

# On Terrorism, Events, and the Nature of Problematic Structures

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## Abstract

This paper argues that French philosopher Gilles Deleuze's concept of "the event" provides a resource for the meaningful reconstruction of the socio-political problem of terrorism. Through an elucidation of the claim that, for Deleuze, all events are genuinely and positively new, I argue—in contrast with two predominant approaches to the problem—that terrorism exhibits a nonlinear and differential structure that cannot be adequately reduced to a set of necessary or sufficient conditions that account for its possibility in advance. In this way, my argument seeks to align terrorism with the properly variable concepts that Deleuze explores throughout his work. Finally, I conclude by suggesting what it might mean to become "worthy" (in Deleuze's sense) of the event of terrorism.

## Biography

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## Essay

### **1. Introduction**

A central feature of Gilles Deleuze's concept of "the event" is that events are always and in every instance genuinely and positively new. Through an elucidation of this claim, this paper argues that Deleuze's analytic of the event presents a resource through which predominant approaches to the socio-political issue of terrorism can be challenged and reconfigured. I argue that, from a properly Deleuzean perspective, the very newness of a terroristic event, in each case, opens up an often overlooked element of terrorism that speaks to its singularity as an event, which challenges the description of terrorism as a product of determinate conditions or states of affairs that might outline its possibility in advance. The overall aim is to problematize the concept of terrorism as an event that is always involved in a process of differing from itself, i.e., a concept which

is implicated in processes of becoming other, rather than something that can be explained by a set of necessary and/or sufficient conditions that account for terrorism.

Why Deleuze? Throughout his career Deleuze was constantly taking up concepts that seem to be involved in processes of becoming other—i.e., concepts that, by their very nature, exhibit a quality of intrinsic variation that renders them elusive of a single definite description—such as the concept of difference, the concept of the new, the concept of the singular (as opposed to the traditional philosophical concept of the “particular”), or the concept of creativity. Moreover, the connection with the concept of events becomes explicit in a 1988 interview where Deleuze comprehensively remarks that, “I’ve tried in all my books to discover the nature of events; it’s a philosophical concept, the only one capable of ousting the verb ‘to be’ and all its attributes.”<sup>1</sup> The intrinsically variable nature of these concepts, then, finds a grounding in Deleuze’s analytic of the event, which is intended to replace, or in the very least to loosen, our tendency to think about concepts in strictly categorical terms. However, in keeping with this model of variation, Deleuze’s analytic of the event must be veritably constructed out of the various inquiries that Deleuze undertakes throughout his works—which display their own variability across works as well as within the individual works themselves. As such, Deleuze’s *oeuvre* exhibits only clues as to what this analytic might look like. It is therefore not obvious what Deleuze has in mind when he speaks of events as resources for reevaluating traditional philosophical problems and the new forms that these problems have taken in the present.

Before we dive into the nature of events and their relevance for the issue of terrorism, it is perhaps useful to take up two predominant philosophical approaches, in order to reveal, by way of contrast, the distinctiveness of the Deleuzian approach. My talk will therefore proceed as follows: First, I would like to offer two brief sketches of what we might, rather loosely, call (1) the Platonic approach to understanding terrorism, which seeks a properly objective definition of terrorism, and (2) the post-Kantian approach to the problem of terrorism, which assumes the empirical fact of particular instances of terrorism, and then from such instances attempts to map out the very conditions under which terrorism becomes a possible problem. As we shall see, from a Deleuzian perspective, both of these methods assume that the concept of terrorism is something that should be understood as a set of either necessary or sufficient conditions, which fails to account for its variable nature. Second, I will offer a brief reconstruction of Deleuze’s analytic of the event, outlining its double or “problematic” structure as the site of the interaction between the intensive immediacy of real or lived experience and the determinate descriptions that actualize particular understandings of that experience. In order to concretize this analytic, I will briefly refer to the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> as a case study that exhibits the ways in which events become inscribed with determinate content and meaning. Finally, I conclude by arguing that the very structure of terrorism itself should be described as *objectively problematic* since, on a Deleuzian view, it is at the level of the very concept of terrorism itself that we find the kind of intrinsic variability that characterizes concepts like difference, the new, or the singular.

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<sup>1</sup> Deleuze (1997, p. 141). By “attributes” of being, I take Deleuze to mean traditional concepts of, for example, essence, form, substance, or identity.

