State Counter-Terrorism in Ancient Rome: Toward a New Basis for the Diachronic Study of Terror

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Synopsis

In book 3 of *Ab urbe condita* the Roman historian Livy relates an event that fits neatly within most modern definitions of the category “terrorism.” This paper sets out to reveal the ways in which Livy’s text destabilizes the event through both narrative and intertextual means to reveal its constructedness, and the key role of political power and historical writing in giving form to this construction. Taken to its logical conclusion, this reading of categories such as “terrorism” reveals a path to a truly diachronic and cross-cultural study of analogous phenomena based around social function rather than definitional content.

Biography

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Essay

In book 3 of *Ab urbe condita*, his monumental history of the city from its foundation, the Roman historian Livy writes in great detail about a “terrorist” incident in 5th-century BCE Rome and the official state response to that threat. His method of narrating said incident is of the greatest interest, since it seems paradoxically to both tell of the recurring and immanent threat of such violent acts, and thus valorize the continuing need for preparedness and swift and ready response; and simultaneously to marginalize, and even minimize, the reality of the threat, instead treating it as an artificial construct of various state apparatuses. This intricate and seemingly contradictory web of competing discourses precisely enacts the tensions inherent in any attempt to follow a category such as “terrorism” diachronically, and it is no surprise that the text of such an eminent and thoughtful historian (and one more attuned to the narrative aspects of his history than many other more “reliable” sources) would provide deep insights into the inherent challenges of historiography. Yet what might be more surprising to the contemporary reader is how little the essential problems of historical narrative have changed over the
past two thousand years, and thus how much can be gleaned for the diachronic study of an analogous modern category such as terror from the work of this ancient master.

It would perhaps be simplest to begin by briefly recounting the event with which Livy’s narrative is concerned, and then to turn to a consideration of how that content is packaged within the larger structure of book 3. The incident itself, namely the terrorist attack, comprises book 3.15.4-7 and 9, a matter of but a few lines. According to Livy, in 460 BCE a Sabine by the name of Appius Herdonius unexpectedly seized the Capitoline hill and citadel in a night attack with a force of 4500 political exiles and slaves (Capozza I.37ff; Cornell “Rome and Latium” 286). They indiscriminately slaughtered all those present whom they could capture and who refused to join their cause. The following morning they make their plea, and demands: Appius Herdonius claims to represent the disenfranchised of the state, and offers freedom to the slaves and the opportunity of return to political exiles. He emphasizes that he wishes for the Romans to accede to his demands willingly, but is willing to call in neighboring powers (the Aequi and Volsci, traditional enemies of Rome at this time) if they refuse. 3.15.9, which reports the terrorists’ agenda, is almost twice as many lines as the description of the attack itself.

The bulk of Livy’s account of the year 460 BCE, which runs from 3.15-3.21, is occupied with the attendant circumstances for, the reaction to, and the fallout from this incident (thus, incidentally, dwarfing it in length). It is worth noting here how much of sections 3.15-18 deal with the manifold fears of various factions within the Roman population, some of them even in direct reaction to Herdonius’ attack (most of them not, though we shall take that matter up again later). In terms of properly categorizing the incident, the fear directly springing from the terrorists’ violence and threat of further violence is of crucial importance. Of the survivors of the night attack it is said that praecipites pavore in forum devolant, “in their panic they flew headlong into the forum” (3.15.6); the consuls timebant, feared (3.15.7) to arm the populace in response to the crisis, due to the deep social divisions Livy everywhere represents in his book, and they are described as incerti on two occasions (3.15.7, 8), the second time paired with solliciti, thus revealing their anxious state of indecision, which makes them completely ineffective. They try calming the population, but in trying to do so they do as much harm as good¹; for the pavida et consternata multitudo, “the cowed and worried multitude” was impossible to control (3.15.8).

The next day, after the list of demands is released, the patres² and consuls find new aspects of the situation terrifying. They are afraid lest neighboring states take the opportunity to attack Rome. Furthermore, the call to slave insurrection is particularly terrifying: as Livy tells us, multi et vari timores; inter ceteros eminebat terror servilis, “There was a great variety of causes for fear; among them all, the terror of slaves loomed large” (3.16.3). Their own slaves form a potential fifth column in their midst, and could become the source of new “terrorist” attacks.

