Inexorable Burden: Rhetoric and Togetherness

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Head of the Graduate Program Date
INEXORABLE BURDEN: RHETORIC AND TOGETHERNESS

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
of
Purdue University

by
Ethan M. Sproat

In Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

Sproat, Ethan M. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. Inexorable Burden: Rhetoric and Togetherness. Major Professor: Thomas Rickert.

This dissertation employs philology and cultural analysis to reassess longstanding notions in rhetorical theory and moral philosophy (via classical rhetoric and technical communication). In particular, I use diachronic analyses of the terms *telos*, *symbouleutikon*, and *sympheron* (from Aristotle to present) as a theoretical springboard to reassess more contemporary issues in rhetoric and technical communication. The technical communication topics this dissertation covers include criticisms of expediency as a motive in technical communication; the changing landscape of instruction manual composition; the role of purpose-completion and stakeholder awareness in visual rhetoric; and the futility of advancing ideology-free technical writing pedagogies. More theoretical topics this dissertation covers include Kenneth Burke’s notions of rhetorical “war” and entelechy; the pluralistic underpinnings of Kantian moral philosophy; and the rhetorical utility of democratic inefficiency.
CHAPTER 1. THE END OF DELIBERATION: COMPLETING DECISIONS TOGETHER THROUGH CONFERRING

“Words dissemble / Words be quick / Words resemble walking sticks. / Plant them they will grow / Watch them waiver so. / I’ll always be a word man / Better than a bird man.”
—Jim Morrison, *An American Prayer*

“I never attack persons,—I avail myself of the person merely as a powerful magnifying glass that allows one to make visible a general, but creeping and elusive calamity.”
—Friedrich Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*

The Problem of Rhetoric in Postmodern Composition

Like Nietzsche, I do not attack individual scholars. Even so, much of this dissertation is an extended response to Steven Katz’s criticism of deliberative rhetoric as articulated in his 1992 article “The Ethic of Expediency.” A couple years ago, I was able to personally interact with Katz as he chaired a panel I participated in at an academic conference. During our conversations then and a few since, Katz has been incredibly helpful in further explaining his ideas and in patiently listening to my own. I see now that Katz and I agree on quite a bit in regard to how we, as teachers and scholars of rhetoric and composition, ought to approach the motives that guide and direct written communication. We differ, however, in how we understand the historical development of some of these motives. For example, Katz sees Cicero as a corrective influence on misguided ideas we inherit from Aristotle. On the other hand, I see Cicero as an extension of runaway rhetorical terminology that got derailed sometime after (or during) Aristotle’s time. Because of our individual
historical perspectives, Katz views the Aristotelian origins of deliberative rhetoric as being driven by self-interest and expediency. On the other hand, I see the Aristotelian origins of deliberative rhetoric as drawing on terminology that acknowledges the inexorable togetherness of deliberation.

I share this brief summary of my collegial association with Katz for two reasons. First, when Katz and I personally deliberate about how we ought to understand the history of rhetoric, our deliberation is a representative anecdote of sorts that exhibits the very tension we're deliberating about. He and I are, in short, deliberating together about whether we are *individuals* deliberating together or whether we are individuals deliberating *together*. The distinction is slippery and not altogether definable. However, as I'll explore through this dissertation, rhetoric that favors individualism over togetherness minimizes the communal qualities of humans that make rhetoric possible in the first place; and individualist rhetoric is also an early step toward validating atrocity.

Second, my personal deliberation with Katz is also symptomatic of a larger argument in the field of Rhetoric and Composition about the efficacy and utility of rhetoric and the history of rhetoric in a field of knowledge that appears to be embracing the more definitionally amorphous moniker “Writing Studies.” As I'll explain in more detail momentarily, Steve’s argument in “Ethic of Expediency” is that the ethic of expediency in contemporary technical communication has
historically served to minimize or disregard human suffering that sometimes results from valuing expediency over human needs. The ethic of expediency has its roots in Aristotelian deliberative rhetoric, and if the motives of deliberative rhetoric are suspect then the motives of technical writing are suspect as well. Steve’s argument is a useful (albeit extreme) metonymy for other critiques of rhetoric’s usefulness to contemporary writing scholarship and pedagogy.

It is not the purpose of this introduction or this dissertation to map out the history of the growing academic divide between Rhetoric and Writing (for a still-topical treatment of this divide, see issues 5.1-5.2 of Enculturation featuring the work of a veritable list of who’s-who in rhetoric and composition; or see Horner and Lu’s 2010 article “Working Rhetoric and Composition” in College English). I only mention the divide as current context for this dissertation that deals with very old ideas. Over the last few decades, the relevance of ancient histories of rhetoric to scholarship about writing and communication has evolved from defining the discipline in the 1960s to suspiciously reifying hierarchies in recent years. Indeed, a panel at the most recent MLA convention titled “Aristotle Is Not Our Father: Conversations in Cultural Rhetorics” is a good example of how far ancient rhetoric’s esteem is falling. The panel’s program description asserts that,

The project of cultural rhetorics is, generally, to emphasize rhetorics as cultural and cultures as persistently rhetorical. In practice, cultural rhetorics scholars investigate and understand meaning-making as it is situated in very specific cultural communities. By “cultural communities,” we mean any place/space where groups organize under a set of shared beliefs and practices -- American Indian
communities, workplace communities, digital communities, crafting communities, etc. (Powell et al.)

In short, the history of rhetoric cannot be tied to any one history or cultural community because rhetoric emerges from all histories and cultural communities. If we limit our historical understandings of rhetoric to Aristotle and the Greeks, we neglect the rich rhetorical traditions and practices of many, many cultures and peoples. As Victor Vitanza reminds us,

> History is the gift that keeps on giving to us, and yet it is a very subtle, expensive giving. It is a gift that I and others have misgivings about. The History—as historians of rhetoric write it—gives a so-called gift of remembrance and yet creates the conditions for forgetting. Some would give The History so that some of us could forget it, be free of it!, all together. Others are more seemingly beneficent in their giving so that we might remember. Yes, How to give, *to gift?*, is the question that needs—desires—to be reopened here and elsewhere. The issue of remembering as forgetting is the issue here. (13-14)

Whenever *a* or *the* history of rhetoric gets written, it gets done by virtue of exclusion. The postmodern conceit provides access to voices heretofore silenced by *official* histories. But this is still a shallow victory—or a puddle of the same defeat—if only because *inclusion* for the sake of *having-been-excluded* reifies the officiousness that originally determined exclusion, for officiousness is always the power we fight. Vitanza’s Third Sophistic project provides hope for breaking this perpetually dichotomy.

However, I confess a sort of scholarly wistfulness about those ancient Greeks, particularly Aristotle. This is in opposition somewhat to my progressive personal
politics, which have led me to appreciate and value the study of non-Western rhetorics because no culture's stories or practices should be excluded or denied access to university curriculum. Indeed, when I think about the term university, I am drawn toward a related entelechy in the term uni-verse—or all verse, all logos, all rhetoric converged into one. In a sense, if we deny one culture's rhetoric in the university, we deny that culture's place in the universe. Yet, in spite of these progressive leanings, I find myself drawn to a form of rhetorical conservatism regarding the Greeks in general and Aristotle in particular.

I am not alone in making this sort of post-postmodern sentiment. Valuable postmodern innovations have greatly expanded our cultural appreciation and understanding of gender, culture, history, politics, sex, language, religion, learning, race, science, art, technology, ethics, and many other aspects of humans' conditions. Yet, we who have inherited this postmodern landscape find ourselves sometimes unsettled with a sort of critical indigestion. In an interview with Larry McCaffery in Review of Contemporary Fiction, David Foster Wallace explains this post-postmodern discomfort this way:

For me, the last few years of the postmodern era have seemed a bit like the way you feel when you're in high school and your parents go on a trip, and you throw a party. You get all your friends over and throw this wild disgusting fabulous party. For a while it's great, free and freeing, parental authority gone and overthrown, a cat's-away-let's-play Dionysian revel. But then time passes . . . and you gradually start wishing your parents would come back . . . It's not a perfect analogy, but the sense I get of my generation of writers and intellectuals or whatever is that it's 3:00 a.m. . . . and we're wishing the revel would end. The postmodern founders' patricidal work was
great, but patricide produces orphans, and no amount of revelry can
make up for the fact that writers my age have been literary orphans
throughout our formative years. We’re kind of wishing some parents
would come back. And of course we’re uneasy with the fact that we
wish they’d come back… And the uneasiest feeling of all, as we start
gradually to realize that parents in fact aren’t ever coming back—
which means we’re going to have to be the parents. (McCaffery 150)

Wallace recognizes the benefits and the burden facing those of us who have
inherited the postmodern intellectual project. We benefit from being free (or
knowing how to become free) from the traditional hierarchies that limited and
restricted former ways of thinking. Yet we also face the burden of defining an
intellectual project that resists static definition—of further developing institutional
scholarship that remains suspect of institutional development—of passing on an
intellectual inheritance to future thinkers who, like us, will doubt the value of
knowledge merely because it is inherited. The postmodern condition is thus
inhabited by a perpetual Generation Zero.

Methodology and Rhetoric’s Elusive Calamity

One possible way of moving forward in such a condition may be through
reappropriation. Postmodernism is a sort of hyper-modernism in which old things
are often viewed in only new ways—or old ideas like *rhetoric* are viewed in terms of
cultures and perspectives that may be very old but are nonetheless new to *rhetoric’s*
traditional frameworks. One aspect of the postmodern intellectual project is that
some ideas may have become so old that reintroducing them may be revolutionary
(which leads our minds to another entelechy—*revolutionary* ideas often *revolve*
from old to new to old to new). Hence, I find myself agreeing with those MLA panelists: Aristotle is not our father, and I do not study Aristotle in some form of misguided effort to reclaim some pristine past before ideas of rhetoric were corrupted. Such efforts are both impossible and nonsensical. Instead, I look at Aristotle’s terms for rhetoric in an effort to uncover possible implications for rhetorical ideas that emerged long after Aristotle. I have since realized that the sort of translational reappropriation I have thus pursued is a blend of old-school philology mingled with more current notions of cultural analysis.

Philology literally means the “love of words,” but as a field of inquiry it has a varied and complex history itself. In brief, philology is a research methodology that employs diachronic analysis—or analyzing how words and terminologies develop across time and cultures. In this dissertation, I employ philology in diachronic analyses of ancient Greek terms—specifically telos, symbouleutikon, and sympheronto note changes in the ways notable thinkers have addressed topics associated with deliberative rhetoric specifically and rhetoric more generally. Philology in this sense is not merely the “correct interpretation of texts.” Any postmodern critic understands the futility of relegating any text to any single interpretation. Rather, philology is useful in mapping how texts have been appropriated via diverse interpretations. Furthermore, philological study helps contemporary thinkers embrace and own the implications of their own appropriations of a text. I use philology in this sense in an effort to show how
alternate notions of telos, symbouleutikon, and sympheron may help shore up critical
gaps in both contemporary rhetorical theory and post-Enlightenment moral
philosophy. Ultimately, I believe my findings help indicate the unavoidable
intersections and inter-reliance of rhetoric and ethics.

My philological interest in Aristotle began when I read Steven Katz’s essay “The
Ethic of Expediency: Classical Rhetoric, Technology, and the Holocaust.” Katz’s main
argument in this essay hinges on historical and quasi-philological interpretations of
expediency itself. Since it was first published in College English in 1992, Katz’s essay
has been anthologized as one of the “central works” of technical communication (see
Johnson-Eilola and Selber in the Bibliography), has been enshrined in an annotated
bibliography of “essential works” in the journal Technical Communication (see Alred
in the Bibliography), and has been the direct subject of a years-long discussion in
the pages of the Journal of Technical Writing & Communication (see Moore [2004],
Katz [2006], and Ward [2009]). To say the least, Katz’s essay and his view of the
historical development of key rhetorical terms has significantly influenced the field
of technical writing. By and large this is understandable and largely deserved.

Katz begins his essay with the translated text of an actual memo written in June
1942 that requests technical upgrades for Saurer gas vans used by the Nazi regime
as tools of mass-murder. The author of this memo, a midlevel bureaucrat, writes a
well-reasoned deliberative appeal to his superior for design changes to the Saurer
gas vans that would make the vans more efficient death devices and easier to clean after use. After sharing this horrifying example of deliberative argument, Katz suggests, “Here, as in most technical writing and . . . in most deliberative rhetoric, the focus is on expediency, on technical criteria as a means to an end” (257). And Katz follows this ethic of expediency all the way back to Aristotle. Katz further suggests that for Aristotle, “expediency seems to become an ethical end in itself. Expediency is always the good—‘utility is a good thing’ Aristotle says, concluding: ‘any end is a good’” (261). Katz’s criticism of Aristotle hinges on Aristotle’s use of the terms *expediency* or *utility*. I’ll discuss momentarily what Aristotle actually said in Greek, but Katz’s main ethical observation is sound: “the ethical problem represented in [Nazi technical rhetoric is] a problem of deliberative rhetoric—defined by Aristotle as that genre of rhetoric concerned with deliberating future courses of action” (258). Through his line of argument, Katz describes a causal chain that looks something like this: as Aristotle portrayed it, deliberative rhetoric is driven by expediency; current technical communication has its roots in deliberative rhetoric as handed down from Aristotle through the Romans through the development of the classical education in modern Europe; the ethic of expediency in current technical communication (along with all its damaging aspects) is thus an intellectual descendent of Aristotle; hence, if the rhetorical motives of technical communication are suspect, then the rhetorical motives of deliberative rhetoric as a whole are suspect as well. Katz explains it this way: “the ethic of expediency... which Aristotle first treated systematically in the Rhetoric... was rhetorically embraced by
the Nazi regime and combined with science and technology to form the ‘moral basis’ of the holocaust;” and as Katz asserts, “it is the ethic of expediency that enables deliberative rhetoric” (258).

I do not dispute most of Katz’s claims. I believe Katz is absolutely correct that an ethic of expediency tends to motivate much of technical communication and that such an ethic has historically motivated much of deliberative discourse. At the end of his essay, Katz indicates the path ahead for those who sympathize with his argument, “In the gruesome light of the holocaust, then, we should question whether expediency should be the primary ethical standard in deliberative discourse, including scientific and technical communication” (272). Conscientious rhetoricians and educators can only conclude that, of course, it should not. Katz then looks to Cicero and Quintilian for corrective measures against Aristotelian expediency. Katz argues that in light of “Cicero’s advocacy of a rhetoric grounded in a knowledge of everything and Quintilian’s definition of the orator as ‘a good man skilled in speaking,’ we can and should teach the whole panoply of ethics in deliberative discourse in our rhetoric and writing courses” (272). Katz goes on to suggest that such rhetoric instruction ought to understand the ethical motives of individual and community happiness as well as the ethical weight of “humanitarian concerns.”

In short, Katz argues that deliberative rhetoric left to its own expedient devices will continue to cause (and be used to justify the institutional causes of) human
suffering; thus, conscientious teachers of rhetoric and writing must integrate ethics into rhetoric curriculum to offset deliberative rhetoric’s historical tendency. Katz’s suggested path toward ethical equilibrium is by-and-large the same approach used in many current American textbooks on technical communication. For example, the current flagship technical communication textbooks offered through Oxford University Press (The Essentials of Technical Communication), Thompson Wadsworth (Technical Communication: A Reader-Centered Approach), and Pearson Longman (Technical Communication Today) all contain significant robust treatments of ethical dilemmas and responsibilities facing technical writers. Also, the Society for Technical Communication has adopted a code of Ethical Principles (dated 1998) that repeatedly asserts the importance of “the public good” (STC Board). I don’t know that we can go as far to say that Katz’s work has been directly and explicitly influential in any of these venues. Rather, it appears that Katz’s critiques of deliberative rhetoric and advocacy of ethics in rhetorical practice are part of a broader phenomenon in technical writing education and the technical writing professions to integrate ethics into technical writing practice.

And herein lies rhetoric’s elusive calamity (to borrow Nietzsche’s words)—that ethics is in toto something entirely different from rhetoric—that rhetoric is somehow so obviously without moral qualities that we must rebuild our educational and professional efforts to adapt rhetoric to ethical concerns—that ethics is that which must be added to rhetoric as a corrective to rhetoric’s destructive
inclinations. Rhetoric’s peculiar situation in regards to ethics is thus both elusive and calamitous—elusive because we have forgotten that rhetoric is pervasively ethical—calamitous because it is rhetoric’s divorce from ethics that precedes and makes possible rhetoric being used as an instrument of atrocity. Both these claims require some initial explaining, but the longer explanation for each is one of the purposes of this dissertation.

First, claiming that rhetoric is pervasively ethical is different from asserting that ethics is pervasively rhetorical. This latter idea is one that many rhetorical theorists are already comfortable with. Nietzsche offers a compelling modernist account of the rhetorical basis of notions of good and evil. In his early essay “Truth and Lying in an Extra-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche fully anticipates the linguistic turn in philosophy with his observations about knowledge-production in terms of rhetorical tropes. “What is truth?” Nietzsche asks. In this concept of truth, Nietzsche also clumps all our notions of the good (as well as reality, the mind, artifice, science, and all other arenas of thought and inquiry). Nietzsche responds that all truth including goodness is, “A mobile army of metaphors, metonymy, anthropomorphisms, in short, a sum of human relations which were poetically and rhetorically heightened, transferred, and adorned… Truths are illusions about which it has been forgotten that they are illusions, worn-out metaphors, without sensory impact” (“On Truth” 250). In this account, ethics (along with all other knowledge) is a verbally created thing, so of course ethics is rhetorical. But this is also no different from saying everything is
rhetorical. That may very well be true, but such a perspective makes it impossible to study epistemology or ontology (much less rhetoric or ethics) in any sort of external manner. If our ways of knowing are inescapably also our ways of being, we can only view our ways of knowing and being from the inside.

This is the essence of Kenneth Burke’s claims regarding the human penchant for constructing vocabularies. People, he asserts, “seek for vocabularies that are reflections of reality. To this end, they must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a deflection of reality” (Grammar 59). Further on in his Grammar, Burke also explains, “it is not possible for us, without contradiction, to recreate in words a world which is itself not verbal at all” (130). Burke stops short of asserting that language is the very stuff of which knowledge is made (which seems to be Nietzsche’s claim).

Rather, Burke asserts that our ways of talking about (i.e. our rhetoric of) realms of knowledge are inextricably tied to those realms of knowledge. Ethics as a realm of knowledge is inseparable from the rhetoric that surrounds ethics. I could share other accounts, but Nietzsche and Burke should suffice to show that the notion that ethics is rhetorical has currency in rhetorical theorists’ circles.

Instead, I assert that rhetoric is pervasively ethical. By this I mean that whenever and wherever rhetoric emerges, it does so directed by a general telos of communal betterment. This is not to say that rhetoric is always used to better society. Nor does
this preclude the reality that bad people use rhetoric to accomplish harmful things. Rather, when people experience rhetoric, they experience a process whereby *this* emerges as more preferable or better than *that*. And the process of rhetoric is communal in that it always engages notions of what will be preferable or better in regards to the isolated community of an individual with her surroundings or a public community of two or more people. Rhetoric in this sense occurs in the ambient agency of an environment on the survival decisions of a lone Robinson Crusoe, and it occurs in dynamic interpersonal communications and chaotic public assemblies. Rhetoric is thus ethical in that it always and already engages people with competing notions of what is good or right. Some may object at this generalization with a call for nuance—that rhetoric deals with *situational* notions of the good while ethics deals with more *general* notions of the good—that rhetoric relies on relative perspectives of good while ethics strives to understand the nature of good regardless of perspective. But this criticism splits disciplinary hairs. Ethical theorists are as diverse and divergent from one another as rhetorical theorists are among themselves. Having taught Ethics for years at a state university, I encountered hundreds of students who repeatedly got frustrated with the sheer number and difference of rational ethical theories. Students would get used to Kant’s categorical imperative just in time to begin grappling with John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism which would be supplanted with curriculum about Simone de Beauvoir’s existential gender ethics which would be followed by divine command theories which would be followed by social contract ethics with Hobbes or economic
ethics with Marx and so forth. To mitigate my students’ frustration, I tried to teach them that the study of ethics is the effort to understand different ways of thinking about right and wrong. In this same vein, the study of rhetoric is the effort to understand the ways people accept different ways of thinking about right and wrong. Thus in practice, if ethics is understanding perspectives of good and bad, rhetoric is understanding how and why people attain those perspectives.

I develop these ideas more thoroughly throughout this dissertation. But for now, the ethical implications of rhetoric lead back to utilizing philology to understand Katz and his treatment of Aristotle. I found Katz’s ethical conclusions unsettling—not because I had any sort of allegiance to Aristotle but because I sensed a larger dilemma about the nature of rhetoric itself, which I sketched in brief just above. Since Katz’s analysis hinged so much on the notion of expediency, I looked closer at Aristotle’s Rhetoric to see if I could see the same things that Katz saw. What I actually found surprised me.

**A Philology of Deliberation**

One of the key passages from Aristotle that Katz quotes is from Bekker number 1362a of the 1984 Roberts translation of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. I include below four different English translations of the same part of 1362a. In each translation below, I have indentified three different terms that have been translated differently from the original Greek. In Greek, these terms are telos, symbouleutikon, and sympheron.
Literally translated, *telos* means “completion” or “the completion of something;” *symbouleutikon* means “the bringing together of decisions or wills;” and *sympheron* means “bringing or bearing together.” To identify these terms in each of the English translations below, I underlined translations for *telos* with a straight line, translations for *symbouleutikon* with a dotted line, and translations for *sympheron* with a waved line.

The first translation of 1362a is from the 1926 Freese translation (available online as part of Tufts University's *Perseus Project*):

> But since the **aim** before the deliberative orator is that which is **expedient**, and men **deliberate**, not about the **end**, but about the **means** to the **end**, which are the things which are **expedient** in regard to our actions; and since, further, the **expedient** is good, we must first grasp the elementary notions of good and **expedient** in general.

The second is from the 1932 Cooper translation:

> Now the **aim** of one who **gives counsel** is utility [what is expedient]; for men **deliberate**, not about the **ends** to be attained, but about the means of attaining these; and the means are **expedient** things to do. Since this is so, and since anything **expedient** is a good, we must make sense of the elementary notions of ‘good’ and ‘expedient’ in general. (Cooper 29, brackets in original)

Next is from the 1984 Roberts translation (this is the version Katz quotes):

> Now the **deliberative** orator’s **aim** is utility: **deliberation** seeks to determine not **ends** but the means to **ends**, i.e. what is most **useful** to do. Further, **utility** is a good thing. We ought therefore to assure ourselves of the main facts about goodness and **utility** in general. (Roberts 2165)

Finally, this is from the 2007 Kennedy translation (the most widely accepted current English translation):
But since the **objective** of the **deliberative** speaker is the advantageous [sympheron], and since [people] do not **deliberate** about this **objective** but about means that contribute to it and these [means] are things **advantageous** in terms of actions, and since the **advantageous** is a good, one should grasp the elements of good and **advantageous** in the abstract. (Kennedy 61, brackets in original)

Without exception, each of these translations follows the early lead of Cicero in translating what Aristotle taught about deliberative rhetoric. Cicero’s early work on rhetoric *De Inventione* along with the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (once attributed to Cicero) together formed “perhaps the most important element in the classical rhetorical corpus for medieval intellectuals, writers, and speakers” (Ward 3). In other words, perhaps more than any other ancient rhetorical theorist, Cicero influenced the sort of rhetoric and rhetorical education that modern Europe inherited through the medieval and renaissance eras. In Hubbell’s 1949 translation of *De Inventione*, Cicero explains Aristotle’s approach to some of the different types of rhetoric this way, “it is generally agreed that the **end** in the forensic type is equity, i.e. a subdivision of the larger topic of ‘honor.’ In the **deliberative** type, however, Aristotle accepts **advantage** as the end, but I prefer both honor and **advantage**” (323-25). In this passage I’ve identified terms in a similar way to the Aristotle passages just above. In the original Latin, **end** is a translation of a form of *finis*, which literally means “end” or “goal.” **Advantage** is a translation of *utilitatem*—literally “utility.” Finally, **deliberative** is a translation of *deliberativo*, which combines *de*—“concerning” or “in respect to”—with *libro*—first person subjective of “to consider” or “I consider” (note: *libro* is also a cognate of *libero*, a verb meaning “to free,” but both *libro* and *libero* are also cognates of *liber*, which refers to parchment or
documentation; a Roman citizen was a citizen by virtue of being a free male and owning documents that pronounced his citizenship; deliberation in ancient Rome was thus a discourse that free, documented males participated in). See Table 1 for a descending comparison of these terms along with their literal translations from the original Greek and Latin.

### Table 1: Aristotle’s Terms in Greek, Latin, and English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aristotle’s terms</th>
<th>Telos</th>
<th>Symbouleutikon (syn + boule)</th>
<th>Sympheron (syn + phero)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literal Translation from Greek</td>
<td>completion</td>
<td>together + decisions or together + wills</td>
<td>together + bear or “confer”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cicero’s Translation</td>
<td>finis</td>
<td>deliberativo de + libro</td>
<td>utilitatem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literal Translation from Latin</td>
<td>end, goal</td>
<td>I consider</td>
<td>utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freese Translation</td>
<td>aim, end</td>
<td>deliberative, deliberate</td>
<td>expedient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper Translation</td>
<td>aim, ends</td>
<td>gives counsel, deliberate</td>
<td>utility, expedient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roberts Translation</td>
<td>aims, ends</td>
<td>deliberative, deliberation</td>
<td>utility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy Translation</td>
<td>objective</td>
<td>deliberative, deliberate</td>
<td>advantageous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These translational differences would be no more than curiosities of classical scholarship if classical and contemporary mis/treatments of these terms were not so influential to our understanding of deliberation specifically and rhetoric more generally. The translational differences are simply striking.

The post-Cicero terms construct deliberative rhetoric this way: the end, aim, or objective of what I consider is utility or that which is expedient or advantageous. Or in a more concise form, the motives for post-Cicero deliberation can be described
like this: in the arguments I consider, my objective is whatever is expedient or useful. Indeed, the very terms end, deliberation, and utility are quasi-direct Latin cognates with no clear parallel connection to Aristotle’s terms. The English term end is used in all its goal-oriented, “finish-line” connotations from the Latin finis. The English term deliberation is used in all of its singular “I consider” connotations from the Latin deliberativo. Further, Aristotle’s term sympheron has a direct Latin translation in the word confero, which is entirely supplanted with that which is useful (utility) or expedient in the Latin term utilitatem. Supplanting sympheron with utilitatem is especially odd; since, confero is a literal Latin translation of sympheron. The individual components of sympheron and confero are fairly commensurable: syn and con both mean “together” in Greek and Latin respectively while the latter components pher and fer are etymologically identical—they both mean “to bear” (or “to bring” or “to carry”). And a direct English cognate of sympheron and confero is the verb to confer or the nouns conferring and conference.

Thus, a more direct and sensible translation using Aristotle’s terms constructs deliberative rhetoric in a much different way: the completion of decisions together is bearing together. Or we might rephrase it this way: to complete decisions together, communicators bear together. Or in a less clunky manner: to complete decisions together, communicators confer with each other.
By the time Cicero was theorizing rhetoric, deliberation had lost this Greek emphasis of *togetherness* in decision-making and gained the Roman emphasis of the individual making decisions. It should be no small wonder then why the Greeks failed to produce a long line of Caesars (Aristotle’s pupil Alexander being the closest exception—perhaps even the missing deliberative link). Whatever caused the Roman shift away from *togetherness* toward individual expediency, the rhetorical fallout is readily apparent in the outright replacing *telos* for *finis*, *sympheron* for *utilitas*, and *symbouleutikon* for *delibero*. With those three changes in place, every interpretation and reading of “deliberative” rhetoric forever after is already flavored and tilted toward individual expediency and away from togetherness.

I am reminded of Nietzsche’s frustrated observations about the construction of truth: “If someone hides an object behind a bush, then seeks and finds it there, that seeking and finding is not very laudable . . . If I define the mammal and then after examining a camel declare, ‘See, a mammal,’ a truth is brought to light, but it is of limited value” (“On Truth” 251). In a similar way, let’s say I define “completion” (*telos*) in terms of “a goal” or “objective” (*finis*), and I define “conferring” or “bearing together” (*sympheron*) solely in terms of expediency or utility (*utilitas*). While I’m at it, I’ll further define the bringing together of wills or making decisions together (*symbouleutikon*) solely in terms of what “I consider” (*delibero*). After I do this, I’ll examine this refitted “deliberative” rhetoric and see how it encourages me to seek as my “objective” what “I consider” to be “expedient.” I may very well declare at this
point, “See, deliberative rhetoric encourages folks to be right bastards to each other.” But such an observation is not laudable and is of limited value.

As of yet, I have not been able to find the ancient source of these significant changes in the way Aristotle’s rhetoric was translated and taught from Greece to Rome. Between Aristotle’s time and Cicero’s, Hermagoras was arguably the most influential teacher of rhetoric who emphasized most significantly the role of stasis in forming arguments. But Hermagoras does not greatly transform Aristotle’s terms. Perhaps the change occurred somewhere in the Etruscan pre-Roman tradition, which was contemporary to ancient Athens and was apparently highly literate, going so far as to wrap their dead in linen books, like the Liber Linteus (Enos 20). Or perhaps the change was more contemporary to Cicero—perhaps by the unknown author of the Rhetorica Ad Herennium who teaches deliberation in the same way Cicero does. But regardless of how the translation leap was made, Cicero is an early notable critic of Aristotle’s deliberative rhetoric—being perhaps the first critic to suggest that some additional ethical component was needed to temper and bridle the damaging impulse of expediency or utilitas.

The frustration from a historical perspective, however, is that expediency as a motive was added to Aristotelian deliberation. To proceed from this in Aristotle: to complete decisions together, communicators confer with each other—to this in Cicero: in the arguments I consider, my objective is whatever is expedient or
useful—frankly boggles the mind. Aristotle’s terminology of *telos*, *symbouleutikon*, and *sympheron* indicates possible (if not obvious) corrective influences to the damaging influence of expediency in rhetorical practice. For instance, deliberative rhetoric as *symbouleutikon* emphasizes *togetherness* in decision making instead of individuals verbally combating each other to get their way; or, the purposes of rhetoric in terms of *telos* suggests that rhetoric can be taught and practiced as a process of *completing* discussions rather than as an objective-oriented contest; or, rhetoric can be motivated by the impulse to *confer* with one another in terms of *sympheron* instead of motivated by situational expediency.

Indeed, Aristotle’s terminology directly confronts the common penchant he sees in deliberative orators to “never admit that they are advising things that are not advantageous [to the audience] or that they are dissuading [the audience] from what is beneficial; and often they do not insist that it is not unjust to enslave neighbors or those who have done no wrong” (Kennedy 49, brackets in original). In a footnote, Kennedy explains that in this section, “Aristotle again recognizes that in practice deliberative orators are often indifferent to the question of the injustice to others of some action” (49). Kennedy further explains that Aristotle advocates an attitudinal shift away from such harmful rhetoric: “Since Aristotle has said in [*Rhetoric* Book I, Chapter 1, Section 12] that we must not persuade what is bad, he would presumably recommend that a speaker seek to identify the enlightened, long-term advantage to the audience, not immediate expediency” (Kennedy 49).
The Question of Aristotle’s Continued Relevance

But these observations face significant institutional difficulty; since, from Cicero’s time at least, Aristotle has been seen as part and parcel to the problems of rhetoric and expediency. And this perspective is understandable. Even though Aristotle’s terms for deliberative rhetoric connote togetherness, Aristotle still described deliberative rhetoric with a definite expediency edge to it. It would be a stretch to read all of his Rhetoric as a treatise supporting communal togetherness. Too many sections of Aristotle’s Rhetoric are directly about a skilled speaker using rhetorical tools to convince audiences regardless of the particular topic at hand. Also, Aristotle’s separation of his Ethics (and Politics) from the Rhetoric indicates that he instituted what is perhaps the earliest and most influential divide between ethics and rhetoric.

A defender of Aristotle might interject and point out that Aristotle’s Rhetoric was part of an integrated curriculum that included the Ethics and Politics (see Clayton 191; Johnstone 1-2; Self 130), and there are certainly key terms shared among all three works (telos, symbouleutikon, and sympheron among them). Thus we can’t fully understand the Rhetoric without understanding the Ethics and Politics. This may be true (I am certainly inclined to believe so), but this still does not mitigate two fundamental difficulties. The chief difficulty remains that rhetoric in general (and deliberative rhetoric specifically) was a distinct enough discipline for Aristotle that he saw ethics as something to be mastered in tandem with rhetoric instead of as
part of the same discipline. Secondly, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* clearly prepares its readers to participate in an ancient Athenian political system, which, by Aristotle’s time, had favored verbally astute rhetors at the expense of less-rhetorically prepared participants—i.e. Athenian politics favored expediency over communal togetherness. An extension of this difficulty is the unavoidable observation that Aristotle’s divisions of rhetoric—deliberation chief among them—have no direct corollary venues outside of the lawmaking assemblies, judicial courts, and customary rituals that were specific to Aristotle’s time and situation.

The first of these difficulties—that rhetoric was a fundamentally different thing than ethics for Aristotle—can be addressed as an extension of an answer to the second difficulty—that Aristotle’s rhetoric was specific only to his time, location, and cultural practices.

As James Crosswhite recounts, Paul Ricoeur advances a strong criticism in this vein in response to Chaim Perelman who described rhetoric’s scope as reaching to all modes of communication (private, public, inward, and outward). Instead,

Ricoeur believes that this concept is too broad . . . that rhetoric was born with the legal reforms that took place in sixth century BCE . . . that rhetoric is forever conditioned, shaped, and limited by the typical discursive situations in which it arose, [specifically] Aristotle’s famous three: the deliberative, the judicial, and epideictic contexts and genres of rhetoric. [Further, while Ricoeur] acknowledges that there is an internal tendency of rhetoric to move beyond these contexts, . . . he also believes that the generative seats of rhetoric provide an unconquerable constraint on rhetoric’s ambitions. Rhetoric will
always have a historical and situational and quasi-institutional character. (Crosswhite 18)

Crosswhite has deep reservations with Ricoeur's account of rhetoric because ancient rhetoric developed not only as a specific political practice but also as an art that could be taught according to situation or need. This adaptable quality of rhetoric indicates how flexible the concept of rhetoric has been since its inception.

Rhetoric as a term emerged in the public practice of the ancient Athenian Assembly. The Assembly fluctuated in size from 3000-6000 male citizens who gathered on a hillside near the Acropolis. Any male citizen could participate each day, but the number was capped at 6000. As Paul Woodruff explains,

Any adult male citizen could speak; the right to speak in Assembly, known as parrhesia, was the most precious of all privileges of Athenians. Nevertheless, ordinary citizens rarely used the privilege, leaving it to those active in politics to speak in the Assembly. Such speakers were known as rhetors; that were able to exert special influence without holding public office, simply in virtue of their speaking ability. (33)

Rhetoric as a term arises from rhesis, which means “speaker” or “speech” and has remained the most widely used term in Western cultures to describe the art of speaking, writing, or arguing. Orators schooled in rhetoric were “those who had absorbed and put into practice a training in public speaking, whether it was exercised in the law courts, . . . deliberations and public assemblies” or elsewhere (Ward 7).
Considering rhetoric thus in its terminological infancy, it would seem odd to assume that the teachable skills that made public rhetoric possible were only used in the specific public settings of the Assembly or the courts or other ceremonial venues. Indeed, it seems a bit absurd to imagine Greek citizens skilled in getting their way in the public Assembly and not using those same skills in all their other interactions.

