The Forgotten Principle
Fraternity in Its Public Dimension
Antonio Maria Baggio
Sophia University Institute

In this article, the author presents background on the notion of fraternity, as well as events in Europe and in Latin America during the past decade or so that have led to a new scholarship on this “forgotten principle.” This scholarship that began in Europe, spread to Latin America, and then back to Europe with new insights and publications in the fields of philosophy, political science, sociology, psychology, economics, and theology. The author cites publications in both Europe and Latin America that have been important contributions to this scholarship. Chiara Lubich, as we will see in the following articles, has contributed to this intellectual movement. And Pope Francis has proclaimed that “fraternity” will be the theme of the Day for Peace in 2014.

Why speak today about fraternity in relation to political theory and practice? This question is neither useless nor rhetorical if we take into consideration that the concept of fraternity does not belong to any consolidated teaching of diverse disciplines dealing with politics such as the social and human sciences, economics, history, philosophy, and law. There is no in-depth study of a tradition dealing with fraternity in politics. The very term “fraternity” is missing from political dictionaries, except in a few extraordinary cases. Instead, we find the concepts of “liberty” and “equality” which, together with fraternity, compose the known “triptych” (liberté, égalité, fraternité) of the French Revolution of 1789. But while the principles and duties of equality and liberty have developed from 1789 onwards, becoming tried and true political categories and having entered as legal principles in the Constitutions of many countries, this has not been true for fraternity.

The French “triptych” however, constitutes a theoretical precedent of particular importance. It does not in fact present itself as simple “datum” or as a “fact” from 1789 since its nature is much more complex. But in the roaring years of the revolution (1789–1794), it never became the official “motto” of France. In 1789, this triptych existed beside many others and its centrality had only a very brief lifespan. It was really liberty and equality that permanently characterized the first revolution. Only the revolution of 1848 elevated it to an official motto of the new Republican France; and it projected its meaning backwards in history making this triptych the symbol of the preceding revolution, giving it a historical importance that it really did not have. In this way, the 1848 revolution created the interpretation by presenting itself as the continuation and the completion of 1789. It is this process of historical re-reading that creates the rhetorical vision of the triptych and transmits it to us. The triptych successively lived through numerous and alternate vicissitudes until finding a definitive placement in Article 2 of the French Constitution of October 27, 1946.
The Appearance of Political Fraternity

Why then should we occupy ourselves with 1789 if the appearance of the triptych was so brief? The fact is that the Revolution of 1789 constitutes an historical reference of great relevance because for the first time in the modern era the idea of fraternity is interpreted and employed politically. It is true that along the history of the Western world, deeply influenced by Christian culture, a certain language of fraternity maintained a continuous presence starting with the New Testament writings where the terms “Christians” and “brothers” are often used as synonyms. During the course of Christian history, fraternity shows a vast spectrum of hues as to the contents of the concept: from the strong theological meaning of fraternity “in Christ,” to a myriad of practical manifestations that go from simple alms-giving, to the duty of hospitality and care, to monastic fraternity which presupposes co-habitation and sharing of goods. In the name of fraternity, hospitals, hospices, and schools were built. Therefore, especially in medieval and modern times, fraternity did not remain closed within a private realm but played a public role. It gave life to a complex world of social solidarity and care for those in need which preceded contemporary systems of welfare.

What is new in the triptych of 1789 is the acquisition on the part of fraternity of a political dimension through its combination and its interaction with the other two principles that characterize contemporary democracies: liberty and equality. Before 1789, one spoke of fraternity without liberty and civil equality; and also fraternity was spoken of in substitution to them. This happened in virtue of the fact that liberty and equality were not yet recognized as principles characterizing citizenship, nor had they been taken on as rights upheld by political institutions. The revolutionary triptych tore fraternity from the variegated interpretations of tradition and inserted it in a totally new context together with liberty and equality as three principles and ideals constitutive of a fresh political prospective. For this reason, the triptych introduced—or better, caused people to glimpse—a new world; a novum that created problems for the way Christianity had up until then understood fraternity. However, it was a novum that was announced and readily failed due to the almost immediate disappearance of fraternity from the public scene. What has remained in the forefront has been liberty and equality, more often antagonistic than allies—antagonistic because they lack fraternity—integrated in some way between them within democratic systems. They became an extreme synthesis of two visions of the world, of two economic and political systems, which continually contended for power in the following centuries.

Liberty and equality have thus undergone an evolution that has made them true and proper political categories, able to express themselves both as constitutional principles and as guidelines for political movements. The idea of fraternity did not enjoy such a fate. If one makes exception for the French situation, it has lived a very marginal journey similar to that of an underground river whose rare surfacing was not able to adequately irrigate the political terrain until democratic thought became silent about its existence.

However, things started to change during the last few decades. Certainly, historians’ interest in the Revolution had never lessened, and within a general context they dealt with the French motto. But with the bicentennial date of the 1789 Revolution, a new interest manifested itself in the triptych in its entirety and in the specifics of fraternity, not only in France but elsewhere. Some
particularly important studies published in this rediscovery period bring to light a trajectory that helps explain the significance that is assumed in occupying oneself with fraternity in a political mode.