That this event meets the usual criteria for terrorist activity is scarcely debatable. Without adopting any single definition of the many that have been proposed for the term
“terrorism”, one can still make the claim that Appius Herdonius’ night attack possesses all the major traits usually proposed as part of such definitions. It is the action of a non-government group; it inflicts violence indiscriminately (on whomever happened to be on the Capitol at the time); this violence is intended to draw popular attention, especially in view of Herdonius’ proclamation; there is a call for political changes (return of exiles, freedom for slaves); and the object is to use fear to cause the Romans to relent (Herdonius prefers for the Romans to make the changes themselves, rather than to be invaded; the latter threat is meant to provoke the former course of action). Furthermore, the fear caused by the attack clearly reaches far beyond the victims of the attack, and into every corner of Roman society.

This may convince the reader that Appius Herdonius and company were terrorists by our definition; but how did the Romans think of them? Certainly there was no term or concept precisely the equivalent of “terrorism” or “terrorist” in ancient Rome. Yet simply because there is no single word or category that fulfills this function does not mean that the Romans did not have other ways of doing the same, or similar, work. For instance, it would have been clear to Livy’s educated contemporary readers that Herdonius and his fellows were being labeled to their disadvantage through a word and an allusion. The allusion is, of course, to the conspirator Lucius Sergius Catilina, more familiar to the English-speaking world as “Catiline”, who in 63 BCE attempted to oust the Roman senate. He offered debt relief, caused a slave revolt in Capua, ranked many political outcasts among his followers, and approached foreign forces (the Allobroges) to secure aid against the Roman state, which he eventually fought openly. More specifically, the allusion is to Sallust’s depiction of Catiline in his famous Bellum Catilinae, a fact that is blatantly obvious since Livy often borrows Sallust’s language almost word for word. Some notable instances include Livy’s se miserrimi cuiusque suscepsi causam (3.15.9) and Sallust’s publicam miserorum causam pro meae consuetudine suscepi (35.3), as well as Livy’s se...omnia extrema temptaturum (3.15.9) and Sallust’s extrema omnia experiri (26.5), both from Herdonius’ public appeal; the interesting echo of Sallust 36.2 ab armis discedere in Livy’s arma poni et discedere at 3.17.1, particularly interesting because it uses language that Sallust employed to describe Catiline’s (largely plebeian) co-conspirators in a passage about the general population of Rome laying down their arms in order to vote on new laws during the crisis; and in the same sentence (3.17.1), Livy’s description of the consul Publius Valerius Publicola hearing these news and se ex curia proripit, where Sallust at 32.1 describes Catiline himself as se ex curia domum proripit after he is denounced by Cicero in the senate house.

By repeatedly alluding to Sallust’s hostile description of Catiline and his co-conspirators, both in specific language and by making Herdonius’ demands and program basically the same as Catiline’s (freedom for slaves, return of exiles, threat of armed intervention from abroad, etc.), Livy essentially states that they are members of the same category and class of criminal. Categorization can, of course, be accomplished by profile as well as by language; but, as mentioned above, language is deployed here as well in the form of the term coniurare, in Livy’s phrase coniurare et simul capere arma, “to conspire/join the conspiracy/swear allegiance (to the conspiracy) and take up arms together” at 3.15.6. Coniurati, literally meaning “those having been sworn together”, is a common
term of abuse for “conspirators” of any sort, and thus has a delegitimizing function in its own right. Of course, just as in the English phrase “the Catilinarian conspiracy,” forms of coniurare/coniurati are common in Latin to describe Catiline and his companions. Other marginalizing characteristics of both Appius Herdonius and Catiline are their alliances with exiles/outcasts; their association with slaves; their readiness to side with outsiders; and, in Herdonius’s case, his Sabine provenance. All of these traits call into question the legitimacy of their “Roman-ness”, a big issue in a society that not only considered its people and culture ipso facto superior, but also determined appropriate treatment and legal rights based on citizenship.

We thus seem to have ample reason to proceed with our analysis of this incident without fear of falling short of modern standards of definition, nor yet of reading ancient history in an anachronistic manner. Yet, having dealt thus summarily (as Livy does) with the mere event and its content, we are now forced to confront the strangeness of the Roman state’s response to and contextualization of the attack as we move into an examination of the titular ancient Roman state counter-terrorism. For, as was discussed earlier, not only were the conspirators successful in raising a variety of fears among the Roman elites; but it seemed that the senate was actually paralyzed by indecision regarding who or what the biggest threat might be, and how to deal with it. It is instead the plebs and their representatives, the tribunes of the people, who for better or worse take a stance and act decisively. Livy writes that amidst the chaos “such madness seized the tribunes that they claimed that it was not war, but the mere mirage of war that had seized the Capitol, in order to divert the people’s attention from considering the Law” (3.16.5). They thus call on the people to lay down their arms and go vote on the aforesaid measure; the consuls call the senate together, since “a greater fear was now apparent, due to the tribunes’ actions, than that which the night attack had called forth in them” (3.16.6).