As Crosswhite further explains,

The early history of rhetoric, the history of its origin, was connected not only with specific changes in political institutions [like the Assembly] and social practices but also with new conceptions of education and of the specific nature of human beings. From the beginning, rhetoric had exceeded its institutional origins.” (19)

Eugene Garver offers a similar observation with a challenging question: “Even in Aristotle’s time, most rhetorical speeches did not fall under one of the three kinds of rhetoric. Today, the proportion of rhetoric that is deliberative, judicial, or epideictic is even smaller. Why does this not demonstrate the irrelevance of Aristotle’s Rhetoric?” (Garver 17). Garver answers this challenge by comparing Aristotle’s Rhetoric to his Ethics texts. Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Ethics texts were educational texts that were about “aspiration rather than obligation” (17). Aristotle focuses on “the three kinds of rhetoric even [though] most of the time speakers find themselves in persuasive situations that do not fall under these kinds” because the kinds of rhetoric “tell us what rhetoric should and can be” (17-18).

In other words, the charge that Aristotle’s kinds of rhetoric do not expressly apply to most situations would have been obvious to Aristotle about most situations during
his life. What Aristotle’s kinds of rhetoric give his readers are situational types in which certain rhetorical motives find completeness. Aristotle’s kinds of rhetoric are theoretical divisions only that provide a philosophic approach to his overall theories of rhetoric. It is important to understand that Aristotle divides rhetoric into three kinds only in Book I of his Rhetoric. As Garver explains, Aristotle in Book II and Book III “can examine all sorts of rhetoric without worrying about whether a given argument is deliberative, judicial, or epideictic . . . . And certainly is we look at the Rhetoric 2,500 years later, Book I will seem outdated—another word for contextually bound—in a way that the rest of the Rhetoric does not” (8).

This realization helps us recognize two useful aspects of Aristotle’s rhetoric. The first is obvious: the specific contexts for Aristotle’s three kinds of rhetoric are outdated and inapplicable to most situations past and present. But the second aspect is subtle and much more critical to understanding Aristotle’s relevance to rhetoric today: Aristotle recognized that rhetoric as a human activity is inclined toward completing itself. For Aristotle, everyday instances of individuals deliberating about one course of action over another are incomplete in that such instances address only a few individuals. However, deliberations that affect all individuals (such as happened in the Assembly) are more complete examples of deliberation.
This is why rhetoric is subordinate to politics for Aristotle. As Garver further explains about the relationship between politics and rhetoric for Aristotle, “Laws should determine as much as possible . . . [But] since laws cannot determine everything, rhetoric is necessary. In this regard, politics is definite and rhetoric indefinite” (12). Yet, for rhetoric to affect political subjects, it must necessarily draw on phronesis, or the indefinite practical wisdom and practical virtue shared by a population. Aristotle develops the idea of phronesis most thoroughly in his Ethics, but he also treats phronesis in his Rhetoric suggesting that the “good” in rhetorical situations can be defined as those things “which living things would choose, in each case, if they had practical wisdom [i.e. phronesis]” (Kennedy 69).

In his Ethics, Aristotle differentiates between this sort of practical wisdom and mere cleverness (in the following Bartlett and Collins translation, phronesis is translated as “prudence”). For Aristotle, cleverness “is of such a character as to be capable of doing what is conducive to the target posited and so of hitting it. If, then, the target is a noble one, the cleverness is praiseworthy; but if base, it is mere cunning. Hence we assert that even the prudent are terribly clever,” for as Aristotle explains, prudence “does not exist without this capacity [i.e. cleverness].” But at the same time, someone trying to be prudent “does not acquire the characteristic of prudence in the absence of virtue,” for “this end does not appear to someone if he is not good. For corruption distorts and causes one to be mistaken about the principles bound
up with action. As a result, it is manifest that it is impossible for someone who is not
good to be prudent” (Bartlett and Collins 132).

Besides being an excellent argument for the unity of ethics and rhetoric, Aristotle’s
opposition of phronesis to cleverness clearly illustrates the anti-expediency motive
that Aristotle tried to articulate for rhetoric. As Garver explains, “the defect of
cleverness is not that it is directed towards bad ends. Its flaw consists in the fact that
it has no ends of its own but must be directed to ends outside itself” (12). In other
words, when phronesis or practical wisdom is divorced from rhetoric, then rhetoric
is guided only by cleverness which has no aims other than to get its own way.
Cleverness is the actual elusive characteristic behind Stephen Katz’s ethic of
expediency. Rhetoric driven by practical wisdom simply does not lend itself to the
sort of expediency Katz decries.

But practical wisdom is somewhat ephemeral, based as it is on the collective
wisdom and virtue of a given population. For Aristotle, this is especially true in
terms of laws and other subjects that cannot or do not determine everything in their
respective realms. In such situations, we must rely on rhetoric as directed by
practical wisdom, for there is no other guide on which to rely. But, as Garver points
out, this peculiar set of conditions situates rhetoric as “an art of persuasion
concerning subjects without corresponding definite knowledge. It is an art for
considering issues about which there is no art” (13). This is why rhetoric benefits
from being moored to a political identity, such as through deliberation, which has its *completion* in publicly discursive settings like the Assembly. Without a political identity through which practical wisdom can be directed, rhetoric has only cleverness to rely on, which is the first damning step toward Katz’s ethic of expediency.

And politically moored rhetoric is in constant danger of being commandeered by cleverness. Of Aristotle’s three kinds of rhetoric, deliberative rhetoric is the most political. Aristotle clearly favored deliberative rhetoric as the most rational of his three kinds of rhetoric. This is because in deliberative rhetoric, inasmuch as practical wisdom is the guiding motive for all involved, Aristotle asserts “nothing is needed except to show that circumstances are as the speaker says” (Kennedy 33). This is one of the foundations of traditional liberalism, which developed out of the Enlightenment. Sharon Crowley describes this sort of traditional liberalism and traditional liberals this way:

> Liberals can be persuaded by empirical facts, particularly if these are marshaled by authoritative sources and couched in appeals to reason, such as definition, analogy, induction, and the like. The thinkers who conceptualized liberalism trusted evidence provided by the senses. Furthermore, they made a rigorous distinction between facts and values on the ground that values are invented without recourse to empirical evidence and are hence untrustworthy. (315)

Traditional liberalism, however, faces frequent attacks—most often from “right-wing discourse whose persuasiveness usually depends on nonfactual proofs” (Crowley 315). This was certainly true of Nazi propaganda that dehumanized Jews
and those who did not otherwise culturally meld with conservative views of the Volksdeutsche. And, as Crowley argues, this is also true of contemporary American right-wing rhetoric that asserts an array of nonfactual proofs supporting falsehoods about Iraqi WMD, birth control, human sexuality, and other hot-button social and political topics. In the face of what Crowley calls “pure rhetoric” with no basis in factual argument, Crowley now styles herself a “recovering liberal” with deep reservations of Aristotelian rhetoric. “The problem for Aristotle, and for us,” she asserts,

is that rhetoric is not logic; its realm is human affairs rather than numbers or symbols. Rhetoric is the art of finding the available means of persuasion, and Aristotle teaches us that those means of persuasion reside in the common sense of the community [or phronesis, practical wisdom]. . . . When fabrications and misrepresentations constitute the common sense, bad things are bound to happen because these argumentative tactics are driven not by the desire to find all of the available arguments but by the desire to silence all of the available opposition. (325)

While Crowley laments the ineffectualness of the rhetorical tradition we’ve inherited from Aristotle, the sort of clever “pure rhetoric” she describes is more clearly of ancient Roman origin. As the nameless Roman author of the Rhetoric Ad Herennium asserts centuries after Aristotle, “when we have submitted our arguments and destroyed those of the opposition, we have, of course, completely fulfilled the speaker’s function” (Caplan 33). That is the motive that underlies the political rhetoric gone awry that Sharon Crowley laments. It is also the mindset that propels the destructive ethic of expediency, which Stephen Katz decries.
In response to theorists like Crowley and Katz, I would suggest that the sorts of rhetoric they critique are not modes of communication that have become too rhetorical or purely rhetorical. Instead, I would suggest that such communication is not rhetorical enough. That is to say, there is a certain rhetorical incompleteness about arguments and technical communication which merely seek to convince and expedite desired actions.

I use variations of the term complete in reference to Aristotle’s use of the term telos. And I do so not in any effort to reclaim some sort of Aristotelian ideal. I am not interested in reclaiming Aristotle. Instead, I find in some of his terms a great many corrective implications for the sort of rhetoric gone awry that theorists like Crowley and Katz observe. Again, I am not interested in merely recreating Aristotle’s conceptual and rhetorical tools. Instead, I believe we can learn much from looking at the conceptual and rhetorical tools that Aristotle used to create his own.

**Chapter Summaries**

In this dissertation, I specifically focus on the three embattled concepts surrounding Aristotle’s description of deliberative rhetoric: telos, symbouleutikon, and sympheron. Each of the next three chapters focuses on each of these terms in order and explores some of the corrective implications of each.
Chapter 2 explores how a reappropriated notion of *telos*-as-completion enriches our understanding of rhetorical theory and practice—specifically in relation to Kenneth Burke’s notions of rhetorical “war” and entelechy. Chapter 3 explores how a rhetorically deliberative understanding of *symbouleutikon* ultimately reveals the pluralistic underpinnings of Kantian moral philosophy. As goes Kant, so goes much of the subsequent history of Ethics. Or in other words, Chapter 3 explores the rhetorical basis for Ethics writ large. Chapter 4 explores a reappropriated notion of *sympherion*-as-bearing-together and reveals the rhetorical utility of democratic inefficiency. Chapter 5 employs the reappropriated notions of *telos* and *sympherion* to expressly technical communication materials—specifically instruction manuals and visually composed graphs and charts. Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation and is a study of principles of *symbouleutikon* in university writing instruction—especially in terms of civic engagement and service learning. Chapter 6 also unapologetically explores the necessity of ideology in education.
CHAPTER 2. THE END OF CONFLICT: TELOS AND THE RHETORIC OF “WAR”

“Every question selects a field of battle, and in this selection it forms the nature of the answers.”
—Kenneth Burke, Philosophy of Literary Form

“Holding one of those things in your hands, cleaning the barrel and shoving rounds into clips, really brings you face-to-face with what a desperate, last-ditch measure they really are. I mean, if it gets to the point where we are shooting people and vice versa, then we have completely screwed up.”
—Neal Stephenson, Cryptonomicon

Beginning with Ends

This chapter begins with an end—specifically, telos. Working definitions of telos tend to posit telos as, “the end for the sake of which something exists or is done, or what it is that motivates an agent or an activity to achieve an end result” (Wallace 114). This specific definition comes from William A. Wallace’s essay “Aitia: Causal Reasoning in Composition and Rhetoric” which appeared immediately after James Kinneavy’s field-altering essay on “Kairos: A Neglected Concept in Classical Rhetoric” in the 1986 collection of essays Rhetoric and Praxis. In his essay, Wallace primarily aims to explore how a recovered understanding of aitia, which translates as cause, could “relate to written exposition and persuasion” (107). However, a recovered and reappropriated notion of telos (which Wallace’s briefly overviews) is significant in its own right to enriching our understanding of rhetorical theory and practice.
The second part of this chapter is an extended definition of *telos*. But for the moment, *telos* could be defined as purpose-completion, or those qualities of rhetorical situations that indicate how we know certain rhetorical situations have been completed and others have begun. To identify qualities of *telos* in a rhetorical situation is not just to ask, “Why are we arguing?” but to also ask, “What sort of rhetorical situation are we even engaged in?” Thus, romantic partners caught in a cruel, name-calling quarrel with each other may pause in deference to their feelings of affection and ask one another, “What are we doing here?” This is a question of *telos* and has the potential to shift their situation from an argument of mutual emotional hurt to a possible discussion of mutual emotional healing. In other words, the question, “What are we doing here?” might rhetorically complete the *telos* of one situation and begin the *telos* of another situation.

Contemporary rhetoric’s most developed notions of *telos*-like qualities of rhetorical situations in this sense come from Kenneth Burke. Burke latches onto Aristotle’s neologism *entelechy* (which is partly derived from *telos*) to identify the purpose-completion qualities of symbolic action. Burke’s notions of attitude and purification also relate to *telos*, though Burke doggedly retains his own idiosyncratic vocabulary and terminology. Burke’s most idiosyncratic yet useful terminology in this regard is his well-known motto *Ad Bellum Purificandum*, or “Toward the Purification of War.” In short, as human’s inclination to complete purposes (i.e. *telos*) emerges from conflict or a natural state of war, Burke via Friedrich Nietzsche explains how
rhetorical/verbal/symbolic conflict can be harnessed to negate the destructive qualities of physical conflict and war. In the end, the ends (i.e. *telos*) of rhetorical conflicts can bring about the end (i.e. cessation) of physical conflicts. Before exploring Burke’s contributions to our understanding of *telos*, a review of relevant scholarship would be helpful in explaining why *telos* has been neglected.

Though *telos* as an explicit rhetorical term may be neglected, concerns of purpose and motivation crop up all over studies and practices of Rhetoric. As Wallace rightly observes, “most [college freshmen's] papers and themes tend to deal with subjects wherein purposes and ends and goals, and their proper or improper attainment, constitute the very heart of their discourse” (115). This is certainly just as true today as it was a quarter century ago. Also, purpose as a concern in specific writing projects is a constant theme in technical/professional communication and in ESL/TESOL scholarship. *Motivation* as a term in the fields of Psychology and Education has garnered enough recent scholarly attention to fill a substantial book of essays *Writing and Motivation*, which purports to be, “the first book which exclusively deals with motivational aspects of academic writing” (Hidi and Boscolo 1). And of course, Kenneth Burke’s *A Grammar of Motives* begins with purpose and motivation in its introductory question: “What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing it? An answer to that question is the subject of this book” (x). Certainly, Kenneth Burke’s entire *Motives* project could be seen as a long answer to the question, “What are all the varied purposes of purpose
itself?” At any rate, if purposes and motives and ends and goals are everywhere in rhetorical practice, whence our lack of discussion about telos specifically? I see at least four general possibilities.

First, perhaps we feel overly familiar with telos. In his provocative introduction to the term kairos, Kinneavy asserts, “Anyone in the field of rhetoric has undoubtedly already encountered . . . telos [which] hardly need[s] justification in such a symposium” (79). Kinneavy goes on to say, “But kairos is not listed in Lahnham’s A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms, nor in the four volumes of the Dictionary of the History of Ideas, nor in the two volumes of The Great Ideas: A Syntopicon, which accompanies the Great Books of the Western World series” (80). Yet, while kairos has since been added to the second edition of Lahnham’s Handlist (Lahnham 94), telos is still absent from Lahnham’s Handlist and the other works that Kinneavy laments have excluded kairos (which was apparently lesser known than telos at the time he wrote).

Or perhaps we are more comfortable discussing telos in the specific, as in specific rhetorical purposes/ends/goals, rather than rhetorical purpose/ends/goals in general or abstract. Consider, for instance, the handful—literally four—sources with the search term “telos” that can be found (as of October 2012) through CompPile—the most comprehensive online “inventory of publications in writing studies, including post-secondary composition, rhetoric, technical writing, ESL, and discourse analysis” (CompPile 2012). Each article searchable with “telos” in
CompPile treats *telos* in terms of situation-specific purposes and goals but is not about *telos* as a rhetorical term in general. Similar searches in larger multi-discipline search engines (e.g. Ex Libris’s MetaLib) return similar results for combined search terms “rhetoric” and “*telos.*” Plus, particularly in technical and professional communication, *purpose* as a term tends to get treated in the same way—as situation-specific goals and ends—not as a guiding disciplinary term (for a smattering of examples see Cubbison; Myers; McAdon; Plung; and Nelson in the Bibliography).

Also perhaps for many rhetoric scholars, *telos*-in-general is uncomfortably connected to the troubled study of *teleology*, the name of which is derived from *telos* and is the philosophic study of purposes in nature. Postmodern rhetorical sensibilities may clash with any such metanarratives that seek to establish universal perspectives over something so unavoidably subjective as *purpose*. Certainly, the idea of purpose-in-general carries almost sinister implications for individual minority purposes that may or may not accord with “more general” majority purposes. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that understanding *telos* as purpose-in-general can help us better understand individual purposes (just as understanding *kairos* as context-in-general helps us better understand individual contexts). And I know of no other more profound teleological claim than this: regardless of what purposes may or may not exist in the rest of nature, and for all our varied and infinitely individual purposes, it is yet an inexorable quality of
humans that we articulate purposes (see also Johnson-Sheehan and Morgan 58–59 and 70–71). In regards to humans, an understanding of telos-in-general begins with that observation.

Finally, perhaps we neglect telos as an explicit rhetorical term because other disciplines have developed parallel terminology to address many of the same issues. I am particularly referring to discussions of intentionality in Analytic Philosophy (and to a lesser extent in Continental traditions). Intentionality is that quality of mental states that directs mental activity toward this or that concern. Not to be confused with most everyday uses of intention, intentionality is the ability mental states have to be about something or other. Discussions of intentionality tend to sidestep ancient Greek considerations entirely—thus failing to intersect telos at all—because, as Victor Caston observes, “According to the standard narrative . . ., contemporary interest in intentionality traces back through Husserl and Brentano to late scholastic philosophy, and from there to Arabic philosophers such as Avicenna and Alfarabi” (23). And though Caston has pursued threads of intentionality in ancient Greek thought (including a forthcoming book on Aristotle and intentionality), philosophic discussions of intentionality by-and-large ignore references to telos or its philosophic cousin teleology. Though not overtly stated in it, Caston’s work suggests a significant contributing reason to the disciplinary disunity of intentionality and telos. Caston argues that, “Augustine is the lynchpin that connects the two traditions” of ancient Greece and Medieval Scholasticism (45).
Augustine’s emphasis of *intentio* (of the individual will and the Divine will) posits a decidedly isolated individual foundation for future discussions of intentionality. On the other hand, *telos*, as Aristotle specifically, is a very socially shared thing.

**A Philology of Telos**

Before wandering too far afield, it might be useful to pause here and consider a brief overview of the ancient development of *telos*. Such a diachronic analysis reveals how *telos* has been utilized in Rhetoric anciently and how a reappropriated sense of *telos* can contribute to Rhetoric today. Usually, *telos* is defined as end or goal or purpose. But this most common of definitions falls short of its most basic meaning: *completion*.

Martin Heidegger offers useful translations of *telos* (and its cognates *telios*, *teleion*, and *entelecheia*) in his early lectures on Aristotle. When speaking specifically about *telos*, Heidegger translates Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* 16.1021b.29 this way: “Τέλος [i.e. *telos*], constituting the end as being-completed, means also that for the sake of which something is, the for-the-sake-of-which as what is outermost” (*Basic Concepts* 57). With *telos* thus defined as “the end as being-completed,” Heidegger further posits, “τέλος is a basic category of human beings” (*Basic Concepts* 57). Heidegger’s strong claim is supported by his translation of the previous section of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* (16.1021b.28), “On this account, even the end of life, death, is called consummation in view of a carrying-over constituting a being-completed [i.e. *telos*]
of life” *(Basic Concepts* 57). Heidegger’s particular understanding of *telos* stems from his understanding of *telos* in larger Greek contexts.

Depending on the translation, Homer uses *telos* in terms of fulfillment or coming to pass or doom or consummation. All instances involve some sort of conflict whether expressly or implicitly. In the battle-ridden Iliad, for example, *telos* often refers to the doom (or destiny) of death that the capricious gods inflict on mortals. In these instances, mortal efforts are pitted in conflict (or at least subservient to) the will of the gods. In other instances throughout the Iliad, *telos* refers to the culmination of battles between or among warriors. In these instances, human efforts are pitted against each other in literal physical conflict. In a few intriguing instances in Homer, *telos* refers to consummation—as in a conversation Odysseus has with Antinous (one of the chief suitors of Odysseus’s wife Penelope). In Odyssey Book 17, lines 475-6, the Murray translation has Odysseus exclaim, “Ah, if for beggars there are gods and avengers, may the doom of death come upon Antinous before his marriage.” The actual Greek phrase here is “πρὸ γάμωι τέλος θανάτοιο κιχείη” which places τέλος (i.e. *telos*) right between marriage and death thus punning on the “fulfillment” characteristics of both death and sex. At any rate, the completion qualities of *telos* were solidly part of Greek semantics when Aristotle employed the word in his Rhetoric.
Heidegger goes on to explain that translating Aristotle’s use of *telos*, “as ‘purpose’ or ‘aim’ has it’s ground, of course,” but *telos* “is not ‘aim’ but rather [has] the character of limit, ‘what is outermost.’ Aim and purpose are definite modes in which τέλος is an ‘end,’ but they are not primary determinations. Instead, purpose and aim are founded upon τέλος as ‘end,’ which is the originary meaning” (*Basic Concepts* 57 and 59). Heidegger elaborates on this “outermost” definition in his translations of Aristotle’s use of *teleion* (a variant of *telos*) which means, “beyond which there is nothing there that . . . makes the being even more genuine” (*Basic Concepts* 58). Consider our use of the adjective *consummate* to describe a completely genuine sort of person, as in a consummate performer or a consummate speaker. Heidegger uses the example of a thief: “A ‘good thief’ is not a matter of being a good human being, but rather the meaning of a consummate thief is one who, in his being, has come into his rightful being-possibility, has brought this possibility to its end” (*Basic Concepts* 58). In short, *telos* is that quality of things that eventually completes itself. What is most striking about Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle is that purpose and aim are sufficient for *telos* but not necessary. In other words, a purpose or aim comes from *telos*, but you can have *telos* without a purpose or aim. This is how Aristotle can posit a teleological view of the natural world without asserting that Nature has some sort of consciousness (see also Hankinson 127-135, who describes Aristotle’s teleology of science as a sort of non-intentional “purposiveness”).
Telos-as-completion nuances our understanding of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in profound ways. According to George Kennedy’s translation, Aristotle begins his well-known three divisions of rhetoric with this:

The species [*eide*] of rhetoric are three in number; for such is the number [of classes] to which the hearers of speeches belong. A speech consist of three things: a speaker and a subject on which he speaks and someone addressed, and the objective [*telos*] of the *speech* relates to the last (I mean the hearer). (Kennedy 47, unless otherwise noted, brackets, italics, and parentheses are part of Kennedy’s translation)

And then after briefly introducing the three species of deliberative, judicial, and epideictic, Aristotle goes on to explain that, “the ‘end’ of each of these is different, and there are three ends for the three [species]” (Kennedy 49). Kennedy notes that “end” in this sentence is *telos*. Kennedy’s translation goes on to relate the particular *telos* of each species of rhetoric: the *telos* of deliberative rhetoric is the advantageous and the harmful; the *telos* for judicial rhetoric is the just and the unjust; and the *telos* for epideictic (praise and blame) rhetoric is the honorable and the shameful (Kennedy 49).

Two features of Aristotle’s rhetorical notion of *telos* stand out immediately from his text: first, speakers and audiences share *telos*; second, *telos* refers to *species* of purposes—i.e. *telos* is a source from which a wide range of subject-specific purposes emerges. It is significant that conventional notions of purpose and aim do not neatly fit with either of these features of *telos*. This is because purpose and aim are typically unidirectional and individual concepts from speaker to audience or from audience to speaker. Indeed, unless the word *shared* (or some other identifier) is
used when we refer to the purposes and aims of multiple agents, we tend to assume that all purposes and aims are individual and potentially clashing. *Telos*-as-completion, on the other hand, has no conventional baggage that prevents it from being a multidirectional concept shared by speakers and audiences.

It is evident from Aristotle that speakers and audience share *telos*. Kennedy recognizes the speaker-audience connection of *telos* in a translational note: “*Telos*, the final objective of the speaker and his art, which is actualized in the persuasion of the audience” (49, note 82). But Kennedy’s note clings to the conventional view of *telos*-as-purpose. If *telos* means completion, then the question is not necessarily, “what purpose does the speaker and audience share?” but instead, “what will complete this situation between this speaker and this audience?” A more colloquial formulation of this question of *telos* might be phrased as, “Where is their conversation heading?” *Telos* is thus a sort of meta-purpose that binds speaker and audience together in a mutually agreed upon activity (in which agreement may be implicit or explicit). The primacy of *telos* in Aristotle’s rhetoric makes sense in this light. Before participants can proceed with the subject matter (*stasis*) or even the art (*techne*) of any activity, they must discern what sort of activity they are even participating in.

This primary rhetorical concern of *telos* bumps into concerns of *kairos*. And while contextual appropriateness definitely affects the direction of every rhetorical
activity, it is equally true that introducing a new rhetorical activity also affects what is appropriate in rhetorical situations. Consider two drunken strangers exchanging punches on a sidewalk outside a bar. While their activity may break cultural appropriateness writ large, their mutual agreement to exchange blows (their telos) certainly establishes the appropriateness of their brawl in their situation. Notice how the appropriateness of their situation could change if mutual friends interrupt them and hold them apart with the question, “What’s going on here?” If the fighters respond in any way other than throwing another punch, that question rhetorically completed the telos of their agreement to physically hurt each other and may begin a still unpleasant but distinctly different telos of agreeing to hurl accusations (or some other similar activity). Notice also that situation-specific purposes, while not exactly irrelevant, can be fluid depending on the rhetorical activity. The fight example above could happen as an effort to resolve (i.e. complete) a perceived insult, misunderstanding, previous suffered wrong, or almost any other situational purpose. But regardless of situation-specific purpose in this sense, such fights ultimately happen because one or more individuals agree with one or more other individuals to begin throwing punches. That agreement is the telos of their situation.

**Telos and Stasis**

Telos in this sense is a sort of pre-argument agreement—a shared intention by at least two participants. This should not be confused with stasis, which has come to inform conventional notions of purpose more than telos, and which fully matured.
after Aristotle via Hermagoras and, later, Cicero and Quintilian. Sharon Crowley and Debra Hawhee explain *stasis* this way: “Seen from the point of view of two disputants, . . . the stasis marks the place where two opposing forces come together, where they rest or stand in agreement on what is at issue” (53). And therein lies the nuanced significance between *telos* and *stasis*: *stasis* addresses subject matter while *telos* addresses rhetorical direction. Crowley and Hawee use contemporary debates about abortion to show how disputants can formulate their arguments from the mutual agreement as to what sort of subject matter to discuss. But *telos* determines what sort of “discussion” even happens, whether it be a debate, an editorial exchange, a public protest, an argument among friends, a tearful decision at home, or (tragically) violence against medical practitioners.

Admittedly, the distinction between *telos* and *stasis* may seem fuzzy, but consider a notable moment in the U.S. Republican Presidential Primary during a debate televised on CNN on January 26, 2012. Wolf Blitzer moderated an exchange between two of the candidates, Newt Gingrich (former Speaker of the House) and Mitt Romney (former Governor of Massachusetts). At the time, Mitt Romney’s sizable wealth (and his tax rate and where he kept his wealth) was in the news (all transcript quotes from CNN).

BLITZER: . . . let me bring this to Speaker Gingrich. . . . are you satisfied right now with the level of transparency as far as [Governor Romney’s] personal finances?

GINGRICH: Wolf, you and I have a great relationship, it goes back a long way. I’m with him. This is a nonsense question. (APPLAUSE)
Note that at the time, Gingrich had been garnering a lot of popular conservative support (especially in South Carolina the previous week) for castigating mainstream media for their supposedly nonsensical or supposedly biased treatment of Republican Primary candidates. After receiving the applause from this Florida crowd, Gingrich attempts to change the telos of the debate away from an epideictic telos toward a deliberative telos:

GINGRICH: Look, how about if the four of us agree for the rest of the evening, we’ll actually talk about issues that relate to governing America?

Notice that Gingrich does not assert any specific issues (i.e. statements of stasis); rather, he merely asserts that the very form of the discussion should be about (unidentified) issues that relate to governing America. It is in Gingrich’s interest to assert a shift in telos from praise and blame to deliberation; the week before, a different news agency broke a story alleging that Gingrich had requested an open marriage with a previous wife. But Blitzer does not back down from Gingrich’s attacks on the media (as moderator John King had the week before in a South Carolina debate). Instead, Blitzer doggedly justifies retaining an epideictic telos while Gingrich strives to establish a deliberative telos:

BLITZER: But, Mr. Speaker, you made an issue of this, this week, when you said that, "He lives in a world of Swiss bank and Cayman Island bank accounts." I didn’t say that. You did.

GINGRICH: I did. And I’m perfectly happy to say that on an interview on some TV show. But this is a national debate, where you have a chance to get the four of us to talk about a whole range of issues.

BLITZER: But if you make a serious accusation against Governor Romney like that, you need to explain that.
GINGRICH: I simply suggested -- (BOOING) You want to try again? I mean --

At this point, Governor Romney interjects to keep the telos of the moment solidly in epideictic territory.

ROMNEY: Wouldn’t it be nice if people didn’t make accusations somewhere else that they weren’t willing to defend here? (APPLAUSE)

At this point, Gingrich caves and finds he must complete the telos he helped fuel by explaining his own epideictic accusations of Governor Romney. Gingrich, Blitzer, and Romney all had individual purposes at stake and individual issues they wanted to discuss. But this exchange was less about specific issues and individual purposes and more about the sort of activity they wanted to engage in. A reappropriated notion of telos-as-completion helps clearly identify such rhetorical shifts.

Telos, Burke, and Nietzsche

But we do not need to reappropriate solely from Aristotle for more current understandings of telos-as-completion. As indicated at the start of this chapter, Kenneth Burke advanced telos-like concepts in his work. Specifically, Burke latches onto Aristotle’s neologism entelechy to describe the formal principle, “which describes a thing by conceiving of its kind according to the perfection (that is, finishedness) of which that kind is capable” (Rhetoric 14). Aristotle derives entelechy or entelecheia from telos and tends to favor entelechy throughout his Metaphysics. Entelechy features so prominently in Aristotle that Heidegger asserts that
entelecheia is “the fundamental concept of the Aristotelian concept of being” (Basic Concepts 59). For his part, Burke describes, “the Aristotelian concept of the ‘entelechy’ [as] the notion that each being aims at the perfection natural to its kind (or, etymologically, is marked by a ‘possession of telos within’)” (“Definition” 507). Perfection in a telos sense does not mean “without error;” Burke uses perfection more in terms of completion or genuineness. As he explains in an interview later in life, “if you’re taking perfection in the sense of trying to be as good as you could, I think that it’s probably doubtful. But from the standpoint of the way I use the term, a guy could be a perfect fool or a perfect bastard or something” (Chapin). Speaking specifically about this “entelechial” principle of perfection, Burke offers a key observation on the matter: “A given terminology contains various implications, and there is a corresponding ‘perfectionist’ tendency for men to attempt carrying out those implications” (“Definition” 510). A clear example of this is the motivational power of dehumanizing wartime rhetoric. If you can convince a population that its enemies are less than human, or animals, or better yet vermin, it becomes not just easier but obligatory to kill or exterminate those enemies.

But what would an analysis of the perfectionist tendencies of a telos terminology look like? Since telos is imbued with notions of rhetorical purpose, the guiding question in such an analysis would not be just, “What does rhetorical purpose mean?” but also, “What is the purpose of rhetorical purpose?” Or in other words, “What is the particular telos of telos itself?” The rest of this chapter employs Kenneth
Burke’s entelechial notions of rhetorical perfection and purification to round out this reappropriated definition of *telos*. Since *telos* as the source of purpose-making always and already involves ambiguous combinations of conflict and unity, the “completion” of *telos* involves understanding rhetorical conflict.

As a study of rhetorical conflict, Kenneth Burke’s essay “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’” ends in a call to action. After analyzing Hitler’s various rhetorical moves in *Mein Kampf* (which Burke translates as *My Battle*), Burke suggests that conscientious readers face an obligation to embrace a “battle” of their own. “Our job, then, our anti-Hitler battle,” Burke claims, “is to find all available ways of making the Hitlerite distortions . . . apparent, in order that politicians of his kind in America be unable to perform a similar swindle” (*Philosophy* 219). In other words, to counter Hitler’s insidiously destructive modes of conflict, Burke advocates not less conflict but *more* of a certain kind of conflict—a physically safe mode of conflict that rhetorically combats physically harmful conflict. This is more than just a capstone to his reading of Hitler’s “Battle.” Burke’s value of rhetorical conflict (as the best antidote to physical conflict) underscores most of his work throughout most of his career.

Burke coined the phrase *Ad Bellum Purificandum*, or “Toward the Purification of War,” to articulate this conflict-valuing perspective. Even the most casual of Kenneth Burke’s readers will recognize this phrase as the oddly hopeful motto of his 1945
book *A Grammar of Motives* (for an in-book explanation of this motto, see *Grammar* 317–20). Though articulated in the 1940s, “Toward the Purification of War” remained a guiding principle for Burke throughout his career up until his very last years (see Burks 8). In a word, “Toward the Purification of War” is Burke’s *telos*. For Burke, that motto is the sort of rhetorical situation we all ought to be involved in all the time. It’s also Burke’s attempt to encapsulate how embracing the *symbolic* qualities of war (i.e. divergence and disagreement) can serve to negate the *physical* qualities of war (i.e. the actual destruction of human beings and their property). In emphasizing the value of conflict, Burke acknowledges that he follows Friedrich Nietzsche’s lead in asserting that *symbolic war can literally be* a vigorous and healthy approach to life and living (for a late-in-life reference to Nietzsche in this regard, see Burke, “Communication” 139–41; for significant early references, see Part II of Burke’s *Permanence and Change*). Thus, those who seek to eliminate war must *not* concern themselves with how to establish peace. Rather, eliminating actual physical conflict requires harnessing, refining, and completing conflict back to its *symbolic* roots—i.e. recognizing the *telos* qualities in conflict.

Scholarship showing a philosophic genealogy from Nietzsche to Burke is not new (Burke himself was the first one to point it out in *Permanence and Change*; see also Hawhee 129-145). And, “Toward the Purification of War” has received a lot of scholarly attention (see Bibliography for Blakesley; Weiser “Burke and War;” Zappen et al.; Weiser *Burke, War, Words*; and Wesier “As Usual”). And there is a
significant Political Science discussion about Nietzsche and the social/political utility of conflict—specifically about agonism, agonistic pluralism, or agonistic democracy (for highlights, see Bibliography for Connolly; Hatab; and Mouffe). But what follows below is an analysis of the emergent conditions and potential implications of rhetorical purpose writ large—of telos itself. The conditions and implications of rhetorical purpose are inseparable from conflict. Inasmuch as telos is the rhetorical source of purpose-making, rhetorical telos always and already involves ambiguous combinations of conflict and unity among individuals and groups. Indeed, humans articulate telos in order to establish unity over the typically conflictual non-purposeful state of nature they find themselves in.

**War as Telos**

In the remainder of this chapter, I hope to sidestep any possible trivialization of actual war by instead meditating on how war functions as an act of communication (something we talk with, like our fists—not something we talk about, like the weather). Viewing war as a telos of rhetoric—indeed, as a telos toward life in general—would nuance and broaden Carl von Clausewitz’s famous adage that “War is a mere continuation of policy by other means” (12). Instead of subordinating war to hegemonic state politics, viewing war as a rhetorical telos suggests that actual war is mass divergent communication manifested in physically violent ways. Actual war is horrific, to be sure, but actual war is also unavoidably and pervasively communicative. In microcosm, this is certainly true for armed individuals disputing
the presence of other armed individuals near their homes. And in macrocosm, it is equally true for whole populations who pit human lives against more human lives over mass disagreements about trade, religion, race, property, or other ideologies. Viewing war as a rhetorical telos is also the most significant step toward understanding Burke’s motto “Toward the Purification of War.” So it would be fruitful to first clearly explain Burke’s ambiguous use of war.