**Toward the Bicentennial of the 1789 Revolution: The Rediscovery of Fraternity**

The first essay of a certain weight explicitly dedicated to fraternity was written by the British historian John M. Roberts. His essay dealing with the topic of the revolutionary triptych was published in a periodical number dedicated to Freemasonry.1 Roberts develops a substantially informed and balanced study in which he deals with the revolutionary triptych in itself as much as with its relationship with Freemasonry. Under this particular aspect, he substantially accepts the conclusions reached by Béatrice Hyslop2 and above all by Robert Amadou adding to them new data and reflections. Amadou was a French scholar of great ability and profound knowledge of Freemasonry and the esoteric French environment. He had in the previous two years dedicated some important studies on this topic, arriving at excluding the invention of the triptych as having Masonic origins.3 “I think,” John Roberts stressed, “that the question remains there, where academic historians left it.”4 The importance of the work of John M. Roberts was that of recalling attention to the problem of the triptych, bringing it through a review with rather small diffusion yet present in many university libraries, outside of the heated discussion in the Masonic environment.5

Directly after Roberts’ work, we find research by Gérald Antoine6 at the urging of UNESCO. At the end of the seventies, ten years before the bicentennial, it seemed pertinent to ask in what measure the great ideals of the revolution—exemplified by the three terms of the triptych—had been present in the culture of successive centuries and whether they were still vital for the Europe of 1989. The research was conducted with contributions by the Institut de la Langue Française (Institute of French Language) of Nancy, which made available its collections starting from the _Trésor de la langue française_ (Treasure of the French Language), and the Laboratoire d’Étude des Textes Politiques Français” (Laboratory for the Study of Political French Texts) in the École Normale Supérieure of Saint-Cloud. The archives of these two institutes, obtained through the computerized sifting of an enormous quantity of texts, provided an inventory of terms and of concordances on the triptych existing in French literature from 1789 onwards. This material gave Antoine, as well as all others interested in this topic,7 a base for good semantic research. Antoine research integrated two other terms which, according to him, constitute two variants of fraternity: “solidarity” and “participation.” The work was published in 1981 and was carried out mostly from the point of view of the history of the language, but was also rich

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5. I thank sincerely Mrs. Irène Mainguy, archivist at the Bibliothèque du Grand Orient de France in Paris, for helping me during my research.
in its implications for all other perspectives. Addressing the question on the disappearance of fraternity, Antoine presents two observations. On the one hand, he claims that fraternity has “always suffered, in the eyes of many, from the excess of its ambitions and from the vague scope deriving from it. One finds an illustration of such a danger in the theory of ‘Fraternal Harmonies’ of the excellent Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, enclosing man, animals, and the vegetal world”; and on the other hand, “the concept of fraternity has very powerful Christian roots that keep it from being a sign of general recognition,” adding that one had to wait for 1848 for the concept of fraternity to find new meanings and wider consensus.

With his observations, Antoine exactly locates the problem of the origin and meanings of fraternity: the “universal bond” as per Saint-Pierre turns out to be logically and politically inefficient, while a more precise connotation of the concept through its inevitable Christian roots is refused because it wars with the “republican” idea of fraternity that imposes itself during the eighteen hundreds. Therefore, Antoine tells us, on the one hand one would like fraternity understood as a universal bond and with strong contents; but on the other one does not want to admit Christianity as the source of fraternity and of those same contents.

We can reply to both of Antoine’s arguments. First of all, it is true that the idea of fraternity generally has a religious source. It is transmitted, even before the concepts themselves, by means of mythical tales that are at the origin of different civilizations. We have then, not just one idea of fraternity, but many, connected to interpretations of original symbols of different cultures that, in a contemporary multicultural society, interact amongst themselves.

We think of Cain and Abel, of Antigone and Ismene, of Romolus and Remus, etc. These representations of fraternity constitute relational models orienting and inspiring human relations. They communicate important contents to cultures descending from those religions, even in cases where cultures have become “secularized” and have become disconnected from their religious roots. The fact that fraternity, as well as other key concepts, come from a religious terrain, is simply a given. It is certainly no motive for declaring the irrelevance of such ideas or to abandon the study thereof since their contents are present in the culture, both of a religious person and of one who is not. Scientific research, real study, has the duty of taking in consideration those important conceptual ties. Antoine’s objection is frequent and an in-depth study of this topic can bring meaningful results when carried out with seriousness. One cannot accept scholarship if it is used for antireligious reasons, which no serious researcher can afford to do. Secondly, the republican idea of fraternity announcing itself in 1848—as well as successive variants—is one interpretation of fraternity. It proposes itself as universal, when, in effect, it is not. 1848 presents a first example of various interpretive efforts in the history of the last two centuries to claim universality for successive re-interpretations, inevitably partial, because conducted from a single point of view, of the concept of fraternity.

