More than “Mere Ideas”: Deweyan Tools for the Contemporary Philosopher

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It looks as if you had more faith in my ideas than I have myself—but I honestly believe that they are methods of action and not mere ideas. . . . I don’t see myself as the one to take the lead in putting them into action. … In the main the younger generation has got to do it, and meantime it is a practical matter as far as it goes to get more persons more used to the idea of the tools—tho of course they won’t be really tools till they are really used.

—John Dewey

John Dewey was born into a world ripe for philosophical reconstruction, as scientific advancement, technological innovation, and social reinterpretation reconfigured the intellectual landscape. Dewey rendered his world intelligible through three important “moral ideas”:

1. The voice and the perspective of “the other” is an essential source for understanding.
2. The practice of intelligence requires a logic of continuity.
3. What is matters in the construction of what can and ought to be.

These moving ideas, these tools, are familiar to contemporary scholars—critical theorists, feminists, and scientists respectively—who claim them as their own while any link to Dewey is obscured or ignored. Here I explore Dewey’s early recognition of these tools. I suggest that Dewey speaks in a voice we can still hear today precisely because these seemingly new ideas were embedded in his philosophical, pedagogical, and relational habits of mind. However, I do so—and conclude—with the caution that “doing Dewey” requires a dynamic rather than static approach to philosophic ideas as heuristic habits are always subject to reconstruction. I begin with some relevant observations about Dewey’s biography.
Biographical Notes

It is well known that John Dewey was born the same year that Charles Darwin published *On the Origin of Species*. As commentators mark Darwin’s achievement in theorizing natural selection, most note the ways in which Darwin was “ahead of his time.” He was able to imagine natural selection as the means of evolution ahead of the evidence for its existence—ahead even of the mechanisms (for example, Mendelian genetics, DNA) that would explain it—and to imagine (and swallow) the implications of natural selection for the status of humans in the world.

Dewey too, was ahead of his time, in part because this world of science framed his thinking. While the Darwin synchronicity and influence is clear, it is less well known that Dewey knew Albert Einstein; that his daughter Jane was an MIT-trained physicist in the field of quantum physics; or that Dewey corresponded with Scudder Klyce who sent him treatises on quantum theory. Uncertainty and relativity, features of the cutting edge physical science of his time, also challenged Dewey’s thinking about thinking.

Dewey’s attraction to the evolution of species and processes of natural selection runs parallel to his interest in the Hegelian evolution of ideas. But remember that Dewey—who wrote his doctoral dissertation on Kant—turned to Hegel rather than Kant because “the road to empiricism is much easier from Hegel than it is from the bog of Kant.” This road to empiricism was Dewey’s path. In his own words, Dewey “jumped thru Hegel . . . not just out of him. I took some of the hoop (continuity, anti-hard and fast separations) with me. . . . [H]e saved me from the Kantian bug which was all the vogue—and . . . headed [me] away from subject-object, individual-social, mind-matter etc isolates.”

A significant transition occurs in Dewey’s philosophy in the decade between 1886 and 1896. The clear signal that Dewey’s thinking had changed irrevocably appears in “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology” (1896), where organic circuit rather than dualistic sequence becomes Dewey’s solution to virtually every philosophic puzzle. Dewey recognizes the transition and speculates as to the causes:

I should find it rather difficult to give any very definite account of my change from the philosophical standpoint. I may, however, mention three things which are quite influential. In the first place I was much struck in the “Psychology” of Professor James [that] the biological conception . . . was perhaps the fundamental thing. Secondly, I became more and more preoccupied with the problem of the adaptation of the logic of K[a]nt and H[e]gel to the conditions of actual scientific inquiry and formulation. In the third place, in the early nineties it was my lot to teach ethics and become especially interested in the problem of the relation of reflection and reason to conduct. I became convinced of the unsatisfactoriness of the current ethics, both empirical and rationalistic, and so attempted to develop a theory of a more organic connection between thought and action. Finally these [th]ree lines of interest came together.
Thus Dewey identifies the themes that will mark more than five decades of philosophizing and explains their origin. Dewey was always careful, as he acknowledges in *Experience and Nature*, to embed his arguments in the philosophical conversation to which he understood himself to be contributing, but that conversation was often not the source of or the impetus for his thinking.