Burke’s use of war is ambiguous in that Burke purposely and frequently slips from war in an actual sense to war in a symbolic sense and back again. In the most basic sense, actual war is the concerted effort of people killing or harming each other, breaking each other’s things, and claiming each other’s property without agreement. Both and Nietzsche condemn this kind of war. With mournful disdain, Nietzsche figures that people who actually seek the real destruction of others already live self-condemned lives (see Nietzsche, Twilight 53–55). Nietzsche does offer a scathingly ironic call for the end of war: “If we could dispense with wars, so much the better. I can imagine more profitable uses for the twelve billion now paid annually for the armed peace we have in Europe; there are other means of winning respect for physiology than field hospitals” (Ecce 344). Nietzsche speaks from experience. He served briefly as a medical orderly on the front in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 (Pletsch 110-12). Nietzsche further calls the kind of reason that seeks to violently remove all challenges to its authority “diseased reason” (Twilight 56). Nietzsche clearly sees actual war as the perpetual lesser of any other options of behaving.
Burke pursues a similar “diseased” path of analysis. “Outright war,” Burke asserts, “is to be viewed not as ‘essentially’ a human motive, but rather secondarily as a *diseased form of cooperation*” (“Communication” 144, emphasis in the original). Actual war is *cooperative* in that the massively technological qualities of warfare require a mind-boggling amount of cooperation among scientists, economists, politicians, media promoters, educators, and civic organizers (not to mention the correlative efforts of the militarists themselves). But actual war is also *diseased* in that it is the most noxious symptom of a larger societal illness that Burke calls “the cult of empire” which consists of the dual human impulses toward dissipation (grabbing whatever you can with whatever resources you can control) and fanaticism (blissfully imposing your subjective perspective over all other perspectives) (*Grammar* 317–18). Actual war is fostered by (or festers in) diseased cultures of empire—cultures of unchecked ambition and unquestioned loyalty (*culture* in this sense carries all its Petri dish connotations into the realm of human society).

In brief, actual war is *cooperative* in that it pulls together efforts from almost all occupations of society (to form and coordinate the use of something as complex as, say, a firearm). Actual war is *diseased* in that it seeks to impose on other perspectives a subjective perspective (as delivered through the barrel of the firearm).
And certainly, the most diseased of all cooperative moments occurs when groups of people convince each other of this telos: that they must destroy each other. This is actual war.

On the other hand, Burke and Nietzsche use war in a distinctly symbolic sense. Both thinkers recognize aggression as a basic human motivation. Aggression is the primordial cultural soup from which telos transforms strife into striving. To begin with, Burke observes that all “organisms live by killing” and that there is “no construction without destruction” (“Communication” 136–37). This involves a wide range of activities from consuming other living matter for survival to destroying tracts of forests for the purpose of commodious living. Human perspectives also develop in a similar way. As a certain thesis encounters divergent antitheses, the thesis is partially destroyed by (and reconstructed in at least the partial image of) each sound antithesis it encounters.

Burke explicitly connects his use of “strife” in this primitive telos sense with Nietzsche’s use of “war.” In the 1930s, while writing Permanence and Change, Burke saw issues of the state “discussed with an almost ferocious pugnacity” (Permanence139). In such a volatile (yet unavoidably democratic) environment, Burke “began to look upon the language of morals as simply the theoretic analogue of the hand, clenched into a fist” (“Communication” 139). Further on, Burke connects this fist metaphor and other ideas to Nietzsche,
Thoughts of that [fist metaphor] were in the back of my mind—but
the trend they took was most definitely influenced by Nietzsche....
Nietzsche's own combativeness was in itself enough to make him
realize the value of combat so far as he was concerned.
(“Communication” 141)

In recognizing his critical indebtedness to Nietzsche, Burke specifically references
Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy* and *The Genealogy of Morals* as being particularly
influential on Burke’s understanding of the dialectical nature of strife and war
(“Communication” 141).

However, Nietzsche’s clearest explanations of his own symbolic use of war are
found in his later works *The Twilight of the Idols* and *Ecce Homo*. For instance, in
*Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche fondly describes Heraclitus as the one ancient Greek
philosopher,

in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better than
anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away and destroying, . . .
saying Yes to opposition and war, becoming, along with a radical
repudiation of the very concept of being—all this is clearly more
closely related to me than anything else thought to date. (*Ecce 273,
emphasis in the original*)

In this passage, Nietzsche apparently references the well-known Heraclitus
fragment, πάντα κατ’ ἐρυν γίνεσθαι, the translations of which range from
Nietzsche’s own suggestion above (i.e. things become through “opposition and war”) to Burke’s translation in which “war” is reconceived as “strife”. Though *telos* is
absent from most pre-Socratic texts, this Heraclitus fragment asserts a sort of proto-
telos, especially in light of all the subsequent iterations of *telos* in Homer that key off
of combat, war, conflict, and death.
Burke explains his own translation of the Heraclitus fragment like this: “I’d want to understand Heraclitus as saying that all things become through strife. I’d want to guard against the tendency to confuse such concepts as ‘strife’ or ‘conflict’ with ‘war,’ a distinction which my early reading of Nietzsche did not always make” (“Communication” 144, emphasis in the original). In other words, later in his career Burke would articulate a more distinct vocabulary difference between strife and war, but when he formulated “Toward the Purification of War” in the 1930s, Burke had Nietzsche and Nietzsche’s value of strife in mind. And strife is key to rhetorical telos in humans. “The very powers developed by us and grounded ultimately in the primal naturalistic necessities of strife or strain,” says Burke, “are the same resources by which we perfected our modes of cooperation” (“Communication” 144). Strife perfected or completed in this way makes it possible for “any conflict of powers [to] be presented as a ‘balance of powers’” (“Communication” 144, emphasis in the original).

Nietzsche and Enemies

Burke’s vision of a kinder, gentler symbolic strife or war can also be seen in Nietzsche’s later works which deal with the life-affirming advantages of fostering a perspective of war. In these works, Nietzsche uses der Krieg (war, warfare) instead of der Kampf (fight, struggle, match, bout, battle, fray) or der Unfriede (strife, discord). From his forward to Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche argues that “War” in a symbolic sense “has always been the grand sagacity of every spirit which has grown
too inward and too profound; its curative power lies even in the wounds one receives” (Twilight 31). He explains this conception of symbolic war more clearly in the “Morality as Anti-Nature” section of Twilight of the Idols,

The spiritualization of sensuality is called love: it is a great triumph . . . A further triumph is our spiritualization of enmity. It consists in profoundly grasping the value of having enemies . . . enmity has now become more spiritual—much more prudent, much more thoughtful, much more forbearing . . . We adopt the same attitude towards the ‘enemy within’: there too we have spiritualized enmity; there too we have grasped its value . . . One has renounced the grand life when one renounces war. (Twilight 53–54, emphasis in the original)

Nietzsche’s use of the word war (der Krieg) instead of struggle or battle (der Kampf, as Hitler later uses) is significant. Der Krieg connotes prolonged effort rather than a single effort, a campaign rather than a single fight, a way of life rather than an anomaly within a life, an overall telos rather than an individual purpose.

This is best indicated by Nietzsche’s use (in German) of the word Kriegs-Praxis to describe his “practice of war” (Götzen 246–47 and Ecce 232-33). Praxis has much the same connotation in German as it does in English and implies more of a daily-living experience than a routine or training. Further, war in this sense is obviously not actual outright war. This symbolic war does not seek to destroy; rather, it seeks to find advantage in the very existence of opposition. Nietzsche explains his “practice of war” / “Kriegs-Praxis” in Ecce Homo:

I only attack causes that are victorious; I may even wait until they become victorious. Second: I only attack causes against which I would not find allies, so that I stand alone—so that I compromise myself alone . . . . Third: I never attack persons; I merely avail myself of the person as of a strong magnifying glass that allows one to make visible
a general but creeping and elusive calamity. . . Fourth: I only attack things when every personal quarrel is excluded, when any background of bad experiences is lacking. On the contrary, attack is in my case a proof of good will, sometimes even of gratitude. (Ecce 232–33)

Nietzsche’s philosophic and more polite sense of war depends on the person waging it to seek out worthy equals. A fight (even a philosophic fight) with an opponent of lesser means is no fight at all. It is only in a perspectively-threatening position that people waging this sort of war really achieve and develop all they can. “Where one feels contempt,” Nietzsche claims, “one cannot wage war; where one commands, where one sees something beneath oneself, one has no business waging war” (Ecce 232, emphasis in the original). Thus, Nietzsche’s symbolic war embraces the necessity of equals engaging each other with conflicting paradigms and perspectives in non-destructive manners.

In Nietzsche’s critique of traditional Christianity in Twilight of the Idols, he particularly revels in his opposition to the traditional Christian Church even though he’s sure the Church would love to see him (and those like him) disappear: “The Church has at all times desired the destruction of its enemies; we, we immoralists and anti-Christians, see that it is to our advantage that the Church exist” (Twilight 53). But while the traditional Christian Church may have desired the destruction of its enemies, Nietzsche readily acknowledges that, “the most serious Christians have always been well disposed toward me” (Ecce 233). Nietzsche’s affinity toward “serious Christians” probably stems from Jesus’ teachings regarding enemies:
You have heard that it was said, “You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy.” But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, . . . For if you love those who love you, what reward do you have? . . . And if you greet only your brothers and sisters, what more are you doing than others? . . . Be perfect, therefore. (Matthew 5.43-48 NRSV)

In the original Greek, Jesus enjoins those listening not to be “perfect” as in flawless but to be “perfect” as in telios, i.e. complete (telios is a variation of telos that Heidegger translates as, “something that is completed,” see Heidegger, Basic Concepts 55-58). Nietzsche pokes at traditional Christianity for forgetting this part of its roots—that valuing enemies is a necessary part of becoming a complete being.

So for Nietzsche (as well as for “the most serious Christians” presumably), preserving the life of an enemy is just as vital as preserving his own. Thus he and others like him, he asserts, have “opened wide our hearts to every kind of understanding, comprehension, and approval. We do not readily deny, we seek our honor in affirming” (Twilight 56, emphasis in the original). So while Nietzsche may condemn as unhealthy certain perspectives that seek to remove opposition, he still finds oppositional value in those unhealthy perspectives. Even these unhealthy perspectives should be encountered, for they provide people opportunities to be healthy (and to develop healthfully) in opposition.

Though Nietzsche might disagree, this opponent-equalizing, life-affirming, opposition-seeking, and ultimately philosophic war is at heart dialectical, at least in Kenneth Burke’s sense. “Allow full scope of the dialectical process,” Burke suggests,
“and you establish a scene in which the protagonist of a thesis has maximum opportunity to modify his thesis, and so mature it, in the light of the antagonist’s rejoinders” (Philosophy 444). The steadied ethos of engagement found in Burke’s dialectic has definite echoes of Nietzsche. In his “Four Master Tropes” essay, Burke also closely identifies dialectic with the classical trope of irony. He does this because both dialectic and irony are “developments” resulting from the interaction of divergent terms and terminologies (Grammar 512). Even though irony is a frequent device used in sarcasm or derisive humor, Burke suggests that, “True irony, humble irony, is based upon a sense of fundamental kinship with the enemy, as one needs him, is indebted to him, is not merely outside him as an observer but contains him within, being consubstantial with him” (Grammar 514, emphasis in the original).

All of this points to this observation: Burke employs Nietzsche’s symbolic use of “war” to represent the conflictual telos that humans use to both survive and communicate. Burke never thinks of “communication without thinking of its ultimate perfection [i.e. telos], named in such words as ‘community’ and ‘communion’” (“Communication” 144). Burke continues, “though such terms do also imply a competitive element, as does indeed the very concept of ‘persuasion,’ which in most cases is to be classed as the very antithesis of war” (“Communication” 144). This is perhaps as good as any aphoristic summary of this particular telos: the purification of war is communion through competition.
Toward Purification

While Burke’s notion of war provides an explanation for the conflictual basis of *telos*, it is the *purification* component of “Toward the Purification of War” that cements conflict and *telos* together. The ambiguity of *purification* in “Toward the Purification of War” stems from what Burke calls the “paradox of purity” or the “paradox of the absolute” (*Grammar* 35). In short, the paradox of purity occurs whenever “actual” occurrences of a concept are juxtaposed with the “pure” concept itself and when *actuality* is viewed in terms of *generality*. Specifically, for any given action, a *pure* action cannot in actuality *be* the action because every *actual* instance of an action is unavoidably singular while a *pure* action would be the action in its *general* sense. *Actual* actions will always be distinct from other instances of *actual* actions while a *pure* action will always be the same and thus only treatable in non-*actual* ways. In this way a *pure* act is always symbolic.

In applying this to war, pure war is the non-actual, symbolic, general form of actual war. Again, actual war is any occurrence in which groups of people organize themselves in concerted movements to kill or harm each other in mass-efforts to assert divergent perspectives (see Burke, “Communication” 144–45). From the symbolic origins of actual war (i.e. divergent perspectives) to actual war’s symbolic ends (e.g. ownership, supremacy, agreement, treaty, etc.), actual war emerges as physical strife toward symbolic ends. In other words, actual war is symbolic strife about which its participants forget that it *is* symbolic strife. (I am, of course,
misappropriating Nietzsche’s sentiment, “Truths are illusions about which it has been forgotten that they are illusions” from Nietzsche, “On Truth” 250). In a word, symbolic strife is actual war’s telos.

In contrast with actual war, pure war is already symbolic in that pure war is only treatable in non-actual terms. In this way, those who engage in pure war never “forget” (in Nietzsche’s sense) that they are involved in symbolic war; pure war can thus serve as a preemption of actual war. This is not to say that all instances of symbolic war are necessarily pure war; indeed, to be an instance (whether symbolic or not) implies a specific and not a general character (much like a computer game simulating a WWII battlefield is a symbolic war but is obviously not pure war or war-in-general). Rather, pure war as telos completes the concept of war back to its symbolic roots. Pure war is symbolic conflict that literally asserts its symbolic nature but never literalizes its symbolic assertions. In this sense, pure war reverses the relationship found in actual war and seeks to transform “war” so that the symbolic nature of war (i.e. asserting divergent perspectives) becomes its actual use.

Inasmuch as actual war is “diseased” cooperation (see Burke “Communication” 144), pure war would be the cure. But also inasmuch as actual war and pure war are dialectic in their telos relationship, with Burke, “we should ‘ironically’ note the function of the disease in ‘perfecting’ the cure, or the function of the cure in ‘perpetuating’ the disease” (Grammar 512). In particular, the attitudinal telos of
actual war—the assertion of divergent perspectives—will always be a guide for pure war. As a telos, war is a means towards its own purification. Consider this explanation from Burke’s *A Grammar of Motives*:

> All means are necessarily “impure.” For besides the properties in them that fit them for the particular use to which they are put, they have other properties (properties that would fit them for other possible uses, including hostile ones). . . . That is, there is no one end exclusively implicit in them. And thus, from the standpoint of any given end, they are “impure.” And we act by a progressive purification of them. (*Grammar* 309–10)

Burke’s assertion is a direct response to Aldous Huxley’s claim that pure ends can only result from pure means. The error in Huxley’s claim lies in the dogged view that ends and means enjoy a hierarchical relationship—that ends necessarily follow means—when of course means are means by virtue of the ends to which they aim. That is, means depend on a telos. Whatever the sought-for telos, means must adapt themselves to those ends. In this sense, a telos actually produces its means and not vice versa. Means fulfill each respective telos insofar as means complete their progression back to their ends. Means are, in a word, *impure* formulations of each respective telos.

Using the conflictual nature of war as a means to mitigating conflict may seem paradoxical at first. Indeed, Burke points out, “if we could get peace by peaceful means we’d have peace already; and if we couldn’t get it by means somewhat short of peace, then there would be no use in our attempting to get it at all” (*Grammar* 309). In other words, if peace can only result from actions that are decidedly not
peaceful, what use pursuing peace if the effort to attain it and keep it only perpetuates the lack of it? Pure war as telos solves this paradox by acknowledging that the elimination of actual outright war will never come about by purely peaceful means.

As noted, pure war as telos places as foremost war’s symbolic purpose—i.e., the assertion of divergent perspectives. The assertion of divergent perspectives is a necessarily dialectical activity. Burke suggests that dialectical thinking “arises when one tries, by the interaction of terms upon one another, to produce a development which uses all the terms” (Grammar 512, emphasis in the original). From this “perspective of perspectives,” Burke suggests, “none of the participating ‘sub-perspectives’ can be treated as either precisely right or precisely wrong. They are all voices, or personalities, or positions, integrally affecting one another” (Grammar 512). As divergent “terms are thus encouraged to participate in an orderly parliamentary development, the dialectic of this participation produces . . . a ‘resultant certainty’ . . . that all the sub-certainties be considered as neither true nor false, but contributory” (Grammar 513, emphasis in the original). Quoting Kenneth Benne’s critique of A Grammar of Motives, Burke summarizes the dialectical purpose of his Motives project: “Reaffirming ‘the parliamentary process,’ [Burke’s project] is motivated by a ‘humanitarian concern to see how far war may be translated practically into linguistic struggle and how such verbal struggle may be made to eventuate in a common enactment short of physical combat’” (“Linguistic” 268).
In practice, such dialectic will always be (at the very least) verbally messy if only because divergence implies a lack of accounting for that which is divergent. The challenge facing conscientious rhetors is to keep such messes verbally contained—avoiding the spilling over of verbal divergence (face-to-face pure war) into physical divergence (fist-to-face actual war). The trick is harnessing the strife found in humans’ natural condition and employing it to cooperative ends or telos. Burke suggests the general shape such a trick might take:

> With a few more terms in his vocabulary of motives, for instance, the rabid advocate of racial intolerance could become a mild one; and the mild one would not feel the need to be thus intolerant at all. And so human thought may be directed towards “the purification of war,” not perhaps in the hope that war can be eliminated from any organism that, like man, has the motives of combat in his very essence, but in the sense that war can be refined to the point where it would be much more peaceful than the conditions we would now call peace. *(Grammar 305)*

Such a telos is at the heart of Burke’s “anti-Hitler battle” mentioned in “The Rhetoric of Hitler’s ‘Battle’.” Indeed, such a telos is the hinge upon which Burke’s entire philosophy of symbols swings. Such a telos is, in a word, the motive of Burke’s entire *Motives* project. But it’s not just Burke’s project, it belongs to anyone who is genuinely interested in seeing the human race survive and thrive.

**A Teleological Account of Telos**

Thus, here at the end of a dissertation chapter about telos, I have yet to make a single teleological observation of my own. Yet, to posit the enduring significance of telos for rhetoric and, indeed, the survivability of the human species, I find a certain
teleological account most convincing. It deals with Burke’s well-known definition of
humans as symbol-using animals, which is related to Heidegger’s similar definition
of humans: “When the Greeks say that the human being is a living thing that speaks,
they do not mean, in a physiological sense, that he utters definite sounds. Rather, the
human being is a living thing that has its genuine being-there in conversation and in
discourse” (Basic Concepts 74, emphasis in original).

I would nuance Heidegger’s definition and say that the Greeks meant “not just in a
physiological sense” if only because our unique physiological ability to vocally
articulate is itself a profound quality among all other fauna on this planet. The
human throat physiologically favors speaking more than swallowing. Biologists
have known this for years. One such researcher observes,

Man is the only mammal in which “communication” has become a
dominant oropharyngeal activity. . . . “speech” involves the exactly
patterned modulation of the basic note emitted from the larynx. That
patterning is produced by a change in the shape of the air space in the
oral cavity and by use of a series of “stops” which involve the tongue,
teeth, and lips. [This suggests] a much more fundamental and wide-
ranging question—the relationship between the evolution of speech
and the changes in both the anatomy and functional relationships of
the structures developed to process food. (Hiiemae 278)

While we cannot know the exact evolutionary nuances of such changes, the fact that
human throats are the general shape and form they are indicates that verbal
communication evidently allowed our proto-human ancestors to survive and thrive
more completely than their other not-as-vocally articulate proto-primate cousins. In
other words, at some point in the evolution of humans, vocal articulation helped generations survive better than mere swallowing did.

However, we should also recognize that mere vocal articulation is but a symptom of a larger evolutionary development in humans. The recent work by Stanley Greenspan and Stuart Shanker on affect-based language development suggests that language acquisition emerges from a panoply of affective behaviors. For a full treatment, see their 2004 book *The First Idea: How Symbols, Language, and Intelligence Evolved from Our Primate Ancestors*. In a 2005 follow-up article on “The Role of Affect in Language Development,” Greenspan and Shanker explain their empirical findings this way,

> Language does not suddenly appear at some pre-determined age in some pre-determined fashion but rather, emerges after the ape or child has begun to engage with his or her caregivers in such co-regulated activities as sharing, requesting, imitating, playing, naming, describing, apologizing, etc. The ape or child is increasingly motivated to use and develop these communicational tools so that he or she may achieve context-dependent, interactional goals: goals which themselves develop as a function of the ape or child’s developing communicational environment and his or her growing abilities and increasingly differentiated affects. (330)

Such findings reject traditional Cartesian views of language-acquisition with the attendant bogus traditional assumptions of “language-acquisition as an internal mental process and language itself as a code for transmitting one’s thoughts” (329).

In a 1978 conference paper, Kenneth Burke anticipated this community-centric sort of scientific finding about language acquisition. In it, Burke admits his indebtedness
to anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski for partly inspiring Burke’s famous formulation of humans as symbol-using animals: “it's helpful to recall Malinowski’s prime representative anecdote for the study of symbolic action: a group of illiterate savages using language as a tool in the cooperative act of catching fish” (“Questions” 333). Remembering this is vital to understanding the need that humans have for telos. Humans are animals whose communal instincts directed the evolution of communication as a mechanism for survival.

We should also recognize that such cooperation is not unique to human animals nor is cooperation merely a sign of non-natural altruism. That is to say, the traditional view of natural selection holds that species evolve by surviving their environments largely in competition with other species and in competition with members of their own species. Until recently, evolutionary biologists had assumed that cooperation was merely “a peripheral feature of the history of life—[a] behavior found in just a few species of social animals” (Sterelny et al. 5). Instead, there has been mounting biological evidence in recent years that suggests that cooperation is mostly ubiquitous in the natural world. Just last year, MIT press published a tome of studies titled Cooperation and Its Evolution, which contains the work of an array of evolutionary biologists and other scientists whose collected research reveals pervasive cooperative aspects in all realms of life. The book’s introduction summarizes these findings in this way:

One overarching trend in the history of life has been an increase in complexity [which] depended on a series of revolutions in
cooperation, as more complex evolutionary agents (metazoans, eusocial insect colonies) emerged out of cooperatively interacting simpler ones. Groups become individuals as the members of those groups go through an evolutionary transition from independence through contingent cooperation to mandatory cooperation. (Sterelny et al. 5)

So while cooperation is evident in the evolutionary patterns of most biological life, in humans the evolutionary role of complex symbolic cooperation is more pronounced than in other symbol-using species—of which there are many, of course. Thus, when Burke refers to humans as the symbol-using animal, he is not asserting that humans are the only species who use symbols. Rather, humans are those animals whose symbol-use has come to circumscribe their existence in more profound and pervasive ways than any other animal species. Recent biological findings seem to support Burke in his use of Malinowski's representative anecdote of humans developing language to better help each other catch fish.

Thus I arrive at a teleological account for telos itself: if communication evolved as a mechanism to help humans better catch fish together, telos is the engine of that mechanism. Without the shared purpose of catching fish, our proto-human ancestors would never have evolved the now-millennia-old complex sets of linguistic symbols evident in the words "catching fish." In other words, just as we have rhetoric because we persuade (and not vice versa), we communicate because we have telos (and not vice versa). Humans have become the dominant species on this planet precisely because of their ability to complete their shared purposes in ways that other animals cannot. The biggest danger for humans occurs when we
forget that communication and rhetoric have always been about the thriving survival of the species. When we forget that basic (however constructed) teleological truth, humans inevitably end up hurting other humans (anywhere on the scale from individuals to entire peoples).

Concerns of *telos* are suddenly accompanied by stark ethical responsibilities. Foremost among these responsibilities is committing our selves, our arts, and our lives to answering these questions: how do we bring pure war to those who already use actual war? How do we dialectically engage divergent perspectives that have abandoned dialectic in their efforts to assert themselves? How do we promote perpetual arguing-without-fighting among those who are already fighting? These questions will not go away any time soon. But as conscientious rhetoricians and critics, we can commit ourselves to see in all such conflicts “the characteristic invitation to rhetoric” (Burke, *Rhetoric* 25). We can do this by recognizing along with Burke that, “We need never deny the presence of strife, enmity, faction as a characteristic motive of rhetorical expression. We need not close our eyes to their almost tyrannous ubiquity in human relations” (*Rhetoric* 20). Far from being discouraged by humanity’s ubiquitous penchant for conflict, instead, “we can be on the alert always to see how such temptations to strife are implicit in the institutions that condition human relationships; yet we can at the same time always look beyond this order” (*Rhetoric* 20). We can do this by following paths of strife back to their rhetorical roots—by using conflict as the very *telos* to see conflict’s end.
CHAPTER 3. THE END OF DIVERGENCE: SYMBOULEUTIKON AND THE RHETORICAL IMPERATIVE

“Rhetorical power and excellence of speech belong to fine art; but oratory (ars oratoria), the art of using people’s weaknesses for one’s own aims (no matter how good these may be in intention or even in fact), is unworthy of any respect whatsoever.”
—Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment

Toward an Actual Ethics of Rhetoric

In the previous chapter, I explored a philology of telos that followed telos specifically in terms of completing conflict back to its linguistic or rhetorical roots. In this chapter, I turn my attention to symbouleutikon, a venue and practice with its own sort of telos or completion. I do this with an eye toward my claim in the introduction—that rhetoric is pervasively ethical. The concept of symbouleutikon provides a setting in which rhetoric’s ethics clearly emerges.

In the next chapter, I explore Aristotle’s specific telos for symbouleutikon, which is sympheron. The commonsense view has been that deliberation (symbouleutikon) has a specific purpose (telos), which is traditionally called expediency (sympheron). But I write this chapter with the guiding question of what we might discover if we reversed the typical order and instead posit that telos (completion, perfection, purification) has a specific symbouleutikon (way of bringing wills together). That is to say, could the human impulse toward completion have its own distinctive “deliberative” activity and content (scare quotes intended)?
Symbouleutikon is the term that Aristotle uses to name what later theorists called deliberation or deliberative rhetoric. Throughout other parts of this dissertation, I use the terms symbouleutikon and deliberation largely interchangeably. But in this chapter, for the sake of clarity and nuance, I prefer to use the term symbouleutikon whenever possible to describe a mode of rhetoric that is more of a state of being-together-in-the-world—a pervasive condition in which humans’ ways of thinking, speaking, and moralizing are infused with an inescapable togetherness.

Symbouleutikon in this sense is a close cousin of what traditionally gets called deliberation. Also for the sake of clarity, I do not use the term symbouleutikon in the narrow sense that Aristotle uses it. Jeffrey Walker notes that, “Aristotle’s rhetorical ideal is evident in his . . . preference for the term symbouleutikon,” or συμβουλής, as a name for deliberative discourse (Walker 38). Walker goes on to say, “Symbouleutikon suggests primarily the discourse of the boulê [or βουλή], the ‘senate’ or council, which deliberated and prepared proposals before they were heard in the . . . popular assembly” (Walker 38). I do not use symbouleutikon in this narrow sense of the pre-assembly council from ancient Athens. Instead, I prefer to use symbouleutikon to connote something similar but with broader implications—implications which Aristotle may very well have been alluding to when he chose the boulê as the basis for what has come to be known as deliberative rhetoric. It is true that boulê did refer to the Greek senate, but “senate” is a secondary or even tertiary meaning of boulê. More basically, boulê means “will” or “decision.” The first part of symbouleutikon, syn/sym or σύν, is a preposition that means “together.” So as
Aristotle names it, the rhetoric of *symbouleutikon* is literally the discourse in which wills or decisions get together. I use *symbouleutikon* in this broader sense. (This is in keeping with the spirit of reappropriation I advocated in the introduction of this dissertation: I take up Aristotle’s artful chisel of *symbouleutikon* to see how it works as a hammer, and lo, the world is suddenly full of nails.)

Also, notice the striking phonetic similarities between *symbouleutikon* and *symbolon*, the Greek word for *symbol*, which literally means “casting together.” The middle components of both words, *boulê* and *bôlos*, are quasi-cognates of each other and mean “will” and “throw or cast” respectively. The language for “casting a vote” was used in ancient Athens in much the same way that we discuss “casting votes” today—namely, participants cast votes after deliberative discussion as *symbols* of their wills or decisions on a matter. When Aristotle named what has since been called deliberation, i.e. *symbouleutikon*, he drew on language that refers to two inevitable qualities of rhetoric—its symbolic nature and how it draws participants together. The symbolic and togetherness qualities of *symbouleutikon* form the soil from which rhetoric’s ethics emerge.

For the sake of having a clear *telos* in mind—a clear path through which rhetoric’s ethics finds its completion—I need to nuance what I mean by “rhetoric’s ethics” and “an ethics of rhetoric.” These two terms mean the same thing to me, but they are very different than describing rhetoric that accords to ethics or an ethics that is
informed by rhetoric. The problem of articulating an actual ethics of rhetoric is that an ethics is not an ethics of rhetoric if it is merely appended to or added to rhetoric. Rather, an ethics is an ethics of rhetoric if it is articulated by and through rhetoric. That is to say, if an ethics is an emergent quality of rhetorical behavior and action then that ethics is an ethics of rhetoric. If by virtue of behaving rhetorically you also behave ethically then you have uncovered an ethics of rhetoric. And further, as I'll argue below, you will have also discovered how ethics completes rhetoric, i.e. how ethics is a rhetorical telos. Articulating that is the challenge facing any ethics of rhetoric.

The idea of an ethics of rhetoric is not new. Perhaps the best-known treatment is Richard Weaver's 1953 book The Ethics of Rhetoric. Weaver’s most significant observations about rhetoric and ethics were his thoughts on what he called “ultimate terms.” An ultimate term is a term “about which all other [related] related expressions are ranked as subordinate . . . . Its force imparts to the others their lesser degree of force . . . . [It is] the ultimate generator of force flowing down through many links of ancillary terms” (212). Weaver explores the term progress as one such term that appeared to be an ultimate term in American society at the time he wrote his book. As a symptom of high modernism, Weaver explains, the term progressive “will validate almost anything” in the public consciousness. Weaver goes on to conclude, however, “An ethics of rhetoric requires that ultimate terms be ultimate in some rational sense. The only way to achieve that objective is through an
ordering of our own minds and our own passions" (232). In other words, Weaver asserts that an ethics of rhetoric requires external, or non-rhetorical, hierarchies of thoughts and motives in order to be efficacious as an ethics. Thus in the end, Weaver’s ethics of rhetoric is still merely an ethics applied to rhetoric, not an ethics which emerges from rhetoric.

But it turns out for other reasons that Weaver may not be the best place to start when considering an ethics of rhetoric. Though an accomplished theorist in his own right, Weaver’s Ethics of Rhetoric is full of unacknowledged references to the work of Kenneth Burke. As Richard Johannesen has researched, Kenneth Burke’s books *A Grammar of Motives* and *A Rhetoric of Motives* were the focus for study by Weaver and the other faculty participants in the quarter-long seminar taught by Burke at the University of Chicago in the fall of 1949. Only after Weaver’s personal and intensive exposure to Burke and his “rhetorics” do we find the development of several rhetorical insights that are significant in Weaver’s view of rhetoric [including] the cultural potency of values in the form of “ultimate terms.” (328)

The subject of ultimate terms occupies much of the third section of Burke’s *Rhetoric of Motives*. But unlike Weaver’s appropriation of Burke, Burke remains suspicious of ultimate terms that reify non-dialectical hierarchies.

Instead, Burke prefers his own articulation of dialectical discourse guided by ultimate terms that serve specifically dialectical hierarchies (which look less and less hierarchical the more they accord to dialectic). Mere dialectic, Burke explains in
his *Rhetoric*, “would leave the competing voices in a jangling relation to each other (a conflict solved *faute de mieux* by ‘horse-trading’); but the ‘ultimate’ order would place these competing voices themselves in a *hierarchy*, or *sequence*, or *evaluative series* . . . being arranged *developmentally* with relation to one another” (*Rhetoric* 187, italics in original). Burke further explains that, “In an ultimate dialectic, the terms so lead into one another that the completion of each order leads to the next. Thus, a body of positive terms must be brought to a head in a titular term which represents the principle or idea behind the positive terminology as a whole” (*Rhetoric* 189). *Symbouleutikon* is one such titular term. *Democracy* is another, so also we might dub the terms *family, university, game, religion*, and others. Burke is saying that when dialectic is practiced in a venue under such a titular term, all discourse that proceeds under the heading of that term leads and proceeds eventually back to that term.

Consider the clash between early American pro-independence Northern delegates and crown-supporting Southern delegates. It was not until after Thomas Jefferson’s first draft of the Declaration was put to committee revision that the crown-supporting factions found themselves inclined to support independence. The pro-independence faction invited the crown-supporting faction’s feedback on a possible statement of declaration and thus set “independence” as an ultimate term that guided dialectical discourse toward eventual independence. In a smaller more intimate venue, a disgruntled teenager may express a desire to leave home but
suddenly find herself involved in a “family” discussion about her frustration; thus, the jangle of voices and dialectical discord between parent and child still happen within and support her “family.” Also consider that any time a baseball coach argues with an umpire about a bad call, their dialectical clash still proceeds toward the ultimate term of “game” with all its attendant rules and expectations.

Such ultimate terms, Burke explains, are “in a different order of vocabulary,” and inasmuch as these terms are in dialogue with other similarly ultimate terms, “there must be a principle of principles involved in such a design—and the step from principles to a principle of a principle is likewise both the fulfillment of the previous order and the transcending of it” (Rhetoric 189). As Burke develops elsewhere, and as I explored in the previous chapter, the principle of principles he alludes to is telos in general, or that which guides a concept to its completion or perfection. An ultimate term is already complete or perfect in the sense that all other terms within an ultimate term’s dialectic find their completion or perfection in the ultimate term. Thus ultimate terms as a distinct order of vocabulary find their completion in telos. Their specific genus, as it were, is telos.

And inasmuch as each ultimate term has a corresponding ultimate activity—play for game; worship for religion; learn for university; debate for delegation—the corresponding activity for telos is symbouleutikon. By this I mean, that inasmuch as telos is the distinctly human drive to conceptually complete and perfect all other
concepts, *symbouleutikon*—the bringing together of wills—is the vehicle humans use to go about their efforts of completing and perfecting their terms and concepts. I should rather say, *symbouleutikon* is that which humans cannot escape as they go about their perfecting efforts. We are trapped in *symbouleutikon*, for we are linguistically bound—or bound to the symbols we share.

In his essay “A Dramatistic View of the Origins of Language” (reprinted in *Language as Symbolic Action*), Burke addresses our linguistically circumscribed reality this way, “Since language has its own peculiar motives, a language-using species could not be motivated solely by nonlinguistic motives. [And] by its very nature, language also drives toward the ‘ultimate’ of itself. And the ultimate is ‘Justice,’ a kind of completion whereby laws are so universalized that they also apply to the lawgiver” (*Language* 440). In other words, Burke suggests that the particular *telos* of language is justice. Burke’s assertion proceeds from three inevitable qualities of language-as-symbol-system.