Coming closer to 1989, one increasingly perceives the importance of the triptych and of fraternity within it. Various studies were made about both the triptych and fraternity, characterized by a great range of interpretations. In a brief, yet dense essay,

8. Antoine, 134.

Giuseppe Panella, explored the complexity of the concept of fraternity and of its multiple historical roles. In concluding, he claims that the role of fraternity is not so much an applicative and political type, as much as a relational foundation:

[D]iffering from concepts of liberté and of égalité the importance of fraternity is neither juridical nor institutional and, as a consequence, is subjected, more than those others, to movements of practical politics. From this arises the need for a re-consideration, and, probably, for a re-evaluation of a nature that is no longer political, but anthropologically motivated.¹⁰

For Alberto Martinelli, the triptych is a signal of an epochal turn:

*Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité* . . . have, for two centuries, constituted the normative and interpretative core of modern society. The three principles did not express radically new concepts and aspirations, but they were transformed, and extended, through collective action, acquiring a universal meaning and defining with particular vigour the modern project for a desirable society.¹¹

From these considerations, one understands the necessity for serious historical research able to go in depth into the different meanings that fraternity has taken on in the mutating of cultures and political projects. From the point of view of the history of ideas, such works are not lacking. Apart from the research commissioned by UNESCO, two French authors in particular have contributed to the “rediscovery” of fraternity through large-scale works which go far beyond the bicentennial celebrations. These scholars are Marcel David, author of *Fraternité et révolution française* (1987),¹² followed in 1992 by *Le printemps de la fraternité : Genèse et vicissitudes 1830–1851*,¹³ and Michel Borgetto, with his doctoral thesis that is almost a definitive work, set in French Constitutional history: *La notion de fraternité en droit public français : Le passé, le présent et l’avenir de la solidarité*.¹⁴ Borgetto was then entrusted with drafting of a more popular volume in the collection “Que Sais-Je?” entitled: *La devise “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.”* ¹⁵ which can in no way substitute the seven-hundred pages of the major work, but is very useful from a didactic point of view.

Naturally, historians have done their part, some of them addressing specifically questions tied to the triptych and to fraternity in an attempt to understand the transformation of mentality. I am thinking of Michel Vovelle,¹⁶ but above all of Mona Ozouf¹⁷ and

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to her ability to bring out all the current aspects of these historical investigations. With the advent of the year 1989, the bibliography regarding the history of the Revolution becomes larger and references to fraternity become much more numerous. However, they do not add important elements to works already mentioned. Rather, in those years in France, there developed a strongly “deconstructive” attitude in regard to the idea of fraternity. While it is rejected as a “political” idea, at the same time the efforts that a few authors dedicated towards demolishing it, testify as to its importance.

For example, in a seminar during 1988–1989, Jacques Derrida puts the relationship between fraternity and democracy at the center of his analysis. He investigates the semantic game that involves the “brother” and the “friend,” in order to underline the “problematic” and the “obscurity” of the “language of fraternity.” At the same time, he sees that language as inescapable:

Where lies the problem then? Here it is: I have not stopped asking myself, I ask that we ask ourselves what it means when we say “brother,” when we call someone “brother.” And when we re-accept or take in the humanity of man equally as to the otherness of the other . . . I ask myself, that’s all, and ask that we ask ourselves what is the implicit politics in this language.18

Here, Derrida expresses the idea that fraternity carries with itself something more fundamental than birth, genealogy, and relationship with a set of parents. Jean-Luc Nancy asks us to consider “if it were possible to think of a fraternity without father or mother, prior to and not posterior to every law and every common substance.”19

Fraternity, the Crisis of Democracy and a View from the United States

The interest in fraternity increases in the measure in which perceptions grow of a sort of “deficit” of political reflection, of at least a partial impotence politics has in facing unresolved problems of democracies. These perceptions have given rise to a certain realization that the principles of liberty and equality are far from being fully realized. Skepticism is growing regarding the universal dimension of democratic principles. One perceives they are “wearing out,” and people have come to doubt their applicability in vast political societies outside of small groupings. It is the problem put, among others, with particular authority by Robert Dahl, who raises an alarm and opens reflection in this regard.20

In brief, the difficulties encountered in realizing problems associated with the principles of democracy bring mistrust and impoverishment, not only of political facts but of their very contents. If we were to accept this situation, we would resign ourselves to failure as democratic societies to achieve the reason of its existence: that of guaranteeing fundamental rights to all, on the basis of universal principles and not on the basis of a privileged belonging to a family, a group, a class, a place, a race. Today’s discussion of fraternity resembles a Kantian court, forcing one to verify “the possibilities and the limits” of liberty and equality by themselves to achieve

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the utopian or realistic character of the democratic ideal. Roberto Mancini has observed that:

[I]t is in connection with the value and the demand for fraternity that the pretention of universality of liberty and equality can be verified. In putting fraternity, once more, within political reasoning, means bringing to justice the pretensions of universality of any other ideology of historical project.21

These reflections can be inserted in a debate characterized by some referring dates in the United States. One of them coincides with the principal work by John Rawls. In his 1971 *A Theory of Justice*, he put forward what could be considered an attempt to insert elements of fraternity in the fundamental structure of society. Rawls’ language, in effect, dissimulates the discussion on fraternity from liberty and equality. For this reason, his work generally is not featured in studies on the topic of the triptych. But let us not be deceived. The same Rawls seems to explain this by writing:

In comparison with liberty and equality, the idea of fraternity has had a lesser place in democratic theory. It is thought to be less specifically a political concept, not in itself defining any of the democratic rights but conveying instead certain attitudes of mind and forms of conduct without which we would lose sight of the values expressed by these rights.22 As we can see from this description, Rawls’ words do not diminish the importance of fraternity which would seem to consist in ways of seeing and acting in order to conserve the valuable contents of rights, or better, the substance of living according to the rules of democracy. For Rawls “fraternity is held to represent a certain equality of social esteem manifest in various public conventions and in the absence of manners of deference and servility.”23 Moreover fraternity includes “a sense of civic friendship and social solidarity. . . Thus understood, it expresses no definite requirement.”24 It is here that Rawls coins a different terminology and undertakes the difficult process of building and defining the principles of justice because, as the situation of fraternity well exemplified, “we have yet to find a principle of justice that matches the underlying idea [of fraternity].”25 Rawls emphasizes that: “This difference principle does seem to correspond to a natural meaning of fraternity: namely, to the idea of not wanting to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off.”26

