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LEANING AGAINST THE WIND: DO CENTRAL BANKS NECESSARILY LOSE?

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Leaning Against The Wind:
Do Central Banks Necessarily Lose?

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Abstract

A leaning-against-the-wind intervention that has only a temporary effect on the exchange rate and that is not too aggressive can be shown analytically to yield positive expected profits to a central bank even when the exchange-rate process is non-stationary. These profits arise if there are some transitory shocks to the exchange rate. Furthermore, very aggressive intervention will yield positive expected profits eventually when there is a tendency for exchange rates to return to a long-run equilibrium level.
1. Introduction

Central banks often justify interventions in foreign exchange markets on the grounds that they are countering "disorderly markets." A sudden drop in the price of foreign exchange may be slowed or stopped by a central-bank purchase of the foreign currency. If the decrease is only transitory, the bank can later sell the foreign exchange at a profit when the price has gone back up. This line of reasoning led Milton Friedman (1953) to argue that stabilizing intervention should be profitable for a central bank. A policy of buying when low and selling when high moderates the extent to which exchange rates vary and at the same time is profitable for the central bank. Conversely, if the central bank loses money from its interventions, Friedman would view that as an indication of destabilizing intervention in the sense of keeping the exchange rate away from its equilibrium level.

In a provocative paper, Dean Taylor (1982) examines whether central banks did or did not make profitable interventions. Using data from nine countries from the beginning of general floating in the early 1970's until the end of 1979, he found that most central banks lost money from their interventions and for some the losses were significant. Taylor, following up on Friedman's ideas, argues that when a permanent economic shock causes the equilibrium exchange rate to shift, a "leaning-against-the-wind" policy will lose money. For example, if the equilibrium price of foreign exchange is falling a central-bank purchase of foreign exchange will keep the price from falling as fast as it would without intervention, but the central bank in effect loses on the transaction when the price later falls below the purchase price. The bank may have succeeded in moderating the rate of change in the exchange rate but, since the price has been kept away from its equilibrium, the loss sustained by the central bank signals destabilizing (or anti-stabilizing) intervention. In light of the
losses by central banks, Taylor suggests that private speculators could make money and serve a stabilizing role by betting against the central bank.

The estimated profits or losses sustained by central banks turn out to be sensitive to the time period chosen for the calculations. To avoid the problems of measuring inventory gains or losses, other researchers have restricted attention to periods in which net intervention is small. Victor Argy (1982), for example, restricts his calculations to periods in which purchases of foreign exchange are approximately equal to sales. A Bank of England study (1983) provides evidence that the intervention by the Bank of England tended to yield profits, most convincingly in periods of nearly zero net intervention. Lawrence Jacobsen (1983) calculates the profitability of US intervention in DM. While the intervention appears unprofitable over periods in which cumulative net intervention is substantial, the results are more positive if one examines the entire period and subperiods in which net intervention was near zero.

Charles Corrado and Dean Taylor (1986) are critical of the studies that restrict the sample to periods over which cumulative net intervention is zero and argue that this introduces a positive bias to expected profits. By a similar line of reasoning, one could argue that studies of almost any realization of profits from intervention are subject to the charge of bias relative to expected profits. Taylor's calculations of profits, for example, were over a period in the 1970's in which the dollar realized substantial depreciation. The central banks by buying dollars had accumulated reserves with a market value at the end of the sample period well below the purchase price. For most patterns that might have reasonably been anticipated ex ante, this particular end-of-sample realization surely fell below the expected price of the dollar.

What is neat about Corrado and Taylor's contribution is that they calculate expected profits based on assumptions about (a) the movements in exchange rates that would have occurred in the absence of intervention, (b) the intervention rule utilized, and (c) the effects
of intervention. Specifically, they assume that the exchange rate would have followed a random walk in the absence of intervention and prove that a leaning-against-the-wind intervention policy can expect negative profits.