First, language-as-symbol-system is unavoidably a shared communal public thing, which is infused with rules that are equally shared, communal, and public.

The second quality, which is closely associated with the first, is that the concept of *meaning* is thus bound to the realm between and among beings instead of locked in mere subjectivity.
And third, language’s public meanings and rules proceed toward their universal application to all language-users, i.e. rules for one are rules for all because the rules themselves are public property. This is a definition of justice.

Understanding each of these three qualities of language reveals how an actual ethics of rhetoric emerges from rhetoric. To explain the first quality, I briefly explore Charles Pierce’s semiotic theory of interpretants, which establishes that all our signs are unavoidably shared things. I also briefly explore Saul Kripke’s use of Wittgenstein to explain why it is language can never be private and how language’s rule-based. To explain the second—that meaning itself exists between beings and not in solitary minds—I draw on Heidegger’s notion of an enworlded ontology. And to explain the third quality—that language’s rules proceed toward their universal application to all language-users—I engage specific problems with the ability of Kantian ethics to account rationally and positively for divergent ethical perspectives. This last task is vital to the ultimate ethical project of symbouleutikon.

**Language, Public, Rules**

In his 2004 article “Abduction is Never Alone,” Floyd Merrell concludes with this hope: “Perhaps, then, we may eventually come to realize that body, mind, signs, and abductive acts, are never alone, within the interconnected participatory whole” (273). What follows in this section is a step toward that hope. Specifically, by viewing Charles Peirce’s semiotics in terms of rhetorical tropes (instead of vice
versa), we come to realize that Charles Peirce’s interpretants like abductive acts are also never alone (nor final). Another way of saying interpretants are never alone is saying that symbols are always shared phenomena. Simply put, an interpretant is the effect that a sign has on someone who perceives a sign. Interpretants are key to how Pierce explains *semiosis*, or the theory of signs.

Pierce suggests that there are actually three fundamentally different kinds of interpretant into which interpretant itself can be divided, namely dynamic interpretant, immediate interpretant, and final interpretant. Late in life, Charles Perce struggled to really articulate what the final interpretant really was. In one letter to an associate, he wrote, “I confess that my own conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from mist” (Pierce, *Collected* 4.536). In a different letter, he continued to struggle with articulating the final interpretant: “it is quite hazy and needs a vast deal of study before it is rendered perfect” (Pierce, *Collected* 8.314). The ambiguity of the final interpretant leads to a significant sense in which interpretants are never alone nor final.

Interpretants are never alone simply because they are (or are components of, or representations of) mental states. Further, inasmuch as a sign is communicable, there must exist some sort of corresponding community through which the sign receives its “final” signification. For this same reason, the “final” interpretant as Pierce describes it can never be actually final, for community (itself as well as each
individual community) is constantly evolving/devolving or at least in a continual state of flux. As such, interpretants will continue to multiply as community itself continues to alter the meaning and media of signs.

This phenomenon makes sense in light of Pierce’s explanation of all three interpretants. The first interpretant Pierce describes as the “dynamic interpretant” which is the “effect actually produced on the mind” (Peirce, *Essential 482*). This sort of interpretant occurs at the very initial stages of cognition all through the most complex stages of cognition. The dynamic interpretant engages a sign whenever and in whatever conditions a perceiver perceives (whether spatially, temporally, mentally, culturally, spiritually, intellectually, emotionally, etc.).

From this first interpretant, Pierce suggests a second interpretant—a sort of intermediate interpretant, which he dubs the immediate interpretant. This interpretant engages with a sign whenever there is some sort of secondary image used to denote the sign. This sign-of-a-sign can be as simple as recognizing the image of a sign in one’s mind, or the familiar notion of a physical object (like a tree). This phenomenon is not unique to humans. “Nature creates similarities,” notes Walter Benjamin, “One need only think of mimicry” (333). Mimicry in non-humans reinforces the hypothesis that even neuronal impulses are metaphoric in nature.

Consider natural camouflage in the world of non-human animals. Natural selection tends to favor animals with natural, but we can’t really say whether camouflaged
animals process camouflage functions on a symbolic level. But what of the predators against which this camouflaging function offers protection? For the camouflage to work as a protectant, a predator must see the camouflage as if it were part of the non-food surrounding scenery. This does not necessarily mean that the predator sees the camouflage animal in terms of anything in particular. But it does suggest that some animals see a thing as if it were not-the-thing, which is a fundamentally symbolic process.

For his part, Charles Pierce describes the immediate interpretant as “the schema in [our] imagination, i.e. the vague Image of what there is in common to the different images of a [tree]” (Pierce, *Collected* 8.314). Whatever the other notions of such an interpretant, this is certainly an “overlying” sort of process.

Finally, Pierce describes the final interpretant as “that which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached” (Peirce, *Essential* 496). Elsewhere, Pierce describes this last interpretant this way:

> My Final Interpretant is . . . the effect the Sign would produce upon any mind upon which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect. . . . the Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered. . . . The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (Hardwick and Cook 110)

It is probably because of these descriptions that subsequent secondary literature on Pierce has interpreted the final interpretant to be some sort of “arriving” at the
summit of the sign—as if some sort of process really has some sort of end. But what I see from his descriptions above indicates that this is a never-ending process. Perhaps the confusion here is one of movement. Pierce describes the “actual” as tending toward the final interpretant. This is not saying that our mental states more and more closely resemble reality—quite the contrary. The final interpretant is that fuzzy situation in which our reality more closely resembles our signs.

Kenneth Burke explores a similar notion in an earlier essay in *Language as Symbolic Action*, in which he reverses the traditional notion that “words are the signs of things” and instead asks “what might be discovered if we tried inverting such a view, and upholding instead the proposition that ‘things are the signs of words’” (*Language* 360-61). What we discover begins innocently enough. The first time a child is told by someone that a particular object is called “tree,” that object is not a tree to that child, it is *the* tree, for no other object in the world is called “tree.” In this moment, and this moment only, does an individual thing precede an individual sign. Every moment thereafter, that individual sign precedes the countless individual things that represent the individual sign. By this I mean that calling a thing “tree” does not overlay the thing with the symbol “tree” as much as it overlays the term/symbol for “tree” with countless analogous (yet singularly different) individual things. Think of a toddler’s excitement when a parent points to an object and asks the child, “What is that?” and the child, gleeful at understanding the rules of the game, recognizes the object for what it is: a sign for the word that the child
learned from the parent. And so, the child calls out "tree!" and waits for another thing to be pointed out that represents the word.

Thus in a very rudimentary form in Pierce's final interpretant, we have here a formulation of *symbouleutikon*—a situation in which a child’s will is brought together with a parent’s will through the symbol game of naming a tree.

Pierce’s notions of the final interpretant suggest some important implications for the ways we understand symbols. First, “symbol” itself implies at least two perspectives, for a single symbol that does not symbolize something else would not be a symbol. There is no symbol (singular) without symbols (plural). By this I mean a symbol is a symbol by virtue of its dialectical relationship with other symbols; a symbol can never be understood by itself—only in relation to other symbols. In a similar manner, a single word in a linguistic vacuum cannot be understood without its interactions with other words; by this I mean language itself is necessarily dialectical. Likewise, a single “thought” cannot be understood without its interactions with other thoughts; so it would follow that all thought is also dialectical. In other words, thinking does not begin with a symbol (singular); thinking begins with the interrelated interaction of many symbols. This means that perceiving thinking in terms of interacting and interrelated symbol-use is not just one way of many of perceiving thinking (which would be a kind of symbolic conversation). Instead, this means that thinking itself is *literally* interactive symbol-
use in nature. In an early essay, Nietzsche asks, “Is language the adequate expression of all realities?” Charles Pierce’s notion of interpretants suggests that the interacting and interrelated symbols we call language is the *only* reality we can express.

Language may be the only reality we can express, but our individual subjective perspectives of reality are still incommensurable with one another. Despite our vast metaphoric vocabulary that encourages us to speak otherwise, I will never see things from your perspective nor you from mine. We do not share each other’s physical eyes or other sense organs, and we do not share each other’s physical brains with their attendant neuronal functions that are unique to each of our individual physical selves and to no other creature.

Yet there is still a linguistic and symbolic bridge between the incommensurability of subjective sensation and the unavoidable language-based reality we all share. This bridge is probably best understood by explaining the Wittgensteinian foundation of Saul Kripke’s language theories. One way of viewing language-making is rule-following in visual/audible/verbal form. But the problem with rules is that, “It is not possible to obey a rule 'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same things as obeying it” (Wittgenstein 69). If this is true then all language must not only be publicly shared but *must also depend on being able* to be publicly shared. There cannot be any such thing as a private language. And by private
language, Wittgenstein means this: "The words of [a private] language are to refer to what can be known only to the speaker; to his immediate, private, sensations. So another cannot understand the language" (Wittgenstein 75). This is either impossible or nonsensical because once a word or symbol is articulated it is able to be articulated to any other creature with the same cognitive symbolic apparatus. In describing a private language, Wittgenstein is not merely taking about some sort of situation like the Robinson Crusoe or the film Cast Away. Those characters were entirely alone and created symbols all of their own making; however, those symbols could be taught and transferred to other people. Their individually made symbols were in public domain (so to speak) as soon as they were cognized. After all, Wittgenstein explains, “If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also . . . in judgments” (Wittgenstein 75).

Consider, for instance, Saul Kripke’s Causal Picture or causal theory of naming. Although Kripke never advocated his Causal Picture as a fully developed theory, it is still instructive toward understanding the public rules that guide symbol-use and language-use. First of all, there is a powerful historicist community component to naming: “In general our reference depends not just on what we think ourselves, but on the other people in the community, the history of how the name reached one, and things like that. It is by following such a history that one gets to the reference” (Kripke 96). Drawing on traditional Christian ceremonial imagery, Kripke suggest that naming occurs when, “An initial ‘baptism’ takes place. Here the object may be
named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is ‘passed from link to link,’ the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it” (Kripke 96). Via shared rules of language, the causal link connecting names to the objects they name thus changes our reality in relation to those things. The baptism of a thing gives it new life, so to speak. This phenomenon varies in detail but remains largely the same from culture to culture and from language to language.

**A Philological Meaning of Meaning**

The arguments supporting the public nature of symbols and language are important because traditional (especially Cartesian) epistemology relies in part on the tacit idea that meaning is fundamentally a private event that individual subjective beings experience on their own. At the risk of asserting an argument *ad consequentiam*, the traditional sort of private meaning-creating epistemology also supports an individualist approach to rhetoric that ultimately underpins the damaging ethic of expediency I reviewed in the introduction. On the other hand, non-private epistemology through the media of non-private symbols and non-private language supports a togetherness-oriented *symbouleutikon*.

Martin Heidegger’s more public notions of *meaning* may help clarify this distinction. “The world is not the mere collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar and unfamiliar things that are at hand” Heidegger reminds us, “But neither is it a merely
imagined framework added by our representation to the sum of such given things. The world *worlds* (Basic Writings 170). By verbing “world” into “worlds,” Heidegger makes a strong claim about the nature of *meaning* itself. The concept of *meaning*, according to Heidegger, is not something a priori “countable” in the universe, neither is *meaning* an “imagined” framework overlaid on the universe by clever language-using animals. Rather, *meaning* is always and already a quality of the particular being of the world. But of what sort of meaning is this *meaning*? Or in a word, what is the meaning of *meaning*? I would suggest that a brief philological analysis of the term *meaning* reveals some striking and quasi-forgotten aspects of *meaning*.

As the OED relates, *meaning* stems from the Old Frisian *mene*, which can be literally translated as *assembly* but which also has its earliest cognate in the Old English *gemêne*, which connotes *fellowship* or *intercourse*, specifically sexual intercourse. Hence, from its earliest uses, *meaning* was something that happened when people got together in overtly discursive ways (as in an *assembly*) but also in much more intimately communicative ways (as with sex). *Meaning* thus began as a performative act that only existed in the interchange between actors.

The *between* quality of *meaning* is especially evident in the mathematic branch of *mean*—as in the arithmetic mean. The arithmetic mean is what results from adding numbers together and dividing the sum by the number of numbers added. In this
sense, an arithmetic mean will always be a number somewhere between the lowest and highest numbers added together. In a word, an arithmetic mean is intermediary—that which is in the middle.

Another branch of mean in the sense of “middle” traces a path of associated definitions beginning with “middle” proceeding to “held in common” then reducing to merely “common” then slipping into a definite classist connotation in the definition “low and vulgar,” which then proceeds into “cruel.” It is difficult to miss the parallel in Heidegger. As Lynn Worsham points out, “Essential to American-ism,” according to Heidegger, “is an assumption that human subjectivity is . . . the ground for truth and Being. . . . This form of subjectivity . . . seeks to systematize every private, social, and political phenomenon and thereby seeks to render everything available for use in the drive for knowledge . . . . Hence, Americanism [is] a totalizing and totalitarian regime” (216). In the next chapter, I actually review some of Alexis de Tocqueville’s prescient observations of American democracy, which explore how the equality of social conditions can lead from a state of holding qualities in common to a state of system-perfecting conformity. But not all senses of mean need be this cruel.

We use mean in another intermediary sense when discussing a middle time between now and later. Now, I am sitting at a desk. Later, I’ll go eat dinner. In the meantime, I will work on my dissertation.
But *intermediary* itself is a slippery concept. Plato and Aristotle latch onto *mean* as intermediary in the sense of moderation and balance (i.e. the Golden *Mean*). But *intermediary* is also that which *mediates*. It is from this usage of intermediary that *mean* acquires its particular flavor of instrumentality and agency. This dissertation is a *means* toward or for some end, to be sure, but this dissertation is also a *means* of communication and inquiry. *Means* in this sense applies to not just written communication or inanimate instrumentalities only. We often find that people and other beings are themselves *means* to ends or of purposes. And even ends and purposes can be *means* to yet other ends and purposes. *Means* that mediate are not only agencies but also the agents themselves and other components of the worlded world.

It is not surprising then that *mean*-as-mediation leads (inexorably?) to sign-making and intention. The questions, “what is the meaning of this?” or, “what do you mean?” reveal the in-between character of *meaning*. This is because the answers, “This *means. . .*” or, “I *mean. . .*,” always and already rely on qualities of subject and object that are between at least two beings—shared—held in common—enworlded—of or pertaining to *symbouleutikon*.

The concept of *meaning* relates to *symbouleutikon* because *meaning* is not something merely decoded from preexisting qualities of the world; nor is *meaning* merely overlaid on the world by conscious intention. Rather, *meaning* relates to
symbouleutikon because meaning always and already emerges in between beings in the world. Meaning is an activity, but it is not the act of discovery nor is it the act of covering what is already there. Meaning is the act of uncovering the particular situation of being-in-the-world. Lynn Worsham points to Heidegger’s use of the term *interpretation*: “Our understanding gets interpreted, in other words, but the interpretation discloses not the speaking subject but the world. Language is a situation, a world, brought forth and disclosed in words” (Worsham 226). This is exactly why human Being is a hermeneutic ontology for Heidegger. We interpret the world as an intricate component of the world and we do so in relation to the beings we interact with.

Consider again Heidegger’s seeming tautology, “the world worlds.” Even though Heidegger’s verbing of “world” describes what the world does, his statement is only meaningful via roundabout understanding that re-approaches “world” by way of “terms of other things” (see the whole middle paragraph in Heidegger, *Basic Writings* 170). This is also the paradox of meaning (as well as the same paradox of Wittgensteinian non-private symbols and language described above). We can say that meaning means, and initially sound silly. But we must understand that to mean is to uncover the prior in-between character of beings with each other and with their world. Such understanding immediately reveals that discussing meaning “in terms of other things” (or other beings or world) really leads back to recognizing that meaning does only what it can do: it means.
When we engage in (and of) meaning, we articulate signs and intentions, which are intermediary markers between subjects, objects, and the world. These are what Charles Pierce calls interpretants. As such, words are the signs of things and things are the signs of words, for words/signs/languages are the intermediaries between the beings-that-articulates and the world. And, we should also remember that meaning is neither in-the-thing nor in-the-being-that-articulates; rather, meaning occurs in the world between beings-in-the-world themselves and between those beings and beings-with-things.

All this talk of between, with its attendant notions of one-two, may lead some readers to suspect a lurking binary—that these notions of meaning are yet another way of thirding in Victor Vitanza's sense. Vitanza asserts, “there are a number of ways of thinking about identification. The one that I’m against is by way of the negative. You see, I, instead, identify with the third man/woman, or the excluded middles” (21). By the “third man/woman,” Vitanza refers to a notion of Michel Serres, which Vitanza quotes at length, “To hold a dialogue is to suppose a third man and to seek to exclude him; a successful communication is the exclusion of the third man. The most profound dialectical problem is not the problem of the Other, who is actually a variety . . . of the Same; it is the problem of the third man” (qtd. in Vitanza 21). In this sense, Serres critiques dialectic as the process whereby two individuals go about identifying a mutually shared reality by virtue of excluding the realities of those not directly involved in their binary dialectic.
Yet, the *between* qualities of *meaning* do not signify a binary; rather, *between* merely signifies that which is intermediary—in-the-middle. In this sense, *among* may be a more appropriate non-binary term than *between* when considering beings-in-the-world, but *among* is also a quasi-step away from the qualities of *middle*, which are core to (in the middle of) concepts of *meaning*. There are no binaries or others in this *between* sense of *meaning*; nor are there thirds in Vitanza’s sense. And it would be unnecessarily complex to suggest that *meaning* is some sort of *fourth* space if only because *meaning* is *all* space between (or among, if you like) beings-in-the-world.

All this does not mean that beings will not or do not disagree as to what different words/signs/languages mean. Indeed, most such disagreements tend to happen when beings desperately strive to agree. This is because agreement is the surrender (or the causing-to-surrender) of one meaning in deference to all others: beings agree by proceeding from pluralities of non-agreement. The activity of *meaning* thus occupies minds-in-the-world during every moment of perception. This means that *meaning* is an ontological activity of interpretation and not just interpretation as a rational activity. Meaning-as-interpretation is ontological in that the world in which beings—you, me, your grandmother—find themselves is a world that always and already contains *meaning* because beings were in the world long before you, me, or your grandmother arrived on the scene. So, *meaning* is not something that is understood as much as it is something that is experienced as part of being-
(together)-in-the-world. Thus, the world in this sense exists only by virtue of beings. But, to clarify, beings do not create the world; rather, the world is the unique situation that exists whenever beings exist. From this genesis, meaning is an emergent quality of beings-in-the-world (much like liquidity is an emergent quality of water).

These Heideggerian notions of meaning suggest that the bringing together of wills—symbouleutikon—is not something that beings pursue like traditional notions of deliberation. Instead, symbouleutikon is something that beings inexorably experience by virtue of being-in-the-world. That we find ourselves in such an inevitable togetherness with all beings provides a pragmatist context for linguistic and symbolic universals. And the possibility of linguistic universals is what makes possible ethical universals as we shall presently explore in Kant’s moral philosophy.

**The Question of Divergence in Kantian Ethics**

In an essay reprinted in *Language as Symbolic Action*, Kenneth Burke asserts, “Of Kant’s three great Critiques (of Pure Reason, Practical Reason, and Judgment) the second leans most toward the Dramatistic . . . since it concerns ethics; and by the very nature of the case, ethics builds its terminology around the problem of action” (436). It is difficult to imagine a post-classical thinker who has had more influence on the development of Western ethical philosophy than Kant. As noted earlier in this
chapter, Burke’s notion of justice as language’s *telos* has its specific formulation in reference to Kant’s categorical imperative.

Even the most casual of Kant’s readers understand that his formulation of the categorical imperative relies on the related notion of universal law. The pragmatic difficulty with both the categorical imperative and universal law is that no human actually lives according to either. Humans are an ethically divergent bunch, whose varied notions of right and wrong frequently clash with one another. In contrast, Kant’s ethical project relies on universal concepts—non-situational ideals that guide moral thinking. In light of Kant’s commitment to universal law, it seems unlikely that Kant could coherently account for (much less value) the social interchange that results from bringing together wills (*symbouleutikon*) of divergent ethical perspectives. Yet, as I explore below, this is precisely the linguistic foundation necessary for Kant to be able to formulate universal law and the categorical imperative. Indeed, I suggest that *symbouleutikon* pursued to its rhetorical end—its *telos*—makes possible the formulation of Kantian universal law.

In what follows, I use the term *rhetorical/moral agents* to refer to the sort of beings-in-the-world that Kant refers to most often only as *moral agents*. The term *rhetorical/moral agent* may be clunky (not to mention potentially problematic since it appears to postulate an ideal—and therefore nonexistent and othered/othering—human actor). However, as should become evident in what follows, *rhetorical/moral*
agents more accurately describes the pluralistic and endlessly diverse motley assortment of beings-in-the-world who are inevitably both rhetorically and ethically infused.

To proceed, I posit a straightforward question: do Kantian ethics account for ethical divergence, or do Kantian ethics at least provide a guide for rhetorical/moral agents as to how to act when encountering divergent ethical views? The answer to both of these questions is an obvious “yes.” But do Kantian ethics account for ethical divergence in such a way that grants any sort of positive value to such divergence? The answer to this is perhaps less obvious but still “yes.” In claiming this, I quickly acknowledge that even though Kant may value the free interchange of ideas and even the learning process that emerges from considering bad ideas, this is not the same thing as suggesting that Kant believed it was a good thing that anyone should ever believe bad ideas. Rather, inasmuch as people do believe bad (or any other kinds of) ideas, it is ethically necessary for rhetorical/moral agents to seek to understand those ideas and perspectives through social interaction. This is necessary because the act of seeking to understand divergent ideas in social interaction is what leads a Kantian rhetorical/moral agent to discern between conviction based on universal truth and mere persuasion based on subjective assumptions. Further, the ethical necessity to consider divergent perspectives has a “universal” edge to it. So even if none of a rhetorical/moral agent’s friends believes any divergent ideas, that rhetorical/moral agent still faces the ethical necessity to
articulate divergent ideas that other people could or might believe. This would provide rhetorical/moral agents in an ethical community what they may otherwise lack: a steady source of divergent ideas among which to better discern truth from error. Thus, Kant values ethical divergence for the learning it provides for oneself and others even though he would not value many of the ideas and perspectives thus encountered.

To better explain this claim, I need to resolve the concern of Kant’s supposed lack of accounting for ethical divergence. This includes showing how Kantian ethics actually rely on non-isolated social interaction and in showing what ways Kantian ethics actually value ethical divergence itself. The former involves reassessing the sociality of Kant’s “ethical community.” The latter involves responding to passages in Kant that would seem to imply (incorrectly) that Kant encourages the strict disassociation of rhetorical/moral agents from those who hold immoral beliefs. In the end, Kant values and relies on the continual engagement of (good and bad) ideas among a plurality of agents because this provides the necessary environment in which all agents can best discern all that is—especially what is true and good. Or to use the recurring term in this chapter, symbouleutikon is the ground from which Kant’s Critical project spring. From rhetoric, ethics.
The Problem of Divergence within Kant’s Ethical Community

There is evidently a problem of accounting for social divergence in the secondary literature on Kant (even though, I would argue, such a problem does not actually exist in Kant’s primary writings). The perceived problem of social divergence in Kant could be summarized this way: rhetorical/moral agents in an ethical community are duty-bound to the exact same behaviors toward each other according to universal law; therefore, any divergence among rhetorical/moral agents will either expel some rhetorical/moral agents from the ethical community or otherwise will not contribute meaningfully toward the distinctive identity of the ethical community. This would prima facie preempt any robust notion of symbouleutikon in Kantian ethics.

Jennifer Moore calls this sort of view a “‘retrenched’ atomist reading of Kant” (Moore 58). She quotes W.D. Gottshalk as representative of such a view. According to Gottshalk,

The Kantian ethics of the moral law ... directs [agents’] actions so that each agent repeats the actions of others and shares a formal identity with them. But it makes no provision for each agent to complement and enrich the others, and to share not only in a formal identity but also in a communal diversity. The Kantian ethics is the ethics of secluded universality. (qtd. in Moore 58)

Moore responds to such a view by theorizing that a strong sense of the idea of “community” includes harmony as a key feature (other key features include unity, communal intention, internal bonds, reciprocity, and others, see Moore 59). Kant describes the kingdom of ends as being a “whole of ends in systematic conjunction;”
therefore, Moore argues, “Kant’s moral social order is a harmony. It is a society in which everyone acts in accordance with, and for the sake of, the moral law” (Moore 60).

The problem with this part of Moore’s argument, though, is that no matter how harmonious any given communities may be, many (if not most) communities also contain ingrained strife (across lines of wealth, gender, race, age, culture of origin, politics, religion, education level, and so forth). Moore does not account for the strife that is present in most communities. At the end of her article, despite her earnest claims to the contrary, readers are left to wonder if Kant’s moral social order (if it exists) can apply to only a narrow range of communities with no internal strife.

The error here may be one of conflation: Moore does not articulate any explicit difference between Kant’s notions of “ethical community” and “juridical commonwealth,” for instance. To be sure, her essay does not mention “juridical” at all, but the trajectory of her argument seeks to locate Kant’s ethical community among actual communities in the world.

Though he does not mention Moore’s article, Allen Wood apparently sees such a move as indicative of a misreading of Kant. Wood claims Kant’s notion of an ethical community, “cannot be conceived on the model of a juridical commonwealth or political state, whose function is to protect the right of human beings through
[Rather,] participation in an ethical community must always be entirely voluntary, never subject to external compulsion of any kind" (Wood, “Religion” 505-06). Indeed, Kant himself claims that, “an ethical community really has nothing in its principles that resembles a political constitution” (“Metaphysics” 6:102).

However, Wood does suggest a quality of Kant’s ethical community that seems to nod in the direction of recognizing social divergence:

since the aim of ethical community is the combination of all human beings into a single system or realm of ends, the ethical community cannot be subject to . . . restricting it to people who live in a certain geographical area or belong to a specific race or heredity. . . it may not bind itself to any specific practices or creeds that would exclude part of the human race from belonging to it. (Wood, “Religion” 506)

But, this recognition of divergence is in danger of leading back to Gottshalk’s critique of Kant’s ethical community. Kant’s table of categories describing an ethical community remove any doubt as to any supposed diversity within the ethical community. These four categories include, one, being “founded on principles that necessarily lead it to universal union;” two, being pure in quality, which means “union under no other incentives other than moral ones;” three, requiring freedom of relation so that “the internal relation of its members among themselves as well as the external relation” of the ethical community to the current political power are “both in a free state;” and four, having an unchangeable constitution yet changeable administration (see Kant, “Religion” 6:101-02).
Jennifer Moore still tries to read diversity into such a community by suggesting that in an ethical community, members are,

Free to pursue their ‘personal’ ends. [But] each member is also an ‘end’ for every other... This means that the ends that members pursue will always be ends that are compatible with those of others. That is, they will be ends that are shared by others or ends that do not affect others at all, rather than ends that reduce other persons to the status of means [only]” (Moore 60).

In this view, Kant's ethical community is itself a constantly dynamic display of diversity. But even Moore’s argument appears to fall short. First, she may conflate Kant’s sense of ethical community with its more juridical counterparts (see Wood, “Religion” 505-06 and Kant, “Metaphysics” 6:102). Secondly, and more pertinently, since inclusion in the ethical community is ideological only, Moore’s description of an ethical community implies this: if the “personal” ends that individual rhetorical/moral agents pursue conflict with the moral order of the kingdom of ends, then those rhetorical/moral agents are no longer (really) part of the ethical community. Conversely, if their personal ends do not conflict with the moral order, then those personal ends (no matter their cultural, religious, or historical significance) do not fully matter in the distinctive identity of the ethical community as an ethical community. Individual members may help each other pursue these personal ends, but such ends are not part of the substance of what makes an ethical community. In such a schema, the moment of disagreement is either the moment of excommunication or of irrelevance. Moore’s arguments thus lead us back to a community of “secluded universality,” which is not the robust symbouleutikon from whence Kant’s entire project springs.
Engaging Divergence beyond Kant’s Ethical Community (or the Pluralistic Key to the Whole Program of Rational Thought)

A more straightforward way of arguing for Kant’s ability to account for ethical divergence needs to follow a different trajectory because ethical divergence is simply not found within Kant’s ethical community. Full stop. Only those agents who respect and strive to live according to universal law are members of Kant’s ethical community (regardless of whether or not they use those specific terms or even acknowledge that they are part of such a community). To try to rebuild Kant’s ethical community to somehow incorporate, allow, or even value internal ethical divergence is to engage in a different project than the one Kant is engaged in.

Regardless of this internal exclusion of ethical divergence, Kant’s ethical community is not necessarily an isolated one. Indeed, Kant frequently refers to the ethical community of rhetorical/moral agents as inter-socializing with other communities (as with a juridical commonwealth or any other socio-political/cultural environment). The ethical community is but one sort of community within and among other inter-related communities. So even if Kant’s ethical community has no place for ethical divergence within itself, the ethical community must unavoidably address ethical divergence around itself. The more helpful question thus becomes, how do rhetorical/moral agents account for ethical divergence in their sociality beyond the ethical community?
The pluralistic answer to that question, it turns out, is key to the whole program of rational thought itself. Citing passages from Kant’s *Anthropology* and *Lectures on Ethics*, Allen Wood summarizes Kant’s position on the matter: “Kant holds that human beings can accomplish the tasks of reason only through interacting with one another. We can develop our reason only by communicating with others” (Wood, *Kant’s 301*). Further, quoting from Kant’s “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking,” Wood goes on to argue, “Our capacity to think at all, and especially to think accurately, depends on our thinking ‘in community with others to whom we communicate our thoughts, and who communicate their thoughts to us’” (Wood, *Kant’s 301*). Indeed, to “think in the position of everyone else” is one of three of Kant’s “maxims of the common human understanding” (*Critique 174*).

Kant calls thinking in accordance with this maxim “a broad-minded way of thinking.” A person achieves this sort of broad-minded thinking, “if he sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others)” (*Critique 174*). Not to put too fine a point on it, but this is precisely the bringing-together-of-wills conditions that comprise *symbouleutikon*.

Elsewhere, Kant refers to the refusal to consider others’ perspectives to be a kind of egoism. More specifically, a “*logical egoist* considers it unnecessary to test his
judgment also by the understanding of others; as if he had no need at all for this touchstone” (Anthropology 17). In contrast to self-centered egoism, Kant coins the term pluralism to mean, “the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world” (Anthropology 18). This sort of pluralism, according to Allen Wood, is itself, “the standpoint of reason. Reasons, in other words, are essentially to be shared between people—they are never only the private possession of those for whom they are reasons” (Wood, Kantian 19). Reasons in this Kantian sense exactly accord with the Heideggerian notions of meaning explored above. Either Kant anticipated Heidegger, or Heidegger is deeply Kantian, or both.

In spite of all this value placed on understanding the perspectives of others, some may still contend that Kant’s pluralism does not actually account for perspectives that differ drastically from universal law. Attentive readers of the Metaphysics of Morals could point to selections that seem to encourage rhetorical/moral agents to avoid the “scandal” of associating with “vicious” people; I refer to this as the “scandal” counterargument below. Other readers of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics could read passages that seem to suggest that the comparison of divergent ideas can only really occur between friends who already share a mutual respect for universal law; I refer to this as the friend counterargument below. Yet others could point to the possibility of a softer divergence at play among rhetorical/moral agents, which I call the softer divergence counterargument. So, I’ll address each of these in turn—first,
the scandal counterargument, second, the friend counterargument, and then the softer divergence counterargument.

The “Scandal” Counterargument

The first counterargument extends from some odd statements Kant makes in relation to “vicious” people and scandals. Some may argue that Kant asserts that rhetorical/moral agents ought not to associate with “vicious” people so as to avoid any scandal that attends associating with such vicious people. I call this the “scandal” counterargument (with “scandal” purposely in quotes, for it refers to something other than we may think) because the misunderstanding in this counterargument centers on what exactly Kant means by “scandal.” As the scandal counterargument goes, since rhetorical/moral agents must avoid scandalous associations with vicious people, Kant’s other injunctions to engage divergent perspectives really only refer to perspectives that differ in non-serious manners (i.e. that do not disagree as to the basic nature of morality).

On the level of individual rhetorical/moral agents, this question arises for Kant, “whether one may also administer to vice-ridden people” (6:474, my translation).

1 The Cambridge edition Gregor translation actually says this: “whether one may also keep company with those who are vicious.” From English to German, this would read, “ob man auch unter Bösartigen gehen dürfe?” However, Kant’s original German reads, “ob man auch mit Lasterhaften Umgang pflegen dürfe?” So I offer the translation above (“whether one may also administer to vice-ridden people”) for a couple reasons. First, it is true that “mit . . .Umgang pflegen” means “to socialize with,” but its connotations from “pflegen” suggest a kind of socializing that fosters, cares for, or is otherwise nurturing toward others. Certainly, there are other ways of saying “socialize” that connote more of a “keeping company” idea such as “er geht unter Leute” or “sie kommt unter Leute.” But Kant does not use those. Also, “vice-ridden” or even “full of vice” or “detained in vice” (though perhaps odd-sounding in English) are closer in
Of particular concern for Kant is “if the vice is a scandal, that is, a publicly given example of contempt for the strict laws of duty, which therefore brings dishonor with it;” in such situations, Kant suggests that “one must break off the association that existed or avoid it as much as possible, since continued association with such a person deprives virtue of its honor” (“Metaphysics” 6:474). This may seem an upfront denial of the value of associating with vice-ridden people. And certainly, we could point to a personal experience of Kant’s that would support this interpretation.

In 1768-9, a young female acquaintance of Kant’s, Maria Charlotta, created a spectacle in Königsberg when she divorced her husband (who was almost twice her age) to marry someone closer to her own age. Kant apparently, “took the side of the former husband, said bad things about [Charlotta], and then found it difficult to visit her after the divorce and the new marriage. . . . [Kant] found the matter neither remarkable nor admirable . . . [and decided] to cut off contact with Maria Charlotta” (Kuehn 168). But this whole affair was more emotionally awkward for Kant than an example of clear moral certitude. Later, “Kant himself recognized that he did not play an admirable role in the affair” because of his petty (almost comic by one account) refusal to speak to his erstwhile friend after her infidelity (Kuehn 168). For

connotation to “Lasterhaften” than “vicious,” which aligns with more malicious terms like “bösartig” or even “teuflisch.” My difference in translation shifts Kant’s question away from a concern about hanging out with a sinister crowd to a concern over how proactive one should be in reaching out to those afflicted with vice in general. This brings the translation closer in line with the apparent intent of the subsequent passages from Kant mentioned in this chapter.
Kant to doubt his own behavior in such a “scandal” should cause us to rethink what he may have meant by “scandal” in the *Metaphysics of Morals*.

Rather than the usually parochial sense of “scandal,” Kant uses “scandal” in the *Metaphysics of Morals* to mean, “disregarding respectability that might lead others to follow it” (“Metaphysics” 6:464). Further, “respectability” in this sense specifically refers to “showing respect for a human being as a moral being” (“Metaphysics” 6:464). This definition occurs just ten pages before his injunction to “break off the association” with vice-ridden people whose vice is a “scandal.” Kant’s injunction can thus be understood as an encouragement to break off public association with people whose particular vices “lead others to follow” in “disregarding” the necessary “respect for a human being as a moral being.”

Like many other parts of Kant’s moral philosophy, this bears a striking resemblance to moral injunctions from the Greek Bible (New Testament). Specifically in 1 Corinthians 8.9, Paul enjoins the Corinth believers to not eat the meat offered at the public sacrifices to pagan idols. It’s not that eating the pagan meat is bad in itself. But, if believers were to eat the pagan meat, it might lead “the weak” to believe that pagan sacrifices are a good thing for Christian believers to participate in.