Even if the traditional language of fraternity is abandoned by Rawls, his intention is explicit: he wants to introduce a systemic fraternity as an inescapable element for a new contractual theory. He does it through the “principle of difference” which should translate within principles regarding institutions, as the ability—characteristic of fraternal relationships—of maintaining a certain equality between those who are different. Rawls builds a scheme of social co-operation inside of which “the difference principle expresses a conception of reciprocity. It is a principle of mutual

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23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
benefit." In this way, through the logical construction of the principle of difference, fraternity “is not an impracticable conception. . . . On this interpretation, then, the principle of fraternity is a perfectly feasible standard,” as long as it is within the democratic conception.

We recall Rawls, here, not so as to indicate him as the solution to our problems. *A Theory of Justice* was only the beginning of a discussion that comes down to our days. But his work helps us to understand, through the example of a fundamental author in the political debate of the last decades, how the theme of fraternity can, paradoxically, be at one time central and hidden. We cannot escape the fact that *The Idea of Fraternity in America* by Wilson Carey McWilliams, one of the major works written on this topic, was published in 1973, two years after Rawls’ work and on the eve of another important bicentennials: of that revolution that brought the formation of the United States of America. McWilliams’ reflection on the role of fraternity in the history of the United States is in reality a reflection on the identity of the nation itself. It should be considered as a work that opens up a new horizon. Unfortunately, it was not followed by other seriously important works in the United States. But the fact remains that, beyond the particular thought of these two authors, with whom we may or may not agree, the topic of fraternity has had an emphasis within United States political theory that would merit being taken into consideration.

**Contributions by Chiara Lubich**

Changing Atlantic’s shores, a decisive impulse to reflections on fraternity in its public dimension has been given by Chiara Lubich and by her Abba School starting in the year 2000 through a series of talks and writings that occupied her up to 2004. One could say that she gave an explicit formulation to the question put forward by our time and which had started to wind itself here and there—that underground river we spoke of—in a periodical manner and in various ways: *Given the problematical realization of liberty and equality, also in the more developed democratic countries, could it not be due to the fact that fraternity had been, on a political level, practically totally disregarded?* In other terms, the three principles of the

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27. Ibid, 88.
French triptych could be compared to the legs of a table: they are all three necessary so that the table can stay upright. It is clear that this question can be answered only by someone who has a lived experience of fraternity, who has understood its strength. Indeed, Chiara Lubich and her companions lived fraternity as part of their spirituality of unity for over fifty years. We could say that the first contribution of Lubich regarding the above question about fraternity resulted from her Abba School where fraternity was transformed into a real and true methodology. It was to address this question that the collection of writings entitled *The Forgotten Principle,*32 was written. It constitutes the first result in the study of fraternity on the part of Chiara Lubich’s School.

Chiara Lubich also had the ability to consider fraternity not only as a need, but also as a resource already active in history. Experiences of fraternity characterized moments of historic changes in recent times, such as the transitions from authoritarian-dictatorial regimes to democratic systems (the Philippines after Marcos or South Africa after apartheid), or the resolution of conflicts which risked becoming permanent (Northern Ireland or Mozambique). These are only a few examples of case studies that when analyzed showed the relevance of fraternity, its cultural and social presence, and its public role. What was lacking until a few years ago was an adequate awareness of this presence. In the absence of an existence of fraternity, which generates a thought of fraternity, the ability was lacking to recognize fraternity and to understand its historical, cultural, and social role. What was perceived, instead, were the difficulties connected to the ambiguity of the term, its interpretations at times being exclusive or ideological. Based on her life of fraternity, Lubich had the ability to recognize fraternity in history and of comprehending possible new meanings. This was a second contribution of Lubich regarding the above question about fraternity.

Chiara Lubich understood that answering the question on fraternity requires a unified and in-depth commitment on the part of scholars together with persons working in the political field. This kind of collaboration cannot be improvised or produced around a table. It is born, essentially, from the reality of people’s lives and choices, and by groups that are moving in this direction able to offer a sample of experiences of growing relevance.33 It is necessary to develop this “research that acts,” to see things from an opposing and yet complementary point of view, to develop an “action that thinks and knows.” The collaboration between scholars and political leaders, between theory and practice, is a third contribution.

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32. Antonio M. Baggio, ed., *El principio olvidado: La fraternidad en la política y el derecho [The Forgotten Principle: Fraternity in Contemporary Political Reflection]* (Buenos Aires: Ciudad Nueva, 2006). Notwithstanding the authors of the book being all Italian, it was published first in Argentina and only the following year in Italy (*Il principio dimenticato: La fraternità nella riflessione politologica contemporanea* [Rome: Città Nuova, 2007]).