Science and philosophy were not more important sources of Dewey’s thinking than were people. His biography reveals a willingness to engage a wide range of people and a wide world of cultures and this too helped frame his thought in a way that seems contemporary. Consider Dewey’s travels to Japan, to China, to Russia. He didn’t go to speak. He went to live. For several years around 1920 and for periods of several months at other times, Dewey (with and without his various family members) lived outside the United States.

In Chicago and New York, Dewey was extraordinarily responsive to almost anyone who reached out to him. He had substantive professional relationships with women, he interacted with a series of “odd ducks,” and he worked with and for the well being of those socially dispossessed. His interactions closer to home suggest a willingness to pay careful attention to the thinking of those who might be dismissed as unsophisticated.

And of course, Dewey thought with and learned from scholars outside the bounds of philosophy because he found the territory that had been staked out for philosophy unfertile. Psychologist William James was a provocateur for Dewey even when they disagreed. Sociologists George Herbert Mead and Arthur Bentley offered Dewey more than provocation; their own theories and concepts (Mead on the social and behavioral nature of the self and Bentley on experience as transaction) figure prominently in Dewey’s best known work.

Each of these aspects of Dewey’s biography corresponds with one of the ideas articulated at the outset. I begin here with Dewey’s ability to listen to the other, to take seriously ideas and observations and responses that issue from standpoints different from Dewey’s own. In a philosophy of ideas, this would be unthinkable. In a philosophy of living, this was central.

**Listening to the Other**

[Open-mindedness is] an attitude of mind which actively welcomes suggestions and relevant information from all sides . . . .

Good teachers are people who are both interesting and interested. I don’t know if Dewey was interesting, though the steady stream of students, correspondents, and others who sought his attention suggest that he was. But it is clear that Dewey was interested in all facets of human action and in any intelligent explanation of that action, no matter what the source. As his biography amply illustrates, John Dewey listened not just to philosophers but also to “the other,” to persons who did not share his academic, political, and economic status. Dewey biographer Jay Martin
puts it this way: “It was and remained a characteristic of Dewey that he was always receptive to alternative ideas. With professional philosophers, he generally held to his own positions, but with intelligent women, non-philosophers, odd thinkers, and ordinary folk, he was a student again.”

Dewey’s associations with “odd thinkers” have been documented and questioned, sometimes respectfully and sometimes not. Recently, some of Dewey’s odd associations have come to make more sense as the value of Dewey’s conception of philosophy becomes clearer. Consider, for example, Dewey’s association with Franklin Ford and the ill-fated “Thought News” experiment. In the age of blogs and social networking, of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report, it seems that Dewey and Ford may have been on to something.

When Dewey originally consulted F. Matthias Alexander for some physical aches and pains around 1916, he may not have understood how Alexander’s approach to healing mind and body as one would find expression in his own thinking. But it did. Alexander, dismissed by many as a folk healer, knew something in practice that we are just today coming to accept widely. Dewey knew it too, but only in theory until Alexander’s system provided the instantiation he needed.

Albert Barnes was an eccentric who both led Dewey down a garden path (The Polish Study) and shepherded him toward significant work (Art as Experience). In a 1932 letter, Dewey says, “I loved your piece on vision & form—you ought to publish it, then I could borrow instead of stealing.” And in a self-deprecating letter to his children, Dewey says of Barnes, he “is a man from whom one can learn a lot but apparently only the opposite kind of a crank like myself is capable of learning from him.”

Scudder Klyce, who wrote Dewey lengthy tomes for more than 15 years, was even odder than Barnes. While most of Dewey’s friends disapproved of this correspondent, it seems that Dewey listened to him with some profit. Dewey acknowledges Klyce as having influenced his logic. And more than a decade later, Dewey says about Klyce: “In my opinion, however, he really did have something, and these non-professionals who have originality have a sort of unfortunate attraction for me, not wholly unfortunate because, after all, I have learned a good deal from some of them.”

If Dewey was attracted to interesting “non-professionals” like Klyce, he was doubly indebted to a long list of “intelligent women” who enacted his ideas even before he could formulate them. His wife of 41 years, Alice, who with the Camp sisters inspired his pedagogical theory through their own action, leads the list. Dewey wrote Schools of Tomorrow with daughter Evelyn, and entrusted his biography to his daughter Jane. Whatever Dewey’s relationship with Anzia Yezierska, it appears that knowing her altered Dewey’s perspective in ways that privileged the aesthetic.