In a similar vein, Kant’s caution to avoid scandal seems to be about avoiding specific public associations that might lead others down paths of disrespectability. This is
different than avoiding private associations with people with whom you merely morally disagree. As such, avoiding “scandal” is more a concern of particular public social contexts than it is about any particular private association. I suspect the difference may be akin to publically associating with Joseph Goebbels on one hand and privately associating with your Nazi neighbors on the other. Publically associating your respectability with Goebbels, because of Goebbels’s prominence in the Nazi cause, might lead those who admire your respectability down paths of Nazi disrespectability. This is the heart of a “scandal” in the Metaphysics of Morals sense. However, privately associating with your Nazi neighbors (even if that neighbor is Goebbels) is an ethical necessity for both your neighbors (to encourage in them respect for universal law) and for you (to exercise broad-minded thinking). Interpreting “scandal” in this way reconciles any supposed conflicts between avoiding scandalous associations and Kant’s multiple other injunctions to socially engage with divergent perspectives.

The “Friend” Counterargument

Some may further argue that Kant goes beyond merely asserting the negative claim that rhetorical/moral agents ought not associate with scandalous people. In this further view, Kant makes an apparent positive claim that rhetorical/moral agents ought only to engage the “divergent” perspectives of friends who already share the rhetorical/moral agents’ moral beliefs (whose views are actually not divergent). I call this the “friend” counterargument—with “friend” purposely in quotes—because
the key misunderstanding in this counterargument turns “friend” into an inaccurate synecdoche that is somehow supposed to refer to all of a rhetorical/moral agent’s associations. As with the scandal counterargument, the “friend” counterargument would likewise read Kant’s other injunctions to engage divergent perspectives as really only referring to perspectives that are already based on shared moral principles (and therefore only differ in non-serious manners).

The passages that seem most clearly to support this view come from Kant’s discussion of friends in his Lectures on Ethics. First, according to Kant, all of us have strong inclinations toward making relationships, so that we,

have a strong impulse to unbosom ourselves and be wholly companionate. But this can be only in the company of one or two friends. People also have a need to confide, moreover, in that only so can their opinion be subject to reflection. If I possess such a friend, of whom I know that his disposition is upright and kindly, neither malicious nor false, he will already be helpful in rectifying my judgment, when I have gone astray. This is the whole purpose of man, which allows him to enjoy his existence. (Lectures 27:428)

This would appear to say a few significant claims: one, humans need to confide in friends so their own perspectives can be subject to reflection; and two, such reflection only occurs with friends that are upright and kindly; therefore, reflection (in the sense Kant values it) does not occur when engaging perspectives that are malicious or false.

However, this is a much too narrow reading of the passage. The passage merely asserts that an “upright and kindly” friend who is “neither malicious nor false” will
be “helpful in rectifying my judgment” (my emphasis). This is not the same thing as saying that only the perspectives of like-minded friends can provide opportunity for reflection. Certainly, as I’ll argue further below, divergent perspectives of all stripes can provide opportunity for reflection. It’s just that a true friend will be “helpful in rectifying my judgment” whereas mere acquaintances may not be helpful and certainly enemies and villains may try to be decidedly unhelpful. When engaging perspectives that are not my friends’, I must think much more carefully and independently to discern my errors in judgment.

But even when among friends, Kant suggests that, “identity of thought is not required for the purpose” of discerning errors in judgment, “on the contrary, it is difference, rather, which establishes friendship; for in that case the one supplies what the other lacks” (Lectures 27:429). So far so good, but he goes on to say:

> but in one particular they must agree: they need to have the same principles of understanding and morality, and then they can fully understand each other; if they are not alike in that, they cannot get on at all together, since in judgment they are poles apart. (Lectures 27:429)

It may be tempting to employ this passage to defend the “friend” counterargument—particularly Kant’s assertion that moral unity is necessary to “fully understand each other” otherwise such agents “cannot get on at all together.”

But it would be a mistake to read this passage that way because this passage is about the association of rhetorical/moral agents as friends and not about their
relationship with other agents regardless of relationship. This is by itself perhaps an unremarkable observation since the passage appears in the middle a long section in the *Lectures* about the nature of friends and friendship. But notice how the passage clarifies itself if we simply add “as friends” to the end of most of its clauses. It may sound a bit redundant, so please bear with me, but the repetition emphasizes the crucial meaning of this passage:

> but in one particular they must agree [as friends]: they need to have the same principles of understanding and morality [as friends], and then they can fully understand each other [as friends]; if they are not alike in that, they cannot get on at all together [as friends], since in judgment they are poles apart [as friends]. (*Lectures* 27:429)

Read this way, this passage merely asserts that moral unity is necessary for friends to understand each other as friends otherwise such agents cannot get on at all together as friends. It is stretch to suggest that this passage is actually about the association of rhetorical/moral agents with other agents regardless of relationship.

**The Softer Divergence Counterargument**

Even if I’m right about the scandal and friend counterarguments above (and I believe I am), none of what I’ve covered thus far has yet to definitively establish that Kantian ethics does in fact value engaging *ethically* divergent perspectives. All I’ve illustrated definitively so far is that, at the very least, Kant believes that scandal does not refer to private associations and that friends cannot get on together as friends unless they share a mutual understanding and morality. But neither of these is the
same as saying that Kant, in fact, values the seeking to understand divergent moral perspectives.

Thus, the contrarian may ask, why couldn't Kant be advocating for rhetorical/moral agents to engage only with perspectives of other like-minded rhetorical/moral agents? Could not there be enough of a softer kind of divergence among like-minded rhetorical/moral agents that helps them develop broad-minded ways thinking? Could not this softer divergence accord to other significant criteria (such as culture, ethnicity, gender, religion, etc.) without implying that Kant values interactions with views he would otherwise call wicked or immoral?

These questions get to the core of the problem: it is difficult to accept that Kantian ethics would value respect for universal law while at the same time valuing the act of engaging perspectives that could directly conflict with universal law. It seems an uphill argument to try to try working around one of the basic formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law. Here mere conformity to law as such, without having as its basis some law determined for certain actions, is what serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be everywhere an empty delusion and a chimerical concept” (“Groundwork” 4:402, italics in original). In other words, once rhetorical/moral agents understand the value of the
categorical imperative, there is no more substantial value in “figuring things out” in regards to other ethical perspectives.

Allen Wood offers a kind of resolution to this problem in one of his discussions of Kantian pluralism. According to Wood’s interpretation of Kant,

To act rationally is to act for [sic²] grounds that are essentially intersubjective—not merely comprehensible by others, but also in some sense shared by and valid for others as well as for oneself. What it is rational for me to do may not necessarily be what is rational for others to do because my situation may differ from theirs. But if I have a valid, rational ground for what I do, then that ground is also comprehensible from the standpoint of others. (Wood, Kantian 18)

But notice that for such “intersubjectivity” to function in moral terms, conversing agents would need to share an intersubjective moral ground. It seems that even in a Kantian pluralism, people can’t be that pluralistic. In order for rhetorical/moral agents to exchange ideas at all with others, it seems that they cannot be so pluralistic that they do not share the same (Kantian) moral ground with those they associate with.

All that is left of the value of divergence in such a schema is to value the duties of “One’s own perfection as an end” and “The happiness of others as an end” which duties could conceivably include increasing all other uniquely human capacities within the bounds of universal law. Universal law does not necessarily stipulate the cultural value of (e.g.) a certain holiday observance, but the duties to one’s own

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² I assume Wood means “from” because everywhere else in Kant’s and Wood’s texts, grounds are always something that action extends from and not something that actions have as their object.
perfection and to the happiness of others may direct us to value such observances because they direct others toward perfecting their own capacities or happinesses (see “Metaphysics” 6:392).

But these same passages are equally difficult to reconcile with Kant’s injunction to respect (while directly engaging) actual divergent perspectives that contain errors of moral judgment (i.e. perspectives that are morally wrong). Specifically, Kant’s injunction about human respect is that, “Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity itself is a dignity” (“Metaphysics” 6:462). This is, of course, a variation of Kant’s Formula of Humanity, which Kant immediately reiterates and then follows up with exactly how in this regard a rhetorical/moral agent may appreciate other human beings as individual ends while at the same using those same human beings as means toward the ends which are themselves. The universal respect a rhetorical/moral agent owes to all human beings including him/herself leads to a duty to respect a human being even in the logical use of his reason, a duty not to censure his errors by calling them absurdities, poor judgment and so forth, but rather to suppose that his judgment must yet contain some truth and to seek this out, uncovering, at the same time, the deceptive illusion (the subjective ground that determined his judgment which, by an oversight, he took for objective), and so, by explaining to him the possibility of his having erred, to preserve his respect for his own understanding. For if, by using such expressions, one denies any understanding to someone who opposes one in a certain judgment, how does one want to bring him to understand he has erred? (“Metaphysics” 6:463)
The duty toward mutual respect thus requires that rhetorical/moral agents interact with divergent views in a way that best allows those divergent views to be thoroughly explained and explored. To be sure, this has a proselytizing edge to it, but the goal here (i.e. the end of this particular duty) is to preserve an opposing agent’s “respect for his own understanding” not necessarily to convert the wayward. Respecting (actively discerning, appreciating, uncovering) the truth in all ways of thinking is apparently vital to Kantian ethics, perhaps even especially in the thinking of that person who “opposes one in a certain judgment.”

The most reasonable path of reconciliation seems to be along these lines: Kantian ethics apparently values both living according to universal law and the learning experience that emerges from engaging contrary perspectives. The act of engaging (i.e. addressing, understanding, trying to find the truth in something) is not the same as believing (i.e. accepting as true). Engaging specifically contrary moral perspectives is what makes a rational conception of universal law even possible. This is because any rational moral perspective “reflects on [its] own judgment from a universal [moral] standpoint” which a rhetorical/moral agent “can only determine by putting himself into the [moral] standpoint of others” (Kant, Critique 174). Even if rhetorical/moral agents never meet anyone with immoral beliefs, such rhetorical/moral agents could still use their rational faculties to articulate divergent ethical perspectives (without believing them) against which they can and should continually compare their own moral beliefs.
Kantian rhetorical/moral agents are, indeed, non-isolated and sociable creatures: it’s their duty to be so. If nothing else, they have a duty to discover the truth of all things, and as Kant notes elsewhere, “Men who separate themselves from all human society necessarily find in the end, when they begin to investigate their condition . . ., that they do not themselves have enough means to distinguish the true from the false” (“Blomberg” 150). Thus again in accordance with the principles of bringing wills together—of symbouleutikon—sociality itself provides the necessary tools for analytic critique. What those tools are exactly, and how exactly divergent sociality provides them, I will address presently.

**Toward the Rhetorical Imperative (or How to Use One’s Moral Perfections in Social Intercourse)**

Though Kant is wary of possible dishonor arising from associating with certain vice-ridden folk, he nevertheless admits that, “One cannot avoid meeting them, without leaving the world” (“Metaphysics” 6:474). Kant even goes beyond this. He suggests that, “It is a duty to oneself as well as to others not to isolate oneself . . . but to use one’s moral perfections in social intercourse” (“Metaphysics” 6:473). But, how exactly do Kantian rhetorical/moral agents use their moral perfections in social intercourse? Another way of phrasing this question is, “How do ethics emerge from rhetoric?”
Kant seems to suggest that the starting point is always using good manners such as “affability, sociability, courtesy, hospitality, and gentleness (in disagreeing without quarrelling)” (“Metaphysics” 6:473). According to Kant, good manners like these are “by-products” of a virtuous disposition. But this does not mean good manners are necessarily appended to rhetorical situations. Instead, these qualities, “are merely the manners one is obliged to show in social intercourse” (“Metaphysics” 6:474). In other words, good manners emerge from social rhetorical situations. By accepting this rhetorical obligation for good manners, a rhetorical/moral agent thereby “binds others too; and so they [manners] still promote a virtuous disposition by at least making virtue fashionable” (“Metaphysics” 6:474). Such positive social qualities are the ports of entry into actual engagement with divergent ethical perspectives. No matter what disagreements may follow, by adhering to rhetorical principles, rhetorical/moral agents always come back to social qualities that continue to foster a virtuous disposition in them and in those with whom they disagree.

Beyond politeness and non-quarrelling agreeableness, though, rhetorical/moral agents have still further obligations towards those with whom they have ethical disagreements. Remember Kant’s discussion of human respect from the Metaphysics of Morals. When rhetorical/moral agents engage the erroneous perspectives of others, they are obliged to seek out any element of truth they can in such perspectives, which will lead to uncovering the likely “deceptive illusion” at the basis of the erroneous perspectives, which is “the subjective ground that
determined [the] judgment which [the erring agent] took for objective” (“Metaphysics” 6:463). These terms (illusion, subjective ground, and objective ground) refer to issues that Kant covered more in depth in his work in logic. Specifically, these terms refer to the distinction between persuasion and conviction. In brief, Kant suggests that persuasion results from assumptions based on subjective grounds of reasoning only while conviction results from actual belief based on objective grounds of reasoning (see Kant, “Jäsche” 73). Rhetorically speaking, we might describe Kant’s nuance as a sort of parallel to the nuanced deference’s between deliberation and symbouleutikon. Kant’s notion of persuasion resembles the sort of expediency motives in traditional deliberation while Kant’s notion of conviction more resembles the togetherness motives in symbouleutikon.

Kant defines persuasion as holding something to be true “on account of the illusion of cognition.” He goes on to explain that when someone is persuaded, “one accepts any degree of truth in order to be able to approve a cognition, without investigating whether the grounds of the opposite have a greater degree of truth or not.” As such, “Persuasion is really a kind of delusion, for one always considers only the one side, without in the least reflecting on the opposite side” (“Blomberg” 143). Persuasion in this sense directly smacks of expediency, especially in terms of the Roman Rhetorica Ad Herennium, which suggests, “when we have submitted our arguments and destroyed those of the opposition, we have, of course, completely fulfilled the speaker’s function” (Caplan 33).
Conversely, Kant uses the term *convinced* in those situations,

when the thing is so logically perfect that I can communicate it to someone else; when I represent to myself that I would hold the thing to be true no matter what the risks; if I were to waver, then I would not really be convinced. But if I believe I am not risking anything when I put up all my interests as security, then I am convinced. ("Vienna" 854-5)

Notice the togetherness qualities of Kantian conviction (or being convinced in Kant’s sense). People are convinced (not merely persuaded) when they can share without any reservation those things they are convinced of with others.

But notice that both persuasion and conviction are still personal states. Kant admits that the “distinction between persuasion and conviction is precarious” because someone could be persuaded by grounds of reasoning that might actually be objective but are only reasoned through subjectively ("Dohna-Wundlacken" 747). The danger in persuasion arises from, “Holding a proposition to be true, without being able to distinguish whether it occurs from subjective or objective grounds” ("Dohna-Wundlacken" 747). So how can rhetorical/moral agents distinguish between subjective and objective grounds of reasoning?

Kant acknowledges that, “we lack a universally sufficient mark, then, for correctly and infallibly distinguishing the subjective grounds of holding-to-be-true from the objective ones,” i.e. between persuasion and conviction ("Blomberg" 147). In such a perpetual state of uncertainty, Kant suggests two methods that make it possible for
people to discern between truth and error. Both methods are fundamentally rhetorical and lead to ethical behavior. First,

One must compare his cognition of this or that object with the cognitions of other people concerning one and the same object and carefully hold them against one another, since it is not supposed that every man should have one and the same grounds moving him to hold one and the same thing to be true; instead there is the greatest probability that what one person considers from one side, someone else, who thinks something else and who conceives the whole thing differently, will be opposed from the other side. (“Blomberg” 147)

In other words, rhetorical/moral agents need to compare their moral cognitions with the moral cognitions of others who may think things through with very different moral beliefs. Second, “One must accept and suppose the opposite of the cognition that one has; one must place oneself, as it were, in the position of his opponent and of one who disputes the truth of my cognition, and then look to see whether it may be thought as true or at least probable” (“Blomberg” 147). This method goes further by suggesting that rhetorical/moral agents can value completely opposite moral views by always trying to find the truth in such opposing moral views. Through such a process, rhetorical/moral agents will either discover errors in their own judgments or, sans any discovery of error, they will be reassured in the strength of their own moral assertions (see “Blomberg” 147). Whatever the case, considering and engaging divergent moral perspectives is at base a rhetorical activity from which emerges specific Kantian duties while at the same time bringing valuable side-benefits regardless of the outcome.
Just a few pages later in the same logic passage, Kant reiterates and summarizes these methods in a two-fold filter for determining objective grounds of cognition: first, “The agreement of other men with our premises, and [second] the testing of our thought according to other men's sentiments” (Blomberg 150). Because all of this relies on rhetorical/moral agents being able to communicate their perspectives, “The freedom to communicate one’s thoughts, judgments, and cognitions is certainly the only most certain means to test one’s cognitions properly, however, and to verify them” (Blomberg 150). Elsewhere, Kant repeats this sentiment that the need to compare our perspectives with a wide range of other rhetorical/moral agents is vital: “this may be the most important reason why learned people cry out so urgently for freedom of the press. For if this freedom is denied, we are deprived at the same time of a great means of testing the correctness of our own judgments, and we are exposed to error” (Anthropology 17). In other words, practices which serve to bring wills together—symbouleutikon—are necessary for any sort of robust judgment to happen about anything.

**Conclusion: the Rhetorical Imperative and Its Perfection**

This then culminates rhetorical/morals agents’ responsibilities in continually seeking out, understanding, and finding as much value as possible in all divergent perspectives. Kantian ethics commits none of the offenses Gottshalk alleges. Kant goes beyond making ample “provision for each agent to complement and enrich the others, and to share not only in a formal identity but also in a communal diversity”
(qtd. in Moore 58). When viewed in light of his work in logic especially, Kant’s ethics relies on each rhetorical/moral agent complementing and enriching one another.

Rhetorical/moral agents thus face what I call a rhetorical imperative that precedes and makes possible the formulation of universal law or Kant’s categorical imperative. Inasmuch as rhetorical/moral agents find themselves in a natural plurality of divergent perspectives, the rhetorical imperative that rhetorical/moral agents face contains a four-fold unending discursive responsibility:

A rhetorical/moral agent completes (i.e. finds a telos in) rhetorical discourse by

1. engaging divergent (i.e. erroneous or immoral) perspectives, which fosters
2. understanding any and all convincing elements in those divergent perspectives, which then contributes to
3. encouraging self-respect in all diverging agents including oneself, which perpetuates
4. engaging further divergent perspectives (see again “Metaphysics” 6:463)

Though not part of rhetorical/moral agents’ responsibilities, this rhetorical imperative should also have the dual benefit of uncovering the specific errors that the erring agents were persuaded of while at the same time helping erring agents become convinced of universal law and universal terms. But these are benefits only. The real responsibilities of the rhetorical imperative are those listed above.

The discursive direction of the rhetorical imperative described above is what Kenneth Burke calls in many places a “rounding-out of the terms,” or in relation to Kant’s ethical project specifically, “following-through-to-the-end-of-the-line”
Burke goes on to suggest that such “orderly perfection of such thoroughness . . . brings up strains intrinsic to the medium” of language (Language 440). As described in the previous chapter, these intrinsic qualities of language are telos or entelechy. Burke goes on to suggest that a further moral entelechy in language “arises when we attempt to embody in practice what we have conceived in principle” (Language 440). In this way, Burke offers a useful summary of the rhetorical grounding of Kant’s ethical project, which accords closely to what I’ve explored above: “Such [moral] universalization comes easy to language. Merely round out a terminology, and “justice” is found to involve ‘self-legislation’” (Language 440). In a footnote, Burke qualifies this claim by grammatically unwrapping Kant’s notions of universal law and the categorical imperative like this: “Suppose that I begin with a purely selfish command . . . , ‘Thou shalt not kill me.’ Next, I universalize the pronouns, so that everyone is a thou and everyone is a me” (Language 440). By pursuing a purely discursive course of action, Burke observes that he ends up with a universal command that ends up “commanding myself not to kill others” (Language 440). In making his own rhetorically based claims about Kantian ethics, Burke understand some rationalists may view his argument as shaky at best or dismissively subjective at worst. So Burke further explains,

We do not thereby obligate ourselves to say that the grounding is “nothing but” language. We say merely that it is at least language (as distinct from “the senses”). And if one so desired, one could say that though these [rhetorical] sources of [ethical] “respect” are grounded in the nature of language as “lawgiver,” language itself is grounded in some kind of ultimate “language-giver.” (Language 440)
Burke’s notion of an ultimate language-giver suggests almost godly qualities for such a source. While Burke stops short of waxing religious in his analysis of Kantian ethics (and while Burke was certainly not personally religious), he does explore the peculiarly theological implications of his linguistic philosophy in the essays collected in *The Rhetoric of Religion*. His observations are not theological in the traditional sense of seriously studying the nature of God as an actual being. Instead, Burke’s particular theological bent is concerned “not directly with religion, but rather with the terminology of religion; not directly with man’s relationship with God, but rather with his relationship to the word ‘God’” (*Religion* vi).

Following Burke’s lead, and toward the perfecting (i.e. articulating a concise *telos*) of an ethics of rhetoric, I would take the opening passage of the Gospel of St. John in the Greek Bible at face value: “In the beginning was the Word [*logos*], and the Word [*logos*] was with God, and the Word [*logos*] was God” (John 1.1 NSRV). In this sense, *Logos*-as-God can be seen as the ultimate of ultimate terms, for there is no term beyond terminology itself. Further in this sense, we might appropriate an admonition of Jesus as a sort of perfection of the rhetorical imperative described above. When asked what the greatest commandment was, Jesus responded with two basic responsibilities: “love God with all your heart [and] love your neighbor as yourself” (Matthew 22.37-39 NSRV). By way of appropriation, if we exchange *Logos* for God as John did, we get a causally connected great rhetorical imperative: “love *Logos* with all your heart and *thereby* love your neighbor as yourself.” Upon this
imperative hangs all rhetoric and ethics. For if we despise the universal discursive use of language, we abandon rhetoric and ethics in preference for other modes of persuasion, which only ends in violence (as Chapter 2 of this dissertation explores).

In the end, instead of an “ethics of secluded universality,” Kantian ethics emerges from and thrives in an ever-churning rhetorical environment of constantly engaging and reengaging rhetorical/moral agents. This is the very stuff of which symbouleutikon in the broad sense is made. Without such rhetorical socialization there is nothing with which or about which to critique or moralize.
CHAPTER 4. THE END OF DEMOCRACY: SYMPHERON AND THE EXPEDIENCY OF INEFFICIENCY

“When social conditions are equal, each man readily lives a life independent of others and forgets the crowd. If legislators of democratic nations did not seek to correct this fatal tendency... a time might come when the disorderly passions of a few men, with the help of the stupid selfishness and small-mindedness of the majority, would ultimately force the main body of society to suffer strange social changes.”
—Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America

“Hain't we got all the fools in town on our side? And ain't that a big enough majority in any town?”
—Mark Twain, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I reversed the traditional order of telos and symbouleutikon in order to see what we might discover if we posited that telos (completion, perfection, purification) has a specific symbouleutikon (way of bringing wills together). Through pursuing that line of reasoning, I uncovered the rhetorical pluralism that makes possible Kantian universal law and the categorical imperative. The rhetorical imperative (a sort of pre-universal law/imperative) emerged as the foundation for an actual ethics of rhetoric. The rhetorical imperative values engaging divergent perspectives as the foundation for any subsequent critical activity. Other theorists have identified similar ethical phenomena in other rhetorical projects. For instance, in his analysis of Chaim Perelman’s New Rhetoric, Mieczysław Maneli suggests “the only true moral and social virtue is our ability to reconsider, to reenter into dialogue, to keep an open mind, to be flexible, open to suggestions, and willing to follow new, reasonable advice... The New Rhetoric may
be the only philosophy that praises those who ruminate, hesitate, are reluctant, doubtful, but ultimately able to act prudently” (Maneli 13, qtd. in Crosswhite, “Universalities” 446). Far from being the only philosophy that values such activities, the work I’ve established thus far in this dissertation traces the necessary conditions for such virtues in Aristotle, Kenneth Burke, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Immanuel Kant and others. This chapter is an extension of those virtues.

As I began the previous chapter with a conceptual reversal, in this chapter, I reverse that reversal and pursue the traditional line of deliberative reasoning to its completion. To wit, Aristotle claims that symbouleutikon has a specific telos, and that specific telos is summarized in the concept of sympheron. Like telos, the Greek term sympheron is not included in Lanham’s Handlist of Rhetorical Terms. Sympheron also receives only passing mention in the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric (283), and has generally received little scholarly attention. In contemporary English translations of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the Greek term sympheron has been translated as “expedient” (Cooper 29) or “utility” (Roberts 2165) or “advantageous” (Kennedy 61). These translations remind me of Martin Heidegger’s critique of a common translation of ethos; Heidegger’s critique can apply to each of each of the above translations of sympheron: “This translation thinks in a modern way, not a Greek one” (Heidegger, Basic Writings 256). The word sympheron is formed from two other words—syn which means “together” and phero which means “to bear.” So when the Greeks used sympheron, they drew on an etymology that means “bearing together.”
More than just ancient vocabulary esoterica, *sympheron* is vital to contemporary conversations about the role *expediency* plays in deliberative rhetoric. It’s abundantly clear that Aristotle uses *sympheron* to describe deliberative rhetoric’s main purpose or goal: “But since the objective of the deliberative speaker is [sympheron], . . . and since [sympheron] is a good, one should grasp the elements of good and [sympheron] in abstract” (Kennedy 61, the original Greek term “sympheron” standing in for Kennedy’s translation “the advantageous”). Though Aristotle used *sympheron* with some connotations of *expediency*, it was not until some time before Cicero in the Roman Empire that expediency alone was theorized as the purpose of deliberative rhetoric. Since then, the place of expediency in deliberative rhetoric has gone on largely unchallenged. Indeed, the *Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*’s entry on *expediency* and its relationship to deliberative rhetoric occupies six double-columned pages (Wander 283-88).

However, the purposes of deliberative rhetoric shifts dramatically if *sympheron* instead means “bearing together.” *Sympheron*-as-expediency implies that deliberative rhetoric can be used to achieve that which is expedient, beneficial, advantageous, etc. But, of course, using the Aristotelian tools of deliberative rhetoric for these purposes inevitably leads to power-plays over what decisions are expedient for which individuals. Conversely, *sympheron*-as-bearing-together implies that deliberative rhetoric can be used to facilitate rhetors and audiences bearing each others’ perspectives and beliefs. The incommensurability of diverse
subjectivities is thus not a stalemate at the end of deliberation; rather, such incommensurability is the very exigency that initiates deliberation.

Incommensurability plays a role in early formulations of *sympheron* in the form of Greek *agonism* (see philological notes below). Some sort of conflict is inevitable in most any human interaction if only because humans are still isolated by their individual perceptions even if their languages (used to describe their isolated perceptions) are shared and public and thus unavoidably unite them. As I explored more in depth in Chapter 3, Ludwig Wittgenstein shows us that language is unavoidably public which suggests that the possibility of private language is incoherent. This means the rules of any language (no matter how privately created) can always be taught to another. This clashes with the incommensurability of subjective experience. No matter how similar or adjacent people are to each other, nobody can perceive or experience the exact perceptions and experiences of another. Language emerges as the fluctuating sets of approximations that people use to perceive as other people perceive. Thus the processes of uniting (and keeping united) divergent perspectives involves a great deal of sustained bearing-together.

This is because even when people *agree*, they must sustain the burden of trusting each other’s perspectives, which they cannot see nor feel for themselves. So while there is a great identity among those who speak the same language and assert their agreement, they must still bear (and constantly make up the difference for) the
incommensurable conflict of not being able to experience the perspectives of others. Understanding *sympheron* in terms of “bearing together” encourages using deliberative rhetoric in efforts to bridge incommensurable perspectives. But viewing *sympheron* solely in terms of expediency, utility, or advantage obscures and confuses this function of deliberative rhetoric and instead favors a destructive form of expedient individualism.

The long-standing incomplete understanding of *sympheron* has led to a throng of critiques that lump the moral incongruities of *sympheron*-as-expediency with Aristotle’s deliberative rhetoric. As emblematic of such a throng, consider Steven Katz’s 1992 article, “The Ethic of Expediency” (which has been anthologized and steadily debated since—by way of example, see Bibliography for Moore in 2004, Katz in 2006, and Ward in 2009). In his interpretation of *sympheron*-as-expediency, Katz vehemently argues that an ethic of expediency, based on Aristotelian deliberative rhetoric, accompanies the contemporary practice and teaching of technical communication. As Katz explains it, the ethic of expediency values means as means independent from their ends; it seeks to perfect processes regardless of what the processes are. Katz draws on actual Nazi bureaucratic rhetoric to carefully illustrate how such an ethic of expediency helped justify and implement the Holocaust. At the end of his article, Katz suggests a sobering thought, “when every field strives to be scientific and technical and decisions are made and consequences weighed and value argued on the ethic of expediency only—the Holocaust may have
something to teach those of us in technical communication, composition, and rhetoric" (273).

Undeniably, the ethic of expediency as a rhetorical justification in any occupation presents a clear danger to the future safety and wellness of society. However, such an ethic does not have its genesis in Aristotle’s deliberative rhetoric. Rather, the ethic of expediency emerges from the particular social conditions that provide exigency for deliberation—i.e. democracy. Thus, those who want to critique expediency will not find solutions in direct critiques of deliberation. Indeed, deliberative rhetoric (as we’ve inherited it from the classical Roman tradition) is somewhat of a smokescreen because of key terms that changed sometime between Aristotle and Cicero. Instead, as I’ll show below, solutions to the ethic of expediency share much with other peaceable solutions to the other problems of democracy.

To show this, I first include a brief philological look at *sympherörn*. After this philological glimpse at *sympherörn*, I dive headlong into the political/rhetorical theories of Alexis de Tocqueville and Kenneth Burke. Both of these theorists provide helpful critiques of democracy that show how an ethic of expediency can emerge from democratic conditions. Their critiques also indicate how it is that *sympherörn* can slip from a damaging ethic of expediency toward a corrective ethic of bearing together. In short, conscientious democratic living encourages an ethic of bearing together that helps keep the excesses of democracy in check.
A Philology of Sympheron

The confusion we’ve inherited about sympheron comes from two main sources—different ancient Greek usages of sympheron and the ancient Roman obscuring of *togetherness* in their theories about deliberative rhetoric that they inherited from Aristotle.

First, ancient Greeks simply used *sympheron* in different but adjacent ways. The earliest recorded uses of *sympheron* are in Homer’s Iliad where *sympheron* is used in specifically combative terms. In book 8 of the Iliad, the goddesses Hera and Athene prepare themselves to enter the war between the Greeks and Trojans even though Zeus had expressly forbidden such interloping by the gods.

> When father Zeus saw [Hera and Athene] from Ida he waxed wondrous wroth, and sent forth golden-winged Iris to bear a message: ‘Up, go, swift Iris; turn them back and suffer them not to come face to face with me, seeing it will be in no happy wise that we shall *join* in combat.” (Iliad 8:399-400, emphasis added)

The word *join* in this translation is *sympheron*. Understanding *sympheron* begins with understanding how combat (*agon*) is something that people bear together. I suspect that *sympheron*-as-combat draws on the shared burden of allies in uniting against a common foe. But I also suspect that *sympheron*-as-combat draws on the inevitable clash that erupts when enemies bring their divergent perspectives to bear on each other. Much like the conflict-centered analysis of *telos* in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, *sympheron*-as-combat suggests that political rhetoric is actually the continuation of war in a different medium. Or, in other words, rhetorical
engagement is the symbolic implementation of combat while actual combat is the physical implementation of symbolic incommensurability.

Additionally, notice that *sympheron*-as-combat still has specifically rhetorically discursive contexts. In the Zeus example mentioned above, Zeus referred to *sympheron* while he “waxed wondrous wroth.” Elsewhere in the Iliad, *sympheron* is also used by the Greek’s resident eloquent rhetor, Nestor of Gerenia who’s described as “sweet of speech, the clear-voiced orator of the Pylians, from whose tongue flowed speech sweeter than honey” (Iliad 1:247-49). In a motivational retelling of a previous battle, Nestor includes this statement, “for when the bright sun stood above the earth we made prayer to Zeus and Athene, and _joined_ battle” (Iliad 11.736, emphasis added). Again, “joined” in this selection is *sympheron*. In both the Zeus and Nestor examples, *sympheron* is used to describe a bearing together of combat motivated by powerfully suasive communications. Also in these instances of *sympheron*, notice the none-too-subtle ancient Greek machismo (for lack of a better word). Ancient Greek obsession with masculinity definitely plays a role in these early combative forms of *sympheron*. Further understanding *sympheron* in these contexts suggests the need future studies in early Greek gender roles and gender expectations. Hints and shades of expediency are evident in these early *sympheron* examples. If nothing else, we should be able to see that it is much more _expedient_ for individual soldiers to join together (*sympheron*) when facing an enemy.
Herodotus uses *sympheron* is a way that is symptomatic of the togetherness/expediency uses of *sympheron*. Consider the pun Herodotus uses when referring to the tragic tale of Mardonius. Just before the Lacedaemonians capture Mardonius at his divinations and kill him, Herodotus tells this about Mardonius: “οὐ μέντοι ἐς γε τέλος οἴ συνήνεικε τὸ ἔχθος τὸ ἔς Λακεδαίμονίους συγκεκυρημένον” (Herodotus 9:37). The pun appears in the two words that begin with συ-. Both are variants of *sympheron*. David Grene’s translation of this selection goes like this: “But in the end this hatred of the Lacedaemonians, which had so much become part of all that happened to him, did not turn out well for him” (Herodotus 9:37, Grene 630). Grene’s translation clarifies distinctions between the two uses of *sympheron*, but A. D. Godley’s translation gives a better hint of the pun: “Yet the enmity which he bore them brought him no good at the last” (Herodotus 9:37, Godley). In this selection, *sympheron* is used to indicate the verb “bore” (as in “to bear”), and it also indicates “good” (or expediency, as in “that’s good for me”). An approximation of the pun in English might go something like this: Yet the hatred he bore to the Lacedaemonians did not bear him anything in return. Herodotus’s pun indicates the area of slippage between *sympheron*-as-bearing-together and *sympheron*-as-expediency. But even in this slippage, both usages still retain their emphasis of togetherness. It was Mardonius’s hatred for the Lacedaemonians that brought him and them together – that wrapped up his actions with theirs. But, paradoxically, his hatred was also the factor that eventually brought him an utter lack of togetherness because the Lacedaemonians eventually killed him.
Elsewhere in his *History*, Herodotus also uses the essential nature of *sympheron* in a quasi-aphorism: “if all mankind should assemble, for market, their own vicious deeds, wanting to barter them for those of their neighbors, on close inspection of those neighbors’ ill acts they would be glad enough to take back home again their own, which they had brought with them” (7:152, Grene 521). Again, David Grene’s translation provides clear distinction between like terms (e.g. “vicious deeds” as opposed to “ill acts”). But A. D. Godley’s translation gets more to the heart of Herodotus’s word-play: “if all men should carry their own private troubles to market for barter with their neighbors, there would not be a single one who, when he had looked into the troubles of other men, would not be glad to carry home again what he had brought” (7:152, Godley). Both translators struggle with exactly how to convey *sympheron* in English. But their choices of words indicates that *sympheron* is somewhere between *assembling* on one hand and *carrying* on the other. In short, *sympheron* is what people do when they bear burdens together (whether literally or metaphorically).