We follow up this analysis by considering two other possibilities. The first begins with the observation that there can be both permanent and transitory changes in the exchange rate. The bank would want to offset the transitory changes and ignore the permanent ones, but if the bank cannot immediately tell one type of change from the other, should it intervene or not? To provide an analytic answer, we can introduce a first-order moving-average process for the exchange rate in the absence of intervention. The moving-average parameter represents the extent to which exchange-rate changes are transitory. Although this is, like a random walk, a nonstationary process, we show that there is scope for profitable intervention.

The second possibility considered is based on the observation that exchange rates appear to move in long waves, with periodic returns to what may be considered long-run equilibrium levels. Consequently, we shall also explore the expected profitability of a leaning-against-the-wind intervention policy when the exchange rate follows a first-order autoregressive process in the absence of intervention. Again, profitable intervention is possible.

2. The Model

To set the stage for our own analysis, we initially reproduce several elements of the specification used by Corrado and Taylor (1986). Assume first that the intervention rule is the following leaning-against-the-wind policy:

\[ I_t = -\lambda (S_t - S_{t-1}) \]  

where \( S_t \) = the observed spot exchange rate, and

\[ I_t = \text{net purchases of foreign exchange by the central bank.} \]
The parameter $\lambda$ indicates the extent of the intervention in response to a change in the spot exchange rate. Assume $\lambda > 0$. A positive value of $I_t$ denotes a purchase of foreign exchange and a negative value a sale. So the central bank buys foreign currency when the price falls and sells when the price rises. A substantial body of empirical work finds that the major explanatory variable for official intervention is the change in the exchange rate. Some of this is cited by Corrado and Taylor. A recent survey by Geert Almekinders and Sylvester Eijffinger (1991) suggests similar results. While evidence of asymmetry in responses under different situations emerges in some studies, interventions still frequently appear to lean against the wind.

Assume next that intervention has a temporary effect on the exchange rate:

$$S_t = F_t + \alpha I_t$$

where $F_t$ is the "free" exchange rate in the absence of intervention. According to equation (2), intervention changes the spot exchange rate from what it would have been, but there is no permanent effect. The parameter $\alpha > 0$ denotes the strength of the effect of intervention. When the central bank buys foreign exchange the price will be temporarily higher (assuming $\alpha > 0$) than it would have been without the intervention, and when the bank sells foreign exchange the price will be temporarily lower. Almekinders and Eijffinger (1991) also survey several empirical studies assessing the effects of intervention. There appears to be virtually no evidence that sterilized intervention can make a permanent change in the exchange rate through a portfolio balance effect, but there is some evidence of short term effects in daily data that die out in the course of a month.

The net profit $\pi$ from central bank transactions in the foreign exchange market from time $1$ to $N$ is defined as the difference between the net accumulated reserves valued at the end-of-period rate and their initial cost:

$$\pi = F_N \sum_{t=1}^{N} I_t - \sum_{t=1}^{N} S_t I_t$$

(3)
When the sum of the interventions is zero, profits are positive if the purchases (with $I_t$ positive) occur at a lower average price than the sales (when $I_t$ is negative). When the sum of the accumulations is non-zero, then one must also take into account the valuation gains or losses by valuing the stocks at the end-of-period free rate relative to the purchase or sale prices at which the interventions took place. Equation (3) taken from Corrado and Taylor accomplishes this valuation.

To express profits in terms of the free exchange rate, which will be assumed to be given exogenously, substitute for $S_t$ from equation (2) into the profit equation (3) and note that $F_N - F_t = \Delta F_N + \Delta F_{N-1} + \ldots + \Delta F_{t+1}$ for $t < N$, where $\Delta F_t = F_t - F_{t-1}$. The result is:

$$
\pi = \begin{cases} 
\sum_{t=1}^{N-1} I_t \sum_{j=t+1}^{N} \Delta F_j - \alpha \sum_{t=1}^{N} I_t^2 & \text{if } N > 1 \\
- \alpha I_1^2 & \text{if } N = 1
\end{cases}
$$

With successive substitutions of equations (1) and (2), $I_t$ can be written as:

$$
I_t = (-\phi/\alpha) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \phi^k \Delta F_{t-k}
$$

where $\phi = \alpha \lambda / (1 + \alpha \lambda) < 1$. Equation (5) can then be substituted into (4) to get profits that will result from the intervention policy as a function of changes in the free exchange rate.