A place of honor on the list of influential women would have to go to Jane Addams who exhibited “the most magnificent exhibition of intellectual & moral faith [Dewey] ever saw,” who forced Dewey to rethink his own views about democratic dialogue and Hegelian dialectic, and who showed him what democracy as “a mode
of associated living” looked like. Female graduate students and colleague educators were drawn to Dewey and he accepted them readily, again acknowledging the value of their insights. Of Ella Flagg Young, for example, Dewey says, “I was constantly getting ideas from her... [I]t was from her that I learned that freedom and respect for freedom mean regard for the inquiring or reflective processes of individuals, and that what ordinarily passes for freedom—freedom from external restraint, spontaneity in expression, etc.—are of significance only in their connection with thinking operations.” Dewey confesses that he “had never appreciated this aspect of [his] own logical theory till [he] found it so emphasized by her” in her practice as an educator. Young and other women spoke to him in action and in word.

That Dewey lent his time, energy, pen, and name to the achievement of social justice for “ordinary folk” is well known. Dewey met with and advocated for the Workers Defense League and for various labor unions. He worked with people of color in the founding of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. He supported immigrants’ rights and opportunities. That his thinking about democratic theory and social interaction might be altered as a result of his interaction with these “others” rarely comes up. But it should, as one example suggests.

Dewey spent significant time talking with immigrants at Hull House in Chicago and later as part of the Polish Study in the Port Richmond section of Philadelphia. When asked about the results of Polish immigrants’ adjustment, Dewey bemoans the typical American attitude toward immigrants, “The complacency consists in regarding the immigrants as constituting the problem and Americanization simply as a problem of assimilating them. Going by what we learned as a sample, the following problem is almost wholly one of reforming the environment of America into which the foreigners come.” Dewey could come to this conclusion because he heard these and other immigrants describe their own experience as participants in an American social life that did not enact democratic dialogue across difference.

In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey wrote of open-mindedness as one of four intellectual virtues (or as he put it “traits of individual method”). Along with directness, single-mindedness, and responsibility, open-mindedness was a habit that marked defensible thought. Dewey lived open-mindedness with near-perfect pitch.

But near-perfect is not perfect and Dewey was not without blind spots. While in China, for instance, Dewey seemed not to notice the often oppressive circumstances under which women lived; but Alice Dewey did notice and said so. And Dewey, on occasion, employed and tolerated offensive language. Nonetheless, one can understand why Albert Barnes might say, “Dewey has the most open mind I have ever seen.”

Given Dewey’s openness to human beings of all kinds in all kinds of places, it is not at all surprising when, later in life, Dewey agrees with Max Otto’s view that one important aim of philosophy is “cooperation with ordinary working people to achieve a philosophy of life.” As we see below, that philosophy employed a logic of continuity.
Continuity: Clearing the Path to Both/And

[Professional philosophers] . . . understand [my work] to be a series of criticisms . . . of influential dualisms which have found articulate expression in influential historical [p]hilosophies and which have made their way into common ways of thinking with a very bad effect. And the principle on which the criticisms are made is that of introducing the principle of continuity in a way which reveals the source of the dualism and eliminates it.¹⁹

Captured in a letter cited in earlier biographical notes is Dewey’s clear acknowledgement of his changing mindset before and after The Reflex Arc essay. Dewey moved away from the accepted—and epistemologically dominant—philosophical standpoint between 1886 and 1896, and in the process moved away from a particular and limited view of philosophy as a professional activity. The principle of continuity, employed critically, carved out the path through traditional philosophic underbrush.