The slippage between *sympheron*-as-bearing-together and *sympheron*-as-expediency can also be illustrated in the analogous term *convene*. *Convene* comes to us from the Latin *con* (“together”) and *vene* (“come”) – literally “come together.” In one sense of *convene*, we might say, “The diplomats’ meeting came together” – i.e. it *convened*. Or we might also say, “Those questions really came together for me” – i.e. they were *convenient*. Though not exactly the same, the slippage between *convene*
and *convenient* is at least analogous to the slippage between *sympheron*-as-bearing-together and *sympheron*-as-expediency. The former emphasizes expedient togetherness; the latter emphasizes individual expediency.

The historical transition in *sympheron* from expedient togetherness to individual expediency also manifests in the odd lexical gap in English words for rhetoric. The closest etymologically similar term to *sympheron* we have in English is *conference*. *Sympher*on is Greek while *conference* is Latin. Their individual components are fairly commensurable: *syn/sym* and *con* both mean “together” in Greek and Latin respectively. The middle components –*pher*– and –*fer*– are etymologically identical; they both mean “to bear” (or “to bring” or “to carry”). So at their basics, both *sympheron* and *conference* roughly mean “the bearing together [of something].”

*Sympher*on represents a lexical gap in English’s words for rhetoric because similar meanings for *conference* are now obsolete. According to the *OED*, the earliest English uses of *conference* did mean “the bearing together or bringing together [of something]” but such uses are now archaic. If such uses of *conference* were resurrected, English-speakers might use *conference* with the emphasis on –*fer*– (to differentiate from other uses of *conference*).

The lexical gap evident between *sympheron* and *conference* already existed by the time Cicero and the unknown author of *Rhetoric Ad Herennium* adapted Aristotle’s notions of deliberative rhetoric to Roman discourse. For Aristotle, deliberative
rhetoric had a definite *togetherness* quality about it. But by the time Cicero and Quintilian came along, deliberative rhetoric emphasized individual expediency. The Roman re-conception of deliberation is especially evident in the difference between the Aristotelian purpose of deliberation and the Ciceronian purpose of deliberation. For Aristotle, the purpose of deliberation was *sympheron* ("bearing together" or at most "expedient togetherness"), but for Cicero (and Quintilian afterwards), the purpose was *utilitas*, or "utility" / "expediency" / "advantage" with no emphasis on togetherness.

This was so much the case that Cicero found it necessary to append ethical correctives to Aristotle's rhetorical purposes. In Hubbell's 1949 translation of *De Inventione*, Cicero explains some of Aristotle's rhetorical purposes this way, "it is generally agreed that the end in the forensic type is equity, i.e. a subdivision of the larger topic of 'honor.' In the deliberative type, however, Aristotle accepts advantage as the end, but I prefer both honor and advantage" (323-25). In the original Latin, Cicero uses the term *utilitas*, which Hubbell translates as *advantage*. In other words, Cicero was taught that Aristotle accepts *utilitas* as the main motive for deliberation. This is especially odd because Cicero's Latin lexicon had *confero*, which is a direct translation of *sympheron*, and Cicero used *confero* in other senses in *De Iventione* and in his other works. In other words, *confero* was a common enough term for Cicero and was a direct translation of *sympheron*, so why use a completely different term like *utilitas* instead of *confero*? The answer to that question is beyond the scope
of this dissertation. It may be possible that Cicero did not know of the original Greek term *sympheron*. Or maybe Cicero did know the term and its etymological affinity to *confero* but believed that *utilitas* was closer to Aristotle’s intention. Whatever the reason, in Aristotle’s time, it may have been true that *sympheron* was beginning to connote elements of expediency. But at the very least, *sympheron* contains nuances of *togetherness* that are absent in the more individualist-oriented expediency as derived from *utilitas*.

To summarize this brief philological study, *sympheron* evolved from combative-togetherness in Homer to expedient-togetherness in Aristotle to expediency at the expense of togetherness in Cicero where it remained essentially unchanged for almost two millennia.

In a certain sense, individualist expediency is diametrically opposed to earlier notions of *sympheron*, for *sympheron* connotes bearing together some sort of rhetorical burden with others in the same rhetorical situation or event. Individualist expediency on the other hand lends itself to connotations of getting rid of burdens, for burdens tend to expedite very little.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Kenneth Burke, and the Expediency of Democratic Inefficiency

Part of a deliberative rhetor’s burden as Aristotle saw it probably dealt with the deliberative rhetor’s responsibility to understand many different political perspectives. For Aristotle, knowing exactly how to rhetorically reach out to people who are devoted to their sociopolitical movements is expressly the realm of deliberative rhetoric. In his *Rhetoric* at the end of the section on deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle spends some effort in explaining how to appeal to people who adhere to different governmental structures like democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, etc. (see Cooper 44-45, Roberts 2173, and Kennedy 74). At first blush, it looks as though democracy is just one form of government in a list for Aristotle, so deliberative rhetoric is not *necessarily* democratic. But as we look past the possible contexts of deliberative rhetoric, we notice what deliberative rhetoric actually *does*. If a rhetor knows how to relate to an individual in any form of government, suddenly the rhetor enjoys a democratic moment with that individual (regardless of the government type). Deliberation democratizes discussion, for deliberation relies on equal interlocutors to function as deliberation at all. Thus the longer a rhetor can deliberatively engage an individual in any form of government, the more democratic the conversation will become. So while deliberative rhetoric does not initially appear necessarily democratic, it actually emerges as being *essentially* democratic.
Burdened as it is with cumbersome dialectical togetherness, deliberative rhetoric’s essential democratic nature apparently clashes with the traditional deliberative motive of expedient individualism. But this clash is apparent only. Upon closer examination, the apparent clash emerges as a causal relationship. That is to say, it is democracy that fosters the very expedient individualism with which *sympheron*-motivated deliberative rhetoric clashes.

The democratic drive toward expedient individualism is especially evident in Alexis de Tocqueville’s more curious observations of American democracy. These observations include his musings on individualism and conformity. Kenneth Burke also observes some compellingly similar proto-expedient phenomena in his critique of the cult of empire, specifically in his ideas of fanaticism and dissipation. Burke’s notion of fanaticism parallels de Tocqueville’s notion of conformity, and Burke’s notion of dissipation parallels de Tocqueville’s notion of individualism. If de Tocqueville’s and Burke’s critiques of democracy are sound, then correctives to the ethic of expediency share much with other peaceable solutions to the other problems of democracy.

*Alexis de Tocqueville’s critique of individualism in 1830s America bears some striking parallels to the ethic of expediency: “Individualism is a calm and considered feeling which persuades each citizen to cut himself off from his fellows and to withdraw into the circle of his family and friends”* (587). The virtue of “self-
sufficiency” often found in democracies fuels this impulse. As the ability to satisfy basic needs spread through society, de Tocqueville argues, citizens in such circumstances will become less interested in each other and withdraw more into their individual interests. The danger here is that individualism may eventually merge with egoism, which de Tocqueville defines as “an ardent and excessive love of oneself which leads man to relate everything back to himself and to prefer himself above everything” (587). As individualism socially isolates people, such people may unintentionally find themselves focusing so much on their own needs that they begin to see the world around them solely in terms of their own wants. This is a step toward expediency as a motivational power.

Paradoxically, democratic social conditions tend to foster conformity even while they foster individualism so that independent individuals appear more and more like one another. Such an assertion runs counter to some contemporary assumptions about democracies.

For instance in their 1997 book, Disclosing New Worlds, Charles Spinosa (and company) suggest, “Since the liberal state does not aim to promote particular goods, the liberal society establishes a space where citizens may freely examine and even exchange their own conceptions of the good for other such conceptions” (Spinosa, et al. 71). Though Spinosa (et al.) do have critiques of this sort of liberal state, de Tocqueville poses some pointed difficulties with such liberalism. Specifically, de
Tocqueville’s observations of individualism suggests that the “free ... exchange” of ideas in a “liberal society” is actually not very free at all.

Also, de Tocqueville’s observations provide nuance to Steven Brint’s claims about “activity-based groups” vis-à-vis “belief-based groups.” Brint believes that the pressure to conform is stronger in belief-based groups than in activity-based groups: “Members of activity-based groups share the enjoyment of an activity without necessarily being required to conform in other respects. By contrast, belief-based groups generally exert a stronger pressure on members to conform to prescribed norms and values. In most cases, respect for individuality is greater in activity-based groups” (Brint 11). Even so, I would suggest along with Tocqueville, the pressure to conform exists even in activity-based groups.

As de Tocqueville explains:

> Whenever social conditions are equal, the opinion of all bears down with a great weight upon the mind of each individual, enfolding, controlling, and oppressing him. ... As all men grow more alike, each individual feels increasingly weak in relation to the rest. Since he can find nothing to elevate himself above their level or to distinguish himself from them, he loses confidence in himself the moment they attack him; [in a democratic society] it will always, therefore, be very difficult for a man to believe what the mass of the people reject or to profess what they condemn. (747-48)

For better or worse, conformity is a part of liberal democratic society. Merely allowing individual freedom and fostering equality does not weaken the power of social conformity. Indeed, freedom and equality impose their own certain flavor of
conformity. The project facing those who seek to defend liberal democracy against the encroachment of expedient conformity does not involve merely ensuring freedom and equality. It also involves acknowledging democracy’s unique forms of conformity. And it also involves strategizing how such conformity may be harnessed to continue to foster and not harm the freedom and equality necessary to liberal democracy.

But such efforts are hindered by the social pressures in a democracy that produce an alarming stasis of beliefs, so that truly original thought is next to non-existent. Instead, in order to progress with what is already known and accepted, people in democratic conditions tend to refine the art of refining rather than creating new arts as de Tocqueville elucidates:

Not that the human mind is idle [in democratic conditions], for it is constantly active; but it is much more involved in the infinite variations that flow from well-known principles and in the discovery of new variations than in seeking new principles themselves. It shows great agility at turning on the spot, rather than plunging forward in any swift and direct movement; a gradual and sustained extension of its orbit of power is preferred to a sudden change of position. (744)

This is true even of higher education. For example, this dissertation chapter (the one you’re reading right now) is a study of pulling together established and accepted ideas, playing them to a variant (but not revolutionary) tune, and drawing observations. I seek to expedite understanding of the ethic of expediency by expediting a clearer understanding of Aristotle and democratic conditions. Democracies are full of expediencies.
The ethic of expediency also parallels a two-fold difficulty of what Kenneth Burke calls the "cult of empire" (Grammar 317). In its ugliest extremes, the cult of empire manifests in what Burke calls “fanaticism” and “dissipation”. These perspectives are anti-critical in that they reduce pluralities of perspectives to singular perspectives.

"By fanaticism,” Burke means, “the effort to impose one doctrine of motives abruptly upon a world composed of many different motivational situations” (Grammar 318). This is exactly what happens with democratic conformity that de Tocqueville observes above. In another essay, Burke recognizes that such fanaticism frequently manifests in unsophisticated teaching methods. Some teaching methods seek to indoctrinate students with “a narrowly partisan point of view in [controversial] subjects” (“Linguistic” 283). A slightly less unsophisticated method of education seeks out other perspectives for students to learn but only for the purposes of strengthening students’ originally-held perspectives. In these circumstances, expediency is again used in its situational sense.

The other difficult extreme in the cult of empire is dissipation, which often manifests as competition. By dissipation Burke means, “the isolationist tendency to surrender, as one finds the issues of world adjustment so complex that he merely turns to the satisfactions nearest at hand, . . . in general taking whatever opportunities of gratification or advancement happen to present themselves and letting all else take care of itself” (Grammar 318). By way of example, Burke refers to merchants who
often place themselves “wholly and trustingly in the market’s hands, as though its workings were a kind of automatic Providence” (318). Expediency in this sense takes on the added rhetoric of divine intervention (cf. Adam Smith’s invisible hand); deity is made subservient to expediency.

In specific reference to dissipation, Burke explains that, “This temptation is always with us, partly because sound common sense admonishes that we should not burden ourselves with problems beyond our powers” (Grammar 318). In this way, dissipation also parallels the democratic difficulties of individualism, which de Tocqueville observed. A clear example of this dissipation impulse emerges in the classrooms of a democracy. Burke explains how:

Far too often, education is wholly under the sign of the promissory. The serious student enters school hoping to increase his powers, to equip himself in the competition for “success,” to make the “contacts” that get him a better-paying job. . . . The “humanistic” aspect of the curriculum is usually approached in the same spirit, even by those who think of themselves as opponents of the vocational emphasis. The courses are expected in some way or other to help students “get ahead” as individuals. (“Linguistic” 271)

Here we get a clear formulation of the problem of expediency. The temptation is to subvert education as a specifically human phenomenon (which helps humans progress in uniquely human ways) to education as a specifically economic phenomenon (which ultimately serves situational exigencies). And while humanistically leaning teachers may overcome or avoid this dissipative and competitive sort of temptation, many students enter and graduate through higher education still dealing with it (however consciously or ignorantly). This
competition-for-self-gratification-sake impulse is a constant temptation in
democracies for precisely the reasons outlined above and is a clear example of the
ethic of expediency.

But we can trace larger characteristics of democratic societies that contribute to the
ethic of expediency. Recall Steven Katz’s main societal critique of Nazi Germany. The
main path of critique I’m following suggests that if the ethic of expediency
influenced insane and murderous Nazi policies, it did so by emerging from
democratic social conditions. Nazi Germany, however, was a decidedly
undemocratic fascist state. However, no ethic has an a priori existence (as I take
issue with Kant in the previous chapter); an ethic always depends on certain social
conditions. Such conditions are evident in the environment from which Nazi
Germany itself developed.

The Prussian Kingdom and the later German Empire of the 1800s were controlled
by landed aristocracy. After the First World War, much of this control base shifted
over into the Weimar Republic in the 1920s. Even with this aristocratic overtone,
most of German history throughout the 1800s and into the early 1900s is a study in
the social tensions generated by democracy and industry. Democratic social
movements begun at around the same time as industrialization took hold in western
German provinces in the early 1800s (Dill 89-90). The tension between populist
liberals and aristocratic conservatives continued to grow through the 19th century.
Throughout the 1800s, such tension usually sided the populist liberals with industrial commerce on one side and aristocratic conservatives with agriculture on the other. The Prussian Kaisers during this time generally recognized that advances in industry held the key to future sustained power. This meant that the King sometimes found himself siding against his own aristocratic political base. Bismark’s infamous *Kulturkampf*, for example, was ostensibly an anti-Catholic program that targeted southern agrarian landowners. And while the drive for secularism was the most-often cited rationale for this discrimination, the fact that southern agrarian aristocrats threatened the progress of northern industrialists certainly played an exigent role (Dill 146-47). Further, the German Empire itself was a constitutional monarchy even though the Kaiser frequently overrode the government’s democratic elements. So while democratic social conditions did not hold full sway over the German Empire, some form of democracy has been part of the German political scene from the mid-1800s through present day, including the Nazi era. And certainly, just prior to the Nazi era, the most prominently democratic era of German politics was the Weimar Republic (cf. Section 109 of *The Constitution of the German Republic* which granted gender equality, totally vitiated titles of nobility, and granted legal equality to all Germans with no mention of race, religion, or creed; see also Peukert 21-51). And it was the Weimar Republic that democratically voted Hitler and his National Socialists into power in one of the most popular democratic votes of the modern age.
The point of this (all too reductive) summary of German political history is this: democratic conditions permeated the social landscape of pre-Nazi Germany. Leading up to the Nazi rise to power, German citizens faced many of the conditions which de Tocqueville observed in 1830s America. While I do not suggest that the political conditions were exactly similar in America and Germany through the 1800s, I do suggest that both places experienced enough in common to serve as instructive analogues to each other. It’s at least conceivable how impulses of individualism and dissipation kept German citizens focused enough on their own concerns to look away from what was happening to their Jewish neighbors; how impulses of conformity and fanaticism imposed such heavy cultural pressure in the advancement of Nazi ideology and Hitler’s election (probably the most popularly-elected official in German history); how industrial pressures of both laborers and managers produced horrific technical documents (cf. the memo Katz references written by a Nazi bureaucrat who argued for more efficient parameters for gassing Jews, see Katz, “Ethic”, 255-56). The Nazi dilemma of expediency is not far removed from other democratic societies.

Claiming that the perpetrators of the Holocaust are not much different from the residents of democracies is not new. Hannah Arendt famously asserted a similar view when she described Adolf Eichmann’s role in the Holocaust bureaucracy as being symptomatic of the “banality of evil.” Arendt observed Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem and collected her observations in a book-length study. In the book’s
epilogue, Arendt explains why she focuses on Eichmann's bureaucratic banality as core to the machinations of the Holocaust. Her explanation is reminiscent of the negative democratic qualities of individualism, egoism, fanaticism, and dissipation as explored by de Tocqueville and Burke:

when I speak of the banality of evil, I do so only on the strictly factual level, pointing to a phenomenon which stared one in the face at the trial. Eichmann was not . . . “a villain.” Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement, he had no motives at all. And this diligence in itself was in no way criminal . . . . He merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was doing. It was precisely this lack of imagination which enabled him to sit for months on end facing a German Jew who was conducting the police interrogation, pouring out his heart to the man and explaining again and again how it was that he reached only the rank of lieutenant colonel in the S.S. and that it had not been his fault that he was not promoted. . . . He was not stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness—something by no means identical with stupidity—that predisposed him to become one of the greatest criminals of that period. . . . That such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man—that was, in fact, the lesson one could learn in Jerusalem. But it was a lesson, neither an explanation of the phenomenon nor a theory about it. (287-88)

Similar to Arendt's views are those of Holocaust historian Christopher Browning, whose historical study of the Polish Reserve Police Battalion 101 suggests that the everyman perpetrators of the Holocaust were largely influenced by the pressing social conformity they faced:

Everywhere society conditions people to respect and defer to authority, and indeed could scarcely function otherwise. Everywhere people seek career advancement. In every modern society, the complexity of life and the resulting bureaucratization and specialization attenuate the sense of personal responsibility of those implementing official policy. Within virtually every social collective, the peer group exerts tremendous pressures on behavior and sets
moral norms. If the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 could become killers under such circumstances, what group of men cannot? (189)

In short, there is more that unites the perpetrators of the Holocaust with most of the peoples they fought than there is that separates them. And the great unifier tends to be the conformity and bureaucratization attendant to the equality of social conditions.

Having painted such a dire picture of the problems facing democratic institutions, I hasten to point out that the solutions to these problems are available through the very conditions unique to democracy. Democracy provides the materials for an ethic of bearing together just as it provides the materials for an ethic of expediency.

Consider John Dewey's famous assertion that “the cure for the ailments of democracy is more democracy” (146). Of course Dewey did not mean that merely multiplying the democratic conditions in which people may encounter the difficulties of democracy is itself the answer to democracy’s ailments. Rather, people who enjoy democratic social conditions need to be conscientiously democratic; by which Dewey means, diverse individuals need to participate in democracy as equals (even if not fully equally). Dewey observes that de Tocqueville “pointed out in effect that popular government is educative. . . . It forces a recognition that there are common interests, even though the recognition of what they are is confused; and the need it enforces of discussion and publicity brings about some clarification of what they are” (207, italics in original). Dewey expands on this by suggesting, “The
essential need, in other words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions of
debate, discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public. . . . this
improvement depends essentially upon freeing and perfecting the processes of
inquiry" (208). In other words, democratic conditions obligate those who live
democratically to acknowledge, engage, and adapt to differing perspectives. It is
from this social soup that sympheron emerges, for an ethic of bearing together stems
from this basic democratic obligation. (For the remainder of this chapter, I use the
phrase “ethic of bearing together” in place of sympheron as a useful synonym for
sympheron and a clear juxtaposition to the ethic of expediency as Katz saw it.)

Kenneth Burke picks up a similar vein of thinking: his admonitory stance toward
democracy gives an ethic of bearing together a distinctly dialectic quality. In 1941
(and consistently thereafter), Burke argued that dialectic is the kind of rhetorical
strategy that is necessary to acknowledge, engage, and adapt to differing ethical
perspectives. As such, dialectic and democratic social conditions flourish in tandem
with each other. Burke’s formulation of dialectic extends from his understanding of
the tropological nature of language. In this way of understanding language,
metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony represent different ways of perceiving
the world. Burke interchanges “realistic” applications with each of these tropes in
the respective forms of perspective (for metaphor), reduction (for metonymy),
representation (for synecdoche), and dialectic (for irony). The most inclusive trope
pair is irony/dialectic. Irony and dialectic arise, Burke suggests, “when one tries, by
interaction of terms upon one another, to produce a *development* which uses all the terms” (*Grammar* 512). Burke describes the unique genius of dialectic as occurring when an observer “considers the whole from the standpoint of the participation of all the terms rather than from the standpoint of any one participant” (*Grammar* 513). Further, as perspectives “are thus encouraged to participate in an orderly parliamentary development, the dialectic of this participation produces … a ‘resultant certainty’ [which] requires that all the sub-certainties be considered as neither true nor false, but *contributory.* (*Grammar* 513, italics in original). Burke’s use of “parliamentary” here is not happenstance. Dialectic/Irony is the most democratic of the master tropes because it is not just a perspective; rather it is a “perspective of perspectives” (*Grammar* 512). It is a dialectical perspective which makes possible the perceiving and *appreciating* of divergent perspectives at the same time.

Burke went so far as describing democracy itself in terms of dialectic. In his *Philosophy of Literary Form*, Burke asserts that democracy is “a device for institutionalizing the dialectical process, by setting up a political structure that gives full opportunity for the use of competition to a cooperative end. “Allow full scope of the dialectical process, and … the protagonist of a thesis has maximum opportunity to modify his thesis … in the light of the antagonist’s rejoinders.” (*Philosophy* 444). But Burke argues that such competitive cooperation should not necessarily be voluntary but mandatory: “The dialectical process *absolutely must* be unimpeded, if
society is to perfect its understanding of reality by the necessary method of give-and-take (yield-and-advance)” (Philosophy 444, italics in original). We must give up the freedom to not participate in a democracy if we want to enjoy the rest of the freedoms democratic conditions provide.

This is not to say that democratic principles ought to be accepted unchallenged. Indeed, forcing individuals to accept democratic principles is itself not very democratic (much akin to bringing democratic government to a different country at gunpoint). Democracy ceases to be democratic when used as a tool of salvation. This is because democracy-as-salvation accepts as inviolate the hierarchy of savior-saved. But democracy is non-hierarchical by virtue of its egalitarian principles.

There’s a strategic difference here between democratic rhetoric and the rhetoric of democracy. The salvation/hierarchical flavor of democracy would lean towards rhetoric of democracy – or rhetoric that supports democratic aims and ideals.

Democratic rhetoric on the other hand harnesses dialectic to implement democracy as a rhetorical strategy itself. Because of this, anyone who uses democratic rhetoric is dialectically obligated to acknowledge their own rhetorical strategies (i.e. dialecticism and democracy), which encourages audiences to engage dialectically with the very ideas of dialecticism and democracy.

The relationship among dialectic, democracy, and an ethic of bearing together should be plain at this point. But, of course, whenever democracy is practiced in any
form, the democratic populace is often beset with rhetorical trappings (whether in political, commercial, or religious forms). In such circumstances, dialectic participation serves (in Burke's words) to teach such a populace how to, “discount such devices; and nothing less than a very thorough training in the discounting of rhetorical persuasiveness can make a citizenry truly free. . . . But we can say that ideal democracy does allow all voices to participate in the dialogue of the state” (“Linguistic” 285). Burke's democratic arguments for dialectic (and dialectic arguments for democracy) specifically show that the ethic of bearing together is overtly rhetorical in nature.

If all this participation is making an ethic of bearing together sound inefficient, that is precisely the idea. In Counter-Statement, Burke defines democracy alternately as a “system of checks and counter-checks” or “a system of government based on the fear that central authority becomes bad authority” (Counter 114). As such, democracy is “organized distrust, ‘protest made easy’, a babble of discordant voices, a colossal getting in one’s own way—democracy, now endangered by the apostles of hope [i.e. fascists] who would attack it for its ‘inefficiency’, whereas inefficiency is the one thing it has it is favor” (Counter 114). Burke touts inefficiency as a virtue of democracy because democracy's sluggishness both results from and fosters the very discordant discussion that tends to keep government from going bad. Accordingly, the ideal democrat as Burke conceives it is “the man who thinks of powers as something to be ‘fought,’ has no hope in perfection—as the ‘opposition’, his nearest
approach to a doctrine is the doctrine of interference. There is no absolute truth, he says, but there is the cancellation of errors” (Counter 115).

Thus, political difficulties are actually linguistic and rhetorical. Cries for more efficient government lead to silencing opposing views (if only because efficiency is by definition the successful pursuit of one course of action at the exclusion of others). This was the main initial triumph of the Nazi rise to power in 1933. Hitler provided one voice for the previously discordant babble of the multi-party Weimar Republic. But this, of course, meant that all other voices were silenced. The more voices (both in number and diversity) that participate in a particular government, the less efficient that particular government is. However, an ethic of bearing together carries with it this unforgettable benefit: the less efficient government is, the less likely that such government will pursue (however efficiently) disastrous courses of action.

Burke's additional thoughts on dialectic and democracy provide further insight into the divisions and connections between an ethic of expediency and an ethic of bearing together. In his essay, “The Rhetorical Situation,” Burke builds on his work in Rhetoric of Motives in which he situates rhetoric as identification. In “The Rhetorical Situation”, Burke considers identification under “three main heads”: identification by sympathy (what you’re for), identification by antithesis (what you’re against), and lastly, identification by inaccuracy (or alternately by
unawareness or by false assumption). Burke suggests this last mode of identification gets “to the very roots of the rhetorical situation” (“Rhetorical” 269). This is because identification by inaccuracy jumbles the dialectical process. When individuals identify with a specific person or program under false assumptions, what are actually divergent voices become one voice at the expense of the subsumed voices (similar to what happened in Nazi Germany). As Burke explains, “The poignancy of the rhetorical situation attains its fullness in spontaneously arising identifications whereby, even without deliberate intent upon the part of anyone, we fail to draw the lines at the right places” (“Rhetorical” 271). This is exactly the sort of difficulty that arises from the ethic of expediency.

A further moral quandary in the ethic of expediency lies in the disjunction between subjective identity and the identity of sociopolitical movements. Burke locates the root of such ambiguity in the word “we” – e.g. “we” invaded Iraq, or “we” dropped the Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or “Yes, ‘we’ can! Yes, ‘we’ can! Yes, ‘we’ can!” This kind of identification becomes especially dangerous when individuals in a populace accept the actions of a government (however abusive or beneficial) merely because they self-identify with the government whether or not the government attitudes accord with their own. Think of the way that “patriot” has shifted in some American vernaculars away from one who seeks to overthrow the established government (ala Samuel Adams and the original Tea Party) to one who holds as inviolate the constitutional documents on which the powers of the current
government reside (ala the current Tea Party movement). In this way, democratically united people ("we") sometimes adamantly and ignorantly affirm an ethic of expediency in the name of the very democracy that the ethic of expediency destroys.

Of course, identifying with sociopolitical movements may be beneficial if the citizens in a democratic society seek to alter the course of destructive governmental behavior through some sense of genuine collective guilt or responsibility. However, first among the considerations Burke stresses in dialectical inquiry is this: a "concern with the principle of ‘identification’ that prevails [...] when ruler and subjects, however disparate their ways of living, feel themselves united in some common cause" ("Linguistic" 269). The constant cautionary quality of an ethic of bearing together, then, is a vigilant suspicion of sociopolitical movements as such.

Gerard Hauser makes a compellingly similar argument for the public space in which people and factions may voice disagreements:

Conflict confronts us with the paradox of inventing a public space in which to disagree. Antagonists must cooperate in order to air their disagreements. . . . Without a space for disagreement, the we that is the discursively created basis of social and political relationship could not emerge. . . . These disagreements arise and lend themselves to rhetorical development only because there is a shared understanding of what is significant even though the ways in which it is framed and its implications are projected may be hotly contested. (152)
I would go a step further than Hauser and suggest that the resulting “rhetorical development” of such cooperating disagreements does not have to be any kind of direct solution to any participant’s complaints.

In the end, we see a perspective of Aristotle’s deliberative rhetoric that runs expressly counter to any ethic of expediency: whenever people are actively engaged in deliberating about getting something else done, they are not actually getting that thing done. Or rather, what gets done through the act of deliberation is the slowing down of getting other things done. This is the general benefit of Aristotle’s deliberative rhetoric and the specific genius of an ethic of bearing together (sympheron): people participating in social structures that encourage them to perpetually engage the divergent perspectives of others.
CHAPTER 5: THE END OF INSTRUCTION: TELOS/SYMPHERON IN TECHNICAL WRITING AND VISUAL RHETORIC

“[People] who believe that they are accomplishing something by speaking speak in a different way from [people] who believe that speaking is a waste of time. [Those] who use speech as a tool of their work, who are confident and fluent—aren’t necessarily more intelligent, or even more educated.”
—Neal Stephenson, Cryptonomicom

Introduction

Up to this point in this dissertation, I have briefly explored some theoretical implications of reappropriated notions of telos, symbouleutikon, and sympheron. This chapter is an effort to put some of these reappropriated theories into practice. The theoretical project underpinning this dissertation began as a response to Stephen Katz’s arguments about the ethic of expediency as it related to technical communication and composition. This chapter re-approaches specific topics in technical communication and composition to see how these practices might fare with reappropriated notions of telos in place of purpose and sympheron in place of expediency. Specifically, I turn my attention to specific topics in technical communication and visual rhetoric and see what might develop in light of reappropriated notions of telos and sympheron; since, those two terms respectively translated as end and expediency were particularly key to Stephen Katz’s arguments in “Ethic of Expediency.”
In his essay “Ethic of Expediency,” Katz argues that,

In the gruesome light of the holocaust, then, we should question whether expediency should be the primary ethical standard in deliberative discourse, including scientific and technical communication, and whether, based on Cicero’s advocacy of a rhetoric grounded in a knowledge of everything and Quintilian’s definition of the orator as “a good ‘man’ skilled in speaking,” we can and should teach the panoply of ethics in deliberative discourse in our rhetoric and writing courses. (272)

In other words, since expediency has been rhetorically used to justify horrific bureaucratic practices, should we not teach a broad range of ethics and ethical theories when we teach technical writing? Though many instructors of writing may morally sympathize with Katz’s suggestion, I have personally encountered significant institutional resistance to incorporating a robust curriculum of ethics in technical writing courses.

When I first read Katz’s essay, I fielded Katz’s perspective to a colleague who, at the time, was involved in coordinating university-level technical writing courses and instructors in a nationally recognized and respected university writing program. I fielded Katz’s perspective as a serious programmatic pedagogical suggestion that ethical theories—and not just situational ethical considerations—ought to be included in university level technical writing curriculum. I suggested that it might serve technical communicators well to know the differences in moral claims between, say, utilitarian claims and Kantian categorical imperatives. I reasoned that such knowledge might help technical communicators in adapting to differing ethical frameworks on-the-job if they could articulate differences in moral claims in general
terms of principle as well as in practical terms of organizational needs vis-à-vis individual concerns (for an analogous argument see Hawthorne 341-56; Hawthorne argues that understanding abstract ethical theories played a vital role in his technical writing students being able to formulate a practical code of ethics for their writing program). However, upon hearing this suggestion, my colleague immediately panned the idea on the grounds that introducing ethical theories like that would be prohibitively complex in technical writing courses that were already strapped for time. Plus, this colleague pointed out, most technical writing students would resist learning abstract differences in ethical theories in a technical writing course, which should rightly focus on specifically technical writing issues. I don’t know if this colleague is solidly opposed to ethics-infused technical writing curricula in other senses, for I have not had another opportunity to discuss the matter further.

But I found myself encountering a repeated similar concern when I was interviewing for tenure-track positions at various universities. In interviews with hiring committees at three different universities with well-developed writing studies programs, when the subject of my research in rhetoric and ethics came up, I was asked variations of this question: “How would you realistically incorporate the study of ethics throughout technical writing course work?” The first time I encountered the question, it honestly befuddled me for reasons I’ll cover below. Two of these three universities at which I encountered the question decided not to pursue my application precisely because my research and pedagogical agendas
infused technical communication with the study of ethics. In the words of one hiring committee chair, “your research agenda in ethics would be a tough sell to the Dean.”

But why should this be so? As I related in the introduction of this dissertation, the flagship technical communication textbooks from Bedford St. Martins, Oxford University Press, Pearson, and Wadsworth all contain fairly robust material on ethics in technical writing (See Bibliography for Anderson; Johnson-Sheehan; Markel; and Teaux and Dragga). In fact, the three textbooks by Anderson, Johnson-Sheehan, and Markel specifically incorporate ethics as constant themes throughout each textbook. And Anderson’s and Johnson-Sheehan’s books both refer to fairly complex ethical theories. For instance, in one section on ethics, Anderson refers to Kant and a reworked notion of universal law (141). And Johnson-Sheehan directly references utilitarianism among other notable general theories of ethics (74). What is so odd, then, about a robust incorporation of ethics into technical writing instruction and practice?

For one thing, I suspect it uncomfortably blurs institutional distinctions among disciplines (which is why my research agenda may be a “tough sell” for certain deans). And while interdisciplinary, multi-disciplinary, and trans-disciplinary initiatives are catching on in some universities, many other universities still lumber under the old disciplinary divisions along the hierarchical lines of schools, colleges, departments, and programs. Such a structure is simply easier to fund and manage.
But I also suspect that the prospect of robustly incorporating ethics into a technical writing curriculum faces difficulty for another, more subtle, reason related to disciplinary distinction. The prospect of robustly integrating ethics in technical writing, in spite of the significant body of literature supporting it, still faces difficulty because our writing institutions still tend to view such integration as a robust process instead of something that emerges naturally from rhetorical activity. By this I mean a rephrasing of a problem I articulated in the introduction to this dissertation: traditionally, rhetoric and ethics are fundamentally distinct discursive projects and activities; thus those who are experts in one are slow to claim expertise in the other.

Indeed, the question of how to incorporate ethics into technical writing already precludes the possibility that technical writers already engage in ethical practices by virtue of practicing technical writing. Yet, I argue, this is precisely what technical writers do even when they don’t realize it. So, for the rest of this chapter, I will focus on a number of actual examples of technical communication and visual rhetoric to guide my analysis of how a study of technical writing naturally leads to a study of ethics.

In pursuing such a project, I should be clear about what is at stake and what is not. What is not at stake in this project is the question of how to convince technical writers that they ought to behave in specifically ethical ways when faced with
specific ethical dilemmas. Some of the textbooks I reference above already do this. Johnson-Sheehan’s book is especially noteworthy in how it ends every chapter with different case studies involving different ethical dilemmas.

What also is not at stake in this project is any sort of effort in extolling the virtues of a more complete training in ethical philosophies. It is an unavoidable institutional reality that we face that most teachers of writing simply do not encounter significant coursework in ethical philosophies as such when receiving their degrees. It is outside the scope of this dissertation chapter to empirically analyze the effectiveness of various degree programs in terms of ethics instruction. At most, I can make what appears to me the commonsense argument that inasmuch as institutions of higher education have and value a general education program (first-year writing, intro to history, college algebra, intro to chemistry, and so forth), those institutions could benefit from incorporating a general education ethics course.