The law in question is the Lex Terentilia, which was introduced by Gaius Terentilius Harsa in 462 BCE as described in Livy 3.9. This law sought to rein in the power of the ruling oligarchy by establishing a code of written and publicly accessible laws that would apply to everybody equally, and the bulk of Livy’s third book is occupied with the attempted introduction of the law and its fallout. The patres spend most of book 3.9-32 fighting the law by any means at their disposal, while the tribunes try desperately to have it ratified. Eventually, after an embassy is sent to Athens to study their laws in 454, a board of ten men (the decemviri legibus scribundis) is appointed in 451 BCE. Livy 3.33-54 is occupied with them, and the remainder of the book (3.55-72) with the aftermath. I bring up the numbers merely to show that, in the years with which we are concerned, this was the true crisis at Rome (at least according to Livy’s narrative); and that Appius Herdonius and his attack are a mere blip on the radar compared to that issue, both in terms of the narrative and of the aforementioned dismissal of his threat by the Senators as soon as they hear of the plebs’ actions.

It is now possible to approach the first instance of the formal construction of the terrorist event, that which occurs within the narrative. P. Valerius Publicola makes a speech to the tribunes and citizenry in which he implies that the tribunes are in league with Appius
Herdonius, and in particular ironically (and unfavorably) compares them to slaves, since where Herdonius’ appeal failed to cause an insurrection, it has been effective at least in winning over the tribunes (3.17.2). He then turns to the people and accuses them of impiety for failing to free the temples on the Capitol from enemies (3.17.3-6). Finally, and most strikingly, he makes a fearsome threat: he would issue the call to arms, and if any should obstruct it, _iam se consularis imperii, iam tribuniciae potestatis sacratarumque legume oblitum, quiosque ille sit, ubicumque sit, in Capitolio, in foro, pro hoste habiturum_, “he would ignore the limits of his consular authority, the power of the tribunes, and the sacred laws, and treat them, whosoever and wheresoever they might be, whether in the Capitol or forum, as enemies” (3.17.7), an extreme position for a man who has just used traditional religion as the basis for his appeal to the populace. Throwing another rhetorical twist into the mix, the consul adds that _ausurus se in tribunis, quod princeps familie suae ausus in regibus esset_, “he would dare to do to the tribunes what the founder of his family had done to the kings” (3.17.8). The direct threats drive off the tribunes as night begins to fall: they are _timentes consulum arma_, “in fear of the consuls’ arms” (3.17.9), while the people, bereft of their leaders, are then plied by the _patres_ with arguments as to how they are putting the city in danger (3.17.10).

The method of state counter-terrorism at Rome, then, is to return terror for terror, and to ensure unity through fear. All, even the most sacred and time-honored protections due to Roman citizens, are potentially suspended before the supposed threat from the Capitol. The person of the tribunes, for example, was supposed to be completely inviolable under any circumstances; the consular _imperium_ did not extend to the slaughter or execution of Roman citizens. Yet the threat level is elevated to such a pitch, that the argument can be made that any lack of cooperation is an immediate and overwhelming danger to the state and tantamount to terrorist activity in its own right. In the case of the tribunes, Valerius Publicola makes no bones at all about his conflation of them with Herdonius’ conspiracy, and the concurrent delegitimization of comparing them to, on the one hand, rebellious slaves, who have no protections under Roman law and are usually tortured, punished, and executed in various horrible ways, of which crucifixion is the most infamous; and on the other, with the tyrannical kings of early Roman legend, who also were to be treated harshly, and with impunity, as the natural enemies of the Republic.

