse of all human beings with one another must be instilled as a working disposition of mind.”

Compare this penultimate claim with the equally striking conclusion to his well-known article, “The Need for a Philosophy of Education,” published nearly twenty years later. Writing against a backdrop of the tumultuous 1930s, Dewey condemns the widespread prevalence of violence, racism, nationalism, and voracious capitalism, and considers how education might respond to such an environment. He writes: “In a world that has so largely engaged in a mad, often brutal, race for material gain by means of ruthless competition the school must make ceaseless and intelligently organized effort to develop above all else the will for cooperation and the spirit which sees in every other individual an equal right to share in the cultural and material fruits of collective human invention, industry, skill and knowledge.”

Here he describes a cosmopolitan orientation as a mirror to what he calls “collective” or world human creativity and artistry. He captures cosmopolitan interest,
itself the reflection of a cosmopolitan self in which mind and character have fused in such way as not only to combat “the spirit of inhumanity” bred by contemporary conditions but to also to fortify self and others to transform conditions so that they fuel a more just and enriching life for all.

Dewey respects the political consequences of his outlook. Like Immanuel Kant before him he marks out the substance of the cosmopolitan challenge. “Is it possible for an educational system,” he writes, “to be conducted by a national state and yet the full social ends of the educative process not be restricted, constrained, and corrupted?”13 Over one hundred years earlier, Kant had written that “Sovereigns look upon their subjects merely as tools for their own purposes . . . [while] parents usually educate their children merely in such a manner that, however bad the world may be, they may adapt themselves to its present conditions.”14 Kant finds these impulses understandable and indicates this by his use of the term “merely.” In other words, he is not suggesting parents should not try to help their children learn how to adapt and survive, nor that sovereigns (or politicians) should never try to influence citizens to support a particular platform. The danger he has in mind concerns the consequence of the “merely” becoming “only,” or, put differently, becoming the dominant impulse rather than one lodged in an empowering vision of human possibility.

Dewey’s and Kant’s recognition of the challenge to cosmopolitanism calls to mind the question whether its actual realization requires a radical new political order: to wit, a “cosmopolis” with governmental institutions to which all would be bound, a system of laws that would obtain everywhere, and other such structures. Like Kant before him, Dewey rejects the idea of a formal world government, whose potentially totalitarian implications were not lost on him. Nonetheless to sustain cosmopolitan relations between persons and communities does require institutional support. Dewey remarks that one reason the eighteenth-century cosmopolitan ideal expressed with such elegance by the likes of Montesquieu and Kant floundered on the shores of emergent nationalism was that it lacked formal structures of support:

One of the fundamental problems of education in and for a democratic society is set by the conflict of a nationalistic and a wider social aim. The earlier cosmopolitan and ‘humanitarian’ conception suffered both from vagueness and from lack of definite organs of execution and agencies of administration. In Europe, in the Continental states particularly, the new idea of the importance of education for human welfare and progress was captured by national interests and harnessed to do a work whose social aim was definitely narrow and exclusive. The social aim of education and its national aim were identified, and the result was a marked obscuring of the meaning of a social aim.15

Leonard Waks rightly points out that that Dewey affirmed at various points in his writing and public speaking the need for genuinely cross-national, cross-governmental juridical and constitutional structures that would have binding force, that would at the very least serve as a genuine check on oppressive practices either
between or within particular nations. The limitation I see in Dewey’s explicit remarks on this score is that they are often juxtaposed, ironically, with a mode of self-congratulatory American exceptionalism. For example, at the close of World War I he contends that “In working out to realization the ideas of federation and of the liberation of human interests from political domination we [the United States] have been, as it were, a laboratory set aside from the rest of the world in which to make, for its benefit, a great social experiment.” These and other statements echo those of Dewey’s contemporary Randolph Bourne, whose own strongly cosmopolitan intuitions harbor a similar, problematic tone of exceptionalism. Bourne argues, for example, that immigrants to the United States ought to see themselves as “threads of living and potent cultures, blindly striving to weave themselves into a novel international nation, the first the world has seen. ... Any movement which attempts to thwart this weaving, or to dye the fabric any one color, or disentangle the threads of the strands, is false to this cosmopolitan vision.” The seeming inability of far-seeing thinkers like Dewey and Bourne to perceive the narrowness in such comments attests to the difficulty (though not impossibility) embodied in becoming reflectively open and loyal at one and the same time. As emphasized above this cosmopolitan posture does not mean abandoning allegiance to or even love for local roots. But it does imply cultivating sufficient reflectivity to be wary of how loyalty can morph into essentialist notions of being “exceptional” on the world scene. Virtually every community since the dawn of human time has been permeable to cultural influence from without, so that whatever may be dubbed exceptional about them is never pure, unalloyed, or unprecedented.