33. The “Political Movement for Unity,” founded by Chiara Lubich in 1996, started experiences of this kind in numerous places in the world, supplying “case studies” on fraternity. Jacques Attali in 1999 had underlined the spreading of a sensation of epochal passage, with the opening up of a horizon characterized by fraternity as a new utopia (utopia in the regulative sense), capable of assigning a task described as: “an institutional system that is coherent, rationally necessary, founded on new rights and capable of regulating concrete problems, such as unemployment, environmental degradation and moral misery” (Attali J., *Fraternités: Une nouvelle utopie* [Paris: Fayard, 1999], p. 24). On fraternity as “The greatly forgotten of republican triptych,” see Bruno Mattéi, particularly involved in the pedagogical sector and has successively contributed as well (see *La république n’est pas fraternelle,* “Le Monde” 21 [2002]; *La fraternité: Est-ce possible?* [Paris: Louis Audibert Editions, 2003]). See too the work of Gurutz Jáuregui, *La democracia en el siglo XXI: Un nuevo mundo, unos nuevos valores* (Oñati: Istituto Vasco de Administración Pública, 2004).
of Lubich regarding the above question about fraternity. Furthermore, in the case of fraternity, the separation between theory and practice had already been deadly at the time of the Revolution, as summarized by Antoine who said that fraternity was rejected because “it does not get along well with the harsh law of terror.”

If fraternity does not find theory-based translations and practical achievements in the public dimension, particularly in the political one, it cannot hope to keep any public meaning that would push it beyond private relationships.

The impulse given by Chiara Lubich has constituted a real turning point, both for the studies to which she originated, as well as the inspiration she was able to give to many other scholars, even in various other matters aside from politics. In the economic field, for example, the introduction of the principle of fraternity has allowed the creation of the concept of “civil economy.” Starting from the Forgotten Principle, numerous successive publications have had a strong interdisciplinary character because the relational dimension of fraternity, and the triptych in its entirety, throws light on many fields of the human and social sciences. Each field is not limited in considering the contribution of the idea of fraternity within itself, but tends to dialogue with other disciplines. Moreover, Lubich’s School created ties immediately between scholars in various parts of the world, particularly in connecting the two shores of the Atlantic. The Abba School is not of one country or culture, but since its inception it has created a dialogue between scholars of diverse cultures, and traditions (popular and academic).

It is not possible to understand the universality of fraternity if not through the contribution of all human societies each in its own original way. Furthermore, the meeting with historical cases in which fraternity was denied has had particular importance to the in-depth analysis of the principle of fraternity. In the case of revolutionary France which produced the triptych, we meet the revolution of the slaves of France. They brought the idea of fraternity which had met with death in Paris to be lived in America (in the colony of Saint-Domingue).

We have then, it seems to me, five elements that characterize the experience and the methodology concerning fraternity as launched by Chiara Lubich: (1) to begin from the understanding of a lived fraternity, (2) study and interpretation of history in the light of fraternity, (3) collaboration between theory and practice of fraternity in the public dimension, (4) inter-disciplinary studies, and (5) intercultural dialogue. Keeping track of this methodological complexity, which excludes easy and immediate responses, we have come to formulate anew the question of fraternity as applied to the public sphere in more advanced terms: Can fraternity become a third political category, beside liberty and equality, to complete and give new meaning to the foundations and to the prospects of democracy?

Let us try to address this question by proceeding step by step.

“Excluding” Interpretations of Fraternity

Studies in this field must face not only the forgotten situation of fraternity, but also remove the “rubble” that obstructs the field of study which was produced by reductive interpretations during these last two centuries, and which have contributed toward
generating a sort of diffidence regarding the very idea. This is the first step in the work to be done. For example, fraternity has been lived—and is still being lived today—in the form of a sectarian bond in the setting of secret organizations that try to influence economic and political power. Another distorted way of interpreting fraternity is as a class bond. The story of the second half of the nineteen hundreds has given us some cases in which, in the name of a proclaimed fraternity, some political regimes have denied other’s liberty, or indeed, have invaded countries to affirm a dominion disguised as fraternity. This was the case of the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe: the attempts to make changes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia that were stopped by the armored vehicles of “sister” nations.37 Again, fraternity can be used to establish a nationalistic bond that goes way beyond one’s just love for one’s country and reaches discrimination and hate for the foreigner.

These interpretations of fraternity cannot be considered as “different fraternities” nor as possible interpretations of fraternity capable of coexisting in a liberal and pluralistic society. They are interpretations of denial. In fact, they have in common the fact of excluding, that is, of eliminating human groups from the range of fraternity. They deny the universal dimension of the idea of fraternity referring it only to “partial” subjects, such as sects, classes, nations, and races. Universal fraternity is thus attributed to a particular subject, generating an ideological short circuit—the bad universality—which can bring about forms of de-humanization of adversaries, of those who do not come under one’s scheme of salvation. It is a fraternity that destroys and in the end self-destructs. From this point of view, the parable of fraternity in the French Revolution, from its beginning in 1789 to its self-destruction as Sanculotte and Jacobine fraternity in 1794, is paradigmatic.38

I would like to underscore that ideology does not belong exclusively to political culture. The lessons of history make us aware of the possibility for each thought to degenerate ideologically. For example, the crumbling of the Berlin wall has given us the illusion of leaving the ideological terrain and walking into the real land of prudent hope. But now we have new and powerful ideological forms that are lagging behind by opposing liberty to equality, prisoners of a dichotomy from which they are not able to escape. On the other hand, fraternity has gone on to acquire a universal meaning, coming to identify the subject to whom it can fully refer as “humanity.” This is the only subject that can guarantee the complete expression of the other two principles as well. Many problems that have arisen in the course of recent centuries could be interpreted today and examined through the lens of fraternity. Democratic principles inasmuch as they are universal would have

37. I was able to see directly the deformation of the concept of fraternity produced by the ideological apparatus of socialist regimes in East European countries. In a series of conferences and public meetings dedicated to deepening further the topic of fraternity in politics at Prague and Bratislave during 2001, the first public responses were always marked by diffidence and required dealing with the doubts and the meaning of the term.