## 2. Two Predominant Approaches to the Problem

The Platonic approach, which seeks the proper definition of terrorism and is motivated by the belief that terrorism has a specific objective structure, virtually saturates the literature on the issue of philosophy and terrorism. Of course, defining concepts is at once both a distinctive and native philosophical activity. It has been a central preoccupation since Plato (*Meno*, *Republic*, *Theaetetus*) into the present. Traditionally, the search for the definitions of concepts has been described as an account (*logos*) that picks out a thing's essential nature.<sup>2</sup> And since Frege, the view has been similar: Concepts are understood as sets of features that are jointly necessary for any thing to be an instance of that concept. Furthermore, the post-Gettier project devoted to defining the jointly necessary conditions for a concept of "knowledge" indeed presupposes such a view of the nature of concepts. Given this well-established tradition, it should not be surprising, then, that this tendency follows us into the literature on philosophy and terrorism.

Of the many instances of this approach, one that quite explicitly toes the line is Baur, who writes that "Plato tells us that there must be some intrinsic characteristic about pious activity that makes it pious, apart from the further question of whether or why that activity is pleasing to the gods. In a similar vein, I want to suggest that there is some intrinsic characteristic about terrorism that makes it terroristic, apart from the further question of whether or why that activity is immoral or unjustified."<sup>3</sup> Amongst those philosophers who make this assumption, the debate turns on isolating such distinctive features: Is terrorism a certain kind of violence? A certain kind of war? Is it perpetrated only against noncombatants? Only against states? Is it morally neutral or intrinsically unjustified? Does terrorism require an agenda and a target audience? Let me say that naturally I do not wish to downplay the importance of such questions; indeed, they are crucial for understanding the nature of the problem. However, the search for definitions that are neither over- nor under-inclusive, nor merely question begging (e.g., is terrorism simply the activity of terrorists?), is apparently endless—especially given the various sub-categories of terroristic phenomena such as cyber-terrorism, industrial terrorism, and even eco-terrorism, which would all have to be accounted for under a comprehensive definition.

In any case, it soon becomes clear that the endless debates indicate that something is being missed in this approach. The next logical step, then, would be to qualify our many definitions of terrorism in terms of the contexts in which they are applicable. Indeed, while some definitions of terrorism work in some contexts, other definitions prove more fruitful in other contexts. Now this might be said to be the advantage of the post-Kantian approach, which abandons the search for strong definitions in terms of objective structures by making definitions of terrorism function within certain points of view. As is well known, Kant argued that before we can make genuine knowledge claims that pertain to either empirical objects or metaphysical objects (such as God, the soul, and freedom), we must first examine our subjective

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<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Aristotle's *Topics*, Book I, Part 5.

<sup>3</sup> Baur, Michael (2005, p. 9).

capacities for making such claims, that is, we must examine our point of view as human beings and ask if such questions make sense for us in the first place, so that our claims to knowledge can be legitimately grounded. Kant does this by granting the fact of cognition or knowledge and tracing the conditions under which that knowledge is possible in the first place, in order to generalize the conditions for the possibility of knowledge *as such*. In a similar way, the post-Kantian approach to the problem of terrorism grants the empirical fact of terroristic acts and looks to the conditions under which these events take place, in order to generalize the conditions under which terrorism can be predicted as a possibility.

This method is applied in sociological, political, or economic descriptions of terroristic activity, in which the empirical evidence of terroristic acts—that is, whose understanding of these events has been *received* as terroristic in nature—is traced down into the conditions that are said to be productive of terrorism. For example, certain conditions of social, political, or economic injustice, specifically where the citizens of a particular social body see no way out of an unjust or oppressive situation, are often said to breed terroristic activity. Similarly, if the beliefs of a group of radicals include the notion that violence or its threat can effectively and productively usher in social change, and they believe that their agenda can influence an audience through the means of violence, it is readily apparent that such conditions would be conducive to producing terrorist activities. In this way, rather than gathering up many instances and debating about which features are the essential features, the post-Kantian approach looks to specific instances of terrorism and investigates the conditions in which such events take place, drawing qualified generalizations about those conditions in order to construct tentative definitions of terrorism sufficient enough to predict future events.