Corrado and Taylor assume that the free exchange rate follows a random walk:

$$
F_t = F_{t-1} + u_t
$$

where $u_t$ are independently and identically distributed random variables with a mean of zero and a variance of $\sigma^2$. They then prove that the expected profit $E(\pi)$ is always negative as long as the central bank's intervention can affect the exchange rate ($\alpha > 0$). If $\alpha = 0$ and if the exchange rate follows a random walk, the central bank's expected profits are zero. We will replace the random walk assumption of equation (6) with two alternatives, both of which contain the random walk as a special case.
3. Intervention with a Moving Average Process

Consider the following moving average process:

$$F_t = F_{t-1} + u_t - \theta u_{t-1}$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

where $u_t$ is an unobserved exogenous shock, with the properties previously assumed. The parameter $\theta$ indicates the degree to which the shocks are transitory. If $\theta = 0$, the level of $F$ is permanently changed by $u$. This would be the case of a random walk. If $\theta = 1$, the effect of a shock disappears fully after one period and the shocks are entirely transitory. For any $\theta$ in between there is a mixture of permanent and transitory shocks. $\theta u_t$ is transitory and $(1 - \theta) u_t$ is permanent.

In a discussion of empirical regularities in the behavior of exchange rates, Michael Mussa (1979, p. 11) notes that typically for monthly data a "first-order moving average process gives a slightly better explanation of the data than the model that assumes that $u_t$ is serially uncorrelated." According to Mussa, estimates of $\theta$ are generally between 0 and .2. Using extremely high-frequency data, Takatoshi Ito and Vance Roley (1986) and Charles Goodhart and L. Figliuoli (1991) report that large exchange rate jumps are partially reversed within a day. And in a recent study, Martin Evans and James Lothian (1993) find a statistically significant role for transitory shocks in exchange rate movements and report instances in which temporary shocks made a substantial contribution. These studies suggest one should not dismiss the existence of both permanent and transitory shocks in exchange rate movements. An analytically tractable way to handle this is to assume a first-order moving average process.

With $\theta < 1$, the process specified by equation (7) is non-stationary over time. If only the net effects of the shocks are considered, then the process can be viewed as a random walk, as if there were a series of cumulative shocks of $(1 - \theta) u_t$. We examine whether or not leaning-against-the-wind intervention, as assumed in equation (1), can be expected to generate positive profits if the free rate follows this moving-average process.
As shown in the appendix, expected profits are:

\[
E(\pi) = \frac{N\phi(\theta - \phi)(1 - \theta\phi)\sigma^2}{\alpha(1 - \phi^2)} - \frac{\theta\phi\sigma^2}{\alpha} \tag{8}
\]

Note that for \(\theta = 0\), which is the case of a random walk, \(E(\pi) = -N\phi^2\sigma^2/[(\alpha(1 - \phi^2)] < 0\). This is the result obtained by Corrado and Taylor. More generally, if \(\phi \geq \theta\) then \(E(\pi) < 0\) for any \(N\). If the extent of the intervention is too great relative to the moving-average parameter, the central bank can expect losses from the intervention.

If \(\phi < \theta\), the first term in (8) increases with \(N\). Therefore, \(E(\pi)\) will be positive for any \(N > \theta(1 - \phi^2)/[(\theta - \phi)(1 - \theta\phi)] = N^*\). When \(\theta\) is positive, a central bank can always have positive expected profits by choosing the coefficient of the leaning against the wind (\(\lambda\)) in equation (1) so that \(\phi < \theta\) for any \(N > N^*\). From the definition of \(\phi\), this holds if \(\alpha\lambda/(1 + \alpha\lambda) < \theta\) or if

\[
\lambda < \theta/[\alpha(1 - \theta)]. \tag{9}
\]

The central bank has more flexibility in its choice of a profitable \(\lambda\) when the effect of the intervention (\(\alpha\)) is smaller and when \(\theta\) is larger, i.e., when the transitory shocks are larger relative to the permanent shocks.