Furthermore, it might easily be argued, this is an artificial elevation of the threat Herdonius poses, since it has been shown that nobody is really very concerned about it at all. The senate dawdles, meets, and scarcely arms the plebs lest they rise up against them; the plebs decides to vote on laws. In logical terms, it is hard to see how a “greater fear” than that of the attack could possibly arise in the way Livy describes it from an ancillary circumstance such as the plebs’ vote, and yet the disruption of that vote be justified in terms of coming together against a greater imminent threat. Either the vote is the greater threat, or Herdonius is; and it is quite crystal clear that, in spite of the rhetoric, the _patres_ know very well which one is which. Thus the event, whatever its “true” nature might be, is constructed in such a way by the _patres_ that it is a powerful weapon in their arsenal against constitutional reform. Of this construction it might be
said that it exercises a delegitimizing function, much as the label “terrorism” does. Yet what is fascinating about this function in the Roman context is that it is not primarily utilized against Herdonius and his crew, who are already entirely illegitimate in the eyes of all concerned, patres and plebs, well before the forces of consular propaganda are deployed (both Valerius’ speech and the groups of sympathetic patres who later make the rounds among the common folk, once the tribunes have been frightened off); and they are simply considered fair game as active enemies within the city. Delegitimizing functions are only effective insofar as they are deployed against relatively legitimate targets; otherwise there is simply no point. This has, in my opinion, long been a problem with the received doctrine that labels such as, and analogous to, “terrorism” are meant to delegitimize their objects. In some cases, this may be true; but more generally, the situation works precisely in the reverse direction. In order for society to readily and unthinkingly accept the label “terrorist”, it has to be applied to an already tarnished and unsympathetic target. There was no need to tarnish the 9/11 attackers in the United States, for instance, any more than there was need to do so in the case of Herdonius in 460 BCE. Instead, the particular application of the label “terrorist”, along with the counter-terrorist methods proposed to accompany it, gain in traction by being associated with a heinous target. The delegitimizing function, that is, springs from the terrorists, and not vice-versa; and its only potential target for delegitimization is one that is, unlike the heinous (in public perception, that is) terrorist, considered in everyday discourse to be perfectly legitimate. This then becomes a truly powerful tool in the hands of whichever state force is able to control the discourse; hence the efforts of consul and patres to get their version of events out as quickly and as broadly as possible.

In this case, the targets are those two inviolable boundaries, the Roman citizen body, and especially those of the threatening tribunes. Under the new senatorial construction of the situation at Rome, these bodies are now available for slaughter. The counter-terrorist counter-threat is so serious that it drives the tribunes from the political field. Meanwhile, there is an attempt, as was previously mentioned, to frighten the population into setting aside their vote to deal with the present threat. Thus, fear and violence are no less tools of the counter-terrorist state than of the terrorists themselves, at least in Livy’s portrait of ancient Rome. Yet in order to understand the full extent of its ideological motivation, and its effectiveness, it is illuminating to consider how the Herdonius episode ends. The actual battle is dealt with summarily; Tusculum, a Roman ally, sends troops, which join the Romans, who have been convinced to take arms by a promise of P. Valerius, thrown in almost as an afterthought in 3.18 between the arrival of the men of Tusculum and the battle itself, rather than being included in the consul’s speech in 3.17. The wording of the promise is strange, too; Livy describes it thus: “the man’s authority had persuaded them when he affirmed that, after the Capitol had been retaken and the city pacified, and so long as they would first allow him to reveal the trickery that the tribunes had concealed within the law…he would not impede the assembly of the plebs” (3.18.6). The parallel but slightly different account of the historian Dionysios of Halicarnassus makes no bones about it: the plebs had to be promised the chance to vote on the law before they would agree to fight (Dion. Hal. 10.15.3-7). Livy’s text thus constitutes a strange evasion of the facts. Events culminate
with a series of short, sharp clauses: *multi exsulum caede sua foedavere templum, multi vivi capti, Herdonius interfectus. Ita Capitolium recuperatum,* “many exiles polluted the temple with their blood; many were taken alive; Herdonius was killed. Thus was the Capitol retaken” (3.18.10). The longest scene in the account of the fighting is that in which P. Valerius is killed. This results in complications that are indissolubly tied to the chain of events surrounding Herdonius’ short-lived insurrection. In fact, it might be argued that Livy’s narrative again places the emphasis on these results by dealing with the actual “event” in such a cursory, almost dismissive manner. The text performs the fading of the event in the face of its construction as pretext, and the consequent manner in which it is the true agenda that then looms large. To what, then, does this agenda, this construction, amount?