In 1893, for example, Dewey took on “The Superstition of Necessity”: “Necessity is a device by which we both conceal from ourselves the unreal character of what we have called real, and also get rid of the practical evil consequences of hypostatizing a fragment into an independent whole.”²⁰ Dewey recognized that hollowed philosophical tools are hypostatizations. He not only uses the principle of continuity to reject the standard logical understanding of necessity, but turns it on its head to privilege the practical over the logical: “. . . logical necessity rests upon teleological—that, indeed, it is the teleological read backwards. The logical process of discovering and stating the reality of some event simply reverses the process which the mind goes through in setting up and realizing an end.”²¹

He analyzes cause and effect and means and ends similarly with respect to necessity and finds the same dichotomizing fault, and then reconstructs the philosophical standpoint in a way that holds distinctive and even dichotomous terminological tools in constructive and mutually defining tension by linking them to the exercise of judgment in action.

“[T]he idea of necessity marks a certain stage in the development of judgment; . . . it refers to a residuum, in our judgments and thus in our objects, of indeterminateness or vagueness, which it replaces without wholly negating; that it is thus relative to “chance” or contingency; that its value consists wholly in the impulse given judgment towards the is, or the concrete reality defined throughout.”²²

And it is this starting point in the exercise of judgment in action with respect to what is that requires Dewey to reject the epistemological constraints of the logic of either/or in favor of a logic of continuity. This logic is neither monistic nor dualistic but pluralistic. For Dewey, either/or conceptualizations create problems where none exist. Worse, they stop thinking. The logic of both/and is
generative and prompts novel, intelligent reinterpretation of and response to the challenges of human living.

While many commentators see Dewey’s dissolution of dichotomies as a result of his Hegelianism, I suggest this should also be linked to his naturalistic (and science-inspired) methodology discussed below as well to his willingness to listen to intelligent women and others discussed above. Dewey himself identified three factors responsible for his change in his logic: the influence of William James on the subject of mind and body, the effort to naturalize Hegelian logic, and the experience of teaching ethics binding him as it does to practical reason. Each of these influences deserves further mention.

William James turned Dewey’s attention to psychology but it was to psychology in a decidedly new key. In his *Principles of Psychology*, in his *Talks to Teachers*, and especially in his writings on the nature of emotion, James turned the spotlight to the body as a feeling, thinking organism, calling into question any theory of human living that separates mind and body. By the time *Experience and Nature* is published in 1925, Dewey’s view of the so-called “mind-body problem” is sharpened. “The isolation of nature and experience from each other has rendered the undeniable connection of thought and effectiveness of knowledge and purposive action, with the body, an insoluble mystery. Restoration of continuity is shown to do away with the mind-body problem.” The contemporary theorizing of neuroscientists like Antonio Damasio and philosophers like Richard Shusterman echoes Dewey’s early understanding.

The Hegelian logic of thesis-antithesis-synthesis provides Dewey with a frame in which to construct a both/and thought process, but recall that Dewey “jumped through Hegel” while getting away from “subject-object, individual-social, mind-matter etc isolates.” From Dewey’s point of view, Hegel’s method, “actually made a complete break with the logical tradition,” enabling Dewey to translate earlier Hegelianism into social or cultural psychology—“[t]hereby getting rid I hope of what [Hegel] calls ‘the load of terrible heavy European classic idealism.’”

Nearly a decade of teaching courses related to ethics and morality prevented Dewey from relying on any theory that separated thought from action and individual from society except for purposes of analysis. As he studied the “relation of reflection and reason to conduct,” Dewey found fault with both empiricist and rationalist ethical theories for their lack of continuity between thought and action. He found fault as well with the cultural and social psychology of moral theorizing. A psychology that assumes that individuals imagine and then implement ideal forms of political and social organization was, for Dewey, dangerously incomplete if not utterly misguided. Changes in interaction among individuals already formed by and through socially constructed habits result in new forms of active organizational practices. There is no question that Dewey’s reconstruction of philosophy was widely misunderstood and, sometimes as a result, widely disputed. Even when appreciated, many philosophers did not understand the extent to which Dewey had shifted his point of view. At a 1940 dinner, William Pepperell Montague introduced Dewey
by noting his intent “to practicalize intelligence.” “Dewey replied quietly but firmly that Montague was taking a narrow, inbred view—a philosopher’s trade-union view, he implied—of what he, Dewey had tried to accomplish. His effort had not been to practicalize intelligence but to intellectualize practice.”