38. Antoni Domènech, in his El eclipse de la fraternidad: Una revisión republicana de la tradición socialista (Barcelona: Crítica, 2004), re-proposes the ideological scheme of a fraternity that is exclusively Jacobine which would then find its natural heir in the socialism of the 1800’s. The aim is that of re-proposing today that idea of fraternity at the heart of a new socialist ideology. Historical reading of the French Revolution on the part of Domènech appears weak and ideological, as the easy liquidation of Gironda’s experience. Moreover, the conclusion is not scientifically acceptable—it cannot be defined as anything other than “dogmatic”—in regards to the United States’ tradition. It ignores completely the rich bibliography that it offers, both in the overcoming of “slavery” and in the role of fraternity in modern history of the North American continent.
the natural tendency of being applied to a universal subject: humanity. But humanity is badly divided, and universal principles cannot find adequate application while we are prisoners of this division.

Fraternity has had a certain, if partial, political application through the idea of “solidarity.” There has been a progressive recognition of social rights in some political regimes that have given origin to “welfare” politics, or rather, to politics that seek to guarantee social rights of citizenship. In effect, solidarity gives a partial application to the contents of fraternity. But, I believe that fraternity has a certain specific meaning of its own which is not reducible to all meanings of solidarity, even though good and positive, through which one tries to give fraternity an application. For example, solidarity allows that good be done to others while maintaining a position of strength, a relationship that is “vertical” going from the strong to the weak. Fraternity instead does not accept subordination. It brings crisis to a relationship of power, since it presupposes a horizontal relationship in the distribution and the sharing of goods and powers; so much so, that the more it is being elaborated in theory and in practice, the idea of a “horizontal solidarity” emerges. This is in effect a form of fraternity as it refers both to the free mutual help between diverse subjects in the social setting, as well as between subjects at equal institutional levels.

I feel, in concluding this section, that we can say that fraternity takes on an adequate political dimension, and is therefore intrinsic to the political process itself, not estranged or applied to it from the outside, only if two very important conditions are met:

• **The first**: Fraternity becomes a constitutive part of the criteria for political decision making, contributing toward determining, together with liberty and equality, the method and contents of politics itself.
• **The second**: It is able to influence the way with which other political categories are interpreted, such as liberty and equality. One must in fact, guarantee a dynamic interaction between principles, without getting rid of any, in all public settings: from that of political economy (decisions on investments, distribution of resources) to the legislative and judiciary (balancing rights among people, between individuals and community, between communities), to the international (responding to the demands of relationships between countries, to be able to confront problems of continental dimensions as well as planetary, and, above all, for the building and maintaining of peace).

What does “Political Category” Mean? And in what way can Fraternity be Such?

To ask whether fraternity could be a political category requires an awareness of the meaning of the terms used so as to avoid ambiguities in the formulation of the question. It is true that the expression “categories of politics” can intuitively be understood. I believe it is useful though to recall briefly the meanings of the terms in question or at least, the meanings they take on in these pages. The terms to be clarified are two: “category” and “politics.”

As to the first one, “category” is used in an analogous way as that established by Aristotle. For him, categories are the original “divisions” of the being to which correspond, on the logical level, the most general predicates of the being. For example, there are a number of concepts that define the category of “substance,” that
answer the question: “What is substance?”39 It is through categories that the boundaries can be traced concerning that about which we are talking. To include or exclude a concept from the group of categories that regard a subject under exam modifies from its roots the identity of the subject under examination. Aristotle sustained that the “being is pronounced in many ways,”40 and these meanings are as numerous as are the categories that belong to it. Analogously, we can say that politics may be defined in as many ways as there are categories that belong to it.

The second term, “politics,” derives from polis, city. It refers to the koinonìa politikè, the “political society,” the society that is proper of a city. To speak of politics means to speak of the city and its citizens. In the city, exist many types of bonds: bonds of blood, bonds of friendship, of interests, of pleasure, of games, etc. Each of these bonds defines a sphere of belonging (family, friendship, business, etc.). “Political” is that bond constituting the relationship of citizenship, of belonging to a city and only this kind of belonging. I am not referring here to a particular interpretation of citizenship among many proposed in history, but to the way of defining it through a specific relationship, the relationship of citizenship there where it exists. Let us consider then “political,” that which has to do with the exercise of the bond of citizenship, or its affirmation or negation relative to single and collective subjects; its conservation from external and internal threats; and the actions, conflicts, and ideas that develop around citizenship.

To consider if fraternity can be a “political category” means that through it we can form political judgements in unlimited numbers. And in fraternity having a determined, precise nature, in forming such judgements, we produce political thought—not thought of other kinds. However, the concept of fraternity involves a particular complexity due to the fact that it expresses a relationship. It never indicates a lone subject, even when it refers to a single subject, to that particular brother or sister. The designation of a subject as brother or sister always expresses a relationship between subjects.