Rather than accede to the demands of the plebs that P. Valerius’ promise be honored, the *patres* replace him with the man least likely to do so, L. Quinctius Cincinnatus, whose son had been forced into exile by the tribunes and plebs, and who had lost his wealth as a result of the forfeit of a kind of bail on his behalf. Furthermore, it was because his son had been so violent in his opposition to the new law that he had been charged with a capital crime (Lintott 56-60). Cincinnatus begins his term in office (3.19) by haranguing the tribunes, again conflating them with the conspirators: “Did Aulus Verginius there [one of the tribunes] deserve a lesser punishment than Appius Herdonius just because he wasn’t in the Capitol? No, by Hercules, he even deserved more…” (3.19.6); he promises that it will be a terrible thing for the state if the law is passed (3.19.11); and ends by declaring his intention to march against the neighboring Volsci and Aequi: “How great a danger those peoples would have presented if they had known the Capitol to be occupied by exiles” (3.19.12). War, of course, would preclude a vote; and in his speech Cincinnatus makes it clear that this is the real reason for the attack, all the while couching it in justifications on grounds of state security and fear of recurrent attack. But that is not all; a legalistic wrangle ensues when the tribunes say they will refuse to allow a levy. Cincinnatus responds that the plebs took an oath to muster until released from duty during Herdonius’ insurrection, and that, since they have not yet been released from that muster, he does not need to make a new levy (3.20.3-4). Furthermore, he would have them assemble near Lake Regillus, and was having augurs prepare a spot for assembly business. Due to Roman traditions of *imperium*, since the location was more than a mile outside the city, the consul could do whatever he wanted without possibility of legal appeal even on the part of the tribunes; and so the “assembly” would have to vote whichever way he wished. Again, as a direct result of the terrorist act of Appius Herdonius, the state is able to suspend citizen rights on the grounds of military expediency and national security, and its tool, Livy tells us, is terror. If, then, the vanishing terrorist “event” is more conspicuous for smoke than fire, and if the state employs that smoke as screen, then what it does behind that screen under the guise of counter-terrorist policy is not just fighting fire with fire (that is again a pretext, and a rhetorical turn); rather, it unilaterally brings the heat.

*Terrebant haec; sed ille maximus terror animos agitabat, quod saepius Quinctius dictabet se consulum comitia non habiturum…dictatore opus esse rei publicae,* “These things were terrifying; but the greatest terror before their minds was that Cincinnatus
continually stated that he would have no fellow consul...the republic had need of a dictator” (3.20.8). In order to avoid this, the tribunes and plebs have to surrender to the authority of the senate, which decrees that in exchange for not continuing the levy, the people and their representatives must not bring the law up for vote that year, and the tribunes must not stand for re-election (3.21.1-2). Except for his account of the elections, this is the end of Livy’s narrative on the year 460 BCE, and it ends on this note of terror and its use to coerce elements problematic to the “state”. The language of national security blends with that of medicine in justifying such extreme tactics: non ita civitatem aegram esse ut consuetis remediis sisti possit, “the state was so sick that the usual remedies could not help it” (3.20.8). Yet the formulation only highlights the abstract nature of “the state”, and the way in which one interest group (the ruling class) has taken over the discourse, and thus pretends to have the authority to evaluate and speak for the state (any deviation from this norm is figured by “sickness”, which must presumably be purged). Meanwhile, those elements which have been stripped of their normal protections and citizen rights, having no court of appeal beyond that which itself legislated away their security, have no choice but to surrender to the state or be treated as common enemies. Livy Ab Urbe Condita book 3 thus shows how a particular category of outlaw analogous to our “terrorist” functions within the state; and though it is arguable that the concrete outcome is a result of the state’s mismanagement, by problematizing the use of a terrorist event in this way Livy’s text highlights the degree to which the signifier is an arbitrary construction subject to (ab)use by any who are strong enough to take control of the discourse; and that neither can such a constructed category be used in a non-artificial, i.e. apolitical or disengaged manner, since it is in no way “natural”, but a result of human activity within the context of a state.