Again, I do not wish to completely undermine the value of this approach, which seems to be essential to understanding a key aspect of the problem, namely, that terrorism does not seem to have a unified essence, but rather exhibits—to use the oft-cited phrase from Wittgenstein—at best “family resemblances” that we can roughly sketch out when we compare various instances of terroristic acts. However, it should be stressed that such skepticism about the concept essentialism of terrorism is integral to the very problem itself; it would be a mistake to think that the problem gets dissolved when we realize that concept essentialism is inadequate. We should rather take this as a clue to the nature of the problem itself, and not, in the extreme, become nominalists or relativists on the issue of terrorism.

From a Deleuzian perspective, the inadequacy of these two approaches stems from their shared orientation of constructing determinate concepts of terrorism from received notions of what terrorism is. On the one hand, the Platonic view holds that the objective formal structure of terrorism must be constructed by discovering those essential features of terrorism that are jointly necessary for an event to participate in that concept. Similarly, the post-Kantian approach looks to instances of terrorism in order to outline the conditions under which terrorism becomes possible. At a superficial level, the traditional philosophical charge would be that such methods are inherently circular, that is, in asking what it is that constitutes terrorism, such methods look to received instances of it, which presupposes the very concept in question. Yet are we not to look to instances of terrorism in order to discover what it is? How else could we possibly proceed? From a Deleuzian perspective, however, the issue lies elsewhere. At

a deeper level, it becomes manifest that such circularity ultimately stems from an indifference to the genuinely variable features of terroristic activity, where it is only similar features that play an active role in constructing concepts. The problem is not just that such methods are circular; it is rather that the problem of the circle is itself generated by the more fundamental presupposition of the activity itself, namely, that variable differences are themselves unproductive of concept construction, and that it is only similarities that produce useful concepts.

Therefore, while it is true that in both cases a received view of terrorism is already either consciously or unconsciously in place from the beginning, which means that the outcome of the inquiry is already set up in advance, this situation is only possible, in the first instance, if we presuppose that positive concepts are not constructed out of the variable features between series but only through discrete similarities from within a series. So, the focus of the critique here is not one that just charges mere circularity, but one that charges that the two predominant approaches fail to think about the problem at the level of the entire series of instances; it rather approaches the problem from within a single determinate series itself, and thus cannot account for variation.<sup>4</sup>

The problem comes into sharp relief when we observe that, in a specifically Deleuzian register, part of what it means for an event to be described as genuinely terroristic in nature is that it be properly *new* in every instance, that is, unprecedented, unpredictable, atypical, anomalous, singular, etc. Indeed, that the very experience of “terror”<sup>5</sup> is invoked to describe such events indicates that there is something about terrorism that *exceeds* our interpretations, representations, determinate descriptions, or even stipulative definitions. Moreover, such problematic features of terroristic events seem to be excluded from just about every definition of terrorism that we see.<sup>6</sup> This should not be surprising since, by the very nature of the activity of defining concepts as traditionally understood, such differential or variable features must be bracketed in order to proceed. It seems, then, that terrorism is something that fits the description of properly Deleuzian concepts that exhibit the intrinsic variability that is grounded in events rather than in states of affairs or otherwise determinate conditions. As such, it is

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<sup>4</sup> So, a properly Deleuzian way of thinking about terrorism suggests that each event of terrorism is the birth of an entire *series* of possible similar instances, rather than each event of terrorism being simply one more instance of a predetermined concept of terrorism.

<sup>5</sup> As a phenomenological point of interest, “terror” is distinct from “fear,” which is typically only experienced in the presence of some fearful object. While “terror” certainly takes place in the present, it seems to spread beyond present experience, drawing on one’s memories of being fearful or anxious, as well as projecting into future anxieties of what is to come that might possibly produce further fear or anxiety. In this sense, “terror” plays on a more complex and integrated temporal structure than does fear, which is, again, typically grounded only in the present experience of something fearful.

What’s more, while terror shares with anxiety this complex temporal structure, it is in fact distinct from anxiety in that it takes place on a collective level rather than on an individual level. So while we would properly describe an individual as anxious, we would correlatively describe a group as terrorized. Finally, it should be borne in mind that terror is not simply the result of a collection of anxious individuals, since it is terror that in fact characterizes the *situation* in which the individuals are involved. In short, the terror that characterizes individuals obtains on a collective level jointly with its obtaining in any single individual, unlike anxiety, which can obtain solely within an individual.