To help get an intuitive grasp on this result, consider Figure 1. Based on information through observations available up to and including time \(t-1\), there is an expected value of the free exchange rate in period \(t\). This is depicted by the point denoted by \(E_{t-1}F_t\) in the figure. Suppose in the absence of intervention, the exchange rate would fall to the point \(F_t\). Given the assumed moving average process, the expected value at time \(t\) for \(F_{t+1}\) is given by the following adaptive-expectations formula:

\[
E_tF_{t+1} = \theta E_{t-1}F_t + (1 - \theta)F_t
\]

The upward sloping line in Figure 1 represents equation (2) and shows the assumed temporary tradeoff between the amount of intervention and the observed exchange rate. As long as \(S_t\) is below \(E_tF_{t+1}\), the central bank is buying foreign exchange at a price below its
Figure 1. Opportunity for Profitable Intervention
expected value next period and this is essentially how it can make an expected profit. The scope for profitable intervention is increased by a larger $\theta$ which would move $E_t F_{t+1}$ farther from $F_t$, and by a lower $\alpha$ which would mean a flatter line representing equation (2). This is consistent with the analytic results discussed above in conjunction with inequality (9).

Our analysis has proceeded as if all the parameters are known and the draws of the free exchange rate always come from the process assumed in equation (7). If this were generally known and the central bank did not intervene to the extent that $S_t = E_t F_{t+1}$, then private speculators would presumably have an incentive to buy the currency when $S_t < E_t F_{t+1}$, and sell the currency when $S_t > E_t F_{t+1}$. If speculative trades drive $S_t$ into equality with $E_t F_{t+1}$, then the best forecast of the next value of the free exchange rate is the current exchange rate. This sort of informed speculation leads to the familiar theoretical claim that the actual exchange rate will follow a random walk.

What we have in mind is addressing a different question. Suppose central banks mechanically follow a frequently assumed leaning-against-the-wind intervention rule and amid the noise in exchange rate movements there is a mixture of permanent and transitory shocks, represented by a moving-average process which is not clearly perceived. Could the mechanical intervention rule yield positive expected profits and hence satisfy Friedman’s criterion for stabilizing intervention? The answer is yes if the strength of the intervention satisfies inequality (9).

Furthermore, as shown in the appendix:

$$\text{Var}(\Delta S_t) = \frac{1 - \phi}{1 + \phi} (1 + \theta^2 - 2\phi\theta)\sigma^2 \leq (1 + \theta^2)\sigma^2 = \text{Var}(\Delta F_t)$$

A strict inequality holds if $\phi > 0$. Since $\phi > 0$ when the central bank leans against the wind ($\lambda > 0$) and the intervention has some effect on the exchange rate ($\alpha > 0$), the central bank can moderate the short-run variability of the exchange rate and have positive expected profits for $0 < \phi < \theta$. 
4. Intervention with an Autoregressive Process

Plots of exchange rates over time between major currencies indicate clearly that there have been long swings in the data. How this can be best modelled formally is still an open question, but some form of mean reversion is frequently acknowledged. For example, John Huizinga (1987, p. 208) writes: "...the long-run movements of real exchange rates differ from those implied by a random walk by having a notable mean reverting component." More recently, Jack Glen (1992) using variance ratio tests suggested by Andrea Lo and Craig MacKinlay (1988) rejects random walk behavior in favor of mean reversion with annual data at lags greater than two years. Over shorter periods of time, however, these tests indicate that exchange rates have what may be called mean aversion, a tendency to move away from some long-run equilibrium significantly faster than a random walk would predict. This is reported by Glen with monthly data and by Christina Liu and Jia He (1991) with weekly data. A similar interpretation can be taken from the analysis by Charles Engle and James Hamilton (1990), who argue that long swings in exchange rates can be modeled by an underlying two state Markov chain. These and other empirical studies provide scope for a variety of hypotheses one might choose to analyze the expected profitability of leaning-against-the-wind intervention by central banks.