The notion of “intellectualizing practice” resonates with contemporary feminist theory. As Charlene Haddock Seigfried points out, pragmatism “was criticized and eventually relegated to the margins for holding the very positions that today feminists would find to be its greatest strengths.” By emphasizing continuity as a naturalistic methodological principle, Dewey avoids monism and dualism and makes way for shifting and situated epistemic standpoints. I turn now to this naturalism.

**Dewey’s Empirical Naturalism**

I believe that the method of empirical naturalism . . . provides . . . the way by which we can be genuinely naturalistic and yet maintain cherished values, provided they are critically clarified and reinforced. The naturalistic method . . . destroys many things once cherished; but it destroys them by revealing their inconsistency with the nature of things.

In these introductory remarks to the 1929 revised version of *Experience and Nature*, Dewey states his view of philosophy as empirical (that is, methodological) naturalism. The point of a naturalistic stance is to uncover, but also to create, the “is” in the process of creating new ideals and values. Dewey’s view is not scientism but an effort to take the results of scientific inquiry seriously while acknowledging what science does not do and cannot do with respect to the value of living.

Dewey, as a man of his own time and of ours, does want to take science seriously. This is the man whose thought takes shape in the shadow of Darwin and Einstein, and he knows it. Later in *Experience and Nature* Dewey says:

[N]atural sciences not only draw their material from primary experience, but they refer it back again for test. Darwin began with the pigeons, cattle and plants of breeders and gardeners. Some of the conclusions he reached were so contrary to accepted beliefs that they were condemned as absurd, contrary to common sense, etc. But scientific men, whether they accepted his theories or not, employed his hypotheses as directive ideas for making new observations and experiments among the things of raw experience. . . . An Einstein working by highly elaborate methods of reflection, calculates theoretically certain results in the deflection of light by the presence of the sun. A technically equipped expedition is sent to South Africa so that by means of experiencing a thing—an eclipse—in crude, primary, experience, observations can be secured to compare with, and test the theory implied in, the calculated result.
The shadow cast by Darwin and Einstein is two-fold. Dewey's thinking is shaped by the substance of their insights: the evolutionary temper in Darwin and the challenge to fixed certainty in Einstein. But, as is evident above, he is even more affected by a critical feature of the scientists' methodology that he finds sorely lacking in philosophy. This is the habit of checking back with nature. Subjecting nature-as-experienced to systematic reflection has always been a prompt for both science and philosophy but only science, in Dewey's view, completes the circuit. Dewey's methodological naturalism is a plea for philosophers to complete the reflective circuit and to check their own insights back against the quality (that is the meaning and value) of lived experience.

In Experience and Nature, Dewey addresses the objection that naturalism is tantamount to a materialism that deprives experience of ideal significance:

If experience actually presents esthetic and moral traits, then these traits may also be supposed to reach down into nature, and to testify to something that belongs to nature as truly as does the mechanical structure attributed to it in physical science. To rule out that possibility by some general reasoning is to forget that the very meaning and purport of empirical method is that things are to be studied on their own account, so as to find out what is revealed when they are experienced.29

While Dewey recognizes Moore's naturalistic fallacy, Hume's is-ought problem, and James's psychologist's fallacy, his response is to view all three problems as a failure to maintain a thorough-going naturalistic method. That is, such fallacies stem from the tendency to take what is in the context of some particular experience as frozen for all experience. It is an error of reification, a failure to understand the dynamic nature of concepts and facts. As early as 1891, Dewey reveals the impetus behind his empirical naturalism: "the usual idea of the Good seems to be an abstraction which has been frozen. [The original idea] denotes full activity, but then it [is] abstracted and put over by itself and then frozen in its isolated [form] apart from the content of specific activities which first gave it meaning."30 Dewey seeks to avoid premature "frozenness" and unacknowledged selection of concepts and ideas that in turn limits responsive action. He argues for an "[h]onest empirical method [that] will state when and where and why the act of selection took place, and thus enable others to repeat it and test its worth."31 The best way to do that is to follow the lead of the sciences in beginning from and checking back to lived experience, enabling replication of assertions in the lived experience of others. This is not scientism. Dewey is simply acknowledging both scientific advances and scientific limits.