<sup>6</sup> A representative list of definitions from philosophers and non-philosophers alike can be found in Shanahan (2010).

imperative that we come to an understanding of terrorism that grounds its concept in its event, i.e., a concept that is grounded in what Deleuze refers to as properly “differential” conditions.

### 3. The Structure and Actualization of Events

In order to understand terrorism in terms of events, we must first get clear on what Deleuze means when he says that events have a double or “problematic” structure. First, Deleuze does not have in mind our ordinary way of thinking about events, in which events either confirm or disconfirm a particular theory or notion already embedded within a scientific, cultural, or socio-political imaginary. Such a description of events renders them a function of received terms and conditions that are already pre-understood. Deleuze seeks to invert this description by arguing that, much more than any acts of mere confirmation or refutation, events provide us with a resource for constructing and reconstructing experience in illuminating and fruitful ways. As such, events are neither simply given “facts” about the world, nor are they completely determined by either linguistic or otherwise ideal structures imposed by the discourses of various groups, but rather exhibit features of both realist and idealist accounts of experience. As Deleuze says, events are virtual, that is, “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract.”<sup>7</sup> In other words, events *as such* are not usually present to our minds but, of course, that doesn’t mean they are fictions; on the contrary, as the most immediate feature of our experience, events provide a generative site for the very production of the meaning of our experiences. As such, events are the closest approximation to the real itself, understood as unmediated expressions of nature’s self-sufficient and properly creative production.

One of the more concrete ways in which we can understand what “event” means is to consider what takes place when received notions are genuinely challenged. For example, the abolition of Apartheid, the movement for women’s suffrage, or the African-American Civil Rights movement can all be characterized as attempts to extract a particular event in its immediacy, the goal of which is to enable a consciousness of forces that we might desire to either oppose or advance. However, in order to achieve this, individuals or groups must break with their present socio-political configuration, that is, a particular received state of affairs, in order to allow *new* or “minor” possibilities to emerge, wrested free from the determinate descriptions that would otherwise exclude them. Such callings into question of the present situation are attempts to specify or “unmediate” an event, in order to generate an open resource for reconstruction through alternative description. Take, for example, Martin Luther King’s “dream,” which envisioned the equality of races as the equality of human beings as beings who bear rights, an idea which escapes the determinate conditions of King’s historical situation (understood as the totality of facts of that particular moment in history). In Deleuze’s language, King’s dream follows a “line of flight” which opposes the well-defined rules laid out by the prevailing social matrix of the day. King’s dream therefore upsets the role that the dominant discourse maintains, whose configurations of the present, it is found,

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<sup>7</sup> Deleuze and Guattari (1994, p. 156).

condition the ways in which the past is received in the present, as well as the ways in which the future is understood to be unfolding. By taking up and occupying a temporal moment that is not yet rendered determinate, but rather critically surveys series of virtual or indeterminate possibilities for constructing responses to the present in novel and creative ways, King's dream discloses the very possibility of reconstructing experience in genuinely new and meaningful ways.

Events, then, have a double structure because while it is obvious that empirical or experienced events do in fact take place (their corporeal dimension), they so often exhibit a potentiality for taking on new meanings, that is, a potentiality for reconstructing our present understandings of our experience (their ideal or incorporeal dimension). Of course, with average everyday events such as boiling water or tuning up a car there is not much at stake. However, with events like terrorism, or more specifically 9/11, the stakes are very high. The question concerning how these major events should be described is absolutely crucial, given that events, in themselves, have no meaning until they are either consciously or unconsciously attributed a meaning. Furthermore, given this intrinsic variability within the structure of the event itself, we can observe with Paul Patton<sup>8</sup> that this is precisely the reason why so much time and energy in politics is spent struggling over the appropriate description of events, since it is nothing other than the description, that is, the meaning attribution, that is going to guide our thought and action in responding to major events. Therefore, there is a crucial performative dimension involved in the description of events since, on this account, it is this or that particular discourse that determines the meaning of an event, thereby effectively creating the necessary responses that take place in thought and action.