Dewey would appreciate that a focus on high-level politics should not distract people from the fact that a cosmopolitan orientation emerges from the ground up. It does not depend upon or await top-down initiatives, and it does not derive its living dynamic from formal structures. It does not need to be created as much as it needs to be recognized and supported, a task that calls for reconstructed perception and attentiveness to how persons inhabit the space between.

**Cosmopolitan and Public Interest**

Dewey urges such a reconstructive effort through his analysis of interest sketched above. His closing sentence to Democracy and Education—“Interest in learning from all the contacts of life is the essential moral interest”—summarizes and expresses his overall philosophy of education. The sentence could be reframed in light of his well-known political and social analysis in The Public and its Problems. In that book Dewey investigates the “eclipse” of the public under the pressure of specialized interests (always contrasted with interest in the singular) and he works out a vision of how to reimagine the public for the purposes of shoring up democratic life. In my view the book could well have ended on the following note: Interest in learning from all the contacts and consequences of life is the essential public interest.

What might this interest look like in practice, particularly with regards to the relation between education, cosmopolitanism, and formal institutions? For one
thing, it would imply reconstructing how educators perceive their various interests. Consider civic education, democratic education, moral education, multicultural education, and progressive education; consider educational assessment, history of education, educational policy, and educational administration. All of these constitute but a few of the current interests in the educational world. From one point of view, this diversity of outlooks is both intellectually precious and also permits a practical focus on specific areas of educational reality. However, understood from the point of view of public interest as Dewey envisions it, these interests can inadvertently advance a parochial, territorial mentality. They can function as perceived end points, destinies, or king-of-the-hill interests, and oblige educators to bend their activity toward them rather than toward the situations and circumstances in front of their very eyes.

To take Dewey's perspective seriously would imply regarding interests such as civic and multicultural education, or school administration and policy—or cosmopolitanism—as suggestive points of departure, or as beginnings, for further inquiry, experimentation, test, and trial—and with all of those terms understood as broader and more supple than when they are lassoed by our current lexicon of qualitative, quantitative, artistic, philosophical, and historical research. Like democracy itself—"a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience"—public interest as cultivated and expressed through education reaches beyond any single theoretical outlook or domain of focus however estimable it may otherwise be. This outlook parallels Dewey's view of pedagogy. He urges his fellow teachers to take students' so-called interests not as terminal aspects of their selves or their future, but as points of departure and as openings into new inquiries and studies.

As an example of how suggestive this perspective can be, consider the societal impact in the United States of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) legislation passed in 2001. The implementation of this act over the last decade has called out a tide of responses from virtually every group in the educational universe of the nation—elementary school teachers, experts in educational assessment, policy makers, educational theorists, school principals, and many others. The responses mirror the interests, beliefs, and values of these various groups and individuals, as well they should. But NCLB has also called out another kind of response that is not reducible to the voice of any one of these groups, just as it is not synonymous with the sum of all these voices. The consequences of NCLB through its implementation and peoples' response to it have called out a public. It is in many respects an inchoate public, one only occasionally finding expression—that is to say, finding its distinctive voice. The latter happens when people from these particular groups have come together at conferences, on blogs, at town hall meetings, and the like, and have together generated a genuinely public voice.

That voice, in turn, is ever-evolving in tone, register, and substance as more and more people find themselves thrown together outside their normal interest groups, and this (once again) as a consequence of the ongoing event called NCLB. The possibilities for continuing to fuel the public that has emerged are extensive.
Consider a scenario in which people from across the educational spectrum have come together to reconstruct the ancient idea of measurement. This example comes to mind because the NCLB legislation equates the idea of measurement with aggregate scores on standardized tests. This narrow view contrasts with the ancient Greek and Hellenistic view of education, in which “measurement” encompassed aesthetic, moral, intellectual, and social development. Measurement embodied notions of proportion and balance drawn from music and art, and ideas of relation and symmetry drawn from mathematics. To “measure” the growth of a student required, on the part of the educator, a developed and expanding sense of judgment, perceptiveness, and insight. All of this is what Shakespeare and other artists had in mind, centuries later, when they came to ask “How does one take the measure of a person?” This rich, educational understanding of measurement contrasts markedly with how the term is construed in NCLB.