The relationship indicated by fraternity is something exact, precise, and not confusing: it indicates a relationship of parity between two different subjects, between two subjects who come from the same parents, from an identical cause. Fraternity indicates a uniting cause. But in itself is plural, composite, being constituted by such a relationship that also applies a principle of difference in the generation of two equals. The brothers and sisters, the subjects we are considering, were generated as different (even when they happen to be twins, as the twinship typology of various mythologies demonstrates). From each of them can flow a choice, one’s own direction which, no matter how far between them, have the possibility to be perfectly “peer” in human value and dignity. Equality between brothers and sisters consists in the possibility of each being free in his or her own diversity. This content of the concept of fraternity—a minimum, and I would add a temporary content, but a necessary one and therefore of defining value—is not only intuitive and experiential, but is indeed confirmed and

39. There is a precedent in Plato that indicates five “supreme genres” of reality, which correspond to thought; *Sophist*, 254; Aristotle maintains the same correspondence: *Topics*, I, 9, 103b 20; *Categories*, I b 25.
40. This key idea of Aristotle is repeated various times in *Metaphysics*: VII, I, 1028 a 10–13; X, I, 1045b 27–35; etc.
sustained by the comparative study of fraternity as it is presented and interpreted by original narrations and in the practices of many civilizations.

The concept of fraternity implies therefore a relationship between liberty (difference) and equality (parity). It is experienced in its first form within the natural family. Here, each one is aware that he or she cannot choose one’s brothers or sisters; it constitutes a fact, a reality that can only be recognized. The brother or sister exists in a parity of rights, which each can exercise according to his or her free choice. Fraternity carries with it a principle of reality, which explains the constitution of a human being. Each man or woman I meet even though he or she may not be my brother or sister is truly or potentially a brother or sister to someone else, and is for this reason a carrier of natural rights to liberty and equality which fraternity guards in unity. Fraternity, inasmuch as a principle of reality, explains the way that the human being is, and the way he or she would like to be considered: free and equal, because of being a brother or sister.

From the dimension of the natural family, we pass on to the universal dimension of humanity. This means we must consider how each person is characterized by liberty and equality with the others as brothers and sisters sustained in the fraternal condition. The fact that fraternity is the universal human condition and that it refers necessarily to liberty and equality does not mean at all that these are historically acquired, or that the fraternal condition is always a harmonious and peaceable one. It is characteristic that the mythological use of the term indicates generally “the supreme god.” “In this original figuration,” explains Benveniste, “the relationship of physical paternity is excluded.”

Thus far, we have considered fraternity from a phenomenological point of view following the development of a common human experience which starts ordinarily from a situation of particular fraternity lived with blood brothers and sisters within a natural family. From that starting point we see that fraternity opens itself to progressively wider relationships until coming to a universal fraternity that defines humanity itself through a fraternal characteristic. However, let us keep in mind that there exists not only this course, but the contrary one as well. The original myths which we mentioned elaborate conceptions of fraternity (like other formative foundations) which act as hermeneutical and behavioural cultural models, transmitting their own form to daily life and to the meaning that it takes on for human beings.

An important example of this double direction (from the particular to the universal and vice versa) assumed by the meanings of relational terms, is offered by the terminology of “father” in the Indo-European setting. Émile Benveniste observes that this term, in the various languages knows two main forms. The first, rendered in Greek as “patér” is found in Sanskrit, Armenian, Latin, Tocarian, Gothic, and Gaelic in an area then sufficiently vast to allow us to talk of a common usage of it. It is characteristic that the mythological use of the term indicates generally “the supreme god.” “In this original figuration,” explains Benveniste, “the relationship of physical paternity is excluded.”

a fraternity of a communal type that defines a relationship of a religious and/or political kind that is much wider than the natural family and exercises an influence on it. The second form, rendered in Greek as átta, the only form, observes Benveniste, which is found in Hittite, Gothic, and ancient Slavic. These languages do not have in their vocabulary a reference to a communal father. The term designates instead a physical paternity and hence a blood fraternity with a private character.

The condition of fraternity, as we see already from the terminological and etymological complexity, cannot be superficially used as an easy political solution, nor can one simply “presume” to know what it fully is. It is certainly a semantically complex “place,” central for the understanding of reality and truth of the human being, where solutions—certainly not easy, but true—to the problems of relationships, political and otherwise, can be sought. Yes, fraternity can be a political category, but it is much more. Fraternity, in as much as a human condition is inescapably difficult and conflict bearing, provides a “place” where we can open ourselves to liberty and equality in the universal sense, with the condition that this must always be won and evolved.

Bibliography of Recent Publications on Fraternity
Beyond the studies already mentioned, there have been important theoretical reflections proposed in France by Maurice Blanchot, Guy Lafon, Nicole Loraux, Marie de Solemne, and Catherine Charlier. In France, there also remains a latent cultural openness toward fraternity which permits one to begin a discussion without having to justify oneself. This is exemplified by non-academic works aimed at the general public by Herbert Herbreteau and Régis Debray. At the academic level instead, one can also point to the very recent publication, edited by Gilles Bertrand, Catherine Brice, and Gilles Montegre: *Fraternité: Pour une histoire du concept*.