The immediate aftermath of 9/11 provides us with a useful case study of the ways in which such major events are actualized. As an event, 9/11 exhibits the double structure that we have briefly outlined above: On the one hand, there is the actualized terrorist act that 9/11 has come to signify, namely, the "turning point" in America's socio-political self-understanding (although this is still up for debate) and, on the other hand, the "moment" that took place on September 11, 2001, the "instant," the pure event, or brute happening prior to its taking on a particular content and description, where chaos reigned amidst our attempts to figure out what was happening. This latter dimension can usually be described only in negative terms: We know that something is happening, but we cannot be sure what it is; its singularity escapes the structures that define our everyday dealings. Whatever it is, it is utterly and painfully *new*.

Now the process by which the event is "actualized," that is, inscribed with a determinate content and meaning, takes place through the social function of language, where various discrete happenings—such as planes crashing into buildings, people running aimlessly through the streets, and firefighters heroically facing the chaos—are unified through determinate description. In making sense of the event, words and phrases such as "terrorism," "act of war," "freedom is under attack," and "enemies of freedom" simultaneously produce and reproduce the actualized event, through jointly present words and images.<sup>9</sup> In this way, the pre-personal and singular event is

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<sup>8</sup> Patton (1997).

<sup>9</sup> By contrast, recall Jeremiah Wright, whose claim that 9/11 represents "America's chickens coming home to roost," effectively placing blame on the United States for the attacks, was treated as a scandal and immediately politicized, especially given Obama's ties to that church.

transformed, taking on a unified meaning that compels us to understand the event in particular ways, not only as individuals, but as a collective social body—i.e., we as “the American people” are no longer the same. Through the endless procession of words and images, the meaning of the event becomes natural to us, compelling us to understand the event in certain ways.

Of course, I do not mean to imply that our collective understanding of 9/11 is a mere fiction. I am not interested in arguing such an absurd point, nor am I interested in melodramatic statements such as “9/11 never happened.” I am furthermore not interested in some form of “media critique,” in which the media is scolded for distorting and controlling the flow of information about events. The point is simply to draw our attention to the manner in which an event actualized through various discourses that represent the event in particular ways, veritably *creating* the very ways in which events are both experienced and recalled, both individually and collectively. It is by paying close attention to such movements, as tactics and strategies rather than as natural representations, that we might see most explicitly the double structure of events, the processes of actualization, and the social function of language in creating and reproducing particular descriptions of events that mark out determinate possibilities for thought and action in response to them.

#### 4. Terrorism as Problematic Structure

Deleuze’s analytic of the event has an important consequence that follows from the intrinsic variability that characterizes the concepts with which we seek to understand events, namely, that events are what we might call *objectively problematic*. By this he means that events, as exhibiting the double structure we have been discussing, are *in principle* not reducible to determinate descriptions, but rather exceed the limitations we impose on immediate experience in describing them. Indeed, Deleuze’s analytic of the event seeks to show that the event and its description are not co-extensive phenomena, but rather there remains *in* the empirical or actualized event a pure or incorporeal dimension that not only resists our attempts to ground it categorically, but more importantly, implicates our descriptions in processes of variation and mutability. The possibility of thinking at the level of events, then, brings us to a level of a *pure* variability, which throughout his work Deleuze seeks to disclose with concepts like the virtual, the new, the differential, the creative, or the singular.

Of course, to describe terrorism as new in each case still does not accurately capture what *actually happens* in a terroristic event. However, it does get us a bit closer to the very problematic structure of terrorism itself: To describe terrorism as objectively problematic is to invoke an order of problems that are never fully captured by the subjective conditions for possible experience that understand the world through interpretations or description. Therefore, such problems are not fully resolvable through the structures that produce our preordered experience, but are rather presented to us at the very limit between what is familiar to us and what remains foreign to us in principle, given our subjective limitations. As Deleuze says, borrowing a famous distinction from

Kant, genuine problems emerge when “the noumenon [is] closest to the phenomenon.”<sup>10</sup>

This dimension of terrorism, then, opens up the essentially experimental nature of thought and action. What, then, would a properly Deleuzean answer to the question “what is terrorism?” look like? First, it should be clear that terrorism is not a problem that can be solved once and for all; since it is a properly objective problem, it can only be dealt with practically and temporarily. As John Protevi observes, such problems can only be resolved for the time being, since our actions now at resolving the problem have consequences that set up the conditions for future instances of the problem.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, in asking this question we are not looking for a set of universal and necessary conditions that define terrorism. We are rather looking for those differences between instances that make terrorism terroristic in the first place. Deleuze himself supports such a position when he says—echoing the sentiments of a genuinely experimental and creative approach to concept construction—“it’s not a matter of bringing all sorts of things together under a single concept but rather of relating each concept to variables that explain its mutations.”<sup>12</sup> This means that, secondly, when we compare and contrast instances of terrorism, we should not just draw out similarities in the direction of constructing a universal concept, but also look to the genuine differences between situations, that is, those differences that have not appeared anywhere else, since (1) it is going to be those differences that are constitutive of the singularity of the event itself, and (2) those differences are going to allow us to take a creative response to the problem, since they would be new features of the problem that are revealed by its particular relation to the individual situation.