Yet the foregoing analysis would not be complete without pushing Livy’s argument to its logical limits – if the category of “terrorism”, or analogous categories such as those deployed by the Roman state in Livy’s narrative, are truly constructs dominated by discourse, then they are, to put it crudely, empty of content (indeed, they are receptacles to be filled with dissidents and other inconvenient parties); not solidly and naturally defined or definable (strict definition would make them less flexible tools), but a gap whose outlines are given form by the surrounding social structure. Form, not content, is their predominant characteristic. As such, it is not surprising that the meaning of terms such as “terrorism” have changed so much over time, been put to so many uses, and indeed even now resist any and all attempts to define them. This is their secret and their strength, and they mislead those who would essentialize them, including scholars. For, if terrorism et al. qua things are red herrings in politics, they are also red herrings in history, and any historian who goes looking for them according to the current definition set into play by contemporary political events will, in “finding” what she/he seeks, retroject the category in precisely the fashion that Livy projects Catiline back into the 5th century in constructing Herdonius as a member of the same category (it is not for nothing that the term “repetition” comes from the Latin repeto, to seek again). The inevitable effect of such (re)constructions of history is to valorize the current discourse in all its political manifestations by giving the illusion of reality and dangerous recurrence to the artificial category, and thus helping to foster the fear that is essential to state counter-terrorisms. Incidentally, this process also flattens and falsifies historical
and cultural difference, much as in Livy’s account archaic Rome becomes late Republican Rome, to our eternal detriment.

The alternative is to avoid the red herrings of “terrorism”, coniuratio, and all their ilk in favor of the true object of study, the functional categories by which groups are marginalized by making them the objects of fear, and extralegal actions against them are justified on the grounds of imminent threat and unofficial status. This is to say, it is precisely this form of manipulation of discourse which defines such categories; the labels, the content hardly matters. The added advantage of such an approach is that it preserves genuine possibilities for cross-cultural and diachronic comparative material, without limiting access to exempla that fit a narrow cultural and historical category (such as “terrorism”). By exposing the workings of state counter-terror both within the narrative (by showing the dynamics of fear and manipulation at play in the Roman state response, and blatantly minimizing the importance of the actual attack) and across narratives (by alluding to themes of historical recurrence and typology across time periods and historical texts such as Sallust’s), Livy’s text points modern historians toward the problems (and, perhaps, their solutions) inherent in attempting to trace the workings of categories such as terror.

1 Livy’s concise description runs sedabant tumultus, sedandum interdum movebant (3.15.7).
2 There is debate about how to translate and understand the title patres in its early Republican context; it is often taken as meaning “senators”; but it can also mean simply the men of the leading families, whether they had any such official title or not at the time, for it is unclear how old the formal institution of the Senate might be. Cf. Cornell Beginnings 245-51; Niebuhr I.338ff.; Momigliano 591 n.93; Richard 233-4; Palmer 197-9. In the text I have simply chosen to leave the title in its original Latin.
3 Hoffman 1-42 is an excellent discussion on the history and difficulties involved in defining the term “terrorism.” He ends by eschewing definition in favor of a substrate of common characteristics, an approach that seems eminently sensible in view of the inability of bodies such as the United Nations to agree on a working definition, even after convening a panel of experts. According to Robert Adolph’s insider account, the panel came up with no less than 109 different possible definitions.
4 Bottiglieri sees this account of evidence for ethnic conflict based on his reading of Dionysios’ version of the story; but even there it is clear that Herdonius is acting in no official capacity. Peruzzi has a slightly different take on the Sabine character of Herdonius’ attack.
5 And, since the attackers know that they cannot possibly take over Rome on their own, their seizure of the Capitol is much more the assumption of a public platform than of an attack position.
6 Ogilvie 423-4, and ad 3.15.5, 7; 3.16.2-4; and 3.17.1. In his note to 3.16.1, Ogilvie also sees a possible allusion to Cicero’s speech in Catilinam, and so the references may extend beyond Sallust, though he is certainly the primary model. On the other hand Noè, unlike Ogilvie, sees Catilinarian elements in Dionysios’ account as well, which if true might point to a common source for this aspect of Livy’s reading.
Incidentally, he also raises the important theme of the literariness of history and the recurrence of types and events, as well as the question of the nature of the relationship between the two. The ramifications of this dimension will be discussed in the paper’s conclusion.

E.g. Cic. Cat. 4.10.20; Sall. C. 52.17 and 52.24; and Suet. Caes. 17.

In his preface alone, for instance, Livy writes that other peoples must accept Rome’s version of events with the same equanimity that they accept their rule, even when they claim such seeming absurdities as their descent from Mars (Preface 7); and that he is much mistaken unless nulla umquam res publica nec maior nec sanctior nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit, “there has never been a state greater nor more religiously observant nor richer in good examples” than Rome (Preface 11).

The story is recounted in 3.11-14. Ogilvie 416-8 believes that it is almost certainly a fabrication meant to explain the tradition that Cincinnatus was called to the dictatorship as he was plowing, an improbable state of economic affairs for such a prominent figure; but cf. contra Cornell Beginnings 249 n.27.

Works Cited