In Italy, in addition to studies published on the occasion of the Bicentenary of the French Revolution, we also point to important pioneering works. These include the volume regarding political symbols studies edited by Giulio M. Chiodi, *La contesa tra fratelli: Esistenza e gratuità* with a chapter on “Politics and Fraternity” by Roberto Mancini; “Appunti sul principio di fraternità nell’ordinamento giuridico italiano” by Filippo Pizzolato; *Il diritto fraterno* by Eligio Resta, and *Politiques de Caïn*, a collective volume written in French by a team of Italian researchers of the University of Messina. An inter-university study seminar on “The Principle of Fraternity and Political Reflection” was held in Rome, at the Pontifical Gregorian University, on July 5, 2003. This seminar was

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followed by a semester course, held at the same university by the Faculty of Philosophy in the academic year 2003–2004, taught by a group of professors from nine Italian universities. It was the first interdisciplinary academic course in Italy dedicated explicitly to the principle of fraternity.

In recent years, the Italian work has also been notably enriched. We mention *La fraternità come principio del diritto pubblico*, eds., Anna Marzanti and Angelo Mattioni.\(^{54}\) In his 2007 book, Mario Vergani writes a significant chapter on “Fraternity and Difference.”\(^{55}\) There are now the works of Adriana Cosseddu,\(^{56}\) Robert Roche-Oliver, a Catalan professor who developed a study about the relation between pro-social psychological theory and political fraternity;\(^{57}\) Giuseppe Tosi;\(^{58}\) and Paolo Giusta (partially available online: www.rivistanuovaumanita.it).\(^{59}\) Also of note is the volume edited by Daniela Ropelato, *Democrazia intelligente. La partecipazione: Attori e processi;*\(^{60}\) the monographs of Iliana Massa Pinto on *Costituzione e fraternità.*\(^{61}\) Finally, we point out the edited volume *Caino e i suoi fratelli: Il fondamento relazione nella politica e nel diritto.*\(^{62}\)

In Spain, a highly significant new work is an edited volume by Antonio Márquez Prieto, *Fraternidad y justicia.*\(^{63}\) This latter book expresses the recent interest in fraternity in Spain. This work particularly studies in depth the perspective of a “justice inside the relationship.”

Naturally, the French Revolution will continue to supply material for study since other continents are now involved such as the Americas and Africa. This is shown by the recent rereading of the thoughts of Toussaint Louverture, as provided through the publishing of his epistolary with Laveaux.\(^{64}\) From the letters emerge a new perspective on the relationship between the Parisian Revolution and the one fought by the slaves of Saint-Domingue (now Haiti), in which fraternity, banished in France, acquires a constructive role in the new nation of ex-slaves, the first Black Republic.

This transatlantic dimension of the study of fraternity has prompted the organization of research projects, conferences and publications that connect European and American scholars. Such

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collaboration was expressed in two international conferences inspired by Chiara Lubich:

- At Port-au-Prince, Haiti: “Politique et economie: Les voies de la fraternite,” March 13, 2002, with three participating universities: Columbia University of New York, the Gregorian University of Rome, and the University of Haiti;

*The Forgotten Principle*, as we are aware, had already been published the previous year in Argentina. The text underwent an academic evaluation by three universities of Córdoba (the National University, the Catholic University, the Blaise Pascal University). During this “Inter-university Day” on April 16, 2007, fraternity, as it was treated in *The Forgotten Principle*, constituted a “discussion of academic interest,” opening the possibility of organizing courses, research projects, and theses on this subject. The volume was translated and enriched by contributions from Latin American scholars in Portuguese in two volumes. At this time, the National University of La Plata (Argentina) established the chair dedicated to “Society, Politics, and Fraternity” (2007). Another chair was created by the Pontifical Catholic University of Santiago, Chile, in 2011.

The year 2008 saw a growing interest in fraternity that led to a group of professors belonging to Chiara Lubich’s Abba School creating RUEF (University Network for the Study of Fraternity, see www.ruef.net.br), an international initiative of academic dialogue which promotes study and research around fraternity in its public domain, as well as in the humanities and social sciences. From 2008, RUEF organized an annual international academic conference regarding fraternity with growing participation of Latin-American scholars (Córdoba 2008, La Plata 2009, Tucumán 2010, Santiago, Chile 2011, Recife, Brazil 2012). RUEF is an important network which characterizes the Latin-American approach to the study of fraternity: a true academic study community free and open to all.

The results are very impressive. They include the following volumes published in Argentina and Brazil that have had a strong impact on scholarship in Latin America:


Finally, we point out three other important texts: Carlos Ayres Britto’s 2003 work: *Teoria da Constituição,* the article of Ana Maria de Barros on fraternity and human rights, and the article of Carlos Augusto Alcantara Machado with extensive bibliography and available online.

Antonio Maria Baggio received degrees in philosophy at the University of Padua, and the Pontifical Gregorian University. His doctorate in philosophy is from the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas (Rome). He has been professor at the Pontifical Gregorian University from 1992 to 2008. He is presently Professor at the Sophia University Institute, and editor of the journal, Nuova Umanità. Baggio is author of eight books and numerous articles on political thought, the latest book being *Caino e i suoi fratelli: Il fondamento relazionale nella politica e nel diritto* (2012).