Like public interest, cosmopolitan interest does not await top-down initiatives to spring to life. As touched on previously it has an organic source at the crossroads of individual and community interaction. Some of its expressions mirror the idea of public interest. For example, Fuyuki Kurasawa deploys cosmopolitanism as an analytic framework in his study of the “alternative globalization” movement. He characterizes the latter as “a loose constellation of transnational ‘subaltern counterpublics’ giving birth to progressive aspects of a fledgling global civil society.” These “counterpublics” include the Zapatista movement in Mexico which supports local economic autonomy for poor peoples, organized protests at meetings of the World Trade Organization, the World Social Forum launched in 2001, organized protests against the United States invasion of Iraq, and various anti-sweatshop, environmentalist, and other activist undertakings. These disparate, dynamic groupings are not orchestrated from a central command site. Instead, like the public that has emerged in response to NCLB, the groups have constituted a public through their work against what they see as the cultural, environmental, and political depredations of globalized capitalism.

Kurasawa examines media accounts, websites, interviews, publications, and more to sketch a portrait of what he characterizes as cosmopolitanism from below. He does not endorse the aims of particular groups in this movement. Rather he seeks to contrast them with what he sees as an undue emphasis on trickle-down political theories that suggest global solidarities depend first and foremost upon universal principles, such as participatory democracy and human rights, that must be entrenched in international laws and institutions in order for effective change to occur. Kurasawa acknowledges the value of such laws and institutions. But he finds extensive evidence in alternative globalization movements that people on the ground are not waiting for top-down initiatives but are enacting what he calls “practice-oriented” cosmopolitanism.

In the world today people in a wide array of endeavors are establishing networks with a “web-like character” that undergirds cosmopolitanism from below. They are generating dynamic cosmopolitan publics. Moreover, echoing Paul
Gilroy’s reminder that people often appreciate and enjoy proximity with cultural difference, Kurasawa writes of the playful and creative dimension of interaction on the ground. Referring to various demonstrations and activities, he writes that “the acts of sharing these sorts of ludic public spaces and moments with others, of discussing matters of common concern with them, or yet again of being in a crowd that marches through the streets of a city, can cultivate transnational relations of solidarity.” With continued proximity, he argues, transnational relations can morph into cosmopolitan ones.

As these writers acknowledge, there remains an important role for formal institutions, structures, and laws for both securing and advancing social gains. The historical record shows that cosmopolitan capacities and accomplishments, manifest since virtually the dawn of humanity, have been fragile and susceptible to destruction by tribalistic and nationalistic impulses. Moreover, as mentioned previously cosmopolitan-minded people have often been singled out for persecution. They have been cast as scapegoats for various societal ills and otherwise treated as foreign to an alleged human norm. Finally, while cosmopolitanism on the ground does not depend upon wealth, power, and privilege, a sympathetic critic could point out that today’s elites might be quite willing to conclude: Fine then, let them be cosmopolitan and poor, and let us be parochial and rich.

Thus scholars and activists in the field of what can be called political cosmopolitanism are right to argue that the sort of orientation sketched in this article—of fusing reflective openness to the new with reflective loyalty to the known—merits institutional support. Writers as diverse as Seyla Benhabib, April Carter, Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, and Elaine Scarry have argued that the idea of the cosmopolitan necessitates the ongoing construction of constitutional arrangements, international agreements, open-door exchanges, formal structures of hospitality, and more. A number of educational scholars who focus on the political, among them Kevin McDonough and Walter Feinberg, Marianna Papastephanou, and Sharon Todd, have made comparable arguments, suggesting that educational initiatives require a complementary political effort. Daniel Hiebert underscores that given today’s migration patterns there will be a stronger and stronger need for mechanisms to ensure that each succeeding wave of immigrants is not repulsed by the one that came right before. Along with long-established groups, immigrant communities will be “critical,” in his view, “to the development of—or lack of—a culture of hospitality and cosmopolitan engagement.”

These and related arguments are timely and valuable, and they will become even more so as the world grows increasingly crowded. In the face of continued injustice, environmental calamity, and social thoughtlessness, it is moving to contemplate the rapidly expanding communications and institutions supportive of cosmopolitan attitudes and sensibilities. These undertakings fuel and strengthen the emergence of cosmopolitan interest. In many respects, too, formal initiatives can be helpful in assisting dispersed people—whether newly arrived immigrants or inhabitants of economically desiccated communities—to reconstruct a sense of
place and of home, and thereby to participate in the sorts of mutually supportive exchanges outlined in this article.