In other words, to paraphrase Protevi once more, the problematic is not just about recognizing “terrorism,” as if we could produce a finite set of necessary and sufficient conditions so that we can judge something as falling within the category of “terrorism”; we are rather interested in the conditions for the creative transformation of terrorism, by isolating its differential or singular turning points at which terrorism exhibits mutations. Such points of divergence enable it, as well as ourselves, to be transformed in a positive manner.<sup>13</sup> It should be clear, then, that the Deleuzean approach differs from either the Platonic or post-Kantian methods in at least one crucial aspect, namely, that the latter look to instances of terrorism, but merely reaffirm the received view, that is, they do not set up the problem as prior to the solution, while the Deleuzean orientation looks to instances of terrorism with an eye to the differences or mutations that indicate terrorism’s variable nature. Because the structure of terrorism is nonlinear and differential, exhibiting variable features in the manner of living, organic, and dynamical systems, its behavior patterns are not *in principle*, although of course sometimes in fact, predictable in the manner of determinate systems. It is therefore part of the very meaning of “terrorism” for it to be problematic, given its variable and dynamical nature. From a Deleuzean perspective, then, the question “what is terrorism?” is one that is primarily interested in the points of variation and mutation that

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<sup>10</sup> Deleuze (1994, p. 222).

<sup>11</sup> Protevi (2010b).

<sup>12</sup> Deleuze (1997, p. 31).

<sup>13</sup> Protevi (2010a).

take place across a *series* of terroristic acts and not just a set of either necessary or sufficient conditions that are traced off particular instances.

With this basic idea in place, I would like to conclude by emphasizing one basic take-away point. In *What Is Philosophy?*, Deleuze and Guattari announce that the sole task of philosophy is to ask what it means to become “worthy” of events.<sup>14</sup> A properly philosophical approach to the problem of terrorism, then, would ask what it would mean to become worthy of the event of terrorism. Naturally, what this might mean is a difficult question on its own, especially given the difficulty of discerning just what is actually evoked by the phrase “becoming worthy.” Now it is well known that the idea of becoming worthy shows up in the ethical reflections of Kant, in the context of uniting the ends that seek to promote our individual happiness with the unconditional obligations that are dictated by the moral laws of pure practical reason (the conjunction of which Kant calls the highest good). However, perhaps closer to what Deleuze has in mind is actually Nietzsche’s description of what he calls “the noble ones,” i.e., those who face the events of life with an affirmative posture, aiming in the direction of creative and productive self-transformation. What I would like to suggest, then, is that becoming worthy of the event of terrorism should include, in the very least, responses to the event that do not issue in further reactive violence, but rather allow the question of America’s self-evaluation to genuinely pose itself, such that the transformative power of the social body might be disclosed.

Of course, there really is no question that the perpetrators of 9/11 acted wrongfully; I certainly do not intend to lend legitimacy to the acts carried out on that tragic day. However, dominant discourses typically emphasize victimization and retribution, and it is clear that the responses that follow depend upon descriptions of the event that conceal the need for a new social and political transformation, for which terrorism is almost always a symptom. In the case of 9/11, descriptions that treat the event as an “act of war” or descriptions that continue to contextualize the event in terms of the “enemies of freedom” actively create and recreate a political imaginary in which a “war on terrorism” is necessary. Indeed, such “solutions” play an active role in reinforcing the received view of the problem, rather than letting the problem present itself as an event that challenges us to question our implicit views concerning, for instance, the nature of our social and political relations. From a Deleuzian perspective, in contrast to such reactive mechanisms, it is rather by letting events usher in creative responses for thinking about the problems of life in new ways that we become worthy. On the collective level, then, it seems that the true problem of 9/11 has yet to be actually posed.

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<sup>14</sup> Deleuze and Guattari (1994, p. 160).

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