Finally, what is not at stake is any sort of dire observation about technical writing in the abstract. I covered enough dire implications in the previous chapters of this dissertation, and I doubt I could get more dire or horrific than Stephen Katz’s analysis in “The Ethic of Expediency” of Nazi technical documents written for the purpose of making more gas chamber vans more efficient.
However, what is at stake in this dissertation chapter is the question of how various technical writing and visual rhetoric practices lend themselves to ethical implications that are part and parcel to the very modes of composition used. In each example below, I explore how attendant principles of *telos* and *sympheron* specifically suggest already existent correctives to Katz's ethic of expediency.

I begin with an analysis of the same Nazi memo written by Willy Just that Katz referenced in “The Ethic of Expediency.” In short, Just’s memo conveys very weak awareness and development of *telos* and *sympheron*. After Just’s memo, I will analyze three actual owner/instruction manuals in terms of the *telos* and *sympheron* evident in each. Merely being conscious of principles of *telos* and *sympheron* significantly changes the way that technical writers relate to their audiences as human beings in actual settings. This is a major step toward correcting the human-ignoring aspects of Katz’ ethic of expediency. Next, I will explore concerns of *telos* and *sympheron* in some graphics analyses by statistician Edward Tufte that he published on his blog. Tufte is most interested in how statistics get visually displayed, so his examples also serve as a bridge between the more non-visual technical writing examples and more expressly visual rhetoric examples used in technical writing. Finally, I’ll finish this chapter with an analysis of the *telos* and *sympheron* elements in various graphics relating to issue of gun violence in America (these graphics were collected in the months after the Sandy Hook tragedy).
Before proceeding, it may be helpful to review some principles of *telos* and *sympheron* specifically in terms of how awareness of each might apply to technical communication more generally.

As I explored more fully in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, *telos is purpose-completion*, or those qualities of rhetorical situations that indicate how we know certain rhetorical situations have been completed and others have begun. In terms of technical writing, to identify qualities of *telos* is not just to ask, “Why am I writing this memo?” but to also ask, “What sort of rhetorical situation will be completed by the writing of this memo?” *Telos* in this sense has definite *invention* aspects. When a technical writer finds herself at loss with how to proceed with a white paper, she might consider her intended audience and ask, “What are we accomplishing here?” This basic element of *telos* is especially evident in deliberative *symbouleutikon*, for as Aristotle posits, deliberation is that mode of rhetoric that concerns itself with future action (see Kennedy 48).

A concern for imminent or future decisions is a crucial component of technical communication. Richard Johnson-Sheehan encourages technical writers to “look to the future” in the conclusions of memos (106), analytical reports (285), other technical reports (447), and in oral presentations (593). But merely looking to the future does not, in itself, demonstrate awareness of *telos*, for technical writers could very well look to the future in ways that do not account for the fully *causal* nature of
their writing (as when a white paper may look to the future in terms of sales but may ignore environmental impact). However, Johnson-Sheehan’s general definition of technical communication captures the general telos of technical communication as “a process of managing technical information in ways that allow people to take action” (10). As a statement of principle, Johnson-Sheehan’s definition includes in it an awareness that technical writing contributes causally to action-taking and decision-making. Being aware of and following all the available causal connections in such a relationship is to be aware of telos.

In this sense, being aware of telos invites technical writers to seriously consider the future as a rhetorical influence on their writing—just as awareness of kairos invites writers to be aware of current rhetorical conditions. For instance, questions of kairos might include the following:

- What is happening now that affects the appropriateness of how I phrase this memo?
- What other elements in the current larger process of things affect what I include in this memo?
- What other situational or contextual elements relate to the subject of this memo?

In other words, questions of kairos encourage writers to view their writing as part of the resulting conditions of broader rhetorical situations. By this I mean, to view writing in terms of kairos is to view it as an appropriate result of a larger situation. Viewing instances of writing in terms of current situation is very useful to writers, and we should continue to encourage writers to consider issues of kairos. In contrast, however, questions of telos might include the following:
• What may happen as a result of this memo? (i.e. What happens after this leaves my influence?)
• Inasmuch as this memo is part of a larger process, where and how will this process end? (i.e. How is this all going to end?)
• What future implications might emerge if this memo becomes policy? (i.e. Where is this heading?)

In other words, questions of telos encourage writers to view their writing as part of the causal conditions of broader rhetorical situations. By this I mean, to view writing in terms of telos is to view it as a potential cause of future situations. I will explore more specific implications of telos in this sense in the examples below.

Related to telos are similarly forward-thinking concerns of sympheron. As I explored more fully in Chapter 4, sympheron is bearing-together, or those qualities of rhetorical situations that serve to share rhetorical burdens among participants. Thus a question of sympheron might be something like, “In what ways are my objectives shared by other people involved?” In this sense, sympheron is closely related to Paul Anderson’s admonition that technical communicators must identify their stakeholders. “When you are defining your communication’s objectives,” Anderson asserts,

> you are (in part) identifying the people you will keep in mind throughout the rest of your writing effort. . . . [Y]ou begin by identifying your readers [and] you must also identify . . . the individuals who will gain or lose because of your message. Collectively, these people are called stakeholders because they have a stake in what you are writing. (90)

Anderson goes on to use ethical arguments as to why technical communicators should consider all these stakeholders. But awareness of sympheron invites
technical writers to think ahead *rhetorically* in terms of all those who will bear some burden related to their writing or to the subject matter of their writing. As I will explore below, such rhetorical burdens range from barely consequential to quite sobering.

**Telos/Sympheron and Just’s Memo**

In my first example, I look back at the Nazi memo central to Steven Katz’s observations in “The Ethic of Expediency.” The memo was written by a mid-level Nazi bureaucrat named Willy Just who was “a dispatcher and welder for the SS motor pool” (Kalfus 32). Katz got the partial text of Just’s memo from the published transcript of *Shoah*, a nine-hour documentary about the Holocaust (Katz 256). Just’s memo is also printed in the massive two-volume collection *Nazism: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts*. The memo was originally written to Walter Rauff, who infamously “designed gas vans used to murder Jews and persons with disabilities” (“More” 2). I include here just the text of the memo that Katz first encountered from the documentary (qtd. in Katz 255-56):

*Geheime Reichssache (Secret Reich Business)*
*Berlin, June 5, 1942*

Changes for special vehicles now in service at Kulmhof (Chelmno) and for those now being built

Since December 1941, ninety-seven thousand have been processed by the three vehicles in service, with no major incidents. In the light of observations made so far, however, the following technical changes are needed:
First: The vans’ normal load is usually nine per square yard. In Saurer vehicles, which are very spacious, maximum use of space is impossible, not because of any possible overload, but because loading to full capacity would affect the vehicle’s stability. So reduction of the load space seems necessary. It must absolutely be reduced by a yard, instead of trying to solve the problem, as hitherto, by reducing the number of pieces loaded. Besides, this extends the operating time, as the empty void must also be filled with carbon monoxide. On the other hand, if the load space is reduced, and the vehicle is packed solid, the operating time can be considerably shortened. The manufacturers told us during a discussion that reducing the size of the van’s rear would throw it badly off balance. The front axle, they claim, would be overloaded. In fact, the balance is automatically restored, because the merchandise aboard displays during the operation a natural tendency to rush to the rear doors, and is mainly found lying there at the end of the operation. So the front axle is not overloaded.

Secondly: The lighting must be better protected than now. The lamps must be enclosed in a steel grid to prevent their being damaged. Lights could be eliminated, since they apparently are never used. However, it has been observed that when the doors are shut, the load always presses hard against them as soon as darkness sets in. This is because the load naturally rushes toward the light when darkness sets in, which makes closing the doors difficult. Also, because of the alarming nature of darkness, screaming always occurs when the doors are closed. It would therefore be useful to light the lamp before and during the first moments of the operation.

Third: For easy cleaning of the vehicle, there must be a sealed drain in the middle of the floor. The drainage hole’s cover, eight to twelve inches in diameter, would be equipped with a slanting trap, so that fluid liquids can drain off during the operation. During cleaning, the drain can be used to evacuate large pieces of dirt.

The aforementioned technical changes are to be made to vehicles in service only when they come in for repairs. As for the ten vehicles ordered from Saurer, they must be equipped with all innovations and changes shown by use and experience to be necessary.

Submitted for decision to Gruppenleiter II D, SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Walter Rauff.
Signed: Just
In Katz’s treatment of this horrifying memo, he relates a brief history of the mobile Saurer gas vans (which were precursors to the more permanent brick-and-mortar gas chambers at death camps across the Third Reich) and gives a “brief rhetorical analysis of this memo from the standpoint of technical communication, argumentation, and style” (Katz 256-57). Katz gives a fairly boilerplate and almost completely accurate rhetorical analysis of the memo’s purpose statement, document design, technical accuracy, logical argument, and use of *topoi* such as cause/effect.

However, I would dispute Katz’s first claim about the rhetorical nature of Just’s memo when he says, “By any formal criteria in technical communication, it is an almost perfect document” (256). As I will explore more below, Just’s memo conveys a grossly underdeveloped sense of *telos* and *sympheron*. But some critics might argue that *telos* and *sympheron* are not “formal criteria in technical communication.” They are, however, formal criteria in deliberative rhetoric, and Katz clearly connects deliberative rhetoric with technical communication using this memo as a working example of both: “Here, as in most technical writing and, I will argue, in most deliberative rhetoric, the focus is on expediency, on technical criteria as a means to an end” (Katz 257). Further, Katz suggests, “given the subject matter, we might wish to claim that this memo is *too* technical, *too* logical. The writer shows no concern that the purpose of his memo is the modification of vehicles not only to improve efficiency, but also to exterminate people” (257). In this way, Katz makes a somewhat accurate observation of *telos* while using misdirected notions of
sympheron through his terminology of expediency that he inherited from the post-
Cicero rhetorical tradition.

Katz is somewhat right in that Just shows no sympathetic concern that his memo, if
followed, will make more efficient the mass-murder of many more thousands
innocent human beings. Upon closer reading, though, Just shows great bureaucratic
concern to make sure that he uses euphemisms to dehumanize his victims and to
rhetorically decriminalize his efforts to manufacture human death on a greater
scale. By referring to his human victims as mere numbers, as “the load,” as
“merchandise,” as “fluid liquids,” as “large pieces of dirt”—by using euphemisms in
such carefully crafted yet horrific ways, Just shows awareness of the situational telos
that Nazi administrators pursued during the Holocaust. The use of euphemism by
Holocaust architects in official documents and speeches gained institutional traction
following the infamous Wannsee Conference at which plans were formalized for the
euphemistically titled “Final Solution”—the deportation and extermination of all
Jews in countries controlled at the time by Germany. The conference chair (and
main Holocaust architect) Reinhard Heydrich instructed Adolf Eichmann to record
the conference minutes in euphemistic language (Longerich 306). Though made
official by meetings like the Wannsee Conference, using dehumanizing euphemisms
to refer to Jews had a robust history in anti-Semitic Nazi literature, as when Hitler in
Mein Kampf”“describes the Jews as bacteria and vermin worthy of annihilation”
(Kalfus 31). This Nazi penchant for euphemism continued through most of the Third
Reich’s technical communication documents that detailed the mass-murder of Jews and other Holocaust victims (see Bergen 168).

However, even though Just’s memo reveals an awareness of a situational telos that utilized euphemism to advance a bureaucracy of death, the telos of Just’s memo fails to complete itself beyond the bureaucracy that instigated it. In other words, Just’s memo fails to accurately and clearly detail his actions in terms of mass-murder, which is precisely what it was. In terms of sympheron, we might also say Just’s memo fails to recognize his victims as stakeholders in his technical practice. Indeed, by using technical euphemism to refuse to recognize his victims as stakeholders, Just thereby denies his victims their basic humanity. But this is a conscientious failure, for Just’s use of euphemism belies his complicit (however complacent) personal participation in the deaths of thousands of innocents. Indeed, Just’s memo could only ever exist as a technical document if, and only if, it denies its full telos—i.e. genocide. In Katz’s observation, expediency thus emerges as the institutional motive of Nazi genocide. Conversely, Aristotle’s notion of sympheron is as far removed from Just’s rhetoric as Just’s memo is removed from common human decency. Just's underdeveloped sympheron expressly manifests in his refusal to address his human victims as stakeholders in his technical communication—as fellow humans with whom he bears the burden of his murderous technical practices.
I believe Just’s horrifically underdeveloped senses of *telos* and *sympheron* are the heart of Katz’s critique that Just “shows no concern that the purpose of his memo is the modification of vehicles . . . to exterminate people” (257). And while Katz laments that Just’s memo is a result of a mode of writing that has become too rhetorical in Aristotle’s sense, reappropriated notions of *telos* and *sympheron* indicate that Just’s memo may not have been rhetorical *enough* in Aristotle’s sense.

Admittedly, Just’s memo is an extreme example—perhaps too easy of an example to explore issues of *telos* and *sympheron* due to its tragic lack of either. That is to say, Just’s “banality of evil” (to borrow Hannah Arendt’s phrase) is a result of his underdeveloped senses of *telos* and *sympheron*. But technical documents beyond the banality of evil—documents that appear merely banal—also illustrate varying awareness of *telos* and *sympheron*.

**Telos/Sympheron and Instruction Manuals**

In my next examples, I look at two instruction manuals for the Roku digital media receiver and player. These innocuous technical manuals for an entertainment device are worlds away from Just’s horrifying memo. The Roku device is a small electronic box about the size of a small square sandwich that connects to in-home internet service and to a digital television screen. Over the internet, the Roku device accesses online third-party “channels” of typically video content. By far the most widely used online service for a Roku device is the Netflix streaming video service. The Roku
device has gone through several upgrades in the years it’s been on the market, but many of the basic procedures for connecting the device to the internet and to a television have remained largely the same. Despite having the same basic installation procedures, later Roku models have very different installation manuals than earlier models.

Consider, for example, the difference between the manual for an early model, the Roku HD 2000C, and the manual for a second generation model, the Roku2 XS 3100X. Images of the manual cover for the 2000C and a portion of “3 | Connect to your network” from that manual are reproduced in Appendix A and B. Images from the manual cover for the 3100X and a portion of “What to Do Step 3” from that manual are reproduced in Appendix C and D.

A few distinct characteristics of each manual are readily apparent. The 2000C manual fits a number of traditional expectations that have plagued consumer technical manuals for years—pedantic, a sense of “bare-bones” functionality, overtly technical in terminology, and visually technical as evidenced in the directly overhead photo of the device that almost invites measurement and other quantifying actions. The cover screams utility with its injunction, “Get Started / 1. Plug in / 2. Connect / 3. Watch.” The instructions for connecting to the network begin in an equally staid manner: “To use your player, you must connect it to your home network. Typically customers connect to a wireless (or wired) router rather
than directly to a broadband modem.” Even the “IMPORTANT” warning on the page manages to come off rather dull: “Don’t place anything on top of your Roku player. Placing objects on top of your player may interfere with the wireless signal, or cause the player to overheat.”

In short, the 2000C manual lacks a developed sense of telos. There is hardly any recognition whatsoever in the document that as soon as the Roku 2000C is connected, the user will immediately have fun with it. The 2000C manual was written with traditional and typical notions of expediency in mind. In fact, we can just dust off some of Stephen Katz’s description of the rhetoric of the Nazi memo in “Ethic of Expediency” and apply his description directly to this Roku 2000C manual: “Here, as in most technical writing and . . . in most deliberative rhetoric, the focus is on expediency, on technical criteria as a means to an end” (257). The technical aspects of the device are the sole telos of the 2000C manual, and the manual makes no genuine connection between the technicality of the device—which users tend to find droll—and the fun that users with have with the device—which is the telos that motivated the users to buy it!

Related to this observation, the 2000C manual also lacks elements of sympheron. The burden foisted on most consumer users of electronics is one of technical ineptitude. Most users do not know how to activate and use their devices right away, so they need manuals to help them. However, most instruction manuals typically
tend to exacerbate the burden of technical ineptitude by making the activation process so technical as to remove a user's sense of humanity from the activation process. Users are dehumanized in the instruction phase of a device and regain their humanity only after the device is functioning. This is the real burden foisted on users by most technical manuals. And traditional technical manuals lack a sense of sympheron that would ease this burden for—or bear together the burden with—users.

The 3100X manual on the other hand is a marvel of consumer telos and sympheron. Right away, the brightly colored cover shows a Roku device at an angle more akin to how users will see it on their TV stands. Also entirely absent from the 3100X manual's cover are the goose-stepping orders from the 2000C manual cover: “Plug in . . . Connect . . . Watch.” Instead, 3100X users are greeted with an inviting, friendly, almost peppy, “Hi! Let’s get started.” Inside the manual in the directions to “Configure Your Network,” the 3100X manual sustains the friendliness and adds a bit of sassy fun: “Step 3 establishes your network connection and brings out your inner geek. You can do it! Just choose wireless or wired and read on for instructions.” Further in the same step, there are a list of “Dos and Don’t on Where to Place You Roku Player.” Among the list is a warning similar to the one in the 2000C manual but, oh so different: “DON'T place your player beneath anything; it may cause the player to overheat. Eeeeks.”
From front to back, the 3100X manual displays a strong sense of telos. It shows a significant understanding as to what happens after the instruction manual is read, as to where this rhetorical situation is heading, and as to how this rhetorical situation will end. The manual establishes a reading and instructional atmosphere that fully anticipates the fun that users are going have with the device. The manual’s writer is so cognizant of telos-concerns that she or he uses the genre of a technical manual to participate in the users’ actual telos—to be part of the fun that the users will eventually experience with the device.

In this same vein, the 3100X manual also displays a strong sense of sympheron. Consider, for example, the portion of the instructions in which the manual asserts that the most technical elements of the activation process “brings out your inner geek. You can do it!” In eight words, the manual accomplishes a mind-boggling amount: It cashes in on American geek-chic zeitgeist. It acknowledges and normalizes the fact that most users are intimidated by technical instructions. It encourages users to endure through what would otherwise be an experience users would rather not endure. In short, the manual bears together with the users the burden that technical instructions tend to foist on users.

Roku is not alone in beginning to write technical manuals this way for consumer products. Giro, a sporting accessories company that specializes in helmets, portrays a similar attitude in the owner’s manual for one of their helmets intended for snow
skiers and snowboarders (see Appendix E). For instance, in the section of the manual that relates how to adjust the helmet’s chin straps, the manual includes *telos*-infused admonitions like this: “If the front [of the helmet] is too low, you won’t be able to see hazards like cliff edges and young freestyle prodigies.” This sentence is humorous because it breaks the expected pattern of an instruction manual; thus, it participates in the very fun it anticipates its users will experience when they go alpine skiing. And at the same time, it acknowledges the sorts of real-world hazards users may experience on the slopes (like cliffs and hotdogging show-offs). This manual also displays a strong sense of *sympheron* in specific technical moments as when it reminds users, “If your straps aren’t adjusted right, your helmet won’t stay on properly, so pay attention.” With the admonition to “pay attention,” the manual contains a tacit recognition that normalizes the typical feeling that instructions are boring but necessary. Such fun and playfulness actually has a much more serious edge with the Giro helmet than with the Roku players. The Giro manual’s fun, sympathetic, and encouraging sense of *sympheron* serves to keep readers more engaged in reading the manual, which may result in more of its helmets being worn correctly, which may end up saving more lives. Thus, suddenly and somewhat abruptly, we arrive at ethics (or ethics confronts us) through entirely rhetorical practices.
Telos/Sympheron and Visual Rhetoric

Not all technical documents are about fun consumer products. Indeed most technical documents are not. Principles of telos and sympheron may actually be more evident and identifiable in more serious examples.

Noted statistician Edward Tufte keeps a regular blog on which he posts observations relating to statistical analysis or other-things-statistics. In a sobering post, Tufte addresses different strategies for displaying statistics relating to the survival rates of different types of cancer. In the blog post, Tufte reprints a simple table (Appendix F) that lists types of cancer in the left column and then lists the percentage survival rate for five years, ten years, fifteen years, and twenty years. The table originally appeared in a peer-reviewed journal article in The Lancet medical journal. Tufte redrafts the information into an even sparser-looking table that orders the data in descending rank of survival likelihood (Appendix G). At first blush, we might say the information in Tufte's table is displayed in a pedantic manner typical to traditional technical writing. But Tufte makes the compelling observation that, "For most presentations, this table with its structure and reporting of standard errors will be the best way to see the cancer data" (Tufte). He then posts a different table of his own design with the same data (Appendix H). This table orders the types of cancer in the same descending order but visually portrays the shrinking likelihood of survival for each type of cancer with a sloping line connecting each of the 5-10-15-20 year marks. As Tufte explains it, this new table
design, “gives an idea of survival time gradients for each cancer. In the table-graphic and in the original table, every visual element contributes directly to understanding” (Tufte, italics in original).

Tufte then shifts his analysis directly into a critique of the graphic designs available in Microsoft’s PowerPoint presentation software. “Applying the widely-used default designs for statistical graphics in PowerPoint to this nice straightforward table yields these analytical disasters [in Appendix I]” (Tufte). The analytic disasters in Appendix I are simply incomprehensible. The designers of the PowerPoint program, perhaps in some effort to “liven up” such graphics in presentations, created a default for statistical display that is confusingly complex. When entered the data into PowerPoint, Tufte derides

The data explode into 6 separate chaotic slides, consuming several times the area of the table. Everything is wrong with these smarmy, nearly unreadable graphs: incoherent, uncomparative, low data-density, encoded legends, color without content, logotype branding, chartjunk, indifference to content and evidence. (Tufte)

Beyond being just a confusing mess of data. Tufte then makes a profound observation of telos: “these graphics would turn into a particularly nasty prank if ever used for a serious purpose, such as cancer patients seeking to assess their survival chances” (Tufte). Tufte’s critiques of PowerPoint’s automated graphics generator are about a lot more than just user readability or usability. Technical writers who foster traditional notions of expediency might merely ask, “Can readers read my graphics?” But technical writers who foster more developed notions of telos
and *sympheron* (even if they don’t those exact terms) might instead ask, “What will reader do with these graphics?” And, “How do these graphics share or exacerbate the burdens of others involved?”

Further, we can see elements of *telos* and *sympheron* competing with each other when we look at graphics used to portray data for particular political ends. Shortly after the tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut, politically charged graphics appeared in various online venues supporting different sides of the American gun violence debate. One such graphic is a chart designed by Max Fisher for the *Washington Post* (Appendix J). On the blog he writes for the *Washington Post*, the chart in Appendix J appears under the headline, “Chart: The U.S. has far more gun-related killings than any other developed country.” The chart takes a little unpacking to fully reveal its sense of *telos*. This is because it displays an underdeveloped sense of *sympheron*. By this I mean that the chart places more burden of interpretation on readers instead of clarifying its data completely from the start. Initially, the chart looks like the USA is by far and away the most gun-violent developed country just like the article title says. But the fine print on the bottom of the chart indicates that the charts lists all the countries who are part of the “Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, excluding Mexico.” Why would Fisher exclude Mexico from the chart? Well, a table from gunpolicy.org relating Mexico’s gun deaths per 100,000, indicates that Mexico’s gun-violence rate is about three times greater than America’s (Appendix K). Max Fisher eventually
acknowledges this disparity in the text of his blog article, but the headline combined with the chart uncover what turns out to be a pro-gun-control telos laced perhaps with a stronger sense of expediency than sympheron.

But a similarly designed anti-gun-control graphic fares much worse (Appendix L). The chart in Appendix L has its earliest online appearance on another news blog, this one written by Kyle Baker for the right-wing Conservative Daily News under the article title “Gun Control Statistics that Reasonable People Should Know.” The most obvious problem with this chart is that the statistics on it are patently false. It employs visual tactics similar to Max Fisher’s chart from the Washington Post, including small-print references on the bottom, which purportedly indicate that the information from the chart was gathered from “Centers for Disease Control, FBI, U.S. Federal Government.” This chart completely favors expediency over sympheron because the burden of fact-checking is foisted entirely on readers. The most recent “Deaths and Mortality” statistics released by the CDC are from 2010 and are available on its website (http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/deaths.htm). The data is difficult to wade through, but it becomes readily evident that the CDC does not keep track of deaths caused by tobacco use and medical errors (which are at best ancillary causes). More careful reading of the CDC’s stats reveals that all the numbers on the chart relating to health-related deaths are simply false. Further, the FBI keeps an online publicly accessible database of homicide stats in America from 1980-2010 (located here: http://ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezashr/asp/off_selection.asp)
that clearly shows that the chart’s claims about firearms and baseball bats are fabrications as well. Appendix M is a straightforward chart of homicides by weapon type in America from 2000-2010. There is no category for baseball bats, but the FBI did tally murders by “Blunt” instruments. Even if all blunt instrument homicides were committed with baseball bats, they would still only total about 7% of the total number of firearm homicides in 2010. Or in other words, in 2010, there were 1,365% more homicides committed in America with firearms than with blunt objects in 2010. As the FBI counts it, more people are murdered with firearms in America than all other deadly instruments combined. This chart is a perfect example of what Sharon Crowley calls “factly-sounding sentences,” which tend to get used more in right-wing American discourse than in left-wing discourse (Crowley, “Pure” 319). Charts like Appendix L betray the deep commitment their authors have to expediency over principles of sympheron. Such rhetoric is a kind of false rhetoric, for it abandons rhetorical practices in favor of solely refashioning facts in its own image.

In the end, telos and sympheron are not really elements that get added to technical documents or any rhetorical text for that matter. Instead, all rhetorical texts display varying senses of telos and sympheron—some quite strong—others so weak as to almost convey an utter lack of telos and sympheron. But the qualities are always there.
A Closing Thought on Blaberon

This chapter has been nothing but practical, focusing as it has on actual technical writing examples. But these examples indicate profound theoretical implications as well. If anything, the examples of weak sympherion in this chapter reveal what may be current examples of what Aristotle called blaberon. As Jacques Ranciere explains, in ancient Greek, blaberon has two accepted meanings:

in one sense it is the lot of unpleasantness that falls to an individual for whatever reason, whether it be through a natural catastrophe or human action, and in the other, it is the negative consequence that an individual suffers as a result of their action or, more often, the action of another. (3)

For Aristotle, blaberon was the negative possible motive of deliberative rhetoric while sympherion was the positive motive. In the George Kennedy translation of Aristotole’s rhetoric, blaberon is translated simply as harmful (49). And Aristotle admits that deliberative orators are always keen to portray their own motives in terms of symperhon and not blaberon. In Kennedy’s translation, right after Aristotle describes both sympherion (which Kennedy translates as advantageous) and blaberon (i.e. harmful), Aristotle admits that deliberative orators often “would never admit that they are advising things that are not advantageous” even if what they were advising were actually harmful (i.e. blaberon).

Aristotle’s observation that deliberative orators often misbehave is not the same thing as condoning such behavior. Instead, I would suggest, Aristotle merely recognizes that deliberative rhetoric always functions under the promissory of
sympheron even in instances that advance blaberon motives. Because deliberative rhetoric is under the promissory of sympheron, Aristotle asserts “that we must not persuade what is bad” and the expediency that we ought to seek is “the enlightened, long-term advantage to the audience, not immediate expediency” (Kennedy 49). As I’ve explored in previous chapters and in this chapter above, I would replace “audience” with “everyone involved” and thus more fully round out the term sympheron as a motive for deliberative rhetoric (symbouleutikon). Anything less than the benefit of all stakeholders involved will necessarily involve some amount of blaberon towards someone involved in or affected by a deliberative decision.

In light of the weak sympheron examples in this chapter, this notion of blaberon is more than merely the opposite of advantageous. Instead, these reappropriated notions of sympheron and blaberon suggest that the post-Cicero order of deliberative motives may be simply reversed. For nothing seems as antithetical to sympheron than situational and immediate expediency. And, as Katz rightly observes, situational and immediate expediency emerges as the source of much harm—blaberon—caused through the actions of others.
CHAPTER 6. THE END OF A DISSERTATION: SYMBOULEUTIKON AND INDOCTRINATION (OR, HOW ONE ENDS A STUDY OF ENDS)

“One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil.”
—Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols

Writing a dissertation largely about ends makes ending the document a bit tricky. A conclusion is a sort of telos for a dissertation, but it also ought to reveal awareness of the future that these ideas will inhabit beyond and after the dissertation—i.e. where is all this going? Also, in one sense, a dissertation is the telos of a PhD program—it’s what completes the degree. But in a different sense, every mature graduate-level writer understands that a dissertation does not complete something as much as it is a means to some other completion or sets of completions. That is to say, a dissertation is its own sort of beginning of a career in knowledge rather than a significant end of a career of learning.

In another more universal sense, we might say that one completion merely serves as a means toward another completion and so on down the line until the utter completion of all things, which, I hope, is not for a long, long time. For when there is nothing more to complete, all purpose will have fled the universe with nothing to remember and nothing to do the remembering.
Both Friedrich Nietzsche and Kenneth Burke situate their personal philosophies in such a universe. As I've noted elsewhere (Sproat 335-36), Nietzsche despairs while Burke seems to almost rejoice: “How pitiful, how shadowy and fleeting, how purposeless [i.e. lacking telos] and arbitrary the human intellect appears within nature,” Nietzsche writes, “There were eternities when it did not exist; and someday when it is no longer there, not much will have changed. For that intellect has no further mission leading beyond human life. It is utterly human, and only its owner and producer takes it with such pathos as if the world hinged upon it” (“On Truth” 246). Kenneth Burke, however, follows this same line of thinking with a slightly more positive turn:

Presumably the realm of non-symbolic motion was all that prevailed on this earth before our kind of symbol-using organism evolved, and will go sloshing about after we have gone. In the meantime, note that, for better or worse, by evolving our kind of organism, the wordless Universe of non-symbolic motion is able to comment on itself. (“Questions” 334)

That may seem like a shallow joy, but being as tiny as we are against the infinite vastness of the lifeless universe, we could at least recognize what a singular thing it is to be, effectively, talking stardust. Thus the economy of language, on a universal scale, reveals language-using creatures to be very precious things indeed, for the stars are many, but the talking specs of stardust are few in comparison. To survive their brief moment in the bleak intergalactic night, humans bring their wills together—in symbouleutikon—and thus reveal worlds without end. Toward that end, I find myself latching onto symbouleutikon as a guiding metaphor for how to proceed beyond and after this dissertation.
I wrote this dissertation primarily as a student and teacher of writing. As such, I will tend to use the ideas in this dissertation towards those ends. Specifically, as I consider the idea of symbouleutikon as part of a telos that will complete itself after this dissertation, likewise I consider my students’ writing as part of a telos that will complete itself after they attend the classes in which I teach them. That is to say, the writing my students do after my class will tend to matter more than any writing they do in my class. So I face this question: do I assign writing projects that bring my students’ wills in congress with other wills beyond our classroom? In other words, do I assign projects that engage my students in the world beyond the university? If I believe anything I’ve written here, then the answer to that question is, “I better.”

The obligation to symbouleutikon—to engage my students with the world beyond our classroom is unapologetically ideological. Indeed, symbouleutikon is part and parcel to the driving telos of my teaching philosophy: My most pressing concern as an instructor is that students learn to think critically and to communicate clearly those critical thoughts. I realize that “critical thinking” is at once both a timeless and embattled pedagogical concept, but for many reasons, it best characterizes my teaching philosophy. I consider critical thinking in its most basic form to be the conscientious perception of any one thing in terms of any other distinctly different thing—what Kenneth Burke calls perspective by incongruity. In short, students write critically when they consider old ideas in new ways (and vice versa), when they suspend final judgment while seeking out reasoned discourse, and when they
embrace non-violent divergence as an essentially democratic ideal. This definition of critical thinking has developed from my scholarly work in which I address the unavoidable interconnectedness of humans and societies as well as the benefits and problems of democratic social conditions. Thus in my teaching, it is vital to me that students learn to view themselves as parts of larger communities, not just in terms of communication but also contribution. Accordingly, I am a strong advocate of service learning and civic engagement in composition courses.

I have been teaching writing courses for nine years. And I’ve been including various sorts of civic engagement aspects in my writing courses for about seven of those years. Over the course of those seven years, I have used different service-based approaches to civic engagement that I can classify in two broad categories: writing *about* service and writing *as* service. This distinction both simplifies and nuances Thomas Deans’s now well known three-way division: writing about the community, writing for the community, writing with the community (Deans 15-20). Deans’s work is invaluable in helping us realize that there are necessary distinctions and different ways of valuing assorted approaches to writing and civic engagement. Especially, his work has contributed to the increasing number and quality of discussions about developing sustainable community partnerships. This is so much the case, that I have observed (mostly anecdotally) a current trend in which the “writing for the community” and “writing with the community” approaches are being favored over Deans’s articulation of “writing about the community.” Indeed,
because of our increased awareness of our ethical obligations to foster long-term community partnerships, de-emphasizing “writing about the community” approaches to civic engagement projects carries some moral implications with it as well.

The moral implications are these: in our efforts to foster long-term community partnerships, we may be tempted to forget the transient nature of most writing instructors (grad students, adjuncts, lecturers, etc.). The economic reality is that most graduate programs in American English departments exist to supply the cheap-yet-highly-educated labor necessary to teach so many sections of low-class-size composition courses. As much as we’d like to think otherwise, the materialist reality is that most English grad students exist to support first-year writing and not the other way around. Thus civic engagement-minded writing program administrators face this dilemma: how do we establish ethically sound long-term relationships between instructors and community partners with an instructor pool that is largely temporary and transitory?

This economic reality is what underpins my basic distinction between “writing about service” and “writing as service.” Only tenured long-term faculty members in rhetoric, composition, writing, and other fields have the economic leisure to weigh the ethical implications of how to establish long-term community partnerships—i.e. partnerships that would make more ethical use of Deans’s “writing for the
community” and “writing with the community.” Both of those approaches, I would simply collect under the head of “writing as service.”

But what of those transient composition instructors who want to be civically minded in their composition courses? Or in my terms, what of those part-time instructors who value *symbouleutikon*? I have been teaching writing and civic engagement as a part-time instructor, adjunct instructor, or as a grad student instructor for the last seven years at four different institutions. If the term “service-learning” were a spectrum as Andrew Furco suggests (Furco 10), I have found myself institutionally limited to implementing student writing more on the “learning” side of service learning and less on the “service” side. This was only the case because the transitory nature of my employment limited me in my ability to establish long-term community partners.

But even establishing long-term community partners is not, in itself, a guarantee of more ethically sound service-learning practices. For example, think of the dilemma community partners face after years of collaboration with faculty members who suddenly change institutions or get promoted into administrative positions away from service-learning teaching. Almost all community partner relationships will eventually end. For these and other reasons, I’m inclined to believe that the ethical burden facing service-learning instructors is not the length of their community partner relationships but the care with which they plan ahead for their exit
strategies. Long-term community partnerships foster a certain kind of _symbouleutikon_ among instructors, students, and community partners. But shorter-term partnerships can foster an equally valuable sort of _symbouleutikon_ among a wider array of instructors, students, and community partners.

With an eye toward this end, I’ve developed a dialogical approach to service learning writing that has deeply ethical implications but is yet sustainable for me, and I argue, for all such transient teachers of writing. It has three simple components:

1. Students engage in community service in just about any sort of task or activity—using volunteer networks already in place that rely on transient volunteer labor.
2. Students qualitatively interview people associated directly or tangentially with the concerns of their service sites.
3. Students use these interviews in their invention strategies for a wide array of writing projects that could be writing about, for, or with the community.