However, it bears underscoring once more that cosmopolitan sensibilities do not await top-down institutional initiatives in order to come to life. On the contrary, both the historical and the contemporary literature on cosmopolitanism dramatize the importance of caution and delicate responsiveness, first and last, on the part of those who would fashion cosmopolitan-minded policy and institution-building. Without such a posture activists may sunder the very accomplishment they are seeking to protect. As Bonnie Honig writes in a wise response to Seyla Benhabib, to focus unduly upon states and formal institutions at the expense of looking at how people actually live threatens to convert the former into “our principal addressees, our guardians, ventriloquizers, impersonators, shapers and censors of our voice, our desires, our aspirations, our solidarities.”30 Her plea echoes that of Peter Nyers and others who seek to defend a cosmopolitanism “of” the people, of the demos, rather than one conceived “for” the people.31 In my view it is crucial to remember that human beings have for millennia enacted a cosmopolitan outlook. They have done so, and continue to do so, in countless ways that repay careful attention and concern.

Concluding Note: Dewey and the Ever-Present Future

According to Dewey, democracy comes to life in everyday association between people rather than awaiting the establishment of formal institutions. Moreover, democracy depends upon the faith that its expressions will take unfathomably diverse forms and that many if not most of these will be impossible to predict or control—and should not be subject in the first place to administrative or bureaucratic attempts to predict and thereby control them. Instead the control should reside in the activities of human beings striving for lives of meaning, of worth, and of mutual regard. For Dewey, the social reformer must be that person most capable of listening, and of listening again, even while retaining the insight and passion for life that triggers the meliorist impulse.

These remarks return us full circle to the insight that cosmopolitan interest means learning from all the contacts of life—an orientation which becomes, in effect, a way of dwelling in the space between. Dewey’s cosmopolitan gesture is to urge steady attention to the quality or constitution of that space, as if the intensity of the attention were reciprocal with the rapidity of change on the human scene. It is possible, as he often noted, to become immobilized if not terrified by the acceleration of events.32 It is also possible to become distracted by them, and to neglect the space between as trivial in significance and in drama compared with earth-shaking doings and demands. The paradox in cosmopolitanism is that while its root term, cosmos, conjures an immensely broad horizon, its expressions are always and instantaneously local and particular. Reflective openness to the world and reflective loyalty to the local can grow in ways that are as varied and unclassifiable as humanity itself. I believe Dewey grasped this cosmopolitan truth and found it redeeming,
which perhaps helps account for why his philosophy of education continues to exert a magnetic attraction for many people the world over.

Dewey keenly appreciated how profound are the pedagogical challenges in assisting the young to take on the kinds of qualities mentioned in the quotations we have heard in this article. It is no easy matter to cultivate a will to cooperate, to develop full, free, and fruitful interaction with others, and to enact a spirit of reflective receptivity to the new and different alongside reflective scrutiny of the old and familiar. The tasks of a cosmopolitan-minded education are diffuse and can never be met through a formal program or even a thousand such endeavors, however useful each one of them may be. Like democracy itself, cosmopolitanism is not a solution to a problem—as if our unstable and unwieldy human condition admits of some kind of final treatment—but rather a way of dwelling that keeps self, other, and world in generative touch. Dewey as a cosmopolitan philosopher helps us understand how meaningful this typically quite ordinary, everyday achievement can be, as well as why these countless on-the-ground gestures offer promising soil in which to grow just human relations.

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Notes

1. I have in mind Emerson’s remarkable essays on the likes of Plato, Montaigne, Shakespeare, Goethe, and others.
2. LW 8: 139.
4. For more on this perspective on cosmopolitanism please see Hansen, “Curriculum and the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Inheritance”; “Cosmopolitanism and Education: A View from the Ground.”
5. MW 9: 361.
7. MW 9: 370.
10. LW 2.
11. MW 9: 105.
12. LW 9: 203.
15. MW 9: 103.
17. MW 11: 72.
18. Qtd. in Earle and Cvetkovich, Social Trust, 91.
23. Ibid., 234.
24. Ibid., 235.
25. Gilroy, After Empire.
27. Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism; Carter, The Political Theory of Global Citizenship; Derrida, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness; Habermas, “Learning by Disaster?”; and Scarry, “The Difficulty of Imagining Other Persons.”
30. Honig, “Another Cosmopolitanism?,” 120.

References


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