Whereas "the office of physical science is to discover those properties and relations of things in virtue of which they are capable of being used as instrumentalities," philosophy reflects on "the intrinsic nature of events [as] revealed in experience as the immediately felt qualities of things . . . to coordinate these qualities with the regularities revealed by science." The goal of philosophy is "intelligently directed experience, as distinct from mere casual and uncritical experience."32
Experience is the means, the only means, of penetrating continually further into the heart of nature. . . . It is not experience which is experienced, but nature—stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in certain other ways with another natural object—the human organism—they are how things are experienced as well.33

Dewey was deeply committed to the idea that what is matters in the construction of what can—and ought to—be, and conversely, that our construction of what can and ought to be is implicated in what is. His naturalism was a tool to support his conception of philosophy as “a generalized theory of criticism.”

There is a special service which the study of philosophy may render. Empirically pursued it will not be a study of philosophy but a study, by means of philosophy, of life-experience. But this experience is already overlaid and saturated with the products of the reflection of past generations and by-gone ages. It is filled with interpretations, classifications, due to sophisticated thought, which have become incorporated into what seems to be fresh naive empirical material. . . . If we may for the moment call these materials prejudices . . . then philosophy is a critique of prejudices.34

This is a view that feminists, postmodernists and critical theorists might find congenial—and useful—whatever Dewey’s own prejudices left unexamined.

“Doing Dewey” Dynamically

I appreciate what you say about the dangers of a philosophy which calls for dynamic application itself remaining static.35

Three of Dewey’s central ideas—the value of the voice of the other, the principle of continuity as ground for the practice of intelligence, and the critical power of empirical naturalism—have become tools in the hands of this “younger generation” of scholars. We are today “more used to the idea of the tools” that marked Dewey’s thought and social action. This is, I think, why Dewey can sound right, and often remarkably timely, particularly in his assessment of concrete social and educational issues. It is also why scholars, educators, and social critics who would look ahead rather than back may nonetheless want to linger a while with Dewey.

But lingering with Dewey does not mean guarding his words as truth. Dewey, perhaps more than anyone, knew that when he said: “I make mistakes of course, and I’m deeply aware of my lack of art in writing. But in the main I think I’m headed right and it will all come out in the wash that needs to.”36 Dewey trusted that his ideas would stand up to test in experience that he himself viewed as the criterion of philosophy. It was then and is now the ideas as tools, not the man, that ought to be the focus of attention. When Myles Horton acknowledged his indebtedness to Dewey but denied that he was a disciple,37 Dewey wrote back with a rejoinder that
remains true today, “I’m so delighted to find that you don’t claim to be a disciple. My enemies are bad enough, but my disciples are worse.”

Lingering with Dewey means approaching the world and the issues of living anew. And that means challenging Dewey’s words, his blind spots, even ultimately, his standpoint. It may mean “jumping through” Dewey, taking only some residue with us.

Recall that the three Deweyan ideas explored here are moral ideas, ideas that move us. They move scholars today not because they are Dewey’s but because they are good ideas. If and when they no longer move us, they will be abandoned, replaced with other tools, other ideas, that prove their worth in lived experience. For now, open-mindedness, intellectualized practice and methodological naturalism are, for contemporary philosophers, more than “mere ideas.” They are, as Dewey hoped, “methods of action.”

Notes
1. C 1918, October 18. Throughout this essay, I cite Dewey’s statements in various letters published as part of The Correspondence of John Dewey. For the sake of readers’ understanding of context as well as ease of location in both hard copy and electronic editions, I cite these with “C” followed by the complete date the letter was originally written. Where necessary for easy reading, I smooth out the text by eliminating carats, corrections, and so on.
2. Dewey draws a distinction between moral ideas (i.e., moving ideas) and ideas about morality in Moral Principles in Education (1909).
3. C 1923, January 5.
5. C 1911, May 2.
8. For an interesting discussion of Dewey’s interactions with several “odd ducks” or “weirdoes,” see Cunningham et al., “Dewey, Women, and Weirdoes.”
20. EW 4: 29.
21. Ibid., 33.
22. Ibid., 36.
23. LW 1: 8.
27. LW 1: 4.
28. Ibid., 15.
29. Ibid., 13-14.
31. LW 1: 34.
32. Ibid., 6.
33. Ibid., 5.
34. Ibid., 40.
35. C 1918, May 15.
37. C 1933, October 3.
38. C 1933, October 5.

References


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