In what follows, we have worked out the results if the mean reverting tendencies are modeled by a first-order autoregressive process in the absence of intervention. Assume therefore that the free exchange rate follows the following autoregressive process:

$$F_t = \delta F_{t-1} + u_t$$

(11)

where $0 \leq \delta \leq 1$.

If $\delta = 1$, this would be a random walk. With $0 < \delta < 1$, there is a gradual return to a long-run value, which has been normalized to 0 in this formulation. As in the previous section, we investigate whether a mechanical leaning-against-the-wind policy can be
profitable and if so, under what conditions. The derivations of expected profits and the variance of the exchange rate in this case involve a lot of algebra and will be sent to any interested reader on request. The result for expected profits is:

\[
E(\pi) = \begin{cases} 
\frac{\phi \sigma^2}{\alpha(1 + \delta)(1 - \phi \delta)} \left\{ N \left( \frac{1 - \phi}{1 + \phi} \right) - \frac{1 - \delta^N}{1 - \delta} \right\} & \text{if } 0 \leq \delta < 1 \\
- \frac{N \phi^2 \sigma^2}{\alpha(1 - \phi^2)} & \text{if } \delta = 1 
\end{cases}
\] (12)

Note that when \( \delta = 1 \), the Corrado-Taylor result emerges again and leaning against the wind cannot achieve positive expected profits.

For \( 0 \leq \delta < 1 \), however, \( E(\pi) \) is positive if

\[
\frac{1 - \phi}{1 + \phi} > \frac{1 - \delta^N}{N(1 - \delta)}
\] (13)

The right side of (13) asymptotically approaches zero as \( N \) gets larger. Therefore, no matter how aggressively the central bank intervenes, i.e., no matter how close \( \phi \) is to one, its intervention can eventually achieve positive expected profits if the exchange rate follows a stable autoregressive process in the absence of intervention.

It can also be shown that

\[
\text{var}(\Delta S_t) = \frac{2(1 - \phi)^2 \sigma^2}{(1 + \phi)(1 + \delta)(1 - \phi \delta)}
\] (14)

Recall that \( \phi = \alpha \lambda / (1 + \alpha \lambda) \) where \( \lambda \) is the strength of the intervention and \( \alpha \) is the effect of the intervention. By choosing a large \( \lambda \) that puts \( \phi \) close to one, the central bank can eliminate almost all variability in the exchange rate, if it has sufficient reserves, and still expect long-run profitability from its intervention assuming \( \delta < 1 \), i.e., assuming a long-run mean-reverting tendency.
5. Conclusions

We have shown that under a mechanical rule for intervention, positive expected profits are possible if the free exchange rate in the absence of intervention would have followed a first-order moving-average process or a first-order autoregressive process. These assumed processes are not meant to represent precisely how exchange rates will move, and interventions are often sporadic rather than following a mechanical rule. The analyses do, however, provide an antidote to the impression left by Corrado and Taylor that intervention can necessarily be expected to lose money in the long run, with the implied interpretation that central banks should have known better than to have intervened. The analysis with the moving average process suggests that central-bank profits from responding to what are at least in part transitory changes in the exchange rate can outweigh losses from the permanent changes even if the exchange-rate process is non-stationary. Furthermore, the analysis with an autoregressive process suggests that even very aggressive leaning against the wind by the central bank will yield positive expected profits eventually when there is a tendency for exchange rates to return to a long-run equilibrium level.