This last aspect illustrates how simplifying the distinction between “writing about service and “writing as service” actually provides more nuance to Deans’s three-way categorization. In my approach, students’ initial service is _not_ their writing. Thus their projects always begin from the frame of writing _about_ service. However, as students engage with the perspectives of people somehow associated with their service sites, they may find themselves drawn toward projects that directly help their service sites. Instructors with sufficient flexibility and energy could advise student projects that could fit in any of Deans’s categories. But all of these potential projects begin with the simple qualitative interviewing assignment that engages students with perspectives outside of their typical university life. In a word, the
interviewing assignment involves students in *symbouletikon*. A copy of the Perspective Interview Assignment that I designed for this approach is located in Appendices N and O. Included in the assignment sheet are options for both service-learning and non-service-learning variations of the project. Notice that my non-service-learning variation is closer to what Deans calls “writing about the community,” but even in the non-service-learning variation, students could still work toward a range of projects that could lead toward writing for or with the community.

In engaging students with real-world exigencies beyond the classroom, I conscientiously nudge them away from traditional genreless genres of classroom writing like the argument paper, the analysis paper, and the nigh-ubiquitous research paper. I’m not alone in shifting university writing projects away from genreless genres. A 2009 survey of first-year composition courses completed by 166 WPAs revealed that only about 6% of first-year writing courses taught the traditional research paper genre; this is a long way down from 83% in a 1961 survey and 78% in a 1982 survey (Hood). In her analysis of her survey, Carra Leah Hood opines that the “genreless form [of the traditional research paper assignment] could be considered its most significant virtue—as the traditional research paper assignment specifically, and simply, provides the occasion for students to demonstrate a set of transferable research skills, genre conventions not among them” (Hood).
Though her view may reflect a small portion of current WPA practices, Hood is still in good company of sorts. Jacques Derrida holds a similar (albeit more nuanced) view of genreless genres: “every text participates in one or several genres, there is no genreless text; there is always a genre and genres, yet such participation never amounts to belonging. And not because of an abundant overflowing or a free, anarchic, and unclassifiable productivity, but because of the trait of participation itself” (Derrida 65). In other words, no matter how genreless student projects are, those very projects will always participate in some genre or another even if it is only by way of a “set of transferable research skills” as Hood asserts. And the fact that such limited participation does not amount to belonging to a certain genre is not problematic for Derrida because even a text that expressly participates in just one genre does not belong to a genre, either. This is because genre classification, for Derrida, is an inescapably subjective activity and every text inescapably singular.

If Derrida is right—that there is no such thing as a genreless genre—the problem of genre in composition classes does not go away. For if Derrida is correct, then students still participate in genres even though they may lack awareness of the genres they participate in. That lack of student awareness—of being aware of human conversations outside the classroom—does little to bring a student’s will in congress with wills beyond the classroom. In other words, it does little to engage students ideologically with writing beyond classroom writing.
I mentioned earlier that my effort to engage students outside the classroom is unapologetically ideological. Apropos to education and ideology, Alexis de Tocqueville made a striking claim about "self interest properly understood" in democratic social conditions. After observing an oddly socially constructive mode of self-interest at play in 1830s American culture, de Tocqueville asserts,

I do not believe that the doctrine of self-interest as it is preached in America is obvious in all its aspects but it contains a great number of truths so clear that all you have to do to convince men is to educate them. Hence, give them education at any price, for the century of blind sacrifice and instinctive virtues is already distant from us and I see the time drawing near when freedom, public peace, and social order itself will not be able to do without education. (613)

Alexis de Tocqueville's formulation of self-interest is a close cousin to *symbouleutikon*. In a similar manner, my dialogical approach to civic engagement writing unapologetically engages ideology in education.

Asserting ideology in education has a long and uncomfortable tradition. More recently, the work of Louis Althusser has served as a critical backdrop for many contemporary critiques of ideology in classrooms. At times, these critiques take an anti-ideological edge—as if ideology itself is somehow out of sync with the goals and purposes of education. But Althusser did not critique ideology per se. He merely critiqued ideology that reifies harmful—namely bourgeois—state ideological apparatuses. This is especially evident when Althusser describes the relationship between the reproduction of labor and ruling ideologies:

the reproduction of labour power requires not only a reproduction of its skills, but also, at the same time, a reproduction of its submission
to the rules of the established order, i.e. a reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology for the workers, and a reproduction of the ability to manipulate the ruling ideology correctly for the agents of exploitation and repression, so that they, too, will provide for the domination of the ruling class ‘in words’…. The reproduction of labour power thus reveals as its sine qua non not only the reproduction of its ‘skills’ but also the reproduction of its subjection to the ruling ideology or of the ‘practice’ of that ideology, with the proviso that it is not enough to say ‘not only but also’, for it is clear that it is in the forms and under the forms of ideological subjection that provision is made for the reproduction of the skills of labour power. (132-33)

Althusser also argued that avoiding ideology is impossible because ideology is part of how humans consciously orient themselves with fellow humans and their surrounding environments.

For if it is true that the Ideological State Apparatuses represent the form in which the ideology of the ruling class must necessarily be realized, and the form in which the ideology of the ruled class must necessarily be measured and confronted, ideologies are not ‘born’ in the Ideological State Apparatuses but from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from their conditions of existence, their practices, their experience of the struggle, etc. (185-86).

From Althusser’s view, state ideological apparatuses cannot be abolished, but harmful bourgeois apparatuses can be replaced with more humane proletariat apparatuses.

Althusser’s observations about the unavoidable nature of ideology are similar to Kenneth Burke’s observations about indoctrination in education. In 1939, Burke responded to an article written by John Dewey protégé William Heard Kilpatrick. In this brief essay, Burke uses the topic of “indoctrination in education” to extend and clarify his earlier thoughts on democracy (found in Counter-Statement). Burke finds
Kilpatrick’s categorical resistance to indoctrination troublesome because of Kilpatrick’s emphasis on democracy. “I take democracy to be a device for institutionalizing the dialectic process,” claims Burke, “Allow full scope of the dialectical process, and you establish a scene in which the protagonist of a thesis has maximum opportunity to modify his thesis, and so mature it, in the light of the antagonist’s rejoinders” (Philosophy 444). Burke goes on to say, “I should want to insist that the all-important desirability of full opportunity for the enacting of the dialectic process should be absolutely affirmed and indoctrinated” (Philosophy 444, emphasis in original). Burke chides Kilpatrick for assuming that Kilpatrick could somehow be involved in education and not be involved in indoctrination: “is not Dr. Kilpatrick doing precisely this [i.e. indoctrination] in pleading so persuasively for ‘the free play of intelligence?’” (Philosophy 444). And later in the essay, Burke gets to the “heart” of the matter with a striking analogy: “to attempt eliminating the problem of bad doctrine by eliminating doctrine per se is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts” (Philosophy 447). In other words, to cry “No Indoctrination!” is to cry for ignorance of indoctrination. Indoctrination in education is unavoidable, so Burke sides with the kind of indoctrination that seeks to constantly engage and understand every form of indoctrination including itself. The political and social manifestation of this “doctrine” is democracy; the educational manifestation is symbouleutikon—or dialogical civic engagement.
The barriers to openly acknowledging ideology in education are legion. The world is full of Kilpatricks who would laugh at the idea of embracing an openly ideological agenda in regards to classrooms, students, pedagogy, course content, etc. Even faculty who tend to have civically minded sympathies tend to hesitate to be actually open about using their classrooms as ideological arenas—or at least to overtly state that what they are doing is ideologically based. In addition, if students think teachers are overtly ideological in their classrooms, students tend to refuse to engage and thus tend to settle in to the less-critical indoctrinations they're familiar with.

My introduction to Katz’s “Ethic of Expediency” is good anecdotal evidence for this. I have learned by sad experience that some faculty who teach professional writing and who are otherwise bright and critically insightful would rather shut out an overtly democratic doctrine in deference to the “No Indoctrination” indoctrination... even though a doctrine of dialogical civic engagement sets students on paths to engage and understand all doctrines including itself.

Dialogical civic engagement as symbolouleutikon, as a deliberative rhetorical doctrine that engages all other doctrines, has all the benefits of the “No Indoctrination!” indoctrination with additional benefits. Specifically, ideological commitment to symbolouleutikon benefits from a refreshing dose of honesty by removing unnecessary doublespeak in the ways we conceive of our roles in education vis-à-vis ideology.
As educators, we do not have any choice between “to indoctrinate” or “to not indoctrinate”—much like anyone who puts print or ink to paper does not have a choice of whether to design or not. Design is a forgone conclusion in any work with documents. And indoctrination is a forgone conclusion in education. We can, however, choose the form of indoctrination we advocate. By advocating symbouleutikon—or dialogical civic engagement—by overtly valuing the constant interchange of opposing voices, we conscientiously preserve the ability to keep any one doctrine from holding dictatorial power and thus silencing opposing voices. What former democratic thinkers naively believed we could avoid, i.e. indoctrination, emerges as the vehicle by which all the damaging effects of indoctrination can be avoided. Toward the future work of that end, I submit the end of this dissertation.


---. “The Vienna Logic: Kant’s Lectures on Logic Written by a Society of Auditors.”


McAdon, Brad. “Reconsidering the Intention of Purpose of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*."


Weiser, M. Elizabeth. “As Usual I fell on the Bias:” Kenneth Burke’s Situated Dialectic. Philosophy and rhetoric 42.2 (2009): 134–153


APPENDICES
Appendix A: Cover from instruction manual for Roku HD 2000C
(http://www.roku.com/Libraries/Roku_Player_Documents/HD-QSG.sflb.ashx)
Appendix B: Step 3 from instruction manual for Roku HD 2000C
(http://www.roku.com/Libraries/Roku_Player_Documents/HD-QSG.sflb.ashx)

3 Connect to your network

To use your player, you must connect it to your home network. Typically, customers
connect to a wireless (or wired) router rather than directly to a broadband modem.
Choose Wireless or Wired setup below, then follow the Guided Setup on-screen to
complete the connection process.

IMPORTANT: Don’t place anything on top of your Roku player. Placing objects on top of
your player may interfere with the wireless signal, or cause the player to overheat.

Wireless

Place your player within range of your wireless network. Avoid enclosing your player
in a cabinet. During Guided Setup, you may need to enter a password if your
network has security turned on.

TIP: During Guided Setup, look for the signal strength bars
above your network name. If you don’t receive a strong
signal, try rotating or moving your player — even a few
inches can help.
Appendix C: Cover from instruction manual for Roku2 XS 3100X
(http://wwwimg.roku.com/Roku2-XS-QSG_0.pdf)

Hi!
Let’s get started.
Appendix D: Step 3 from instruction manual for Roku2 XS 3100X
(http://wwwimg.roku.com/Roku2-XS-QSG_0.pdf)

WHAT TO DO STEP 3

CONFIGURE YOUR NETWORK

Step 3 establishes your network connection and brings out your inner geek. You can do it! Just choose either wireless or wired and read on for instructions:

WIRELESS: If you use a wireless network, you can grab that Roku remote and jump right into Guided Setup. When prompted, select “Wireless” as your network connection and have your network name and password ready to do the following:

• Select your network from the list of available networks.
• Enter your network password, if you use one. Remember, network passwords are case sensitive.

DOS AND DON'TS ON WHERE TO PLACE YOUR ROKU PLAYER:

• DO place your player within range of your wireless network.
• DON'T place your player in an enclosed cabinet; it may interfere with the wireless signal.
• DON'T place your player beneath anything; it may cause the player to overheat. Eeeeeks.
Appendix E: Selection from instruction manual for Giro helmet

**How to Adjust the Straps**

The front of your helmet should fall just above your eyebrows. If the front is too low, you won’t be able to see hazards like cliff edges and young freestyle prodigies. If the front is too high, you’ll look like a geek and your helmet will not provide as much protection as when positioned properly (Figure 1). Try strapping your goggles on.

If the helmet is on correctly you won’t be able to scratch your forehead.

You’ve no doubt noticed the straps hanging off your helmet. As plush as they are, they’re not there just to warm your cheeks. They are designed to keep your helmet on by buckling under your lower jaw. If your straps aren’t adjusted right, your helmet won’t stay on properly, so pay attention. To adjust them, fasten the buckle and tighten the chin strap by pulling on the loose end of the strap until your helmet fits snugly. How snugly? As snugly as you can without impairing your ability to chew and swallow an energy bar. Got it? Now make sure the loose end of the strap still loops back up through the rubber “0” ring.
Appendix F: Long-term survival rates of cancer patients

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cancer site</th>
<th>Relative survival rate, % (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oral cavity and pharynx</td>
<td>56.7 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oesophagus</td>
<td>14.2 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stomach</td>
<td>23.8 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colon</td>
<td>61.7 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rectum</td>
<td>62.6 (1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liver and intrahepatic bile duct</td>
<td>7.5 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pancreas</td>
<td>4.0 (0.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larynx</td>
<td>68.8 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lung and bronchus</td>
<td>15.0 (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melanomas</td>
<td>89.0 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breast</td>
<td>86.4 (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cervix uteri</td>
<td>70.5 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corpus uteri and uterus, NOS</td>
<td>84.3 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ovary</td>
<td>55.0 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prostate</td>
<td>98.8 (0.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Testis</td>
<td>94.7 (1.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urinary bladder</td>
<td>82.1 (1.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kidney and renal pelvis</td>
<td>61.8 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brain and other nervous system</td>
<td>32.0 (1.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thyroid</td>
<td>96.0 (0.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hodgkin’s disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Hodgkin lymphomas</td>
<td>57.8 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple myeloma</td>
<td>29.5 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leukaemias</td>
<td>42.5 (1.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Rates derived from SEER 1973-98 databases (both sexes, all ethnic groups). NOS—not otherwise specified.

Table 4: Most recent period estimates of relative survival rates, by cancer site.
### Appendix G: Estimates of Relative Survival Rates


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cancer Site</th>
<th>5 year</th>
<th>10 year</th>
<th>15 year</th>
<th>20 year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>95.2 0.9</td>
<td>87.1 1.7</td>
<td>81.1 3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Testis</td>
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<td>88.2 2.3</td>
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<td>82.8 1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breast</td>
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<td>78.3 0.6</td>
<td>71.3 0.7</td>
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<td>67.9 2.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>64.1 1.8</td>
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<td>Larynx</td>
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<td>54.4 1.6</td>
<td>49.8 2.0</td>
<td>47.3 2.6</td>
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<td>Colon</td>
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<td>55.4 1.0</td>
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<td>Non-Hodgkin's</td>
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<td>46.3 1.2</td>
<td>38.3 1.4</td>
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<td>44.2 1.4</td>
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<td>Ovary</td>
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<td>Leukemia</td>
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<td>Brain, nervous system</td>
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<td>3.0 1.5</td>
<td>2.7 0.6</td>
<td>2.7 0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix H: Estimates of Survival Rates with Visual Gradients
Appendix I: PowerPoint Chartjunk

Appendix J: Gun-Related Murder Rates in the Developed World
Max Fisher, December 14, 2012
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/12/14/chart-the-u-s-has-far-more-gun-related-killings-than-any-other-developed-country/

*The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, excluding Mexico*
**Appendix K: Rate of Gun Homicide in Mexico per 100,000 People**

http://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/mexico

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rate of Gun Homicide per 100,000 People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>6.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>7.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix L: Gun Control Stats, Compare Ten Big “Killers” in the U.S.
Kyle Becker, December 19, 2012
http://www.conservativedailynews.com/2012/12/gun-control-statistics-that-reasonable-people-should-know/

*According to the FBI, the #1 weapon used in violent crimes... is a baseball bat. WHY is there NO outcry to RESTRICT baseball bat ownership? (Maybe because so many law-abiding citizens enjoy them safely, for sport? Hmmmm...)

Deaths per year from selected causes. Source: Centers for Disease Control, FBI, U.S. Federal Government.
## Appendix M: U.S. Murders by Instrumentality, 2001-2010

FBI Supplementary Homicide Reports, 1980-2010


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Firearm</th>
<th>Knife</th>
<th>Blunt</th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>8,104</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>1,109</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>13,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>8,439</td>
<td>1,812</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>13,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>8,259</td>
<td>1,889</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>13,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>8,226</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>1,113</td>
<td>13,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>9,177</td>
<td>1,996</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>14,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>9,757</td>
<td>1,989</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>14,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>9,267</td>
<td>1,923</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>14,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8,636</td>
<td>2,055</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>13,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8,269</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>13,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8,190</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>12,787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix N: Perspective Interview Assignment, Page 1

**Perspective Interview Assignment, Part I (Service Learning)**

As you fill service hours at your service location, pay attention to which employees or workers seem to be making most of the organizational or administrative decisions. Also pay attention to which employees or workers seem to be most involved in different aspects of your service location’s day-to-day operations. Also pay attention to the individuals who seem to be benefitting most from the service performed at your service location. Also consider which community organizations or which faculty, departments, or programs on campus employ or involve individuals who may concern themselves with topics that directly relate to concerns at your service location.

From these pools of individuals, identify five specific people with whom you think you might be able to schedule a thirty-minute interview.

On the appropriate course website discussion thread, list these individuals, their occupations, their connection to topics related to your service, and their contact information (ideally phone and email).

For example, if I were volunteering at an animal shelter, I might consider the facility manager or a long-serving volunteer or a University researcher in animal science or an employee in the local government’s animal control or someone who has adopted multiple animal companions from the animal shelter.

**Perspective Interview Assignment, Part I (Non-Service Learning)**

Think of five beliefs or practices that are difficult for you to accept or understand. These beliefs or practices should be currently legal or conceivably could be legal (i.e. if it is not legal, there is a significant number of people who currently actively campaign to make it legal).

Please be honest. These beliefs can deal with religion, politics, race, diet, cultural traditions, family practices, sexual orientation, gender, technology, education, economics, campus policies, local or state laws, or any other perspective that you find odd or difficult to understand.

Now find a campus or local community organization that involves people who advocate each of those beliefs or practices.

On the appropriate course website discussion thread, list these beliefs or practices with their relevant organizations and the phone number and email address for a person at that organization.

For example, if I found it difficult to accept or understand vegetarianism, I would try to find some student group that advocated vegetarianism and find out who at the group could answer questions for me.
Appendix O: Perspective Interview Assignment, Page 2

Perspective Interview Assignment, Part II

**GOAL**
Record and write a 1000-word report on a 30-minute interview with someone selected from Part I.

**MEANS**

1. Once I have approved at least one of your options in Part I of this assignment, write a list of questions you would like to ask your interviewee (see attached example questions). You should write questions that try to sincerely understand your interviewee’s perspective. I must approve your questions before you do your interview.

2. Arrange an interview with your interviewee. Be honest with your contact about the nature of the interview (i.e. that this is part of an assignment for a writing class and that the interview will last about 30 minutes). If your interviewee asks, supply your proposed questions ahead of time so your interviewee knows what sorts of questions to expect.

3. Before you arrive for the interview, ask your interviewee for permission to record the interview. If your interviewee gives permission, be sure to plan ahead to bring a device with recording capabilities. If your interviewee does not give permission to record, ask if you can take notes on a laptop or pad of paper. Respect your interviewee’s preferences.

4. When you arrive for the interview, thank your interviewee for taking the time for you and explain again the purposes of your interview. Take some field notes (e.g. details about the setting, interviewee’s dress, facial expressions, appearance, and demeanor).

5. Pay attention to the time. If you still have questions to ask after your 30 minutes is finished, tell your interviewee, “Well, our 30 minutes are up. I still have a few more questions, but we can just end now if you prefer.” Do not try to pressure your interviewee.

**OUTCOMES (SERVICE LEARNING)**

Write a 1000-word report about your interview.

1. Your report should use your interview notes and transcript to answer these questions:
   a. Which of your interviewee’s specific concerns did you find yourself sympathizing with? Why?
   b. Which of your interviewee’s specific concerns did you find yourself disagreeing with? Why?
   c. What about the interview or interviewee fit with how you expected the interview to go?
   d. What about the interview or interviewee surprised you?
   e. What are the most pressing concerns this person has about topics related to your service?

2. Write your report as if you were just telling the story of the interview. Begin with your reasons for pursuing the service you’re doing this semester. Talk a bit about your interviewee. And then relate the most relevant details about the interview. It is perfectly acceptable to use long block quotes from your interviewee’s responses (this is why recording equipment will be very valuable).

3. Use MLA format

4. Save your document as a DOCX, RTF, or PDF. Attach your document to the appropriate discussion thread on the course website.

**OUTCOMES (NON-SERVICE LEARNING)**

Write a 1000-word report about your interview.

1. While writing your report, remember this admonition from Anthony Weston: “Ask not which side is right, but what each side is right about.”

2. Your report should use your interview notes and transcript to answer these questions:
   a. Which of your interviewee’s specific values/reasons/justifications/perspectives did you find yourself sympathizing with? Why?
   b. Which of your interviewee’s specific values/reasons/justifications/perspectives did you find yourself still disagreeing with? Why?
   c. What about the interview or interviewee fit with how you expected the interview to go?
   d. What about the interview or interviewee surprised you?

3. Write your report as if you were just telling the story of the interview. Begin with your perspective on the subject and why you believe what you do. Talk a bit about your interviewee. And then relate the most relevant details about the interview. It is perfectly acceptable to use long block quotes from your interviewee’s responses (this is why recording equipment will be very valuable).

4. Use MLA format

Save your document as a DOCX, RTF, or PDF with a file name that includes the course number, your last name, and the words “Perspective Interview.” Attach your document to the appropriate discussion thread on the course website.
VITA
VITA

Ethan M. Sproat

Purdue University
Department of English
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Office: 402 Heavilon Hall
English Dept Phone: (765) 494-3740
Email: esproat@purdue.edu

EDUCATION

PhD, English Rhetoric and Composition, Purdue University, Indiana, 2013
Dissertation: Inexorable Burden: Rhetoric and Togetherness
Committee: Thomas Rickert (chair), Jennifer Bay, Richard Johnson-Sheehan,
Patricia Sullivan

MA, English Rhetoric, Brigham Young University, Utah, 2008
Thesis: Dialectic, Perspective, and Drama
Committee: Gary Hatch (chair), Grant Boswell, Gregory Clark

MA, Science Fiction Studies, University of Liverpool, England, 2003
Dissertation: Reclaiming Literary Experience: The Aesthetics of Fantasy
Chair: Andy Sawyer

BA, Philosophy, Utah Valley University, Utah, 2005
BA, English, Brigham Young University, Utah, 2002

PUBLICATIONS

In Print

“To See Our Two Ways at Once’: The Correspondence of Kenneth Burke and
Paul de Man.” Rhetoric: Concord and Controversy. Eds. Antonio de Velasco and

In Progress

“The End of Conflict: Telos and the Rhetoric of Kenneth Burke’s ‘War.’” Journal
Article. Revise and resubmit for Philosophy & Rhetoric.

“Review of Ralph Ellison and Kenneth Burke at the Roots of the Racial Divide.” Book
Review. Invited submission for Rhetoric and Public Policy.

“Interpretants Are Never Alone Nor Final: Rhetorical Tropes and Kenneth
Burke’s Semiotic.” Journal Article. Under review at Semiotica.
ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

Graduate Teaching Assistant, Department of English, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, August 2008-present

Adjunct Faculty Instructor, English Program, Ivy Tech Community College, Lafayette, Indiana, August 2008-May 2009

Part-time Faculty Instructor, University Writing (Honors Program), Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, September 2004-August 2008

Adjunct Faculty Instructor, Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Utah Valley University, Orem, Utah, September 2003-August 2008

TEACHING AWARDS

Quintilian Award for Instructional Excellence (top ten percent of instructor evaluations), Introductory Composition, Purdue University, Fall 2010, Spring 2011, Spring 2012

Honorable Mention, Instructor of Best Visual Display Award for Student Project, Introductory Composition Showcase, Purdue University, April 2012

Dean’s Award, Best Instructor Project (“Engaging in Public Discourse”), Introductory Composition Showcase, Purdue University, April 2011

Dean’s Award, Instructor of Winner of Dean’s Award for Best Student Project, Introductory Composition Showcase, Purdue University, April 2011

Excellence in Teaching Award (nominated), Ivy Tech Community College, 2009.

Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences Faculty Excellence Award (nominated), Utah Valley University, 2006, 2008

HONORS

High Pass Preliminary Doctoral Examination, Purdue University, 2010

MA Graduate with Distinction, University of Liverpool, 2003

Eagle Scout, 1995

GRANTS

Purdue University Research Grants

Purdue Research Foundation Summer Research Grant, 2011

Purdue Research Foundation Summer Research Grant, 2012

Purdue University Travel Grants

Department of English Travel Grant to attend and present at Conference on College Composition and Communication, 2010, 2011

Department of English Travel Grant to attend and present at Triennial Kenneth Burke Society Conference, 2011
Department of English Travel Grant to attend and present at Rhetoric Society of America Conference, 2010

Brigham Young University Travel Grants

University Writing Travel Research Grant for archive research at The Pennsylvania State University, 2007

University Writing Travel Grant to attend and present at Conference on College Composition and Communication, 2007

University Writing Travel Grant to attend and present at Rhetoric Society of America Conference, 2007

CONFERENCES

National Conference Presentations


“Of Tweets and Twutterances (or Tweeting the Incommensurable to Extremes).” Conference on College Composition and Communication. Louisville, March 2010.


Featured Session Presentation


Regional and Special Interest Conference Presentations


Panel or Session Chair
Kenneth Burke Society at CCCC Special Interest Group, Las Vegas, March 2013.
Kenneth Burke Society at CCCC Special Interest Group, St. Louis, March 2012.
Kenneth Burke Special Interest Group, Atlanta, April 2011.

COURSES TAUGHT

Technical Communication and Civic Engagement (Upper Division)

Worksite Internship Practicum: Professional Writing (English 490, Purdue)
This is an online, distance learning, supplemental course for students undertaking summer internships in almost any field or discipline. The course focuses on the writing and communication student interns experience and provides them a forum to discuss on-the-job observations with other student interns.

Business Writing for Entrepreneurs (English 420E, Purdue)
In this course, business students develop and craft workable entrepreneurial projects. These begin with elevator pitches and culminate in team-based business plans for original businesses.

Business Writing: Service Learning (English 420, Purdue)
This course is offered to juniors and seniors from a wide range of professional disciplines. Coursework focuses on professional genres such as the memo and white paper. The final project is a team-based unique project in which students work closely with community partners in filling a specific need for a local business or organization. Past projects have included small advertising campaigns, menu redesigns, rebranding proposals, and others.
Technical Communication and Civic Engagement (First-Year)

Accelerated First-Year Composition: Engaging in Public Discourse (English 108, Purdue)
In this course, first-year students complete approximately 30 hours of community service in a wide range of fields. The writing projects for the course are based on their service experiences. Past projects include profiles based on qualitative interviews of service providers/recipients, evaluations of related local resources (whether private or government), research projects that situate students’ service in larger national or international contexts, and memoirs about students’ service experiences.

First-Year Composition: Business Leaders Learning Community (English 106, Purdue)
This first-year writing course involves less intense projects that are similar to those in the upper division business writing courses at Purdue (see above).

First Year Composition: EPICS Learning Community (English 106, Purdue)
EPICS stands for Engineering Projects in Community Service. The first-year engineering students enrolled in this course are simultaneously enrolled in engineering courses in which they complete engineering related projects for local community organizations. The writing projects in this course are based on the students’ service much like Accelerated First-Year Composition above.

Intensive Writing: Service Learning (Honors 150, BYU)
As I taught this course, this first-year course is almost identical to Accelerated First-Year Composition: Engaging in Public Discourse above. The only significant difference is the inclusion of two course-specific, BYU-published textbooks—a collection of readings assembled by the program director and a writing guide written, compiled, and edited by upper-division BYU Honors students.

First-Year Composition

First-Year Composition: Rhetorical Situations / Real Texts (English 106, Purdue)
This course utilizes primary texts and real-world contexts as invention material for students’ writing projects.

First-Year Composition: Writing Your Way at Purdue (English 106, Purdue)
This course utilizes students’ experiences as first-year Purdue students as invention material for students’ writing projects.

First-Year Composition (English 111, Ivy Tech)
This course incorporates a uniform curriculum and text common to all Ivy Tech first-year composition courses. Required projects include rhetorical analyses, memoirs, research projects, and arguments.

Intensive Writing: Research Writing (Honors 150, BYU)
This course utilizes two course-specific, BYU-published texts to facilitate the teaching of a broad range of possible writing projects with academic research as the primary focus.

Ethics and Philosophy

Ethics & Values: Sociopolitical Ethics (Philosophy 2050, UVU)
In this multi-disciplinary general education ethics course, students read pertinent works from historical and contemporary theorists. Through papers and in-class quizzes, students bring these works to bear on a range of historical and contemporary sociopolitical issues and problems.
Ethics & Values: Science Fiction & Ethics (Philosophy 2050, UVU)
In this course, students consider theoretical ethics works in light of dilemmas and situations discussed in a range of dystopian or otherwise sociopolitical-themed science fiction short stories.

Introduction to Logic and Philosophical Writing (Philosophy 1250, UVU)
This course introduces students to systematic reasoning in philosophical contexts. Projects include short and long papers of logical analysis and philosophical argument.

Introduction to Philosophy (Philosophy 1000, UVU)
This course introduces students to a range of influential ideas in the history of Philosophy.

ACADEMIC SERVICE AND ACTIVITIES

Curriculum Development
Community Resource Coordination, Worksite Internship Practicum: Professional Writing, Department of English, Purdue, 2011-2012
Work entailed assisting Professor Jennifer Bay in further designing the Worksite Internship Practicum. I also coordinated with local businesses, organizations, and Purdue’s research park in order to better inform local interns about receiving University credit for their internships.

Accelerated First-Year Composition: Engaging in Public Discourse, Pedagogical Initiatives Committee, Department of English, Purdue, 2010-2011
I was part of the original committee of faculty and PhD students who redesigned Purdue’s Accelerated First-Year Composition course to incorporate service learning.

Philosophy 2050: Ethics and Values, Department of Philosophy and Humanities, Utah Valley University, 2008
By request of the department head, I composed the initial draft of the rewritten departmental course guidelines for Philosophy 2050, an inter-disciplinary general education ethics course.

Invited Talks
Panelist, Dissertation Prospectus Forum, Department of English, Purdue University, December 2011
Speaker, Thesis Prospectus Session, Department of English, Brigham Young University, February 2008

Learning Community Instructor
Business Leaders Community, Purdue University, 2012
Explorers Learning Community, Purdue University, 2011
EPICS Learning Community, Purdue University, 2009
Freshman Academy, Brigham Young University, 2005-2008

Departmental Service
Job Placement Representative. GradSEA: The Graduate Student English Association, Purdue University, 2011-2012

Journal Service
Review Board Member, Present Tense: A Journal of Rhetoric in Society, 2012-present
Conference Service
Proposal Reviewer, International Association for Research on Service-Learning and Community Engagement (IARSLCE) Conference 2012
Planning Committee, Computers and Writing 2010, 2008-2010
Fundraising Committee, Computers and Writing 2010, 2009-2010

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND COMMUNITY SERVICE

Service Learning Instructor, Accelerated First-Year Writing: Engaging in Public Discourse, Purdue University, 2009-2012.
Oversaw and facilitated the community service hours and individual projects of approximately 140 students (15-20 students per semester).

Worked with a team of fellow graduate students to improve the public usability and accessibility of an online-controlled webcam that overlooks the Celery Bog Nature Area.

Advised boy scouts (ages 12-17) for the following merit badges: Scholarship, Reading, Public Speaking, Communications, Citizenship in the Community, Citizenship in the World, Citizenship in the Nation, American Cultures, American Heritage, American Labor, Music, Theater, Bugling, Art, Cinematography, Wilderness Survival, Hiking, Camping, Backpacking, Orienteering, Geocaching, Emergency Preparedness, Cooking, Salesmanship

Service Learning Instructor, Business Writing, Purdue University, 2009-2011.
Oversaw and facilitated the community service hours and individual projects of approximately 120 students (20-40 students per semester).

Taught daily early morning religious education classes to approximately 25 young men and women ages 14-18 in my congregation.

Neighborhood Chair for Brigham Young University, 2001–2002.
Acted as liaison between Provo City Council and the student residents of BYU.

PROFESSIONAL WORK

Copyediting Work
Indexing

Other Professional Work

This is the current Online Writing Lab resource that explains rhetorical situations. As of October 11, 2013, this resource is the top hit in Google and Bing searches for “rhetorical situation.”

Publisher Representative, Parlor Press, Conference on College Composition and Communication; San Francisco, 2009; Louisville, 2010; Atlanta, 2011; St. Louis, 2012
Work entailed representing Parlor Press to convention attendees and other publishers, setting up and taking down Parlor Press display booth, and processing book orders.

This short documentary was originally filmed by folk-rock musician and Academy Award-winning documentarian, Harry Chapin, who was also Kenneth Burke’s grandson. I headed the project to transfer this documentary from VHS to digital, add optional subtitles, repackage it as a DVD, and arrange for the Kenneth Burke Society to sell and distribute those DVDs.

This PowerPoint presentation compiles and condenses material from the main Online Writing Lab MLA formatting resource.

Instructed LDS men and women ages 19-25 from various cultural and national backgrounds in communication, leadership, and interpersonal skills.

Work in Progress

This eight-hour collection of interviews with Kenneth Burke is an entirely different video project from the similarly named documentary directed by Harry Chapin above. But like the Chapin project, this project will transfer footage from analog to digital, add optional subtitles, repackage it as a multi-DVD set, and arrange for the Kenneth Burke Society to distribute those DVD sets.

Editor and Project Lead. *Kenneth Burke at Washington University in St. Louis*. CD.
This project collects previously archived audio material of a 1970 reading and a 1971 discussion with Kenneth Burke while he was the Visiting Hurst Professor at Washington University in St. Louis (WUSTL). I am securing permission from the Kenneth Burke Foundation to repackage these recordings as a CD and arrange for the Kenneth Burke Society to distribute those CDs.
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

AP Reader, English Language Exam, Educational Testing Service, 2009-present
Conference on College Composition and Communication, 2007-present
Rhetoric Society of America, 2007-present
Rhetoric Society of America at Purdue, 2009-present
          Cofounder & Vice President, 2009-2010; President, 2010-2011
Modern Language Association, 2012-present
Kenneth Burke Society, 2007-present
Kenneth Burke Student Association, 2011-present
          Cofounder, 2011

RELEVANT GRADUATE COURSE WORK

Purdue University

Core

Introduction to Composition Studies (Shirley Rose)
Issues in Composition: Classical Era (Richard Johnson-Sheehan)
Issues in Composition: Modern Era (Patricia Sullivan)
Issues in Composition: Postmodern Era (Thomas Rickert)
Empirical Research Methodologies (Patricia Sullivan)

Technical Communication / Professional Writing

Professional Writing Theory (Michael Salvo)
Professional Writing Practicum (Patricia Sullivan)
Computers and Rhetoric (Samantha Blackmon)
Archives and Digital Humanities (Jennifer Bay and Patricia Sullivan)
Experiential Learning and Civic Engagement (Jennifer Bay)

Philosophic Rhetoric

Kenneth Burke and Contemporary Rhetoric (David Blakesley)
Public Rhetorics (Thomas Rickert)
Refashioning Burke’s Parlor (David Blakesley)
Introduction to Semiotics (Floyd Merrell)
Seminar in Ethics: Immanuel Kant (Patrick Kain)

Brigham Young University

Rhetoric and Composition

Rhetorical Theory and Criticism (Gregory Clark)
Early American Rhetoric / American Lit Pre-1865 (Gregory Clark)
History of Rhetoric (Nancy Christiansen)
Basic Composition Theory and Pedagogy (Gary Hatch)
Composition Pedagogy (Brett McInelly)

Critical Theory/Other

Theoretical Discourse (Matthew Wickman)
Creative Writing Theory (Lance Larsen)
Heidegger and the Scottish Novel (Matthew Wickman)