We should note that other analytical issues arise when central banks intervene to try to defend exchange rate target-zone systems, such as the Bretton Woods System or the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. In those cases, the issue becomes whether or for how long the central banks can weather speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates when there are divergent domestic policies. Our analysis applies more to regimes of managed floating in which the central bank is reacting to exogenous events in an attempt to moderate the severity of observed exchange rate changes.
References


Appendix: Derivation of Expected Profits

Taking the expected value of the profit function equation (4) in the text gives the following expression, assuming \( N > 1 \).

\[
E(\pi) = E\left\{ \sum_{t=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=t+1}^{N} I_t \Delta F_j - \alpha \sum_{t=1}^{N} I_t^2 \right\}
\]

(A1)

With a moving average process for the free exchange rate, the following autocovariances follow from equation (7) with \( \mu = 0 \) and \( \mu^2 = \sigma^2 \):

\[
E(\Delta F_t \Delta F_{t-k}) = \begin{cases} 
(1 + \theta^2)\sigma^2 & \text{if } k = 0 \\
-\theta \sigma^2 & \text{if } k = 1 \\
0 & \text{if } k > 1 
\end{cases}
\]

(A2)

\( E(\pi) \) from equation (A1) can be evaluated in two parts. The first term is:

\[
E\left( \sum_{t=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=t+1}^{N} I_t \Delta F_j \right) = E\left[ \left( \frac{-\theta}{\alpha} \sum_{t=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=t+1}^{N} \Delta F_j \right) \left( \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \phi^k \Delta F_{t-k} \right) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{-\theta}{\alpha} \sum_{t=1}^{N-1} E(\Delta F_{t+1} \Delta F_t)
\]

\[
= \sum_{t=1}^{N-1} \theta \sigma^2 \phi / \alpha = (N - 1) \theta \phi \sigma^2 / \alpha
\]

(A3)

For the second term in \( E(\pi) \):

\[
E(I_t^2) = E\left\{ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (-\phi / \alpha) \phi^k \Delta F_{t-k} \right\}^2 \quad \text{from (5)}
\]

\[
= (\phi / \alpha)^2 \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \{ \phi^{2k}(1 + \theta^2)\sigma^2 - 2\phi^{2k+1}\theta \sigma^2 \}
\]

\[
= (1 + \theta^2 - 2\theta \phi)\phi^2 \sigma^2 / (\alpha^2 (1 - \phi^2))
\]

(A4)
From (A1), (A3) and (A4),

\[
E(\pi) = N \left\{ \frac{\theta \sigma^2}{\alpha} - \frac{(1 + \theta^2 - 2\theta \phi) \phi^2 \sigma^2}{\alpha(1 - \phi^2)} \right\} - \frac{\theta \phi \sigma^2}{\alpha}
\]

\[
= \frac{N \phi \sigma^2}{\alpha(1 - \phi^2)} \left\{ \theta(1 - \phi^2) - (1 + \theta^2 - 2\theta \phi) \phi \right\} - \frac{\theta \phi \sigma^2}{\alpha}
\]

\[
= \frac{N \phi(\theta - \phi)(1 - \theta \phi) \sigma^2}{\alpha(1 - \phi^2)} - \frac{\theta \phi \sigma^2}{\alpha}
\]

This is reproduced as equation (8) in the text.

We next consider how the intervention affects the variance of changes in the exchange rate. To do this, use equations (1) and (2) in the text to relate \(S\) to \(F\) and take first differences. The result is:

\[
\Delta S_t = \phi \Delta S_{t-1} + (1 - \phi) \Delta F_t
\]

This implies:

\[
\Delta S_t = (1 - \phi) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \phi^k \Delta F_{t-k}
\]

This follows from (A6) and (A2) that:

\[
\text{Var}(\Delta S_t) = (1 - \phi)^2 \left[ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \phi^{2k} \text{Var}(\Delta F_{t-k}) + \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \phi^{2k+1} \text{Cov}(\Delta F_{t-k}, \Delta F_{t-k-1}) \right]
\]

\[
= \frac{(1 - \phi)^2 \sigma^2}{(1 - \phi^2)} [(1 + \theta^2) - 2\phi \theta]
\]

\[
= \frac{1 - \phi}{1 + \phi} (1 + \theta^2 - 2\phi \theta) \sigma^2 \leq (1 + \theta^2) \sigma^2 = \text{Var}(\Delta F_t)
\]

This is reproduced as (10) in the text.
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